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ABSTRACT 
The present study aims to investigate the electoral politics of Uttar Pradesh wdth 
particular reference to caste and community mobilisation since 1990s. However, our 
argument in this thesis is that the increasing electoral significance of the caste and 
community, far from being relatively spontaneous, is deliberately planned by politicians 
for a clear electoral purpose. They are best thought of as a solution to the problem of how 
to change the salience of caste and community issues and identities among the electorate 
in order to build a winning political alliance in a highly socially fragmented society of 
Uttar Pradesh. And the consequent political competition under this broad electoral 
condition leads to the fragmentation, defragmentation and refragmentation of political 
identities. We also have tried to identify the trend to bring into focus the electoral 
incentives for which political parties dependent upon the low caste mobilisation in the 
state will not allow the polarisation of electorate on religious lines. In this process, 
Muslim voters, who were otherwise neglected till 1980s, received a wider attention since 
1990s as a strategically important coalition partner for the political parties representing 
the low castes. 
Our aim in this thesis is to understand electoral incentives for political parties in 
the electoral upsurge of Oppressed Castes and Muslims that takes place in Uttar Pradesh 
since 1990s. The main objective behind selecting the Oppressed Castes as our subject of 
study is to move comprehensive political inquiry in the direction of a deeper 
understanding of their contemporary electoral upsurge and the consequent rise of 
Bahujan Samaj Party, which is why we believe that it represents the most important 
political development in Uttar Pradesh since Independence. Moreover, the party has 
proved itself as the only embodiment of the active, authentic participation of Oppressed 
Castes in UP politics since 1990s. 
We have selected the Muslims as another subject of our study mainly because of 
the rising salience of the community in the highly competitive electoral conditions 
consequent upon the rise of low caste politics in Uttar Pradesh since 1990s. With regard 
to Muslims, the central purpose of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that the high levels 
of multiparty competition along caste lines among the majority Hindu community 
increases the salience of Muslim votes and that bipolar party competition generally 
decreases the importance of Muslim votes. 
Final Exploration 
This study brings to the fore this fact that contemporary electoral politics of Uttar 
Pradesh is dominantly shaped by caste and community considerations. At the same time, 
while going through the electoral history of Uttar Pradesh, we also find that there had 
never been a time when the politics of the state was not coloured with caste and 
community factors. The root of political mobilisation of caste categories lies in the very 
division of Indian society on caste and conmiunal lines with inbuilt discriminations, 
colonial model of representative institutions, introduction of adult suffrage and the socio-
political geography of the electoral constituencies. The decisive impact of "number" on 
the electoral outcome under adult suffrage model forced the political parties in Uttar 
Pradesh to consolidate, and mobilise the caste groups. 
In general terms, the electoral politics of Uttar Pradesh, since Independence to late 
1960s, can be understood in two inter-cormected features. First, the domination of upper 
caste elites provided the framework of political bonding in a fragmented society that 
sustained the monopolistic design of the Congress for two decades in the state. Second, 
the systematic attempt of the upper caste elites to alienate and exclude the marginalised 
castes from the power structure of the state was made either by arresting the rising 
consciousness of marginalised caste groups or by co-opting their emerging elites. 
The decade of 1970s and 1980s witnessed the process of defragmentation of 
lower castes into a political identity with the consistent effort of socialist parties to 
mobilise them in order to create an electoral base. The instrument behind the mobilisation 
of low castes was the emergence of reservation politics dominantly supported by the 
socialists. However, the assertion of the nascent political identity of the low castes did not 
sustain for long. This was largely because of the refragmentation of the same into many 
political identities without concrete outlet that was successfully encashed by the 
Congress. 
However, the appointment of the Mandal Commission and its implementation 
with consequent violent reaction of the upper caste groups in early 1990s suggested that 
the defragmentation and consolidation of the lower castes will further be accelerated and 
may prove to be effective and decisive in turning the electoral outcomes outside the 
domain of parties representing upper caste interest. 
We may have reason to be less pessimistic that in the past, the upper caste 
collectively organised themselves in one political category under the barmer of Congress 
party and successfully dominated the power structure of Uttar Pradesh. While the decline 
and displacement of the Congress system in the decade of 1990s was marked by the 
replacement of upper caste groups by the assertion of marginalised lower caste groups 
under the barmer of numerous socially fragmented parties. Uttar Pradesh politics 
epitomises this trend, apparent in the emergence of more or less homogeneous parties of 
the OBC strata and Dalits. 
The argument of this thesis, however, suggests that the mobilisation of collective 
caste categories is now fragmenting on individualised caste assertion. This gives way to 
the processes of fragmentation, de-fi^gmentation and re-fragmentation. The collective 
political grouping of this broader caste groups fragmented themselves into individualised 
caste groups in order to reap the benefit of competitive electoral competition of political 
parties during mid 1990s in UP. It in turn resulted in the unfolding of unexpected political 
patterns. The electoral incentives that lay behind the fragmentation of caste and 
community proved to be decisive factors in increasing multiplication and fragmentation 
of political parties that resulted into the intensification of electoral competition in the 
state. Particularly significant is the decline of Congress party with the desertion of the 
Brahmins, Kshatriya, Dalits and the Muslims. Equally important is the rise of Bhartiya 
Janata Party with the consolidation of Kshatriyas, Brahmins and Banias. Most 
importantly, the subaltern castes sought to break free from their marginalised position 
and began to consider the potential of wider horizontal political mobilisation with a 
broader collectivity of similarly placed caste groups. We find the manifest example of the 
consolidation of Dalits, more particularly Chamars, along with the Bahujan Samaj Party 
and the Other Backward Castes, particulary Yadavs, with the Samajwadi Party. 
However, the individualised assertion started increasing its pace in the mid-1990s 
that gave birth to the refragmentation process of the caste clusters. Kurmis and Lodhas no 
longer find themselves in the web of OBC politics of Mulayam Singh Yadav. These two 
castes have now established themselves into an important political category. Jats have 
already consolidated behind the Lok Dal of Ajit Singh. Pasis and Valmikis have started 
asserting their independent identity quite outside the domain of Dalit politics of 
Mayawati. Thus, the process of fragmentation of political identities is making it difficult 
for the political parties to keep the conglomeration of caste categories remain intact and 
permanent with their domain, 
Another landmark in the changing style of UP politics was the electoral strategy 
of Hindutva politics under the championship of Bhartiya Janata Party. It was largely 
designed to curb the sharp political mobilisation of OBCs and Dalits by tactically 
portraying the Muslims as alien enemy. However, the BJP' s strategy of using religious 
cleavages, as those between Hindus and Muslims to their advantage, was countered by 
the strategy of the political parties using the caste cleavages exemplified in the conflict of 
upper, backward, and Dalits and their consequent consolidation by the BJP, SP and BSP. 
Our findings about the relationship between political competition and caste and 
community mobilization in Uttar Pradesh might seem to lend empirical support to the 
argument that the political incamation of caste and community in Uttar Pradesh is an 
inevitable by-product of electoral competition in highly fragmented societies. Our central 
finding is that a high level of electoral competition makes the low caste groups and 
minority communities especially Muslims strategically important. 
A deep analysis of the electoral politics in UP since 1990s indicates that the 
electoral incentives of socially heterogeneous constituencies have led parties to switch 
from the strategy of demobilizing and excluding other social categories to the strategy of 
building bridges between included and excluded categories. The heterogeneous nature of 
constituencies exerts a powerful moderating effect on conflicting issues in the following 
ways: first, no party is able to build a stable majority on its own, and must reach out to 
groups outside its core voters and groups that it formerly excluded. Second, since the 
dimensions of mobilization keep changing, no single group, no matter how defined, is 
permanently excluded from the political system. If we look at the party system in UP as a 
whole, every group has found a voice in the political system: Muslims, upper castes, 
backward and Scheduled Castes are all being courted by all four parties, namely the 
Congress, the BJP, the BSP, and the SP. 
However, the present study is confined specifically to understand the electoral 
behaviour of the Dalits (Oppressed Castes) and Muslims. In this respect, we can have our 
doubt on the independent exercise of Muslim's "free will" during the course of all 
elections, parliamentary or assembly, till 1980s. Our findings about the relationship 
between political competition and Muslim response in Uttar Pradesh support the 
argviment that the political environment of Uttar Pradesh did not provide fertile soil for 
the independent assertion of Muslims at least till 1980s. Like other segments, Muslims 
too supported the Congress vehemently till 1960s. The reasons to support the Congress 
were many. But the most important was that the Congress was successful in bargaining 
votes with the Muslims in exchange of its equivocal promise to provide security to them 
in the state. It seems obvious to us that the Muslim fear-psychosis about their physical 
protection after independence and political necessity pushed Muslims to vote for the 
Congress. 
Nonetheless, the high levels of party competition combined with strong backward 
caste movements that regard Muslims as acceptable and valuable coalition partners were 
visibly absent in Uttar Pradesh till mid 1960s. It was in this context, that Muslims were 
placed in an extremely bad position to decisively demand political preference, 
employment as well as educational preference in lieu of their votes. As a result of this 
weak presence of caste politics, there was no strong alternative to Congress for Muslims. 
Consequently, Congress was able to secure Muslim votes without putting much energy 
into wooing Muslims. Muslims had no alternative in the state except to support the 
Congress despite being aware of the fact that the ruling Congress politicians had little 
incentive to woo Muslim voters at the expense of the Hindu nationalist swing vote (the 
Jana Sangh) and their core upper-caste constituencies. Thus, in the first two decades after 
Independence, the electoral behaviour of Muslims was largely guided by one particular 
issue that of physical protection or at least non-aggression from the state. 
But as the inter-party competition increased with a focus on backward caste 
mobilization, Muslim vote became a matter of pivotal salience in the state. Propelled by 
the need to survive politically against the Congress, non-Congress politicians found 
greater incentives to appeal to Muslim voters who could provide them with the margin of 
victory. The strategy of the non-Congress parties was to moderate their stance towards 
issues sensitive to Muslims and preserve the option of forming coalitions with them. 
Needless to say, it was with this aim, the opposition parties in U.P approached the 
Muslims that finally shifted the balance in their favour temporarily in 1967 and 1977 
elections. However, Muslims did not vote in these elections differently. They were very 
much the part of anti-Congress upsurge prevailing during these elections. Though the 
immediate reasons that forced Muslims to say good bye to Congress inl967 and 1977 
elections was the maltreatment of Urdu, doubts about the minority character of Aligarh 
Muslim University, increasing incidents of anti-Muslim violence in Uttar Pradesh and the 
reluctance of ruling Congress in preventing the riots because of the doubt whether doing 
so would help or hxirt them politically. 
Only in the late 1980s, backward caste parties began to provide real competition 
in Uttar Pradesh that turned Muslims for the first time into a key swing vote. Disgusted 
by the dual politics of Congress on Ayodhya-Babri mosque controversy Muslims 
permanently deserted the Congress in 1989 to support the party emerging as alternative to 
Congress. Mulayam Singh, first as a leader of Janata Dal and later as supremo of 
Samajwadi Party, therefore made successful efforts to woo the Muslims from Congress. 
The Muslim votes were sufficient to give Mulayam Singh a stable majority in the UP 
Assembly. The parties like Janata Dal and later Samajwadi Parly had been able to win 
power in the state only by building coalitions that included Muslims. 
With the deepening cross-cutting ethnic cleavages since 1990, the political parties 
showed a greater willingness to reach out to Muslim voters. It is true to that where intra-
ethnic cleavages are strong, politicians fi-om the ethnic majority will often prefer to seek 
the Muslim support rather than the support of segments of their ovwi ethnic groups with 
which they are in competition for scarce political power. As a result, the parties are 
competing for Muslim support because of the number of votes Muslims can deliver and 
the low cost to the majority parties of the demands of Muslim voters relative to the 
demands made by other groups within the majority community. 
More importantly, the Muslim voters in UP are now in a better position to profit 
fi-om this increasing electoral competition. As the party politics that focuses on 
redistribution from forward to backward caste, the low caste parties will have greater 
incentives to appeal to Muslim voters who can provide them witli the margin of victory. 
At the same time, the competitive party system has led to a reduction in Hindu-Muslim 
violence, as politicians are forced by electoral incentives to take firm actions to prevent 
Hindu-Muslim riots. 
So far as the voting behaviour since 1990 is concerned, Muslims are being guided 
by the anti-BJP voting. In this process, they also deserted the Congress and started voting 
for the parties that represents the low caste interests. The desertion of Congress was 
consequence of many reasons. First, it was largely because of the Congress' dubious 
stand on the Muslim issues. Second, the Muslim voters have realized that the Congress 
had treated them as vote bank. Once the election is over, their peculiar problems do not 
merit the Congress attention. Therefore, Muslims started looking for other options that 
culminated in their consolidation behind the low caste parties. 
The anti-BJP voting of Muslims was guided by the anti-Muslim mobilisation 
politics of the BJP. A landmark in this direction of completely alienating the Muslim 
voters from rallying behind the BJP was the demolition of Babri Masjid. The electoral 
motive behind this move was to polarize the voters on religious lines in order to curb the 
influence of the Mandal politics which would risk alienating countless Hindu voters from 
the BJP. However, the strategy of BJP using ethnic wedge issues only helped the party in 
consolidating the upper caste voters with certain floating votes among the low caste 
identities. 
It is significant to find that the Mandal versus Mandir phenomenon helped the 
anti-upper caste political parties not only to consolidate their own caste base but also 
Muslim electorates. There were three reasons why Muslims find it more comfortable to 
be with the low caste political parties. First, the alienation from the Congress left no 
alternative before Muslims except to align with the low caste political parties. Second, in 
the emerging context of electoral competition between upper caste and lower caste, 
Muslims were treated as potential partner by the low caste political parties to dislodge the 
upper caste from the power structure of the state. Third, the politics of Mandir against the 
Mandal of BJP made the upper castes common enemies of both low caste parties and 
Muslims, As a consequence, Muslims and lower castes entered into a long term electoral 
coalition against the common enemy. 
With regard to the Oppressed Castes, we find that the Oppressed Castes in Uttar 
Pradesh have come a long way since the early days of their political passivity. They are 
in a better position to understand that how India's widely acclaimed democracy does 
function as undemocratic monopoly of upper castes. The answer lies in their historical 
follies which they have committed to be caught in the "tactical logic of social unity" 
efficiently managed by the Congress system to maintain upper caste's domination over 
the power structure of UP. Understanding this logical manipulation enabled them to 
better answer the question: why power always rotates around the upper castes despite the 
change of governance in the state? This is out of the fact that they remained "vote bank" 
throughout the course of electoral history either for one party or another party. They had 
never asserted their numerical strength which is really a vehicle to attain power under the 
management of universal adult fi-anchise. Instead, they poignantly conceded the 
systematic weakening of their organizational base and their potential claims in the power 
structure of UP through the means adopted by the upper caste parties, namely, co-option, 
accommodation, and factionalism. They have also realized that there is no party in India 
that has natural intention to emancipate and empower them. Against this larger political 
canvas, the Oppressed Castes have found the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party 
inspirational and liberating and recognized it as their own party. They have found a voice 
against the upper castes and an ability to counter the forces that confined them to the 
periphery of society. The party's first agenda is to convert this community into a strong 
electorate that wields its sheer size for political purposes. In this pursuit, the BSP has 
largely succeeded in the goal to unify and consolidate the Oppressed Castes, The party 
has proven to be inventive and innovative in its approach to social and political 
mobilization. The active grassroots mobilization by the BSP has yielded positive result. 
The Oppressed Castes, who once lagged behind upper castes in terms of exercising their 
franchise, have now surpassed the upper castes in terms of turning out to cast their vote. 
This certainly gives an impression of "the strong political aspiration on the part of 
Oppressed Castes and their effort to assert in a democratic polity by utilizing the electoral 
process," It simply proves that tiie Oppressed Castes actively transformed themselves into 
a category of political relevance that can no longer be resisted by any clever design of the 
upper caste's political parties. In this context, the credit goes to BSP and its effective use 
of administrative power that inculcated the idea of social, political, and economical 
empowerment of Oppressed Castes which could be possible only if there is active and 
effective participation of the community in the political process of the country. 
Testing the Electoral Incentives Explanation: Methodology 
The present study is based upon the electoral incentives explanation of the 
political mobilisation of Oppressed Castes and Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. In this context, 
it must be confessed at the very outset that in testing the electoral Incentive model so far 
as the mobilization of Oppressed Castes and the consolidation of Muslims are concerned, 
we lack systematic data in support of such exploration. A few pioneering collaborative 
projects have collected aggregate statistics on our subject of study. But for our purpose 
these surveys and researches hardly are enough to provide support to our study. In this 
thesis we test our electoral incentive explanation argument for the rising political 
consciousness of Oppressed Castes and Muslims and the role of political parties using the 
Election Commission's data. Census data, and various state-level opinion data on 
Oppressed Castes and Muslim support for parties available since the mid-1990s. 
For information on politician's electoral incentive motive, we rely upon the 
interviews conducted by numerous scholars and journalists with leaders and workers of 
the political parties in the state. We combine information gleaned from these interviews 
with an ethnographic study of election campaigns stretching from 1996 to 2004 and a 
content analysis of party pronouncements as recorded in news paper sources. We also 
draw on a variety of documentary sources, including official literatme of political parties 
and clippings obtained from the news papers and magazines. To address the lack of good 
data on the subject of study, we rely on the well developed body of secondary literature 
on Uttar Pradesh politics. Electoral politics in general and ethnic parties in particular, 
have been the subject of sustained attention among scholars of Indian politics. The 
theoretical and empirical richness of this literature provides a particularly strong 
foundation on which to construct the electoral incentive explanation behind the political 
mobilisation of low castes and the consequent increasing salience of Muslim electorates 
in the state. 
In addition to this effort to gather material on the role of politicians and political 
parties in fomenting the fragmentation of low caste categories and consolidating 
Muslims, the researcher also spent several years in many districts of Uttar Pradesh as a 
Research Investigator of National Election Study Surveys programme organized by 
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi and also later supervised the 
CSDS' State of the Nation surveys in Western Uttar Pradesh. Being a part of different 
CSDS survey programme, we extensively used the CSDS data on the voting behaviour, 
preference and shifting loyalties of Oppressed Castes and Muslims during the different 
Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections in UP. 
Plan of the Study 
We begin in Chapter 1 by examining the social, political, economic, religious and 
demographic structure of Uttar Pradesh. In this process, we explored the historical 
geography of the state and the validity of it being called the heartland of India. Focus was 
also put on the land distribution, religious profile with issues, and caste structure with 
deep caste cleavages persistent in the state. In Chapter 2, we evaluate the evolution of 
representative institutions and its impact on the electoral politics of the state. We also 
reflect upon the electoral politics of Uttar Pradesh with reference to caste and community 
in the light of political incentive explanation since independence to 1980s. We find that 
the electoral politics of UP since 1950s to 1980s, the upper caste groups were playing the 
dominant role in appropriating the incentives through marginalizing the low castes. 
Chapter 3 tests the argument of the thesis, by examining the importance of 
electoral incentive in explaining the polhical behaviour of Muslims since 1950s to 1980s. 
We show that from 1950s to 1980s, lower levels of party competition in UP is 
statistically associated with higher levels of Muslim's political deprivation. We also 
provide qualitative evidence to show that politicians and political parties did act in the 
way in which our model suggest and that the level of political competition for Muslim 
voters was conditioned by the level of fragmentation of political parties on caste lines. 
The main objective of Chapter 4 is to make a comprehensive political inquiry in 
the direction of a deeper understanding of the contemporary electoral upsurge of the 
Oppressed Castes and the consequent rise of Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. We 
provide a general introduction to the BSP, the electoral context in which it operates, 
alternative explanations for the pattern of variation in its performance. We also locate the 
party's effort to attract the other caste groups and Muslims in order to attain the margin of 
10 
victory in the state. We find that it is out of the compulsion of electoral incentive that 
BSP toned down its aggressive posture with regard to the upper and backward caste 
groups. 
In Chapter 5 we explore the participation of Muslims in the electoral politics of 
UP in the 1990s and mid 2000s. The main objective of this chapter is to examine as to 
why Muslims should increasingly be the pivotal voters in UP politics? Why has increased 
political competition not placed Hindu nationalist voters, rather than Muslim voters, in 
the pivotal position in state politics? We also demonstrate that the electoral incentives we 
see are at work in the changing strategies of political parties with respect to expanding 
their base among Muslims and the perceptible change, if any, in the Muslim's support for 
political parties. 
The conclusion draws out the implications of this argument for electoral incentive 
behind the mobilization of caste and community in the Uttar Pradesh politics. It shows, 
drawing on examples from post-Independence politics of the state particularly since 
1990s, that politicians can transform election results by reconstructing the political 
identities with which voters may identify. We also find that with the emergence of 
backward and Oppressed Caste mobilization in 1990s, the role of Muslim voters has 
become strategically important and decisive in tilting the balance of electoral outcome. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Politics in Uttar Pradesh since the 1990s has been characterized by the interplay 
of caste and community mobilisations. Howe\er, our argument in this thesis is that the 
increasing electoral significance of the caste and conununity, far from being relatively 
spontaneous, is deliberately planned by politicians for a clear electoral purpose. They are 
best thought of as a solution to the problem of how to change the salience of caste and 
community issues and identities among the electorate in order to build a winning political 
alliance in a highly socially fragmented society of Uttar Pradesh. And the consequent 
political competition under this broad electoral condition leads to the fragmentation, 
defragmentation and refragmentation of political identities. We also have tried to identify 
the trend to bring into focus the electoral incentives for which political parties dependent 
upon the low caste mobilisation in the state will not allow the polarisation of electorate 
on religious lines. In this process, Muslim voters, who were otherwise neglected till 
1980s, received a wider attention since 1990s as a strategically important coalition 
partner for the political parties representing the low castes. / ' 
Our aim in this thesis is to understand electoral incentives for political parties in 
the electoral upsurge of Oppressed Castes and Muslims that takes place in Uttar Pradesh 
since 1990s. To avoid any circumlocution, wc have chosen the term 'Oppressed Castes' 
as general identifier of the same people widely known to us with multitudes of 
nomenclature such as Out Castes, Exterior Castes, Depressed Class, Untouchables, Ex-
untouchables, Harijans, and lastly the official euphemism Scheduled Castes. We will 
require to use the appellations frequently and interchangeably if need arises. It is also 
important to note that we have used the temi "low caste" in the sense that the term 
includes both the Other Backward Castes and the Oppressed Castes. 
The main objective behind selecting the Oppressed Castes as our subject of study 
is to move comprehensive political inquiry in the direction of a deeper understanding of 
their contemporary electoral upsurge and the consequent rise of Bahujan Samaj Party, 
which is why we believe that it represents the most important political development in 
Uttar Pradesh since Independence. Moreover, the party has proved itself as the only 
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embodiment of the active, authentic participation of Oppressed Castes in UP politics 
since 1990s. 
We have selected the Muslims as another subject of our study mainly because of 
the rising salience of the community in the highly competitive electoral conditions 
consequent upon the rise of low caste politics in Uttar Pradesh since 1990s. With regard 
to Muslims, the central purpose of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that the high levels 
of multiparty competition along caste lines among the majority Hindu community 
increases the salience of Muslim votes and that bipolar party competition generally 
decreases the importance of Muslim votes. In order to test the first one, we would 
identify three important phenomenon closely related with the electoral strategy of 
political parties with respect to Muslim vote. The first one is to find out the relationship 
of electoral competition with anti-Muslim riots. The second point is to look into the 
changing strategies of political parties with respect to expanding their base among 
Muslims and the perceptible change, if any, in the Muslim's support for political parties. 
The third thing is to enquire the salience of Muslim votes in the high degree of party 
fractionalization and the high levels of multiparty electoral competition in Uttar Pradesh. 
However, the present study necessarily involves addressing three general 
problems in the instrumentalist literature on the socio-political mobilisation of Oppressed 
Castes and Muslims. First, we want to account for state level variations in the political 
consciousness and participation of Muslims and Oppressed Castes: why do apparently 
these two categories, selected for the present study, have witnessed different level of 
mobilisational strategy in different phases of the state politics? Second, when dealing 
with the role of the political incentives for the electoral mobilisation of Oppressed Caste 
and Muslims, we want to understand the conditions under which the politicians who 
represent the low castes have an incentive both to incite fragmentation of caste categories 
and to align with the Muslims as potential strategic partner. Third, we want to 
demonstrate that the political incentives we identify as important, actually work in the 
way we suggest, by tracing through the cases of Oppressed Castes and Muslims where 
politicians are engaged desperately to form a coalition in order to get the margin of 
victory. 
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There are, however, many reasons why we selected the state of Uttar Pradesh for 
our study. First, the state is diverse and most populous, with substantial variation in 
socio-religious cleavages most often associated with intra-and inter caste and community 
conflicts. Second, the state witnessed the multiplication of political parties and 
intensification of electoral competition with the mobilisation of low castes and the 
minority communities in the 1990s. Third, it was because the key political debate 
regarding Muslim issues with the potential of great electoral incentives and Hindu-
Muslim violence such as the status of Urdu, minority character of the Aligarh Muslim 
University, the issue of cow slaughter, anti-Shahbano campaign, the infamous Ayodhya 
temple-mosque dispute were engineered in UP. Fourth, a large number of scholars have 
written on this state, making a much wider range of information on the political condition 
of the state available than we could hope to find in less well studied states such as Orissa 
and Rajasthan. Fifth, it was more because scholars who paid attention to the electoral 
politics of the state offer us little insight into the role of electoral incentive model behind 
the political mobilisation of caste and community by the politicians. 
Review of Research and Development 
The earliest writings on the Indian politics were embedded in the institutional 
studies of government and politics, in which context electoral politics essentially 
connoted the party system, party politics and elections. Norman D. Palmer's The Indian 
Political System (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), Rajni Kothari, Politics 
in India (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1971) and his Politics and the People: In Search of a 
Humane India, 2 Vols (Delhi: Ajanta, 1989) are the early writings on Indian government 
and politics. The more contemporary overview of Indian politics is Paul R. Brass, Politics 
in India since Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The 
relationship of India's democratic structures with society was also the subject of much 
scholarly writings. Lloyed I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity of 
Tradition (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1969), and their In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The 
Political Economy of the Indian State, (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1987), and Rajni 
Kothar (ed.), Caste in Indian Politics (Delhi: Orient Longman, Reprint, 1995) are the best 
example of this genre. 
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Among the more wide-ranging contributions to the electoral dynamics are Myron 
Weiner's Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-Party System, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957), The Politics of Scarcity, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962), Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), India at the Polls: A Study of the 
Parliamentary Elections, (Delhi: M. Manoharlal Publishers, 1983), Myron Weiner and 
Rajni Kothari (ed.), Indian Voting Behaviour: Studies of the 1962 General Elections, 
(Delhi: Munshiram and Manoharlal Ltd, 1965). The most influential essay on the Indian 
political system in the years of Congress dominance is unarguably Rajni Kothari's "The 
Congress "System" in India", Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 2,1964. 
There was also a phase when explanations of Indian politics relied heavily on the 
category of "faction". In Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, 2 volumes (Delhi: 
Chanakya Publications, 1983), Brass attributed the irmer party factionalism and 
leadership conflicts as the main reason that results in instability and change in Indian 
politics. The second volume carried forward the argument through an analysis of class, 
caste, and party in Uttar Pradesh. The standard account of ethnic conflict as transacted 
between the state and ethnic elites is sought to be corrected in accounts of how ethnic 
parties transact with social groups. Zoya Hasan's Quest for Power: Oppositional 
Movements and Post Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1998) documents the decline of the Congress in UP, and explores the politics of 
empowerment and the politics of difference. 
The political stirrings of lower castes and the organization of political support 
around caste and community have attracted considerable scholarly interest. For example, 
Ian Duncan, "Dalits and Politics in Rural North India: The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar 
Pradesh", The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1999; Christophe Jaffrelot's 
The Bahujan Samaj Party in North India: No Longer Just a Dalit Party?", Comparative 
Studies of South Asia. Africa and the Middle East, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 1998, "The Rise of 
the Other Backward Classes in the Hindi Belt", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1, 
February, 2000, and his India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Low Castes in North 
Indian Politics, (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003); Pradeep Kumar, "Dalits and the BSP in 
Uttar Pradesh: Issues and Challenges", Economic and Political Weekly, April 3, 1999. An 
analysis of attempts to mobilize ethnic blocs by weaving the demands for political and 
material benefits into the larger narrative of group politics, has been nicely done by 
Kanchan Chandra, in her work "The Transformation of Ethnic Politics in India: The 
Decline of Congress and the Rise of Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur", Journal of 
Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2000, and her Why Ethnic Parties Succeed? Patronage and 
Ethnic Head Counts in India, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
The transformation of the party system and the increased influence of regional 
parties have seen the emergence of the federal arena in which state politics now 
commands greater weight and authority. However, the recent work on the party system 
and electoral politics marks a break with the earlier studies, which focused on one 
particular party (like the studies on the Congress Party, Bhartiya Janata Party, Bahujan 
Samaj Party or Samajwadi Party). In this direction the works of Rajni Kothari, Paul R. 
Brass, Angela S. Burger, Christophe Jaffrelot, Kanchan Chandra, Zoya Hasan, Bruce 
Graham, A.K. Verma and numerous other scholars are notable. 
The writings on elections have been of broadly three types: compendia of data; 
survey research; and thematic case studies. Of the first type, which are excellent source of 
primary data on elections, David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: 
Elections, 1952-91, (New Delhi: Living Media, 1991) contains not merely constituency-
wise and state-wise Lok Sabha results, but also provides slate census data and a 
comprehensive introductory section on vote-seat relationship, political parties, and 
psephology. Another useful compilation of data on the Lok Sabha elections is V.B. Singh 
and Shankar Bose, Elections in India: Data Handbook on Lok Sabha Elections, 1952-85, 
(New Delhi: Sage, 1986, 2nd edh.), followed by a second volume covering the period 
1986-91 (New Delhi: Sage, 1994). They have also edited the five volume State Elections 
in India: Data Handbook on Vidhan Sabha Elections, 1952-85, Vols. 1-5, (New Delhi: 
Sage, 1987-8). 
One of the earliest election studies based on survey research was Samuel J. 
Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmad, Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behaviour in 
India, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) which explored the themes like party 
identification and political involvement, and their consequence for the political system, 
social conflict, and policy decisions. More recent survey research is reported in Subrata 
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Mitra and V.B. Singh, Democracy and Social Change: A Cross-sectional Analysis of the 
National Electorate, (Delhi: Sage, 1999). An interpretation of state elections, has been 
done by Yogendra Yadav in his article "Reconfiguration in Indian Politics: State 
Assembly Elections, 1993-95", Economic and Political Weekly, January 13-20, 1996. 
Yogendra Yadav's "Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends of Bahujan 
Participation in Electoral Politics in the 1990s" in Francine R, Frankel, Zoya Hasan, 
Rajeeva Bhargava and Balveer Arora (eds.). Transforming India: Social and Political 
Dynamics of Democracy, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000) carefully weighs the 
evidence (from survey data) to comprehend the new "bahujan" upsurge in Indian 
democracy, and to question some of the received wisdom about political participation in 
Indian elections. 
In the case study genre, one of the earliest, and most ambitious, election studies 
was contained in the volumes that emerged out of a Massachussetts Institute of 
Technology project studying elections between 1952 and 1972, Myron Weiner and John 
Osgood Field were the general editors of the five volume Electoral Politics in the Indian 
States, (Delhi: Manohar, 1974-7) though the individual studies examining electoral 
politics in relation to women, tribals, communist politics, migration, agrarian 
modernization, ethnic cleavages, and much else, were authored by many well known 
political scientists. More recent examples of the case study approach include the essays in 
Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly (eds.), India Votes: Alliance Politics and Minority 
Governments in the Ninth and Tenth General Elections (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1993). This volume deals with patterns of political mobilization in the 1989 and 
1990 elections held in the shadow of events which were to prove decisive in shaping 
recent Indian political history, including Mandal, the Mandir, and the Oppressed Caste 
politics. Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds.), Indian Politics and the 1998 Elections: 
Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics (New Delhi: Sage, 1999) examines, through a 
series of state-level case studies with particular reference to Hindutva and the importance 
of regional parties. 
There are quite a few studies so far as the electoral behaviour of Muslims are 
concerned. The early study of Gopal Krishna, "Electoral Participation and Political 
Integration" in Centre for the Study of Developing Society, Context of Electoral Change 
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in India: General Elections 1967, (Delhi: Academic Books, 1969) is more important with 
respect to Muslim voting behaviour in Uttar Pradesh. Theodore P. Wright Jr. has also 
dealt extensively with Muslims in his works "Muslims as Candidates and Voters in 1967 
General Elections" in Virender Grover (ed.), Political System in India, vol. 6 (Deep and 
Deep Publications). In addition he has written a few other papers on Muslim voting 
behaviour. However, they are based generally on newspaper reports and other secondary 
sources. For example, his "Muslims in the 1977 Lok Sabha Elections" in the vol. 7 of the 
above mentioned book. Some other studies like S.M. Sayeed's "Role of Muslim Majlis in 
U.P. Politics" in Virender Grover (ed.). Political System in India, vol. 5, (Deep and Deep, 
1987) are also present. A general study of voting behaviour in U.P. was done by Raj 
Narain in "Studies in Fourth General Election, Allied Publishers, 1972. The problem 
being that Muslims constituted only 8.4 percent of the sampling taken for this study. 
Another macro level study was carried out by Ramashray Roy in A Study of the 1969 
Elections in Four Indian States, Orient Longman, 1973. Also Violette Grafs "The 
Muslim Vote" in Subrata K. Mitra and James Chiriyankadath (ed.). Electoral Politics in 
India: A Changing Landscape, Segment Books, 1992, is a useful study. Mushirul Hasan's 
study. The Changing Position of Muslim in the Political Future of Secularism in India, 
Oxford University Press 1996, makes an interesting reading but it is based on secondary 
sources and lacks empirical data. Centre for Developing Societies-Lokniti, Delhi is doing 
commendably good so far as the election studies are concerned in India. 
Notwithstanding the rich studies on our subject, the scholars did not take note of 
the electoral incentive model behind the political mobilisation of caste and community in 
Uttar Pradesh. There is one study which looks at the Hindu-Muslim violence from the 
view point of electoral incentive approach that is Steven I. Wilkinson, Votes and 
Violence: Electoral Competition and Communal Riots in India, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). Drawing heavily upon the model developed by the Wilkinson, 
we have applied the electoral incentive model in order to imderstand the mobilization of 
Oppressed Castes and the increasing importance of Muslim voters in Uttar Pradesh since 
1990s. 
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Testing the Electoral Incentives Explanation: Methodology 
We begin with the conjecture that the electoral incentives remain an important 
focal point behind the mobilisation of Oppressed Castes and the Muslims, that resulted in 
their crystallisation as significant political identities. In this context, it must be confessed 
at the very outset that in testing the electoral incentive model so far as the mobilization of 
Oppressed Castes and the consolidation of Muslims are concerned, we lack systematic 
data in support of such exploration. A few pioneering collaborative projects have 
collected aggregate statistics on our subject of study. But for our purpose these surveys 
and researches hardly are enough to provide support to our study. In this thesis we test 
our electoral incentive explanation argument for the rising political consciousness of 
Oppressed Castes and Muslims and the role of political parties using the Election 
Commission's data. Census data, and various state-level opinion data on Oppressed 
Castes and Muslim support for parties available since the mid-1990s. 
For information on politician's electoral incentive motive, we rely upon the 
interviews conducted by numerous scholars and journalists with leaders and workers of 
the political parties in the state. We combine information gleaned from these interviews 
with an ethnographic study of election campaigns stretching from 1996 to 2004 and a 
content analysis of party pronoimcements as recorded in news paper sources. We also 
draw on a variety of documentary sources, including official literature of political parties 
and clippings obtained from the news papers and magazines. To address the lack of good 
data on the subject of study, we rely on the well developed body of secondary literature 
on Uttar Pradesh politics. Electoral politics in general and ethnic parties in particular, 
have been the subject of sustained attention among scholars of Indian politics. The 
theoretical and empirical richness of this literature provides a particularly strong 
foimdation on which to construct the electoral incentive explanation behind the political 
mobilisation of low castes and the consequent increasing salience of Muslim electorates 
in the state. 
In addition to this effort to gather material on the role of politicians and political 
parties in fomenting the fragmentation of low caste categories and consolidating 
Muslims, the researcher also spent several years in many districts of Uttar Pradesh as a 
Research Investigator of National Election Study Surveys programme organized by 
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Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi and also later supervised the 
CSDS' State of the Nation surveys in Western Ultar Pradesh. Being a part of different 
CSDS survey programme, we extensively used the CSDS data on the voting behaviour, 
preference and shifting loyalties of Oppressed Castes and Muslims during the different 
Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections in UP. 
Plan of the Study 
We begin in Chapter 1 by examining the social, political, economic, religious and 
demographic structure of Uttar Pradesh. In this process, we explored the historical 
geography of the state and the validity of it being called the heartland of India. Focus was 
also put on the land distribution, religious profile with issues, and caste structure with 
deep caste cleavages persistent in the state. In Chapter 2, we evaluate the evolution of 
representative institutions and its impact on the electoral politics of the state. We also 
reflect upon the electoral politics of Uttar Pradesh with reference to caste and community 
in the light of political incentive explanation since independence to 1980s. We find that 
the electoral politics of UP since 1950s to 1980s, the upper caste groups were playing the 
dominant role in appropriating the incentives through marginalizing the low castes. 
Chapter 3 tests the argument of the thesis, by examining the importance of 
electoral incentive in explaining the political behaviour of Muslims since 1950s to 1980s. 
We show that from 1950s to 1980s, lower levels of party competition in UP is 
statistically associated with higher levels of Muslim's political deprivation. We also 
provide qualitative evidence to show that politicians and political parties did act in the 
way in which our model suggest and that the level of political competition for Muslim 
voters was conditioned by the level of fragmentation of political parties on caste lines. 
The main objective of Chapter 4 is to make a comprehensive political inquiry in 
the direction of a deeper understanding of the contemporary electoral upsurge of the 
Oppressed Castes and the consequent rise of Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. We 
provide a general introduction to the BSP, the electoral context in which it operates, 
alternative explanations for the pattern of variation in its performance. We also locate the 
party's effort to attract the other caste groups and Muslims in order to attain the margin of 
victory in the state. We find that it is out of the compulsion of electoral incentive that 
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BSP toned down its aggressive posture with regard to the upper and backward caste 
groups. 
In Chapter 5 we explore the paiticipation of MusHms in the electoral politics of 
UP in the 1990s and mid 2000s. The main objective of this chapter is to examine as to 
why Muslims should increasingly be the pivotal voters in UP politics? Why has increased 
political competition not placed Hindu nationalist voters, rather than Muslim voters, in 
the pivotal position in state politics? We also demonstrate that the electoral incentives we 
see are at work in the changing strategies of political parties with respect to expanding 
their base among Muslims and the perceptible change, if any, in the Muslim's support for 
political parties. 
The conclusion draws out the implications of this argument for electoral incentive 
behind the mobilization of caste and community in the Uttar Pradesh politics. It shows, 
drawing on examples from post-Independence politics of the state particularly since 
1990s, that politicians can transform election results by reconstructing the political 
identities with which voters may identify. We also find that with the emergence of 
backward and Oppressed Caste mobilization in 1990s, the role of Muslim voters has 
become strategically important and decisive in tilting the balance of electoral outcome. 
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CHAPTER; ONE 
UTTAR PRADESH: A GENERAL PROFILE 
Utlar Pradesh has always played a significant and special role on the political map 
of India. It is called the heart in the body politic of the country and there have taken place 
in these state events, so momentous, as have changed and revolutionized the course of 
political history of the whole country. Throughout Indian historj', starting with the 
Mauryas, through the Guptas, the Sultanat, the Mughals and lastly the British, this region 
remained the nucleus of Indian politics. It has produced possibilities of conflict which 
some internal differentiation creates under changed political circumstances; the 
possibilities of irreconcilable conflict of unending civil war.' It has largest population of 
any Indian state and as a consequence it sends the largest cohort of Members of 
Parliament (MPs) to the national Parliament. After Independence, UP had to deal with the 
troubled legacy of partition, as well as with the large Muslim minority, which remained 
in the state. It saw some of the key political debates related to Muslims, which proved to 
be a turning point in the electoral history of Uttar Pradesh such as the Hindi-Urdu 
controversy, the agitation for the ban on Cow slaughter, anti-Shahbano campaign and 
Ayodhya movement.^  It reveals that the history of contemporary communalism can be 
traced to the complex connections between political power and electoral politics of Uttar 
Pradesh. 
At the same time, the political importance of UP is likely to be as great as ever, 
despite the loss of 18 percent of its and 5 percent of its population to Uttaranchal. During 
the national movement UP produced an extraordinary generation of leaders, and some of 
the most distinguished leaders of the Congress and opposition after independence were 
also drawn from this state. A sweeping majority in this state swept the party to power at 
' See Alok Rai, "The Problem: The Matter of UP", Seminar, No. 432, August 1995, p. 13. 
" On why UP matters, see the special number of Seminar, "UP Matters", Ibid. 
the center and also set the electoral trend in north India. It is a common assumption that 
only that party or alliance mled India which triumphed in UP. The decimation of the 
Congress in UP triggered the end of the party's monopoly of power in the country. Thus, 
it can be rightly said that who so ever controls Uttar Pradesh controls the political power 
in the country. Doubtless, UP has lost its commanding role in govenunent formation at 
the center but it retains its political clout as the chief locale for the transitions from 
Congress dominance to the post Congress politics. Behind the instability and fractured 
verdicts of the assembly elections since 1989, is a definitive movement in the pattem and 
structure of politics. The rainbow coalition crafted by the Congress has disappeared from 
UP, where it was most fully elaborated and consolidated. This coalition of upper castes, 
Dalits and Muslims was at the heart of centrist politics. In the post Congress era, 
however, UP is the most prominent site of contestation^ between non-Congress groups 
seeking to establish a new social equilibrium. The rise and prominence of OBCs is 
another important development, which has changed the agenda of north Indian politics. 
The challenge facing the upper castes from the rise of OBCs and Dalits is potentially the 
most radical challenge to their domination in the country. At stake is not just a limited 
sharing of political power but basically a change in the persoimel of power. This sharing 
could upset the status quo on such a large scale that it would necessarily affect the overall 
structure of inequality, established patterns of social relations and political power in 
Indian society."* The enormity of the changes needs to be underscored because unlike the 
south where new groups were included without much confrontation, changes in UP, 
where economic and political power were never separate, signal a significant social 
revolution in the stagnant north which so far has been the bulwark of conservative forces 
and tradition.^  This social change constitutes the greatest challenge to the onward march 
of Hindu nationalism. In post Ayodhya period UP matters even more because the way in 
which differences between caste and communities has been played out has undoubtedly 
' On the growing importance of states as the leading arena of contestation see Atul Kohli, "Power and 
Powerlessness: India's Democracy in a Comparative Perspective" in Joel Migdad and Others (eds.). State 
Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
* See Zoya Hasan, Quest for Power: Oppositional Movement and Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh, 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 6-7, 
' Ibid. 
influenced the nature of mass politics and altered the ways of winning and sustaining 
political power. 
Accounting for 16 percent of the country's population, covering the area of 
2,40,928 square kilometers^, as the fifth laigest state of the country and home to the 
largest number of poor, it exercises considerable influence on the economic and 
demographic parameters of the countiy. A microcosm of Indian society, UP has been and 
still is the stage for the construction of new social and political designs in Indian 
democracy. Unlike the non-Hindi- speaking states, which are distinctly, regional or 
linguistic in ethno-cultural terms, UP self-consciously rejected a distinct regional identity 
because it was supposed to be the core of Indian civilization. 
A crucial feature of the relationship between state and society was the ability of 
the state to isolate itself from the logic of the traditional social order by ignoring the 
pressures of traditional society.^  This relationship has now changed. The state lost its 
super-ordinate position and relations between state and society were renegotiated in such 
a way that the goverrmient found it difficult to insulate itself from the pressures of caste 
and community politics. It can be well argued in this context that the status quoists 
Congress regime in UP faced with an economic crisis of under development and an 
associated crisis of governance was extremely susceptible to the growth of non-economic 
movements and to the transfer of political power to both right wing political formations 
and left-of-center social justice coalitions which challenged its supremacy in the political 
realm at multiple levels. But this does not mean essentially that the present mass 
mobilization is very much concerned about changing the existing unequal structures. 
Conflicts around religion, caste and class were conflicts about gaining power, rather than 
challenging the nature of the state. 
The growth and assertiveness of caste and community politics in Uttar Pradesh 
was the consequence of failure to promote economic development adequately and 
equitably and in the weakness of the centralized structures of governance and policy 
processes that excluded the majority of classes, castes, communities and groups from 
' Census of India 2001, Series 10: Uttar Pradesh, (Lucknow: Directorate of Census Operations, Uttar 
Pradesh & Uttaranchal, 2004). 
' Sudipta Kaviraj, "On the Crisis of Political Institutions in India", Contributions to Indian Sociology, Vol. 
18, No. 2,1984. 
' Ibid. 
political power and goveniance. Another major reason why the political regime was so 
singularly unsuccessful in tackling the specific problems of social and economic justice is 
the uneven and slow rate of economic and industrial growth in the state.' 
Limited development is closely related to social inequality. The caste structure of 
UP is not as rigid and exclusionist as were its counterparts in the southern state; 
continuous hierarchies, rather than sharp divisions and differences, characterizes the caste 
structure of UP. The polarizing caste contrasts found elsewhere are moderated by the 
presence of a significant number of upper castes as well as by the existence of 
intermediate castes such as Kayasthas and Jats. 
Rural class structure in UP is very unequal, distinguished by the presence of a 
class of big landowners and large number of poors. Equally significant is its relatively 
small middle class created through privileged and restricted access to education, 
government, employment and politics. The poorest people consist of the Scheduled 
Castes, most backward classes and religious minorities. The Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS), and provincial services in UP have been 
dominated by the upper castes and classes; so too have political institutions, the 
legislatures and party organizations. The only groups, which have benefited from 
government policies and economic development are rich farmers, mainly through heavy 
subsidies, the absence of agricultural income tax and the support given to the agro-
processing industry.'° The rest of the deprived population has expressed resentment 
against the fact that the benefits of development have been monopolized by upper castes-
classes to their total exclusion. Democracy provided them the opportunity for the 
ventilation of grievances against their exclusion from the privileges of political power 
and the opportunities of development. 
The present chapter will explore Uttar Pradesh's demographic background, 
historical geography, land system, economy and highlight its caste and community 
structure. 
' Zoya Hasan, Quest for Power, op.cit., p. 9. 
'" Ibid. p. 10. 
Demographic Patterns 
1-Population:- The demographic scenario in Uttar Pradesh presents a worrisome picture. 
The heavy and rapidly increasing population pressure constitutes a major obstacle to the 
state's development. According to Census of India 2001, the population of UP is close to 
166 million (166,197,92 Ij comprising 87.5 million (87,565,369) males and 78.6 million 
(78,632,552) females. A figure surpassed only by the largest and most populous countries 
of the world. The population of UP is more with the countries of world except the 
population of China, United States of America, Indonesia, Brazil and Russian Republic. 
This population is distributed in 25,757,640 households living in 107,452 villages and 
704 towns. It supports and sustains a whopping 16 percent to total population of India, 
which ranks first in the country. Current birth and death rate in UP are above the national 
average." 
During the decade 1991-2001, the population of the state has registered a growth 
of 25.8 percent. Age structure of the population reveals that 40.9 percent of the state's 
population comprises children in the age group 0-14 years; population in the age group 
15-59 years constitutes 51.7 percent and the elderly population (60 years and above) 
accounts for 7 percent of the total population. In parts of the state, the land has passed 
beyond the point of population saturation and yet the growth rate continues to increase. 
Low couple protection rate combined with high fertility rate and a high proposition of 
young population indicate a potentially explosive demographic situation in Uttar 
Pradesh.''' 
2-Urbaiiisation Level:- The degree of urbanization, which plays a crucial role in the 
process of economic development is quite low 20.8 percent as compared to the figure of 
27.8 percent for India. There is considerable unevenness in the degree of urbanization 
across regions and districts. Western region is the most urbanized region of the state with 
an urban population of 26.2 percent where as in eastern region this figure is as low as 
11.6 percent.'^  
" Census of India 2001, op.cit. 
'^Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
The population of the state is overwhelmingly rural which constitutes around 
131.6 million of the total while the urban population constitutes only 34,5 million. 
There are 35 cities in the state with a population of one lakh or more and only six cities 
i.e. Kanpur, l.ucknow, Varansi, Allahabad, Agra and Meerut are in the list of million plus 
population cities.'^ Administratively UP is divided into 70 districts, ranging in area from 
1000 square kilometers to over 7000 square kilometers and in population from 7 lakhs to 
4.9 million.'^ What is most important is that all districts, even those with large urban 
centers are predominantly rural. 
3. Population Density: Uttar Pradesh is among the more densely populated states of the 
country. The population density of the state has increased sharply from 548 per square 
kilometer in 1991 to 690 per square kilometer in 2001. Its worth noting that its ranking at 
all India level, in terms of population density, came down from %^ in 1991 to 9"^  in 2001 
Census. However, the severity of population pressure in UP is revealed by the fact that in 
so many districts, density exceeds to 1000 per square kilometers. Since the degree of 
urbanization in the state is low, the burden of population pressure is largely in rural areas. 
This rural population density has led to extremely high agrarian density throughout the 
state." 
4-Sex Ratio: The sex ratio in the state has always remained unfavorable to females. As 
per the Census of India 2001, the sex ratio in Uttar Pradesh is 898 female per 1000 male. 
The sitxiation in this respect is somewhat better in the eastern and hill region. Sex ratio is 
lowest in western region, which is economically more developed. Lowest sex ratio is 
observed in the case of Mathura, Gautam Buddha Nagar, Badaun, Shahjahanpur, Hardoi, 
Agra, Jalaun, Kanpur village and Etah districts. The districts of Azamgarh, Jaunpur, 
Pratapgarh, and Deoria are not for highest sex ratio.'* 
5-Literacy: Literacy level in Uttar Pradesh continues to be abysmally low and occupies 
31" rank in terms of National Literacy percentage. For the purpose of Census 2001, a 
person aged seven and above who can both read and write with understanding in any 
•"Ibid. 
" India 2006, (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 2006), pp. 19-20. 
'* Ibid., pp. 1043-45. 
" Census of India 2001, op.cit. 
'Mbid. 
language, is treated literate. The results of 2001 Census reveal that there has been an 
increase in literacy in the country, which reached to 64.8 percent. ITie literacy rate of UP 
is 56.3 percent. Male literacy rate has been 68.8 percent and the female literacy rate at 
42.2 percent. The rural literacy in the state is 36.66 percent in which female literacy is 
19.02 percent while male literacy is 52.05 percent. Total urban literacy is 61 percent in 
which the male literacy is 69.98 percent while female literacy is 50,38 percent. What is 
even more significant from the long-term point of view is the high level of illiteracy 
among the children particularly in the rural areas and girls. The districts where literacy 
level is still below 33 percent include Bahraich, Sidharthnagar, Gonda, Maharaj Ganj, 
Lalitpur, Bareilly, Badaun, Moradabad, Pilibhit, Rampur, Shahjahanpur, Barabanki, 
Kheri and Sitapur.'^  
Administrative Divisions and Regions 
Administratively, UP has been divided into changing numbers of districts, which 
have been combined in different ways into divisions and regions for specific purposes. A 
perennial complication of discussing and mapping regions within UP is that district 
boimdaries have changed, slowly up to 1971 but increasingly rapidly since then. For the 
purposes of this chapter we will use data based on either the 63 districts of the 1991 
Census or the 70 districts of the 2001 Census. 
A common shorthand for describing differences within UP (until 2000 and the 
secession of Uttaranchal) was to distinguish five regions: west, central and east UP, Hills 
and Bundelkhand. Together, the three first regions cover the UP Gangetic plains, while 
the hill region is UP's share of the Himalayan mountain region (also known as 
Uttarakhand, but granted statehood as Uttaranchal—^with the addition of Haridwar 
district—by the BJP government). Bundelkhand is the UP section of the northernmost 
part of the central Indian plateau. Table 1 allocates the 63 districts of 1991, and the 
additional districts (given in Italics) to these regions, but also divides west UP into two, 
northwest and southwest. 
"Ibid. 
Political Heartland of India 
Uttar Pradesh, as United Provinces before independence, finds itself in a mess. 
The state's political life lacks a common focus and is deeply fragmented along 
affiliations of class, caste, religion, faction and region. Its representative and civic 
institutions are in disarray. It stands almost^the bottom vis-a-vis other states within the 
Indian Union as far as most indices of human development - literacy, per capita income, 
infant mortality, female education, sex ratio and population - are concerned. It woefully 
lacks basic infrastructure and is shorn of industrial dynamism. Perhaps, what is worst is 
its self-constructed identity as the political 'heartland' of India, which looks increasingly 
hollow. In November 2000 UP's boimdaries contracted as a separate state of Uttaranchal 
was carved out its territory. This marks the beginning of a process of reconfiguring 
political space, which is bound to transform, not just Uttar Pradesh, but also the entire 
federal polity of India itself.^° To get an insight into this likely transformation, we will 
need to turn back into history to examine how the notion of UP as the 'heartland' of India 
came to be constructed in the first place. 
Table 1; Regional Distribution of Districts in UP, 2001 
Regions Districts 
UP Hills Almora, Bageshwar, Chamoli, Champawat, Garhwal, Dehra Dun, Hardwar, Naini Tal, 
Pithragarh, Ryudraprayag, Tehri-Garhwal, Udham Singh Nagar, Uttarkashi 
Western NORTH-WEST: Baghpat, Bijnore, Bulandshahar, Ghazlabad, Meerut, Moradabad, 
MuzafTarnagar, Rampur, Saharanpur 
SOUTH-WEST: Agra, Aligarh, Auraiya, Bareilly, Budaun, Etah, Gautam Buddh Nagar, 
Etawah, Farrukhabad, Firozabad, Hathras, Jiyotiba Phule Nagar, Mainpuri, Mathura, 
Pilibhit, Shahjahanpur 
Central Barabanki, Fatehpur, Hardoi, KannauJ, Kanpur Dehat, Kanpur Nagar, Kheri, Lucknow, 
Rae Bareli, Sitapur, Unnao 
Eastern Allahabad, Ambedkar Nagar, Azamgarh, Basti, Bahralch, Ballia, Balrampur, Chandauli, 
Deoria, Faizabad, Ghazipur, Gonda, Gorakhpur, Jaunpur, Kaushambi, Kushinagar. 
Maharajganj, Mau, Mirzapur, Pratapgarh, Sant Kahir Nagar, Sant Ravidas Nagar 
(Bhadohi), Shrawasti, Siddharth Nagar. Sonbhadra, Sultanpur, Varans! 
Bundelkhand Banda, Chiirakooi, Hamirpur, Jaluan, Jhansi, Lalitpur, Mahoba 
Source: Census of India 2001, op.cit. 
In this following paragraph our aim is to discuss about the salience of UP's 
identity as a regional society and to offer some preliminary observations. Perhaps we 
"^ On this particular analysis, see Rasheeduddin Khan, Federal India: A Design for Change, (New Delhi: 
Vikas, 1992). 
could begin our exploration by recognizing, first of all, the multiple ways in which UP 
has been imagined as a 'heartland' and the way in which it came to be structured as such 
in the hidia's body-politic. In this context, it is possible to think of at least six distinct, 
though sometimes, overlapping, 'constructions' which have emerged in the last hundred 
and twenty years. The British colonial officials were the first to invent the notion. Their 
views, originating in the influential 'Oudh School' in the 1870s, increasingly represented 
UP as a 'model' province, which occupied a unique place in the Indian Pax Britannica.^ ' 
Then, there took place in the 1920s a nationalist 'appropriation' of UP, locating it as the 
'site' of the 'fi-eedom struggle'. Thirdly, and contemporaneously, a competing viewpoint 
drawing upon long Islamic traditions and local history, configured the state as the 
powerhouse of 'Muslim Politics .^ ^ Then from, the late 1980s, there has been an attempt 
by protagonists of 'Hindutva' to consecrate it as battleground for, 'Hindi, Hindu, 
Hindustan' and more recently for the embattled Babri-mosque-Ayodhya campaign. 
Fifthly, from the perspective of caste based politics after the experiment of 'Mandal' in 
the late 1980s, UP has occupied a pivotal role in the electoral politics of the country.^ ^ 
Lastly, there has been another construction of UP as the repository of the Nation's 
composite culture. Of course many of these constructions over-lap. For example, UP's 
existing identity has undoubtedly been shaped by the dominant Congress nationalist 
construction which emerged triumphant after independence and which has been adapted 
and reinvigorated in the post colonial period by the ruling elites. Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognize at the outset that UP, with its existing boundaries and structure, 
owes its existence to the British. They amalgamated various districts, areas and territories 
to carve out a single administrative entity. Prior to their amalgamation, these areas and 
'^ See Thomas R. Metcalf, Land, Landlord and the British Raj: Northern India in the Nineteenth Century, 
(Berkeley; University of California Press, 1979); and Peter Reeves, Landlords and Governments in Uttar 
Pradesh: A Study of their Relations until Zamindari Abolition, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
^^  See for example the centrality of UP in the Pan-Islamic networks of learning as shown recently by 
Francis Robinson in his The Ulema of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia, (Delhi: 
Permanent Black, 2001). 
'^ On this, see Yogendra Yadav, "Reconfiguration in Indian Politics: State Assembly Elections, 1993-95", 
Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), January 13-20, 1996, pp. 95-104; and Ian Duncan, "Casteism and 
the Interpretation of Indian Politics", paper for the Political Studies Association-UK, SQf'' Annual 
Conference, April 10-13, 2000. http://www.psa-ac.uk/cps/2000/duncan%20tan.pdf 
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regions had no unity of their own and their coming together produced a somewhat 
unusual entity in cartographic terms. 
A Peep into the Historical Geography 
It is beyond the scope of our research to trace the history of Uttar Pradesh as a 
region through antiquity. Yet it is worthwhile to recognize that the geographical space 
occupied by present day UP was, through the course of history, made up of multiple 
regions or cultural zones which today lie submerged within it.^ '* The Buddhist text, 
Anguttara Nikaya, mentions the existence of sixteen mahajanapadas or states, ascribed by 
historians to the period seventh to fifth centuries BC. Out of these, seven lay in the 
territory formed by present day - UP, namely Kuru (Uttarakhand), Matsya Surasena 
(Braj), Kosal (Awadh), Panchala (Northern Awadh), Mallas (Northern Bhojpur), Vatsa 
(Western Bhojpur), and Kashi (Eastern Bhojpur). Many of these mahajanapadas were 
monarchies, with rulers who established their kingdoms around capital cities, which acted 
as focal points where religious, political, economic and military activities came to be 
concentrated. Many such capital cities around which successive regional kingdoms came 
to be established - Hastinapur, Kanauj, Kaushambi, Mathura, Prayag, Ayodhya, Kashi, 
and Mirath - were located within the boundaries of present day UP. In the seventh 
century A.D., Harsh Vardhana established a vast kingdom with the city of Kanauj as its 
center, with territories extending to the greater part of northern India. Subsequently, 
many regional kingdoms and dynasties such as the Pratiharas^^ came to be centered here. 
The early medieval period saw the emergence and growtli of many of the urban centers 
which feature on the map of present day UP. Many of these cities evolved as political 
^* For a discussion on the concept of 'region', see Bernard S. Cohn, "Regions Subjective and Objective: 
Their Relation to the Study of Modem Indian History and Society" in B.S. Cohn (ed.), An Anthropologist 
Among the Historians and other Essays, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
" For this discussion of ancient UP, I have drawn upon the following works: Bimala Chum Law, Historical 
Geography of Ancient India, (Paris: Society Asiatique de Paris, 1954); Surendranath Majumdar Sastri 
Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India, (Calcutta: Chukerverty, Chatterjee & Co. Ltd., 1924); Nundo 
Lai Dey, The Geographical Dictionary of Ancient and Medieval India, (London: Luzac, 1927, second ed.); 
F.R. Allchin, The Archaeology of Early Historic South Asia: The Emergence of Cities and States, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Niharranjan Ray (general ed.), A Source Book of 
Indian Civilization, (New Delhi; Orient Longman, 2000). 
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centers, pilgrim sites, or trading marts, some times as a combination of all three?^ A few 
of them developed into local and regional Muslim Kingdoms, for example, the Kingdom 
of Jaunpur, which arose in the fourteenth century. Under the Muglial emperors, who were 
able to establish Pan-Indian political authority, UP and its surrounding areas were 
constituted into the four Subahs (Provinces) of Delhi (Haryana, Mewat, Uttarakhand and 
Rohilkhand), Agra (Braj and Bundelkhand), Awadh (Central Disctircs) and Allahabad 
(Bhojpur and Baghelkhan)?' Irfan Habib's Atlas of Mughal India makes it possible for 
the first time, to get detailed quantitative information on the areas and revenues for each 
of the Subahs and Sarkars (Districts), which constituted the Mughal Empire. For instance, 
we learn that the Subah of Allahabad consisted of 34,613 square miles, while those of 
Awadh and Agra 26,463 square miles and 46,417 square miles respectively.^ ^ 
At this point in our discussion we could perhaps pause and take cognizance of the 
fact that, until the coming of the British in the mid eighteenth century, UP did not possess 
a common structure or history. Different Kings, rulers, governors and chieftains, had over 
the course of history, controlled different parts of its territories, which were themselves 
distinct regions; the hill areas of Uttarakhand or Uttaranchal; the distinct Braj-speaking 
zone around Mathura; the Bundelkhand region with Jhansi as its center, Rohilkhand 
consisting of areas around Rampur and Moradabad; Awadh with Lucknow as its cultural 
center; and finally Poorvanchal, made up of Bhojpuri-speaking eastern parts with Benaras 
and Allaliabad as its main centers. Different linguistic affiliations and dialectics 
demarcated the cultural boundaries of there regions.^' The begirming of British 
interference in the affairs of UP, which they then called Upper India from their location 
in Calcutta, changed the situation completely. It inaugurated a process of conquest and 
amalgamation, which changed the political geography of Northern Indian. 
*^ For an interesting discussion on the evolution of urbanism, see Narayan Gupta, "Urbanism in India" in A. 
Rahman (ed.), History of Indian Science, Technology and Culture, Vol. Ill, (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 359-79. 
'" For detailed regional history under Mughals, see K.K. Trivedi, Agra: Economic and Political Profile of a 
Mughal Suba, 1580-1707, (Pune: Ravish Publishers, 1998). 
*^ Irfan Habib, An Atlas of the Mughal Empire, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
" See, Gyanesh Kudaisya, "Constructing the 'Heartland': Uttar Pradesh in India's Body-Politic", Journal 
of South Asian Studies (ns), Vol. XXX, No.2, August 2002. 
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Following the Battle of Buxar in 1764, the British made Awadh a buffer state 
between the East India Company territories and those of the Marathas. Then, in 1773, 
Kora and Allahabad were sold to the Nawab of Awadh under the Treaty of Allahabad. In 
the same year Rohilkhand was conquered by Awadh with active British military aid and 
Banaras, Ghazipur and Mirzapur were ceded to the British in return. Then in 1801 ten 
districts under the Nawab of Awadh (the ceded districts) were taken over by the company 
to support the maintenance of a subsidiary force in the region. These districts were 
Allahabad, Fatehpur, Kanpur, Azamgarh, Gorakhpur, Bareilly, Moradabad, Bijnaur, 
Badaun and Shahjahanpur. In 1801 several central and western districts including 
Etawah, Mainpuri, Etali, together with the parts of north-western regions namely Kumaon 
and Meerut, were annexed; and in 1803, following the defeat of Marathas, the British 
brought Bundelkhand under their direct control. In 1816 Garhwal and Dehradun were 
annexed as a resuh of the Treaty of Sangauli with the King of Nepal. In 1840 and 1853 
respectively, Jalaun, Hamirpur and Jhansi suffered the same fate. In 1856 the Kingdom of 
Awadh itself was annexed, precipitating the outbreak of the Revoh of 1857. In 1877 all 
the annexed territories were constituted as the North Western Province and Oudh (NWP 
and O) and put under the control of a lieutenant governor. In 1902 the NWP and O was 
renamed the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (UP). In 1920 UP became a 'Governor 
Province'. In 1937 when the Congress came to power under the terms of Provincial 
Autonomy, the words 'Oudh' and 'Agra' were dropped. Following Independence, the 
only change in UP's identity was the change in its nomenclature: from the 'United 
Provinces', it became 'Uttar Pradesh' (Northern Province). 
After all the British did not amalgamate the different territories simply to create a 
new administrative unit on the map. Occupying a large and dominant cartographic space 
across northern India, UP had to be invested with a conunon framework of rule. 
Therefore they went about creating a framework which increasingly placed people living 
in UP under similar conditions in matters of taxation, policing, urban life and a variety of 
other spheres. The first key element of this new framework was the institution of 
^° This paragraph substantially draws upon, The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XXIV, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1908), pp. 146-61. 
'^ Gyanesh Kudaisya, "State Power and the Erosion of Colonial Authority in Uttar Pradesh-1942", Ph.D 
Thesis, Umvevsity of Cambridge, \992, Ch-1. 
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provincial Police, which was raised, in the violent aftennath of the Mutiny of 1857. The 
mission of the new police was primarily defence of the realm, rather than the protection 
of the common man and his property. A second important element of Pax Britannica in 
UP was the reordering of the physical environment of its cities and towns. Cities were 
made, riot proof, safe, clean and loyal^ ^ after 1857. Here was just one process, which was 
homogenising urban life in the province. '^' Third one was the codification of laws to 
impose their own authority. The criminal codes set aside indigenous methods of criminal 
justice, which were based on status, caste and local identities and claimed a complete 
monopoly by the state over the use of force, enshrined in the right to take life and to 
punish. 
The criminal laws and the institution of policing show an obsessive British 
concern with collective activities and the threat that they posed for the authority of Raj. 
The fear of collective assemblies led colonial officials to develop an elaborate system of 
controls, which prohibited crowds from accumulating. For each city and town in UP a 
detailed 'riot plan' was developed, along with a system for the licensing of meetings and 
processions.''^  Again, in the system of governance constructed by the British in UP, the 
military played a vital role. Together, the police and the army helped the Raj carry out its 
minimalist agenda of maintaining public order while letting local society run its own 
affairs.^ * 
Another important part of the new framework of governance was the dependence 
upon landlords and local elites to maintain order in rural society. Landed estates were 
regarded as institutions of social control and landlords were seen as 'natural leaders' of 
rural society. This led the British to create in UP a revenue system, which harnessed the 
'influence' of the landlords to maintain stability and a 'solid buffer of support' for the 
" Veena Talwar Oldenburg, The Making of Colonial Lucknow. 1856-1877, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
" See Gyanesh Kudaisya, "State Power and the Erosion of Colonial Authority in Uttar Pradesh-1942", 
op.cit., Ch-1. 
On this theme, see Radhika Singha, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India, 
(Delhi: Oxford University, Press, 1998). 
Sandria B. Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of 
Communalism in North India, (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1989). 
* Kudaisya. "Slate Power and the F-rosion of Colonial Authority in Uttar Pradesh-1942". op.cit., Ch. 1 & 2. 
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Raj. As a result the taluqdars became the 'barons and yeomen' of Awadh. In particular 
they become the accredited 'intermediaries, or brokers of power between state and 
village.''^  Peter Reeves, in his detailed study of landlords and governments in UP, has 
shown how this system originated and the maimer in which it was consolidated and 
adapted to meet changing political circumstances, such as the introduction of 
representative goverrunent at the local level.''° 
Overall, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the British were convinced that 
they had 'constructed' a frmnework oi'governance, which established UP as a 'model' for 
the directly ruled 'provinces' of British India. Successive colonial administrators from Sir 
Alfred Lyall to Sir Harcourt Butler to Baron Malcolm Hailey increasingly looked upon 
UP as the 'heartland' of the Raj. 
In less than one decade this construction of UP as a colonial 'bastion' came to be 
seriously challenged and eventually dismantled under the leadership of newly-emerging 
professional elites, like Motilal Nehru, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Tej Bahadur Sapru, and 
others, who energetically took up the challenge of transforming the province from a 
loyalist stronghold into a hot-house of nationalism. They invigorated the tradition of 
public debate, extended the nebulous political organization to the Muffasil and in general, 
laid the foundations for the political transformation of the province that took place after 
World War I.'" The subsequent Home Rule and Khilafat campaigns marked the transition 
to fiiU scale 'nationalist' politics. 
How did the Indian National Congress bring this about? It did so by successive 
political campaigns and setting up an organizational structure which paralleled that of the 
Raj in terms of district and tehsil-level committees, with the main provincial headquarters 
located at Allahabad. Allahabad was seen as the center of political activity^^ despite the 
" Ranjit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement, (Paris, 
1963); and Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in 
Colonial Iruiia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
'* On this theme, see Thomas R. Metcaif, op.cit.; and Peter Reeves, Landlords and Governments in Uttar 
Pradesh, op.cit., Ch. 2 
" Metcaif, ibid. p. XI. 
*° Reeves, Landlords and Governments in Uttar Pradesh, op.cit., Ch. 2 & 3. 
*' See The Indian Nationalist Movement, c. 1912-1922. Leadership, Organization and Philosophy: The 
Writings of Hugh Owen, (New Delhi: Sterling, 1990). 
^' See Peter Reeves, "Lucknow Politics, 1920-1947" in Violette Graff (ed.), Lucknow: Memories of a City, 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 213-26. 
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i'act, British moved tiie provincial capital to Lucknow after 1920, in symbolic gesture to 
move closer to their landlord allies, the laluqdars. The campaigns of the early 1920s gave 
the province a growing reputation and the nationalists were able to bring into focus the 
inequalities of the agrarian system and to demonstrate their growing ability for mass 
mobilization. In the 1930$ and 1940s the Congress continued to contest the British 
construction of UP. For example, its boycott of'Dyarchy' challenged the landlord system 
of political representation, the Civil Disobedience and No-Rent Campaigns seriously 
challenged the authority of Raj. However, the Congress challenge was of a symbolic 
nature and it drew upon an every day discourse, which was anchored in a new language 
of politics that frequently used religious metaphors. More than campaigns, it was the 
Congress control over provincial power during 1937-39 that seriously undermined 
colonial authority. The onset of World War II in late 1939 brought to an abrupt end this 
process of internalized 'take-over' by the Congress. The Congress mounted two further 
campaigns of 1940-41 and the Quit India movement of 1942. In both these movements 
the UP Congress was able to demonstrate its organizational capacity as well as strong 
popular support.'*^ Now, too, the UP Congress leadership continuously projected the 
province as the 'heartland' of the emerging nation, a vision that recognized its solid 
credentials of undertaking the most powerful mass campaigns against the Raj. Jawaharlal 
Nehru himself shared the view that UP lay at the core of India as a nation. He wrote, that 
"The United Provinces are a curious amalgam, and in some ways an epitome of 
India. They are the seat of the old Hindu culture as well as of the Persian culture that 
came in Afghan and Mughal times, and hence the mixture of the two is most in evidence 
there, intermingled with the culture of the west. There is less provincialism there than in 
any other part of India. For long they have considered themselves, and have been looked 
upon by others, as the heart of India. Indeed, in popular parlance, they are often referred 
to as Hindustan."'*'* 
On the eve of Independence, such was the self-confidence of UP Congressmen 
that many raised the demand that Allahabad should be made capital of India, although it 
" Gyanesh Kudaisya, "Foreshadowing "Quit India": The Congress in Uttar Pradesh" in Neera Chandholce 
(ed.), Mapping Histories: Essay Presented to Ravinder Kumar, (New Delhi: Tulika, 2000), pp. 225-54. 
** Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.334. 
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was unsuccessful.'*^ The general consequence of the way in which the state was fonned 
and administered is that regional identification with UP as a cultural or Imguistic unit is 
weak. People there particularly Hindus, tend to think of UP as the heart and center of 
Hindu India, but their identifications are generally either wholly parochial and sub-
regional or supra-regional, embracing the whole of the Hindu speaking area or 
Hindustan.'*^ Some, of the implications of UP, preserving its persona as the so-called 
'heartland' are obvious: UP has failed to develop a regional identity of its ovra, its public 
life has been marked by a lack of cohesiveness; and the state's political leaders have 
failed to develop a regional agenda. Overall, they seem to have been handicapped by the 
burden they carry of representing the 'heartland'. It is the centrality of the 'heartland' as 
the defining features of modern UP's political culture has cost the state a heavy price in 
terms of governance and development.'*' Uttar Pradesh stands out as a case of resilient 
governmental inertia as far as public provisioning is concerned, Dreze and Gazdar 
conclude.'** But that is not all. Because of the prevailing political culture in UP, state 
politicians have been prevented from harnessing the possibilities of democratic politics in 
the area of social development. Even, the future political scenario of Uttar Pradesh does 
not present an optimistic picture. Zoya Hasan, in her study of oppositional movements in 
UP, argues that politics in the state has become deeply fragmented. Among the major 
player, Zoya Hasan identifies:'*' 
i) Political groups representing the interests of newly emergent 'farmers' of 
western UP; 
ii) The Samajwadi Party representing the OBC's (Other Backward Castes) and 
increasingly the Muslim minority alienated from the 'secular' Congress after 
its failure to protect the Babri mosque fi-om demolition; 
iii) The Dalit based Bahujan Samaj Party; and 
iv) The Bhartiya Janata Party especially the cause of 'Hindutva'. 
*' On this episode, see Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, 
(London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 195-6. 
** Paul R. Brass, Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, Vol. I, (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1983), 
p.231. 
^ See Jean Dreze and Haris Gazdar, "Uttar Pradesh: The Burden of Inertia" in Jean Dreze and Amartya 
Sen (eds.), Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
•" Ibid., p. 53. 
*'' Zoya Hasan, Quest for Power, op.cit. 
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Plagued by a deeply fragmented polity and a lack of cohesiveness in political life, 
the time has come for Uttar Pradesh to rethink its status as a 'heartland'. A beginning was 
made with the creation of Uttaranchal in November 2000. However, the process has to go 
much farther.^ ° In recent years demands have been raised for the further break-up of UP 
by the creation of Haiit Pradesh'', Doab Pradesh, Bundelkhand, Poorvanchal and Awadh 
Pradesh. 
Land System 
With the breakdown of Mughal authority, local chiefs and governors attempted to 
establish their supremacy, the countryside often became the scene first of their fights and 
later of their reckless revenue exactions.'" By the late 18"' century, landlords were chosen 
to collect the revenue dues of lands adjacent to their own estates. Such persons were 
known as taluqdars.'^ The land revenue dues charged in the early years of British rule 
were generally very heavy. One means of meeting the revenue demands, which was 
widely used in the year, was the sale of lands. The nature of proprietorship reveals the 
existence of two broad types of village organization in the area. In one most of the land 
was partitioned among the members of the proprietary body, each members cultivating 
his own share recognized as bhaiachara system. In the other, a substantial part of the 
village lands was let to underprivileged cultivators, the interest of proprietary body 
consisting to a large extent of rents known as Zamidari.''* In Zamindari villages, 
proprietary profits were reckoned in terms of rent, each individual being entitled to his 
hereditary or customary shares; where as in bhaiachara villages, since the proprietors 
were cultivators, individual assets tended to be reckoned more in terms of the land 
cultivated by each proprietor.'' 
In the late 18"^  and early 19"^  century, the taluqdars gained importance as a result 
of the important revenue functions they perform in Oudh. The distinctive feature of the 
'" Jairam Ramesh, "Future of Uttar Pradesh: Need for a New Political Mindset". 
www.jairam_ramesh.com/publications/publications.html. Accessed August 1", 2002. 
" Jagpai Singh, "Politics of Harit Pradesh: The Case of Western UP as a Separate State", EPW, August 4, 
2001, pp. 2961-7. 
" Asiya Siddiqi, Agrarian Change in a Northern Indian State: Uttar Pradesh, I819-I833, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), p. 7. 
" Ibid., p. 8. 
"Ibid., p. 15. 
" Ibid., p. 16. 
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taluqdar's position was that he was wholly a rent receiver and did not himself participate 
in the cultivation of land. He enjoyed a rent from agricultural 'and as well as various 
taxes analogous to manorial dues. By the end of 19 century the typical taluqdari estate 
was unusually a large one. Forty taluqdari estates paid on aimual revenue of over 50000 
Rupees; 104 paid between 5000 and 50000 rupees; 48 paid less than 5000 and 159 had 
estates with an average area that was one hundredth of the average area of these estates 
which paid over 50000 rupees.^ ^ 
The actual extent of Zamindari area in Oudh, then constituted the second most 
important land owning right in Oudh, next to that of taluqdars. Out of over 23,000 
mauzas as a whole, Zamindari tenure accounted for over 7000. While the taluqdari area 
covered (6,902,408) acres, the Zamindari tenure was spread over 4,441,712 acres.'' The 
third proprietary class of landholders, apart from the taluqdars and the Zamindars, was 
that of the under-proprietors known as pukhtadars. They had to pay revenue and this 
revenue could be paid either straight to the government or through the superior 
proprietor. Normally, 25 percent of the gross rental of the taluqua was to be the 
pukhtadars share.^ ° Below the taluqdar, the zamindar and the under proprietor in the 
echelon of agricultural interests in Oudh was the vast body of tenant cultivators, who led 
for the most part, a dim, slow moving and too often a poverty stricken and hxmger bitten 
life.*' Of these only one percent held rights of occupancy under which they paid rents less 
by two annas in the rupee. Following them at the bottom of scale were tenants whose 
rents could be raised each year barring no holds, and the landlord if he so wished, could 
evict them from their holdings at pleasure.^ The hierarchy of the Oudh agrarian system, 
therefore, can be said to have existed in the following descending order: (1) the taluqdars, 
(2) the zamindars, (3) the under proprietors consisting of (i) the pukhtadars, and (ii) those 
^ Ibid., p. 44. 
" B.H. Baden-Poweli, Land Systems of British India, Vol. II, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprint, 1972), 
p.221. 
" Ibid., p. 227. 
"ibid., p. 221,227. 
*** Majid Hayat Siddiqui, Agrarian Unrest in North India: The United Provinces 1918-22, (New Delhi: 
Vikas, 1978),pp. 13-14. 
*'H.C. Irwin, The Garden of India; or Chapters on Oudh History and Affairs, (London, 1880), p. 4. 
" Ibid., p. 33. 
" "There was the bond-serf cultivator who worked for high caste tenants usually being indebted for life. 
This debt may have been contracted generation back, it did not matter", Ibid., p. 55. 
^ Majid Hayat Siddiqui, op.cit., p. 15. 
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with whom a separate (sub) settlement had not been made; (4) Occupancy tenants, (5) 
tenants- at will; and (6) agricultural laborers.*^ 
In the years that followed, and especially by the beginning of the 20"^  century, 
some important changes had come about in the social situation of Oudh, which affected 
agrarian relations. The elements of these changes were: (1) (i) the fragmentation of 
holdings as a result of the acute subdivisions that would take place among the 
coparcenary land holding bodies, and (ii) consolidation of holdings as a results of the 
absorption of small land holders by the large land holders; (2) the diminishing extent of 
under proprietary rights; (3) the alienation of land from small zamindars and the growth 
of other (subsequent) under proprietary rights; (4) the emergence and expansion of 
thekadari; and (5) the decline of rent free holdings.^ ^ 
By the late 1930s, the new political context drove the landlords of UP towards an 
unprecedented crisis. It was due to the fact that the prospect of provincial autonomy 
threatened to remove official protection, which they had taken for granted, and placed 
them at the mercy of unfamiliar, possibly hostile rulers.^' Of a total landlord population 
of about 1.227 million in UP there were about 1.008 million small landlords, paying the 
annual revenue of 100 and less. The landlords of UP, in the context of provincial 
autonomy, initially tried pure landlordism as the means through which to retain control. 
Hence, other options were not abandoned, even while resorting to landlord politics, they 
shifted conveniently after the elections to communalism, even though it meant bifurcating 
into Hindu and Muslim communal organizations.^' 
After independence, the entire system of intermediaries was abolished by the 
Congress government of UP under the terms of the, Zamindari Abolition Act of 1951. 
But Zamindari Abolition did not dispose the former Zamindars and taluqdars; indeed it 
allowed them to retain control of lands traditionally presumed to be under their personal 
cultivation and removed from their control lands they did not own.'° The intermediaries 
"'ibid., p. 16. 
"• Ibid., p. 35. 
*' Salil Misra, A Narrative of Communal Politics: Uttar Pradesh, 1937-39, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
2001), p. 59. 
•^^ Ibid., p. 63. 
"'ibid., pp. 70-71. 
™ Zoya Hasan, op.cit., p. 73. 
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who lost rights over land were only 1.42 percent of the rural population. '^ The main 
beneficiaries were well-established peasant proprietors.'^ Socially they ranged firom high 
caste Thakurs to the backward castes and some Muslims.''^  The inequality of agrarian 
society continued in part because no limit was placed on the maximum area held for 
cultivation by landlord or tenant. Many Zamindars preserved their dominance by 
concealing the true nature of their holdings through fictitious transfers.^ '* At the time of 
Zamindari abolition, 10,235,000 acres were recorded as Sir and Khudhkasht land of the 
landlords. This amounted to 18 percent of the total area under cultivation. Although the 
landlords secured 8,135,000 lakh acres, or 79.5 percent of their Sir and Khudkasht land in 
the state.'^ 
With all its limitations, Zamindari abolition did away with the social and political 
control of the taluqdars and big Zamindars and was, widely acknowledged as the 
harbinger of change in rural society. The caste groups that benefited the most were the 
Ahirs, Kurmis and Lodhas even though they occupied a secondary position in the rural 
and political hierarchy compared to the upper castes.'* 
Despite significant legislative initiatives, reforms after Zamindari abolition were 
not effective. The government faced serious problems in implementing tenancy reforms, 
land ceiling and distribution of government/community lands. The Land Ceiling Act of 
I960'', though an important step in the reform process, made no further change in the 
rural structure after Zamindari abolition and tenancy regulation. 
The UP revenue Department estimated that there were 23,682, large land holdings 
accounting for 2,345,304 acres in the state in the 1950s. But no effort was made to 
appropriate, much less redistribute, this land. Large-scale land transfers a few months 
before the introduction of the legislation reduced the potential surplus land fi-om 6.88 
'^ ibid., p. 74. 
^^  Charan Singh was the chief proponent of peasant proprietorship. See Charan Singh, Abolition of 
Zamindari: Two Alternatives, (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1947). 
" Zoya Hasan, op.cit., p. 74. 
^* See, W.C. Neale, Land Reforms in UP, (Washington: AID, 1970). 
" Ibid. 
" Zoya Hasan, op.cit., p.76. 
" The Land Ceiling Act of 1960 set a high ceiling limit of 40 standard acres per individual, which was 
reduced to 18 acres in 1970. On land ceiling, see Richard S. Newell, "Ideology and Realities: Land 
Redistribution in UP", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer, 1972. 
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lakh acres to 4.37 lakh acres. Of this also, only 20,000 acres were distributed and, what is 
more half of this was uncultivable. 
Land reforms became the centerpiece of radical vocabulary in the 1970s, but they 
were virtually excluded from the policy agenda in UP, Only 2.87 lakh acres out of an 
estimated 7,50 lakh acres were declared surplus after the introduction of the Ceilings Act 
in 1972,'' Furthermore, only 67.78 percent of the land declared surplus was redistributed. 
None of the big landowners lost lands of any significance due to land ceilings. The 
continued influence of the former big zamindars and talukdars in the countryside is an 
important factor in contemporary party politics in UP, 
Economic Development 
The Indian economy has been characterized as a sleeping giant that is yet to 
recognize its potential strength. During the 1990s, the Indian economy has done 
reasonably well in terms of economic growth and related macro economic indicators. But 
this high growth in the 1990s has co-existed with the continuation and sometimes even 
intensification of deep social fissures. In Uttar Pradesh, traditional inequalities and social 
divisions remain extremely powerful and their persistence hinders many social 
fin 
endeavors. More generally, the concentration of political power in the hands of 
privileged sections of the society has contributed, perhaps more than anything else, to a 
severe neglect of the basic needs of disadvantaged groups in state and local politics,*' It is 
still possible, for instance, to find villages in UP where a powerfiil land lord has 
deliberately obstructed the creation of a village school by the government,*^ The lives of 
majority of people in Uttar Pradesh continue to be blighted by endemic poverty, under 
nutrition, ill health, educational deprivation, environmental degradation, avoidable 
morbidity, premature mortality, and deep seated inequality of opportunity. 
The economy of Uttar Pradesh is characterized by agricultural and industrial 
decline. Because industrial and agricultural out-put failed to keep ahead of population 
" Ibid,, p, 237, 
•" Arun SJnha, "Uttar Pradesh: Mockery of Reform", EPfV, December 23-30, 1978, p. 2065. 
'° Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, India: Development and Participation, (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p. 93). 
"' Ibid., p. 93-94. 
" See Dreze and Gazdar, "Uttar Pradesh- The Burden of Inertia", op.cit. 
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growth. Agriculture is the main occupation of 73 percent of the population of the state. 
The net cultivated area in the state is 168.12 lakh hectares. Notwithstanding, the 
pressure of a dense population it has produced a situation in which the small holdings of 
most peasants can barely sustain them and their families.^ '* The western region of the 
state is far more advanced in terms of agriculture, infrastructure, and even industr>' than 
the other regions, particularly the eastern region along with which it constitutes the large 
majority of the states area and population.*^ The agricultural productivity is high in the 
western region where the net sown area is 73.60 percent of the total land area reporting 
whereas the state average is 57.91 percent.*^ UP's agricultural problems are most severe 
in the eastern rice growing districts of the state where population densities are over 1000 
[)er square mile, land holdings are very small, and few industries exist to absorb the 
increasing numbers of unemployed. 
By the end of March 1998, there were 2616 medium and large industrial 
undertakings with an investment of Rs. 41, 266.20 crores and employment opportunities 
for 7.38582 persons. Besides, there were 491433 small-scale industrial unhs involving a 
total investment of Rs, 4846 crore and employment opportimities for 1880,000 persons.*^ 
The state's industrial base rests very heavily on two old and declining industries - the 
sugar refining industry, and textile industry. Another industrial unit, namely automobile, 
is 32 in number with an investment of Rs. 5,740 crores provided jobs only to 20,280 
persons.** Despite the steps that have been taken to develop more industries in the state, 
the condition of industrial sectors, housing sectors, group housing sector, residential 
buildings, commercial assets, information technology and institutional sectors remain in 
bad condition. The state of irrigation, power sector and transportation in Uttar Pradesh 
reflect the picture of dismal failure. 
The experience of a decade of economic reforms clearly indicates that one of its 
major victims has been balanced regional growth.*' One of the reasons why centralized 
planning was advocated earlier was that it could restrain the regional disparity. In spite of 
" India 2006, op.cit., p. 1041. 
" Paul R. Brass, Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, op.cit., p. 233.. 
" Encyclopaedic District Gazetteers of India, Vol. 6, p. 393. 
^ Ibid. 
" India 2006, op.cit., p. 1041. 
** Ibid. 
*' See NJ Kurian, "Grooming Inter-State Disparities", Seminar, January 2002, pp. 62-66. 
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planning, liowever, regional disparity remained a serious problem. Private, and foreign 
investments have increasingly gone to relatively developed regions that have better 
social, economic and physical infrastructure and better governance, especially in terms of 
speedy decision making processes.^ ^ The poorer states, especially UP, Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Orissa are also investing less because historically tliey mobilized resources for 
public involvement mainly through grants and assistance from the center, which are now 
declining due to fiscal constraint. The benefits of the commercial bank credit and 
financial flows from national level financial institutions like IDBI, IFCI, etc. to Uttar 
Pradesh are very low in contrast with five major states viz., Gujarat, Maharasthra, Tamil 
Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Kamataka. During the reform era, UP performed badly with 
State Domestic Products (SDP) growth below 4 percent per aimum. The standard of 
living in UP also declined in the 1990s compared to 1980s. The main reason for this 
could be the comparatively higher growth of population in the state. In general, UP with 
higher population growth has performed badly in terms of SDP growth in the 1990s.'' 
Even in UP, the share of the primary sector has declined significantly over the last 
two decades. The share of the primary sector, which was nearly 50 percent of SDP in the 
early 1980s, has now come down to nearly 35 percent in the 1990s. Poor performance of 
agriculture rather than rapid growth of non-agricultural activities has brought this change. 
However the share of the secondary sector has increased from less than 20 percent in 
1980-81 to 26 percent in 1999-2000. While the tertiary sector shares nearly 31 percent in 
1980-81 to nearly 39 present in 1999-2000. The tertiary sector, rather than industry, 
which has become the engine of growth in the last two decades, gives no sign of 
remarkable growth in UP.'^ 
An analysis of the growth performances, regional disparities, and economic 
development of Uttar Pradesh revels that the development process has been uneven rather 
failed by almost every standard of measurement to keep pace with the rest of the country. 
'"Ibid. 
" See, B.B Bhattacharya and S. Sakthivel, "Regional Growth and Disparity in India: Comparison of pre-
and post-Reform Decades", EPW, Vol. XXXIX, No. 10, March 6, 2004, pp. 1071-1077. 
^ Ibid. 
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Social Structure 
Institutions do not exist in a vacuum and therefore, cannot be studied in isolation. 
They are always in interface with several other institutions, an interaction which 
eventually determines their nature. Infact it is not the institutions that so much affects the 
society, as it is the latter that actually determines the real nature of the institutions by 
making them operate in its social, culture and political milieu.'^ This emphasis on the 
social determinants of institution is particularly significant in the modem context in those 
societies where democratic institutions have been introduced over a period of time. It is 
only through the operation of the democratic principle that the real underlying tendencies 
can manifest themselves through the process of unfoldment. Needless to say, this does 
not happen in a short span of time, but may take several decades if the society is exposed 
to the democratic institutions for the first times and the people are yet to come to terms 
with the working of these democratic bodies.''' India particularly Uttar Pradesh combines 
antiquity with continuity which has made the social set up excessively diverse. Unlike the 
American states where centuries of rapid industrialization have leveled the social ground 
by bulldozing the social and economic unevermess to a great extent, the essentially 
agrarian nature of the UP's economy has retained the diversities of culture, religion and 
caste. India has, in fact, been termed a continent of many communities united through 
shared experience but powerfully motivated by parochial and regional considerations.'^  
This is also true about Uttar Pradesh particularly and significantly. 
Evidence about how social structures vary across UP is very limited. Here we 
shall consider only indicators of caste and community patterns. It is common in the 
analysis of caste and community politics to give into the presumption of numbers. Thus it 
is often argued that political outcomes can be determined to a fair degree by the caste and 
community composition of electoral constituencies.'^ This falls quite in line with the 
' ' Pradeep Kumar, "The National Parties and the Regional Parties: A Study in the Socio-Political 
Dynamics" in Ajay K Mehra and Others (eds.), Political Parties and Party Systems, (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 2003), p. 288. 
^ Lewis P. Fickett, "The Politics of Regionalism in India", Pacific Affairs, 44 (2), Summer, 1971, p. 193. 
"' Pradeep Kumar, op.cit. 
Francine R Fmakel, "Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social 
Order" in Francine R Frankel and M.S.A Rao (eds.). Dominance and State Power in Modern India: 
Decline of a Social Order, Vol. I, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 823, 100-01. 
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overall assumption that Hindus are generally hound by their caste loyalties, so why 
should politics be any different. 
(1) Caste in UP: 
It needs to be admitted at the outset that it is difficult to match population by caste 
and election result. This is for two reasons. In the first place the last caste census was 
published as far back as in 1931. Secondly, caste enumeration is provided district wise 
and these districts do not always coincide with parliamentary electoral constituencies. 
Nevertheless, with the help of Singh's'' painstaking efforts, an attempt has been made to 
no 
match one with the other. The result is an approximation no doubt, but a close 
approximation. At the level of Parliamentary constituencies, this can be applied with 
minimum inaccuracies. 
Table 2: Caste Composition of the Lolt Sabha Constituencies in Uttar Pradesh (%) 
Constituency 
Kheri 
Hardoi 
Shahbad 
Etah 
Bareilly 
Gorakhpur 
Saidpur 
Moradabad 
Misrich 
Source: H.D. Sii 
Ahirs 
5-10 
Do 
Do 
10-15 
5-10 
10-15 
5-10 
do 
igh, 543 Faces of 
Brahmins 
5-10 
do 
do 
do 
do 
10-15 
5-10 
do 
'India: Guide to i 
Rajputs 
5-10 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
Parliamentary Co) 
Kurmis 
5-10 
do 
do 
do 
do 
10-15 
do 
do 
tstituencies. New 
SCs 
Over 25 
do 
do 
15-20 
do 
do 
Over 25 
do 
Delhi: Newsmen 
Publishers, 1998; and Census of India 1931, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Vol. XVIII, Part II, 
Allahabad: Government of the United Provinces. 
Table 3; Higher than average population of Brahmin (%) 
Constituency 
Amethi 
Sultanpur 
Akbarpur 
Source: H.D. Singh, op.cit. 
Constituency 
Azamgarh 
Jaunpur 
Ghazipur 
Brahmins 
10-15 
10-15 
10-15 
, and Census of India 1931, op.cit. 
Table 4: Ahir Population (%) 
A/iirs 
15-20 
15-20 
15-20 
Source: H.D. Singh, op.cit.; and Census of India 1931, op.cit. 
H.D Singh, op.cit. 
Census of India 1931, op.cit. 
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The census figures about UP are indeed very striking. In only a handful of 
districts do castes such as the Brahmins, Rajputs, Ahirs or Kurmis make it to between 15-
20 percent of the population. In Kanpur and Gonda, Brahmins constitute between 15-20 
percent of the population; in Robertsganj and nowhere else are Kurmis somewhere 
between 15-20 percent of the population; in Saidpur, Azamgarh and Jaunpur Ahirs are 
between 15-20 percent of the population. In only nine out of a total 70 districts do the so-
called upper castes and dominant agrarian castes have some kind of presence. In the 
famous Jat districts of Muzaffamagar, Meerut, Agra and Saharanpur, Jats hardly make it 
to being even 10 percent of the population. In Muzaffamagar, which is widely acclaimed 
to be Jat lair, only 8.44 percent of the population belongs to that community. The same 
trend holds for districts such as Bijnore, Bulandshahar, Agra, and Meerut, and yet they 
are famously associated with the Jat leader Chaudhri Charan Singh.^ 
Interestingly, only the Scheduled Castes constitute above 25 percent, and in some 
cases even above 30 percent of the population in practically every district of UP. Yet 
there is no area in UP, that is known to be controlled by Scheduled Castes. If numbers 
and caste loyalties were alone important, then surely the SCs should be ruling UP. In 
Muzaffamagar the Jats number only about 8.5 percent of the population, but are able to 
contain the SCs who make up over 20 percent of the population. But in contemporary 
politics of Uttar Pradesh, SCs are now increasingly able to free themselves from mral 
subordination. More and more rural SCs are looking outside the village for employment 
and if within the village, then not as agricultural labourers. To a great extent this situation 
has arisen because there are not enough jobs in the villages. The Green Revolution and 
sub-division of holdings have converted most famis into family plots or capitalist 
enterprises. Lack of agricultural jobs in the villages has had at least one salutary effect. 
Now that SCs are relatively free of Jat, Gujar, Ahir or Rajput domination, they have 
greater political maneuverability. This loosening of ties with the landed castes has not 
always led to successful urbanization of SCs. In a large number of cases they continue to 
live in the village and work in neighboring cities and township. Even so, the fact that they 
are no longer dependent on the agricultural sector for jobs, the way they used to be in the 
" For more details, see H.D Singh, op.cit, pp. 297-337. 
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past, has enabled and emboldened them to join alternative political formations. It is not at 
all surprising that it is only in the last ten fifteen years that politics of the Baliujan Samaj 
Party (BSP) is becoming credible in UP. As long as the SCs were fettered as agricultural 
labors without any opportunities outside the village, a party like the BSP could hardly be 
expected to be an active political option for them. The Harijans (or the Chamars) of UP, 
are the most advanced of all the SCs in UP and it would be safe to surmise that many of 
them play a leading role in the SC politics of their respective constituencies. 
Table 2, 3 and 4 shows that Sultanpur and Akbarpur share roughly the same kind 
of caste profile. In both these constituencies Brahmins and Ahirs comprise 10-15 percent 
of the population, and the Scheduled Castes over 25 percent of the population. In Kheri, 
Hardoi, and Shahbad, Ahirs, Brahmin and Rajputs each comprise between 5-10 percent 
of the population while the SCs make far more than 25 percent of the population. Ahirs 
make up about 11.7 percent of the population in Etah, and in Bareily the Kurmis are 
approximately 10.2 percent of the population. The trend is expressed more strongly in 
Saidpur. The population of Ahirs is quite high here. It stands at between 15-20 percent of 
the population. In Azamgarh, Jaunpur, and Ghazipur, Ahirs and Kurmis are between 15-
20 percent of the population. 
It would be worthwhile to reiterate in this cormection that with the same kind of 
caste composition a variety of electoral results are possible. Take for instance the case of 
Moradabad, Kheri, Hardoi, Shahabad, and Misrich. In these constituencies Ahir, 
Brahman, Kurmi, Rajput and SC proportions are roughly the same. Yet the election 
outcomes differ widely between constituencies, and within the same constituencies over 
different elections. 
It is quite understandable why politicians should attempt a caste calculus. Most of 
them would obviously like members of their caste and people they can trust and depend 
upon to carry the mantle for them. From the electorates' point of view, however the 
matter is quite different. Voters can only vote for whoever is actually contesting. The 
point then is to ask why certain castes figure more prominently as candidates than other 
castes. Concurrently, one must also ask why the Scheduled Castes do not do as well as 
they should though they have a fair population representation in many constituencies. 
Politics is not only about numbers, it is also about ability to exercise power in a 
concerted and organized fashion and for that economic capacity and relative financial 
security play a significant role in the matter.'"" The ability, to be organizationally 
effective, demands a certain degree of economic security which poorer castes are, more 
often than not, unable to muster.'"' No caste in Uttar Pradesh or anywhere has the 
adequate numbers, to win an election on its own. It is not as if all agrarian castes come 
together spontaneously and unproblemalically because the Brahmanical ranking places 
them close to one another. It must be remembered that one of the important feature of the 
Hindu system of stratification is the profound mutual repulsion that exists between 
different castes.'"^ This is true for all castes. The Jats and Gujjars of UP, for example, are 
constantly undermining each other, though on the face of it they appear to be, as owner-
cultivators, natural allies. Such examples abound everywhere-between the Srivastavas 
and Patwari Kayasthas of UP. It can be rightly argued that inter-caste solidarities, 
therefore, cannot emerge full blown fi-om the logic of the caste system itself and no caste 
can on its own swing an election unambiguously in its favour. 
Another important aspect is caste alliances in Uttar Pradesh like AJGAF.'"'' which 
stands for Ahir, Jats, Gujars and Rajputs and the All India Kurmi Sabha which is made up 
of disparate castes such the Ayodhya, Dhamuks, Mahatos, Koeris and Kurmis.'"^ The 
caste alliances appears to emanate fi-om secular and political factors and do not spring 
full-blown from primordial loyalties. These castes not only do not intermarry but in many 
cases there might even be problems of interdining as well. In the Oudh peasant 
movement of the 1920s, the Kurmis, Pasis and Muslims came together against 
landlordism, but throughout their struggle they ate in separate kitchens.'"^ 
The popular assumption that caste loyalties contribute to caste alliances, which in 
turn determine voting behaviors, is clearly in error. What needs to be appreciated is that 
these interests must really be powerfiil enough for castes to overcome their natural 
'"" Dipanker Gupta, Interrogating Caste: Understanding Hierarchy and Difference in Indian Society, (New 
Delhi: Penguin, 2000), pp. 17-172. 
"" Pradeep Kumar Bose, "Mobility and Conflict: Social Roots of Caste Violence in Bihar" in Dipankar 
Oupta (cd.). Social Stratification, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 379. 
'"^  C. Bougie, "The Essence and Reality of the Caste System" in Dipankar Gupta (ed.). Ibid. 
"" Dipankar Gupta, Interrogating Caste, op.cit., p. 174. 
"^  Ibid. 
"" Majid H. Siddiqi, opxiL, p. 117, 
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repulsion towards each other and form united fronts. It is therefore caste chemistry and 
not caste arithmetic that one should pay attention to.'°^ 
The fact that SCs, in spite of their numerical strength, do not have a proportional 
strength in the electoral system indicates quite strongly that they are held back by their 
weak organizational abilities. In rural areas, it is still very difficult for poor SCs or STs to 
politically form independent blocks without arousing the wrath of the more affluent 
communities. For this reason the political ambitions of the SCs rarely get off the 
ground."" 
Caste identifications in Uttar Pradesh remain very largely restricted to local caste 
groups. The strongest caste movement so far has been that of the Chamars, a low caste 
group of leather workers and field labors in the countryside and of menial labourers in the 
cities and towns. Discontent among the Chamars, the largest caste group in the state, over 
their social status and economic position, has been reported in a village in eastern UP,"^ ^ 
in Kanpur city,'°^ UP districts (on Delhi border)"^ and in the Western districts of the 
state. Clearly, the potential for a state wide caste movement exists among the Chamars, 
but so far the protest of local Chamar castes have not been coordinated in such a 
movement.'" 
The dominance"^ of the traditional landowning castes continues in both economic 
and political life. The 'dominant castes' are Brahmin and Rajput in most parts of the 
state, but other landowning castes are important in certain areas, for example, the Jats in 
Western UP and the Bhumihars in Eastern UP. Between the dominant landowning castes 
and the usually landless low castes, such as the Chamars, there exist thousands of 
cultivating and artisan castes, most of them very small and known only in particular 
areas. Two large caste groups in the state are the Ahirs and Kurmis, the major cultivating 
castes of central and eastern UP. Generally called "back ward", they were often tenants of 
'"* Dipankar Gupta, Interrogating Caste, op.cit., p. 175. 
'"'Ibid., pp. 17-176. 
'"" Bernard S. Cohn, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste" in Mckim Marriott (ed.), Village India: 
Studies in the Little Community, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 53-77. 
"^ Arthur Niehoff, "Factory Workers in India", Milwankee Public Museum Publications in Anthropology, 
No. 5, (Milwankee: Board of Trustees, Milwankee Public Museum, 1959), p. 68. 
"" Oscar Lenis, "Peasant Culture in India and Mexico: A Comparative Analysis" in Marriot (ed.), op.cit., p. 
165. 
" ' Paul R Brass, Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, op.cit., p. 235. 
"Mbid. 
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Rajput and Brahmin Zaniindars before Zamindari abolition; they are behind the Brahmins 
and Rajputs in education, and have only recently begun to show their potential 
importance in politics. 
In the cities and towns, two important caste groups are the Kayasth and Baniyas. 
Kayasthas are prominent in all modem professional occupations and are generally given 
the status of elite castes. Baniyas are predominant in trade and commence. Members of 
both caste groups have occupied prominent positions in the political life ol the state. ' 
(2). Muslims in Uttar Pradesh: 
According to Census 2001, Muslim constitutes 18.5 percent of the total 
population of the state, which is the highest so far as the other religious minorities in the 
state are concerned. The Sikhs are the second numerous minority group, constituting 0.4 
percent. Buddhist and Jains covers 0.2 and 0.1 percent respectively (Table 5). However, 
Muslim conmiunity is unevenly spread across UP. The most distinctive area is the 
western UP. It displays the large concentration of Muslims, around 22.7 percent. A 
further segregation of western UP shows that Muslims are numerically strong in north-
west, around 39.5 percent, but their strength get down to only 15.7 percent in south-west. 
They form about 15.5 percent and 16.2 percent of the population of Central and Eastern 
UP respectively. Bundelkhand has fewer Muslims, around 6.7 percent (Table 6). 
Table S: Population of all Religious Communities in Uttar Pradesh 
Religion 
Hindus 
Muslims 
Christians 
Siklis 
Buddhist 
Jains 
Total Population 
133,979.263 
30,740,158 
212,578 
678,059 
302,031 
207,111 
Source: Census uf India 2001, op.cit. 
Tabic 6: Regional Distribution of Muslims 
Regions 
WESTERN 
North-lVest: 
South-West: 
CENTRAL 
EASTERN 
BUNDELKHAND 
Muslims 
22.7 
39.5 
15.7 
15.5 
16.2 
6.7 
Percentage 
80.6 
18.5 
0.1 
0.4 
0.2 
0.1 
Source: Census of India 2001, op.cit. 
11} Ibid. 
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Contrary to the other minority communities in Uttar Pradesh, Muslims are 
disproportionately concentrated in rural areas. Of the total Muslim population of the Uttar 
Pradesh, 64 percent Muslims live in rural areas, while 36 percent live in the urban areas 
(Table 6). This shows the low level of urbanization process among Muslims. As 
compared to the other minority or majority community, literacy rate among Muslims are 
lowest, 47.8 percent. It is below the average literacy rate of Muslims at national level that 
is 59.1 percent and also below the average literacy rate of Uttar Pradesh as a whole (56.3 
percent). It is surprising to note that the rural Muslims are more literate than the urban 
Muslims. 
Table 7; Demographic Pattern of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. 
INDIA 
UTTAR PRADESH 
Residence 
Total 
Total 
Rural 
Urban 
Total Muslim 
Population 
138,188,240 
3 0,740,158 
19,666,297 
11,073,861 
(%) 
13.4 
18.5 
64 
36 
Literacy 
(%) 
59.1 
47.8 
57.4 
42.6 
Source: Census of India 2001, op.cit. 
Total 
Rural 
Urban 
Table 8:' 
Total 
Workers 
(%) 
29.1 
67.4 
32.6 
rhe Category of Muslim workers in Uttar Pradesh (%) 
Cultivators 
25.7 
96 
04 
Agricultural 
Workers 
21.6 
92.1 
07.9 
Household 
Industrial 
Workers 
11.9 
53.8 
46.2 
Other 
Workers 
40.7 
40.2 
59.8 
Non-
Workers 
70.9 
62.6 
37.4 
Source: Census of India 2001, op.cit 
Table 8 shows the poor working condition of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. The total 
workforce among Muslims is 29.1 percent of the total Muslim population in the state. 
The Muslim working class could be further categorized in rural and urban Muslim 
working class. Conspicuously, 67.4 percent Muslim workers live in rural areas and only 
32.6 percent live in urban areas. The poignant condition of the Muslims in the state could 
also be seen when we find that almost 71 percent Muslims are workless. Of the total 
Muslim workers, cultivator constitutes 25.7, agricuUure workers 21.6 percent, household 
industrial workers 11.9 percent, and workers belonging to other category 40.7 percent. It 
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proves that Muslims remain untouched with tlie fruit of economic development in the 
state. They are only confined to the agricultural activities and rural areas. 
However, it is important to note that UP witness the bitterest social and political 
conflicts that divided Hindus (most particularly upper caste Hindus) and Muslims. It is 
primarily over the issues of language, jobs, separate electorates, cow slaughter, uniform 
civil code and the construction of Ram temple that oft resulted into Hindu-Muslim riots. 
However, the conflicts on these issues are being aggravated by the political parties that 
claim to represent the Hindutwa ideology in the state (overtly by the BJP and covertly by 
the Congress till mid 1990s). It is worth noting that parties do not have intention to 
subscribe to any ideology but find reason to intensify the Hindu-Muslim conflicts. The 
most appropriate reason is the electoral incentives that lie behind the ant-Muslim 
mobilizations. By adopting the electoral strategy of polarizing Hindu-Muslim votes, the 
parties concerned aimed to attain power. 
However, the emergence of low caste politics with the implementation of Mandal 
Report put the Hindutwa campaign of BJP on low platform. The low castes consolidated 
behind the political parties duly representing them. Examples would include the Bahujan 
Samaj Party, which represents Scheduled Castes; and the Samajwadi Party, which has a 
particular base in backward castes. These developments set a new pattern of political 
mobilization on caste and community lines that resulted in the high level of electoral 
competition in the state. Muslims almost deserted the Congress and responded to the 
appeal of alignment with the low castes made to them particularly by the low caste 
parties. Given the party fractionalization on caste and community lines and fragmented 
configuration of constituencies in 1990s and mid 2000s, anti-Muslim parties also adopted 
the strategy of wooing the Muslim voters in order to get the margin of votes to attain 
power. Thus, Muslim votes have now become more salient in the contemporary politics 
of Uttar Pradesh. 
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CHAPTER; TWO 
CASTE AND THE FRAMEWORK OF ELECTORAL 
POLITICS: 1950s TO 1980s 
For anything that has ever been said about Uttar Pradesh electoral politics, there is 
a good chance that its opposite has also been asserted. If some have described electoral 
politics in UP as an anomaly, others have seen it as an ideal case for testing 
representative democracy at function. If there are those who marvel at its resilience and 
endurance, there are also those who see it as hopelessly fragile. If the multiple levels and 
forms of participation impress some, there are also others regard this as a mask that 
conceals the reality of unequal access. Indeed, if there is, in the study of Indian politics, 
any single issue that remains unvaryingly contentious, and on which there are as many 
verdicts as there are scholars, it is surely the complex projectory of Uttar Pradesh's fifty 
and half years experience with this unique political form of representative democracy and 
their electoral politics. The analyses of the scholars who subscribe to the limited, 
proceduralist view of democracy, emphatically exclude the many social and economic 
inequalities that make it difficult for even formal electoral participation to be effective. 
There are many formidable obstacles that prevent voters from doing even the few simple 
things that they- as the political sovereign- may reasonably expect to do. The fi-ee 
exercise of the franchise, for example, may require freedom from caste superiors, from 
dominant landlords, or, in the case of women, from male heads of household. In this 
chapter, we shall attempt to not merely evaluate the evolution of representative 
institutions, but also reflect upon the electoral politics with reference to caste and 
commimity in Uttar Pradesh since independence. 
The Principle of Elected Representation and Separate Electorates: 
Some of the pioneering work in analyzing the dynamics of elections in British 
India has come fi:pm scholars such as Chris Baker and Chris Bayly, Peter Reeves (on 
United Provinces), Ian Talbot (on Punjab), B.R.Tomlinson (on the Indian National 
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Congress aiid elections in tiie 1930s), and Salil Mishra (on Uttar Pradesh).' Harold 
Gould, writing about pre-independence Faizabad, remarks at "how spontaneously...the 
ethi\ic dimensions of caste and religion came to the forefront once democratically 
constituted political arenas had been established."^ The form the new representative 
institutions took had far reaching repercussions for the course of electoral politics in India 
and most particularly in Utter Pradesh. Electoral politics, along with the politics of 
movement, whether nationalist, separatist, or subaltern in scope, was an important 
channel of political socialization. The electoral arena and representative bodies acted as 
an intensive training ground for politicians in the art of successfully adapting the 
exogenous forms of competitive democratic politics to indigenous modes of political 
discourse and pattern of social organization. Furthermore, even if it did not necessarily 
politically educate a widening electorate in the maimer envisaged by British Indian 
policy-makers, regular elections ensured that an alien form of political expression became 
accepted as a familiar reality by a significant section of the Indian Population even before 
independence.'' 
We are primarily concerned with the establishment of democratic institutions and 
colonial experience of representative politics in India. Many more scholars have sought 
to trace the roots of India's democratic system back to antiquity— t^o the Sabhas and 
Samitis referred to in the Rig Veda in the second millermium BC.^  However, while this 
ancient legacy has been utilized to impart an indigenous legitimacy to the representative 
institutions of modem India, the more tangible legacy has been the colonial one. The 
experience of representative institutions in colonial India, for the six decades preceding 
independence, has received little scholarly attention. Though, these were patently 
institutions of limited democracy, the fact that they were extracted, inch-by-inch, from a 
' C.Baker, "The Congress at the 1937 Elections in Madras", Modern Asian Studies, vol. 10, no. 4,1976; 
C.A.Bayly, The Local Roots of Indian Politics: Allahabad 1880-1920, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1975); P.D. P.D.Reeves, B.D. Graham and J.M. Goodman (eds.), A Handbook to Elections in Utter 
Pradesh, 1920-1951. (Delhi: 1975); I.A.Talbot, "Muslim Political Mobilization in Rural Punjab 1937-46', 
in P.Robb(ed.), Rural India, Land Power and Society under British Rule, (Delhi: 1986); B.R.Tomlinson, 
The Indian National Congress and the Raj 1929-42: The Penultimate Phase, (London: 1976); Salil Misra, 
A Narrative of Communal Politics: Uttar Pradesh, 1937-39, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001). 
^ H.Gould, "The Emergence of Modem Indian Politics: Political Development in Faizabad. Part 2: 1935-
1947", ne Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, \o\. 15, no. 3, 1977, p. 216. 
' See, James Chiriyankandath, "'Democracy' Under the Raj: Elections and Separate Representation in 
British India" in Nirja Gopal Jayal (ed.), Democracy in India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
pp. 54-55. 
* S.C. Kashyap, Our Parliament, (Delhi: 1989), p. 1. 
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reluctant colonial authority, making them legitimate precursors of the democratic 
institutions that were established after independence. From colonial accounts, the 
principle of elected representation was first introduced at the level of municipal councils 
and rural boards through Lord Ripon's 1882 Resolution on Local Self Government, 
which envisaged it as an instrument of political and popular education.^  Given such a 
rationale, the parochial electoral politics brought into being by the reforms were 
inevitably limited to very few. For instance, Chris Bayly found that in Allahabad the 
municipal board electorate was confined to a small number of house proprietors, mainly 
professional men, and traders- less than one in fifty of the city's population of 150,000.^  
These meager refonns were actually motivated by the need to levy new taxes for local 
requirements which would appear more legitimate if these bodies had elected Indian 
members.'' Between 1862 and 1892 the Governor-General's Executive Council had only 
45 Indians nominated to it, who were mainly rulers of princely states or wealthy 
Zamindars and merchants, or retired government officials. Meanwhile, the formation of 
the Indian National Congress (INC), and its pressure for constitutional reform, led to 
further change in the composition of the legislative councils, beginning with the Indian 
Councils Act of 1892, which was partially intended to contain the Congress agitation and 
co-opt the moderates within it.' It was by this Act, the elective principle was introduced 
in a convoluted manner at the provincial and national level, which allowed for a minority 
of the seats to be filled by nominations on the recommendation of certain bodies.'^ 
Many English officials however believed that the principle of elections was 
inappropriate for India. They argued that the various social cleavages in India made the 
country incapable of maintaining representative government. The debate was joined by 
John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, and Lord Minto, the Viceroy, who together 
had responsibility for reconmiending constitutional reform to the British Parliament.'' 
' His Majesty Government (HMG), Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, /, (London: 1930), pp. 
299-300. 
* Bayly, The Local Roots of Indian Politics, op.cit., p. 100. 
^ See, Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1983), p. 19. 
' See Bipan Chandra et al, India's Struggle for Independence 1857-1947, (New Delhi: Penguin Boolcs, 
1988), p. 114. 
' See Nirja Gopal Jayal (ed.), "Introduction", op.cit., p. 20. 
'" HMG, Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1, op.cit., p. 116. 
" See Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1989), p. 182. 
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Anyway, in some respects, the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 were a logical elaboration 
of the changes set in motion in 1892. Under this reform, the elective principle was made 
explicit with the majority of the non-officials elected either indirectly or directly by 
separate electorates of large landholders and Muslims chosen on a very restricted 
property franchise.'^  The most momentous feature of this reform package was clearly the 
provision for separate electorates that accentuated fissiparous tendencies in the nascent 
Indian body politic. The systcnt of separate electorates, thus guaranteed that two party 
arenas one for the Muslims and the other for the Hindus would develop. Since each 
religious community could choose its own representative, India now had a system of 
1T 
political dualism in which social cleavages were institutionalized. 
The gradual spread of democratic ideas is signaled by not only the demand for 
greater representation and powers in the provincial and central legislative councils, but 
also in the demands for civil liberties and the right to free speech during first world war. 
The commitment to democratic values thus paralleled the demand for more representative 
councils. The Government of India Act of 1919, introduced for the first time, the 
principle of direct elections for all levels of politics from local bodies to the provincial 
and central legislatures.''* Seventy percent of the members in the provincial and 
Legislative Coimcils now come to be elected by less than three percent of the Indian 
population, comprising mainly propertied males who paid income tax or land revenues, 
rents and local rates. Thus, between eighty and ninety percent of those elected to the 
provincial councils of the United Provinces in 1926 were lawyers and landowners. 
Women and the so-called 'depressed' classes were clearly disadvantaged in the matter of 
representation.'' The separate electorates were retained for Muslims throughout India on 
the basis of Lucknow Pact of 1916 and extended to Sikhs in Punjab, Indian Christians in 
Madras, Anglo-Indians in Madras and Bengal, and Europeans in five provinces.'* In 
addition, a number of seats were reserved for non-Brahmins in Madras and Marathas in 
Bombay, both majority communities, who were thought likely to be under the dominance 
" HMGJieport of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1, op.cit., pp. 117-118. 
" See Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox, op. cit. p. 184. 
" See James Chiriyankandath, op.cit., p. 59. 
" Ibid. 
" HMG, Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1, op. cit., pp. 144-4S, and 167-68. 
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of a strongly entrenched [Brahmin] minority.'^  Special Constituencies were also 
maintained for large landholders, commercial and industrial interest, and universities. 
The overall effect was to direct electoral and legislative politics into, primarily, 
communal and more tangentially, class channels. Sumit Sarkar argues that "the Montford 
reforms had broadened the franchise, but preserved and even 
extended separate electorates; there was, therefore, a built in temptation for politicians 
working within the system to use sectional slogans and gather a following by distributing 
1 S 
favors to their own religious, regional or caste groups." 
No doubt, the reform of 1919 established, two major transformations in the 
political process in the decentralization of power from the centre to the provinces, and the 
growth and extension of the principle of elections and representations." Notwithstanding, 
owing to the reliance upon a property qualification, members of the depressed classes 
who constituted a very low percentage of electorates and therefore were placed at 
electorally disadvantageous position.^ " In sum, the great majority of electors were 
relatively prosperous caste Hindus or Muslim males. '^ Indeed, in the United Provinces 
the great majority (70-90 percent in most areas) were illiterate and had their ballot papers 
marked by polling officers in the presence of the candidate's agent^ -^a practice that made 
no pretence at preserving the secrecy of the ballot and greatly strengthened the hand of 
entrenched local interests. Most importantly, in the United Provinces the prominent 
aspects of electioneering in the west- holding public meetings, issuing addresses, and so 
on- were little used. Though canvassers were employed and leaflets, posters, and satirical 
poems were widely distributed in some places, what was most important for a candidate, 
especially in rural constituencies, was to gain the support of landowners and other 
influential local persons. Under the circumstances, it was no surprise that landholders 
and lawyers pre-dominated among the successful candidates. In terms of caste upper 
castes Brahmins, Thakurs, Vaishyas and Kayasthas who formed just over a fifth of the 
" Ibid., p. 138. 
" Sumit Sarkar, op.cit,, p. 234. 
" See Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox, op. cit. p. 183. 
^^  See James Chiriyankandath, op.cit., p. 63.. 
'^ Ibid. 
" United Provinces Government, Report on the Working of the System of Government, United Provinces of 
AgraandOudh, /92/./925,(Allahabad: 1930),p. 174. 
"ibid., p. 172. 
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Hindu population in the United Provinces, provided ninety three percent of the Member 
of Legislative Councils (MLCs).^ ^ 
The communal divergence was accentuated by the discussions that marked the 
prelude to the last major step in pre-independence India's constitutional development— 
the 1935 Government of India Act. Partly owing to the failure of the representative of 
Hindu and Muslim Communal organizations to arrive at a consensus at the Round Table 
Conferences that followed, the deepening communal divide in national and UP politics in 
particular remained unabridged and Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald's 1932 
Communal Award generally followed the pattern that greatly concerns the contemporary 
caste and community politics. It was by this award, the general means Hindu 
representation was further reduced to allow for separate representation for the depressed 
classes. This provision was later amended at Gandhi's behest in the Poona Pact, by 
which the seats reserved for the depressed classes were more than doubled on the basis 
that they would forego separate electorates, already extended by the Award to Indian 
Christians, Anglo-Indians and European Indians throughout India.^ * 
The Government of India Act 1935 had been extended the voting rights to anyone 
who paid the annual revenue of Rs 5 and rent of Rs 10 (Rs 25 and 50, respectively, for 
the wives of voters) and this gave voting rights to many tenants who had not exercised 
it before. On the whole, in UP, the voters' number increased to over five million 
(5,158,250 to be exact, with 4,370,889 general votes; and 722,134 Muslim votes)^^ with 
a little over 4.5 million rural votes. Apart from a liberalization of the property fi-anchise, 
the major innovations were the extension of the vote to all literate women and to women 
whose husbands were either serving or retired military men or held enhanced properly 
qualification. The new political context created by the reform drove the landlords of UP 
towards an unprecedented crisis. Two things may have become quite clear to them. First, 
retaining political control and dominance was going to be a great deal more difficult in 
the 1930s unlike in the 1920s. Secondly, electoral politics had started turning into mass 
^^  Ibid., p. 560. 
" "Communal Decisions". Cmd. 4147, GB Parliamentary Papers. 1931-32, vol. 18, p. 965. 
' Sec James Chiriyankandath, op.cit., p. 69. 
P.D. Reeves and Others (eds.), A Handbook to Elections in Uttar Pradesh, op.cit., p, xvii.. 
Ibid., p. 1. 
'Government of India Bill (as amended in Committee and on Report)', GB Parliamentary Papers, 1934-
35, vol.2, pp. 336-337. 
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politics and if the landlords wanted to survive politically and socially, they had no choice 
but to experiment with it.''° The net result was the formation of the National Agriculturist 
Parties of Agra and Oudh (NAPs) in 1934—the party representing the politics of 
landlordism and loyalism. However, NAPs failed to take off as an effective opposition to 
Congress.^ ^ It was for the first time Indian politicians had the opportunity of winning real 
power at the provincial level, even though it was power circumscribed by the 
discretionary and emergency provisions that, ultimately allowed a governor to take over 
and indefinitely run the administration of the province. Notwithstanding this fact, it was 
by the election of 1937 elective and legislative politics in India have been structured by 
party competitions/^ Of all the groups in the fray, Congress was easily the strongest and 
the most popular force. Congress had some exposure to the electoral arena as well as 
Swaraj Party had twice contested elections in the 1920s.^ ^ Another party which made 
effective presence in UP in 1937 election was Muslim League representing Muslim 
unity.^ " 
Here, it can be rightly argued that the character of the representative institutions 
introduced during colonial rule helped to determine the charmels into which the emerging 
politics followed. The introduction of separate electorates in the 1909 set the pattern for 
subsequent development. It legitimized the language of communal and interest group 
politics by acknowledging its primacy and according it institutional recognition. The 
trend was reinforced as the scope of both institutional and movement politics expanded in 
the 1920s and 1930s to draw in people for whom the language of liberal democracy 
conveyed little. The 1937 elections saw the entry into the legislatures of a new breed of 
congressmen, less cosmopolitan, more representative of rural and small town India and 
'" See Salil Misra, op.cit., pp. 59-71. 
" See for details on the story of the formation of NAPs and its Congress opposition role, P.D.Reeves, 
Landlords and Governments in Utlar Pradesh: A Study of their Relations until Zamindari Abolition, 
(Oxford: 1994), pp. 204-213. 
" See Vanderbok, William and Richard Sission, "Parties and Electorates from Raj to Swaraj: An Historical 
Analysis of Electoral Behavior in late Colonial and Early Independent India", Social Science History, 1988, 
vol. 12 (summer), pp. 121-142. 
'^ Swarajists had done reasonably well in the UP Provincial Council elections, winning 28 and 20 seats, 
respectively, in the elections of 1923 and 1926. See Reeves and Others (eds.), A Handbook to Elections in 
Uttar Pradesh, op.cit., pp. 59-148. 
'* For the role of Muslim League in UP, see Salil Misra, op.cit., pp. 49-59 and 128-221. 
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more comfortable with the language of community and caste.^ ^ Politics and elections in 
contemporary India and particularly Uttar Pradesh as in the India of the 1930s and 1940s 
continued to be shaped by community and caste faction to a much greater degree than in 
any other country sustaining liberal democratic institutions on the western model. Even 
institutionally the legacy of a democracy created to reflect perceived group interest rather 
than individual judgment remains in the reserved Scheduled Castes seats in the central 
Parliament and UP Legislative Assembly, Today Indian politicians and voters~as 
forward, Backward Class, and Scheduled Castes Hindus, as Muslims, as Sikhs-continue 
to have to come to grips with the consequences. In terms of the legacy of separate 
representation and the recognition by the state of distinct social groups on the basis of 
caste and religion, the past lives on to deleterious effect. The most important continuity 
between the pre and post-independence period, is that elections based on separate 
electorates made it virtually inevitable that political pattern even after the abolition of 
separate electorates in independent India appeals to the caste and commimity loyalties. 
Electoral Politics and Universal Adult Franchise: 
Despite the persistent demand of universal adult franchise in pre-independence 
India, the voting right had never been extended to cover the entire adult population of 
India. The promise of universal adult franchise was finally realized only in our 
constitution.^ ^ By almost unanimously opting for universal adult franchise and direct 
election to the legislatures, the framers of the constitution endorsed the path of modernity 
for the Indian-nation-state in contrast to the alternative Gandhian vision of decentralized 
village level democracy, with indirect elections.^' Adult suffrage was perceived as the 
only way of giving voice and thereby powers, to the aspirants of the people who had long 
been denied any representation of their interest. Likewise, the virtue of direct elections 
was seen to lie in the fact that they made possible the creation of a new national identity 
" See S.A. Kochank, The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One Party Democracy, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 370-404. 
^^ Even before the drafting of the Constitution began, the Sapru Committee (1945) pointed to the educative 
effect of the 1937 elections, arguing that adult franchise was the only way of preventing the concentration 
of power in the hands of few, even if the average voter's "judgment may be faulty, his reasoning 
inaccurate, and his support of a candidate not infrequently determined by considerations removed from a 
high sense of democracy." Cf Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 147. 
" See Nirja Gopal Jayal (ed.), "Introduction", op.cit., p. 22. 
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superseding the parochial and caste identities of people.''^  In the aftermath of the trauma 
of partition the architects of our constitution were reluctant to institutionalize any 
arrangements that could threaten the unity of the country or represent a compromise with 
separatist sentiments. With this in mind, the introduction of imiversal adult suffrage was 
viewed as a means by which all views and interests would have the opportunity of being 
heard whilst at the same time providing the vehicle to bring sense of national life and 
consciousness of national issues to the mass of India's population?' It was argued that 
direct elections to a central parliament and state legislatures, would represent the people 
z& a whole and be contested on issues relating to the broad economic and social problems 
of the mass of Indians rather than narrow parochial caste or communal lines.^ " 
Nonetheless, when India launched on its vast democratic experiment in 1951-52, the 
long-term consequences of aduU suffrage were not only not known but they could not be 
predicted with reasonable accuracy either. The socialists saw great potentialities in adult 
suffrage. After all the vast majority of the new electorates was poor. Since they were the 
companions of the downtrodden, they expected them to turn to the socialists rather than 
to the Congress. The Hindu communalists could also hope that the ballot would favor 
them because after all among the aduh men and women the Hindus were an 
overwhelming majority. '^ 
While, the constitution and the detailed arrangements for elections were 
predicated on the principle of individual rights as the basis for participation in the 
electoral process and neither recognized nor made provision for the mobilization or 
presentation of collective rights. But in two important respects, the fi-amework of the 
constitutional measures and the thinking behind them could be said to be the important 
cause behind the contemporary electoral politics of caste and community in India and 
Uttar Pradesh particularly. First, the constitution did retain special provisions for the 
political representation of the Scheduled Castes and a category of reserved 
'* See Austin, op.cit., pp. 46-49. 
•" See Ian Duncan, "Casteism and Interpretation of Indian Politics", paper for the Political Studies 
Association-UK, SCf' Annual Conference, April 10-13, 2000 
hitp./www.psa. ac. uk/cps/2000/Duncan%20lan.pdf 
*' Ibid. 
•" See Madhu Limaye, Birth ofNon-Congressism: Opposition Politics 1947-1975, (Delhi: B.R. Publishing 
Cocporatiou, 1988), pp. 4-7. 
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constituencies'* ,^ for which only they could stand for election, was created. Although, the 
separate electorates and primary elections of the colonial regime were abolished, the 
principle of collective rights and representation was nonetheless retained in this 
attenuated form. On the one hand, this represented a breach in the general principle of 
individual rights as the basis for political representation and on the other hand it opened 
ihe possibility that in the future other groups particularly caste groups, would demand 
similar treatment on the basis of an analogous position to the Scheduled Castes. 
Secondly, those who framed the constitution largely failed to recognize, the 
strong collective identities, interests and political organizations that had already emerged 
by the time of independence among caste groups in many parts of the country. The 
colonial state through its counting and classifying activities had been involved in a vast 
project that sought to specify and delineate distinct, localized and separate caste groups. 
In reality, the effect had been quite the opposite and operations like the census, land 
settlement operations and social welfare programme had resulted in the mobilization of 
groups with little previous awareness of common identity in a variety of larger trans-local 
political forms."*' Many among the population of India during the colonial period came to 
see the census less as an authoritative and given representation of separate and divided 
communities and instead "began to wonder what they would look like and what would 
happen, it they combined."'*'* 
It can be said there that political communities and loyalties based on caste and 
community identities, already had a robust and effective existence by the time of 
independence. Embodied in the principle of universal adult suffrage, and given effect 
through popularly elected representative institutions, democracy was thus a revolutionary 
principle for a society marked by multiple hierarchies, and entailing modes of oppression 
entrenched over centuries. In a predominantly agrarian-often feudal society in UP, the 
inequities of the caste system, and its linkage with ownership and control overland was 
the most striking manifestation of social inequality. The introduction of political equality 
in such a society should have been explosive. 
"^  See, Article 330, Article 332 and Article 334 of the Constitution of India. 
*^ See Ian Duncan, "Casteism and Interpretation of Indian Politics", op.cit. 
** Sudipta Kaviraj, "On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony" in Sudipta 
Kaviraj (ed.), Politics in India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 157. 
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Caste, Party, and Electoral Politics 
In any political system there are agencies that link people and groups to 
government. Particularly important in representative forms of government are political 
parties, which not only provide a link, but whose members are often directly involved in 
governmental decision making. "The first and foremost aim of each political party is to 
prevail over the others in order, to get into power or to stay in it."^ ^ While tracing the 
roots of political paijies in India and particularly in Uttar Pradesh, we necessarily go back 
to colonial times. The emergence and growth of political parties in India is obviously 
related to the rise of nationalism in the country. However, the rise of nationalism in India 
was preceded by a fairly long period of gestation, which witnessed the evolution of 
national consciousness. The closing years of 1880s concretized the foundation of the 
party system. The social reform movements, and their successor nationalist movements 
of a more focused, aggressive and militant variety, are important as anti-colonial 
platforms and organizational bases for the party system in a nascent nation; their maturity 
however, emerges from the participation of the leaders and intelligentsia in governance. It 
is in this context of party system that several studies have analyzed the pre-independence 
origins of the political parties in India and the expansive role of the Indian National 
Congress within this party system. Parties in India initially served as petitioners for social 
groups as advocates of social policy and as initiators and proponents of reform to provide 
effective political participation. Imbued with enhanced powers in successive colonial 
constitutional reforms, the electorates expanded in size and parties became increasingly 
attracted to contesting before the newly-endowed electorates to secure positions of 
advantage in legislatures and government to effect substantive policy changes and to 
force continued reform. The events, reform movements, the demands for representation 
of Indians in civil service and decision making bodies as well as protest against the 
policies of colonial government at various stages were led by powerful and committed 
leadership which in turn played a crucial role in the emergence of democratic political 
culture that eventually crystallized into the framework of a party system in the country. 
The institutionalization of the Indian National Congress on 28 November 1885, is rightly 
considered as the moment of the begiiming of party politics in India because it set in 
•" Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (New York: Harper & Row, 1943), p. 279. 
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motion processes that on the one hand, were signal to a number of ideas to bloom, on the 
other hand, in the process of its evolution and growth, rules of political mobilization and 
competition were written. Throughout this process, it remained the pivot on which the 
party system hinged before and after independence. Indeed, Congress has been largely 
responsible for the social deficit of the contemporary Indian democracy. Also founded by 
the prominent personalities of the Indian intelligentsia, that is persons socialized in Indian 
tradition but educated in English and trained by the British in the new profession, the 
Congress remained an elite club, taking with it a critical mass from the heterogeneous 
society. The Congress system'*^  turned out to be conservative in its socio-economic 
orientation primarily due to the social composition of the party since the intelligentsia at 
its helm, often from an upper caste elite, recruited notables who enjoyed a personal base, 
which helped them to win elections. 
However, early studies of the workings of the political process in independent 
India stressed the differentiation of parties in terms of ideology and programme and 
embodied an assumption that the description and analysis of changing party policies and 
election manifestos represented the reality of Indian politics. Little attention was given to 
the extent to which these policies were in fact the basis on which parties gained support 
or won elections. They also tended to assume that differentiation among the political 
public was along lines of broad economic and social interests rather than narrow 
particularisms of religion, caste, region or language. If caste, for example, was at all 
important then it was believed that its significance would wane with time and that the 
future development of democracy in India depended upon the consolidation of the party 
political system along lines of principled policy differences. In the general political 
discourse of the time the notable exception to this disengagement from caste was Ram 
Manohar Lohia, the socialist leader, who argued that the horizontal mobilization of the 
lower castes on the basis of explicit appeals to caste identity had substantial political 
potential for organizing the poor and deprived."*' By the late 1950s, the existence of caste 
loyalties, which previously had been seen of no importance, was now perceived to be an 
** This expression was coined by Rajni Kothari and refers to the identification of the Congress with the 
state and party's capacity to remain in power by adjusting to the movements of society. Rajni Kothari, "The 
Congress System in India", Asian Survey, 4(12) December, 1964. 
*'' See D.L.Seth, "Secularization of Caste and the Making of New Middle Class", Economic and Political 
Weekly (EPW), August 21-28, 1999, p. 2506. 
45 
important component in the political fabric of the country. The involvement of the mass 
of Indians in political life was now seen as a process in which existing identities and 
loyalties, and the organizations and movements that sprang from them, would play a 
major part. Brass in his early and influential study of factional politics in Uttar Pradesh 
saw factions as structures, which linked political parties with institutions like locally 
based caste groups and he maintained that they operated "comfortably in the traditional 
society from which they spring and in the secular institutions of modem govemment."^^ 
Factional politics, it was argued, divided social groups, both class and caste, which might 
otherwise articulate specific demands and mobilize on the basis of them. By recruiting 
the support of dominant groups, who then in turn recruited those who were economically 
and socially dependent upon them, factional politics also prevented the emergence of 
organizations, which might challenge the dominant economic, social and political order. 
A large part of the success of the Congress Party and its maintenance of a system of 
single party dominance in the first two decades after independence were attributed to its 
careful management of factional politics. 
Most importantly, the subaltern castes sought to break free, even if only in 
electoral terms, from their dependent local position and began to consider the potential of 
wider horizontal political mobilization within a broader collectivity of similarly placed 
jati groups in 1970s.''' Nowhere was this process more pronounced than in Uttar Pradesh. 
In this state the Congress regime of hegemony was first challenged and then swept away 
by caste based parties, which had embarked on a strategy of horizontal mobilization. 
Vote Bank Politics and the Congress 
From independence until the fourth general elections, in 1967, a multi party 
system with one dominant party existed nationally in India and also in Uttar Pradesh. The 
kind of part}' system that exists has a bearing on the building and maintenance of 
opposition parties. The Congress has an aura of legitimacy, stemming from its heritage as 
the national movement seeking independence, from the emotional commitment therein 
generated, and from its possession of positions of authority, achieved through electoral 
** Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Utter Pradesh, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1965), p. 237. 
•" See Ian Duncan, "Casteism and Interpretation of Indian Politics", op.cit. 
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victories.^ " It appears to be a broadly based and fairly well organized party in Uttar 
Pradesh. It is important here to note that, the upper caste domination provided the 
framework of political bonding in a fragmented society. The Congress leaders of UP 
came mostly from the upper castes and relied largely on this social milieu to maintain 
their ascendancy. The views of influential figures such as Sampumanand led the 
Congress to accommodate upper caste notables. The party, in doing so, sought to use 
their social influence, in terms of economic leverage or physical intimidation. These were 
the sources of the notables' political clout and hence the starting point of the Congress's 
'vote bank polities', an arrangement where votes "can be delivered by local potentates 
acting as political intermediaries between the parties and the electorate."^' This party-
building strategy relied on co-option of influential notables, in stark contrast to the cadre 
based parties such as those developed by the communists or the Hindu nationalists." The 
capacity of the Congress to co-opt local notables after independence was reflected in the 
social profile of the electoral candidates fielded by the Congress. Far from 
accommodating the low castes, the party continued to nominate upper caste politician, as 
evident from the social background of its ML As in the 1950s and early 1960s, when it 
dominated the UP politics. The over representation of the higher caste among Congress 
MLAs is very High and continued to rise from 1952-62, where as the low castes 
remained very unrepresentative. One should bear in mind that the large number of 
Scheduled Castes MLAs was due to the reservation system (Table 1). 
The social profile of the Congress governments in the 1950s-1960s reproduces the 
same pattern. The stability of the upper castes' over representation in the UP government 
over three decades is astonishing. From the late 1930s till the late 1960s the upper castes 
accounted for two-thirds (or even three quarters) of ministers and never less than 59 
percent (Table 2). Unsurprisingly, Brahmins predominated till the late 1950s, but they 
tended to loose ground and by the 1960s the Banyas were the most numerous group in 
three governments out of four. Muslim representation steadily declined over the entire 
period. The Scheduled Castes always had a handful of ministers, which maintained their 
'" See Angela S. Burger, op.cit., p. 264. 
" 'Voting Behavior in a Developing Society- A working Paper' in CSDS, Party System And Election 
Studies, (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967), p. 280. 
" For a comparative study of the Congress and the Jana Sangh party-building patterns, see Christophe 
Jaf&elot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s, (London: Hurst, 1996), 
ch.3. 
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representation at a low rather than a marginal level. The most striking statistics concern 
the lower castes, which could manage only a couple of representatives. The Congress 
therefore appeared to be dominated by a tripolar elite of Brahmins, Banyas and Rajputs. 
The caste background of the party MPs in UP reconfirms this (Table.3). From the time of 
Motilal Nehru to that of Jawaharlal Nehru, the party had a-remarkable over representation 
of the upper castes in its ranks. It was largely because of the reason, the party leaders, 
including Nehru, recruited even more influential local personalities (often upper castes) 
to serve its electoral interests, developing an interlocking network of 'vote banks' whose 
incumbents joined the nationalist intelligentsia in the party machine. Thus it was that in 
the two decades after independence Congress established the supremacy of the upper 
castes in the political system of Uttar Pradesh. The main upper castes-Brahmins, Rajputs 
and Banyas-which, together, control the Congress in UP largely coincide with the 
coalition of interests described by Bardhan as regrouping the "dominant propertied 
classes."" For him, the monopoly of power exerted by this coalition was not 
incompatible with a system of representative democracy. 
Table 1: Caste and Community 
CasteA. Communities 
Upper caste 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
Banya 
Kayasth 
Bhumihar 
Tyagi 
Other 
Intermediate Castes 
Jat 
Low Castes 
Yadav 
Kurmi 
Other 
Scheduled Castes 
Chamar 
Pasi 
Other 
Muslim 
of Utter Pradesh Congress MLAs, 1952-62 (%) 
%inUP 
20.4 
9.2 
7.2 
2.4 
1 
0.4 
0.1 
O.l 
1.5 
1.5 
41.9 
8.7 
3.5 
27.5 
20.9 
11.8 
3 
6.1 
14.6 
1952 
58 
28 
13 
8 
5 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
7 
3 
2 
2 
21 
14 
3 
4 
11 
1957 
56 
22 
15 
8 
6 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
24 
16 
2 
6 
10 
1962 
61 
27 
19 
8 
3 
1 
0 
3 
2 
2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
22 
16 
1 
5 
8 
•According to the 1931 Census 
Source: Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Low Castes in North Indian Politics, 
(Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003), p. 67. 
" See P. Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). 
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Tflhle 1: Caste and Communitv of the Members of the Uttar Pradesh Government, 1937-67 (%) 
Caste& 
Communities 
Upper caste 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
Banya/Jain 
Bhumihar 
Kayasth 
Khotri 
Amil 
Other 
Intermediate 
Castes 
Jat 
Low Castes 
Kurmi 
Murao 
Yadav 
Scheduled 
Castes 
Muslim 
Unidentified 
1937 
66.6 
33.3 
6.7 
13.3 
13.3 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
13.3 
20 
— 
1947 
57.7 
21.1 
5.3 
15.8 
1'5.8 
— 
— 
— 
5.3 
.5.3 
— 
— 
— 
— 
5.3 
26.3 
5.3 
1952 
64 
28 
12 
12 
— 
12 
— 
— 
4 
4 
4 
— 
4 
— 
12 
16 
— 
1954 
59 
22.7 
4.5 
18.2 
— 
13.6 
.... 
— 
— 
—-
— 
4.5 
— 
— 
4.5 
18.2 
18.2 
— 
1957 
60 
30 
10 
10 
— 
6.7 
3.3 
— 
— 
6.7 
6.7 
6.6 
3.3 
— 
3.3 
10 
13.3 
3.3 
I960 
66.6 
14.8 
7.4 
22.2 
3.7 
3.7 
3.7 
3.7 
7.4 
3.7 
3.7 
3.7 
— 
— 
3.7 
11.1 
11.1 
3.7 
1962 
67.7 
16.1 
9.7 
22.6 
3.2 
3.2 
6.5 
3.2 
3.2 
3.2 
3.2 
6.4 
3.2 
— 
3.2 
16.1 
6.5 
— 
1963 
66.7 
28.6 
9.7 
19 
— 
— 
4.8 
4.8 
— 
4.8 
4.8 
4.8 
4.8 
— 
— 
14.3 
9.5 
— 
1967 
84.7 
23.1 
1.1 
46.2 
7.7 
— 
M M * * 
.... 
1.1 
7.7 
— 
Source: Sarvadhik Pichhra Varg Ayog Report, Lucknow: Uttar Pradesh ki Sarkar, 1977(Hindi), pp. 91-5; 
Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution, op.cit., p. 71-72. 
Table 3:Caste and Community of Congress MPs in Uttar Pradesh, 1952-62 (%) 
CasteA Communities 
Upper caste 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
Banya/Jain 
Kayasth 
Bhumihar 
Tyagi 
Nayar 
Khatri 
Intermediate Castes 
Jat 
Low Castes 
Yadav 
Kurmi 
Scheduled Castes 
Muslim 
Christian 
Sadhu 
Unidentified 
1952 
58.5 
33.3 
6.6 
12 
4 
1.3 
1.3 
— 
— 
2.6 
2.6 
0 
— 
— 
22.6 
8 
1.3 
1.3 
5.3 
1957 
55.1 
27.7 
12.3 
7.6 
3 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
— 
— 
— 
1.5 
1.5 
— 
21.5 
9.2 
1.5 
— 
10.8 
1962 
54.7 
21 
12.9 
4.8 
4.8 
3.2 
1.6 
1.6 
4.8 
1.6 
1.6 
3.2 
1.6 
1.6 
24.2 
6.5 
— 
— 
9.7 
Source: Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution, op.cit., p. 87. 
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State of Opposition Parties: 
It was during the first three general elections, opposition strength was fairly well 
distributed throughout Uttar Pradesh. It is important here to note that there were no 
parties in the state, which operate exclusively in UP. Opposed to the Congress in 1960 
were seven opposition parties. Although Congress has experienced a steady decline in its 
voting strength in the state, no opposition party by itself has acquired sufficient strength 
to represent a threat to the Congress.^ "* On the left were the Communist Party, the 
Socialist Party, and the Praja Socialist Party. On the right were the Jan Sangh, the 
Republican Party, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Swatantra Party. 
The Jana Sangh^^  (JS), formed in 1951, was one of three Hindu communal parties, which 
had fought the post independence general elections. The other two, the Hindu Mahasabha 
and the Ram Rajya Parishad, had faded into significance and left the Jan Sangh alone as 
the only important Hindu political party in India, A major reason for the survival and 
success of Jana Sangh was its origin from a militant but non-political Hindu 
organization— t^he Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. It differs fi-om the other major 
opposition parties in UP in that it did not develop out of Congress. There had been 
neither major splits within the party nor mergers with other parties. The Jana Sangh was 
reportedly a highly centralized and highly disciplined party. 
Table 4:Seats Won by Major Political Parties in UP State Assembly Elections 1952-1962 
Party 
Congress 
Jana Sangh 
Praja Socialist 
Lohia Socialist 
Communist 
Swatantra 
Republican 
Hindu Mahasabha 
Other 
Independents 
1952 
390 
2 
20* 
— 
— 
— 
— 
1 
3 
14 
1957 
286 
17 
44 
24 
9 
— 
— 
— 
— 
50 
1962 
249 
49 
38 
24 
14 
15 
8 
2 
— 
31 
Source: Angela S. Burger, Opposition in a Dominant Party System: A Study of the Jan Sangh, the Praja 
Socialist Party, and the Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh, (Berkeley: University of California, 1969), p. 33. 
•The Praja Socialist did not exist in 1952. The figure combines the 19 seats won by the Socialist Party and 
1 seat held by the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party. 
'* Paul Brass, Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, vol. 1. Faction and Party, (Delhi: Chanakya 
Publications, 1983), p. 239. 
" The Jana Sangh's antecedents and manner of founding are studied in Myron Weiner, Party Politics in 
India: The Development of a Multi-Party System, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
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The second opposition party was the Praja Socialist Party (PSP). The socialist 
tradition in UP, as elsewhere in India, has its origin in the Congress Socialist Party (CSP), 
which was formed as a group within the Congress in 1934.^ * In UP the CSP was very 
strong, controlling much of the Congress organization on the state and district levels. It is 
estimated that less than 20 percent of the membership of the CSP in UP left the Congress 
in 1948" owing to the personal influence of Acharya Narendra Dev. But significantly, 
their exit in 1948 did not lead to an exodus from the Congress. The majority of socialists 
remained in the Congress and the pragmatists among them like C.B. Gupta, Mohanlal 
Gautam, Lai Bahadur Shastri and Kamlapati Tripathi rallied behind the leadership of the 
chief minister of UP, G.B. Pant, who occupied the middle groimd and attempted to cast 
state and society in that mould.'^  The second major addition to the socialist opposition in 
UP came from a- group of followers of Rafi Ahmad Kidwai who were defeated in a 
struggle for power in the Congress. In 1950, the followers of Kidwai who had been 
pushed to the backgroxmd in the Congress formed an opposition party known as the Jan 
Congress. Triloki Singh, S.K.D. Paliwal, and Gopal Narain Saxena were the foremost 
leaders. Shortly before the 1951-52 elections, the Jan Congress merged with the Kisan 
Mazdoor Praja Party formed by Achaiya J.B. Kripalani.*' Shortly after the first general 
elections in 1952, the Socialist Party and the KMPP merged to form the Praja Socialist 
Party. The course of the new party did not run smoothly. In 1955, the Lohia split 
occurred, again creating two socialist parties in the state and in the country—the Praja 
Socialist Party and the Lohia Socialist Party.^ " Moreover, throughout the post 
independence period, there has been a constant movement of political leaders from the 
Congress to the PSP, from the PSP to the Socialist Party, and very often from one of the 
^ Ibid. Also see Hari Kishore Singh, A History of the Praja Socialist Party, (Lucknow; Narendra 
Prakashan, 1959); Madhu Limaye, Birth ofNon-Congressism, op.cit. 
" See Paul Brass, Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, vol. 1, op.cit. p. 248. 
'* See Chalapathi Rau, Govind Ballabh Pant: His Life and Times, (Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1981). Rau 
observes that Pant was accused of shrewdness worthy of Chitpawan Brahmins, but though a conservative 
by upbringing, tastes and habits, he was in no way orthodox or reactionary and mixed without inhibitions 
with Muslims and Harijans, p. 328. 
" See Angela S. Burger, Opposition in a Dominant Party System, op.cit. pp. 37-38. 
'^ For various accounts of the split see Lok Nath Joshi, The Farce of Discipline, (Lucknow: Uttar Pradesh 
Socialist Party, 1955); Dan Singh, An Appeal to the Chairman and All Members of the Praja Socialist 
Party, (Naini Tal, Uttar Pradesh: Dan Singh Vakil, 1955); Facts on Lohia's Attempts at Disrupting the 
PSP, (New Delhi: Y.B.R. Murthy, 1959); and Hari Kishore Singh, op.cit. pp. 168-216. 
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socialists' parties back to the Congress. '^ Socialist politics in UP and in the country and 
the political balance between the two socialist parties in UP were fiindamentally altered 
in the period between December 1962 and January 1965." After the 1962 elections 
legislative backbenchers of the two parties in Uttar Pradesh, manuevering secretly, 
established a "United Socialist Party" within the Assembly. Dr. Lohia opposed the action 
and was able to thwart the merger within a few weeks." It is not possible to examine here 
all the events leading to the reunification and subsequent split of the two socialist parties 
as a whole. The merger and subsequent split of the two socialist parties demonstrated 
some important features of the party system in UP. They demonstrated, first the fluidity 
of the system. Secondly, the party maneuvers demonstrated the intimate connection 
between the conflict in the dominant party and conflict within and among opposition 
parties. Thirdly, the Congress clearly had greater strength than its low popular vote would 
indicate because of its absorptive capacity.*^ 
In caste background, both the Jana Sangh and the PSP in 1962 elected far greater 
numbers of MLA's of elite caste than of lower castes. The PSP, however, elected many 
MLA's of backward castes and only a few of Scheduled Castes, whereas in the Jana 
Sangh there was a near balance between the two groups. The Socialist Party had more 
backward caste representation.*^ This configuration was confirmed by the social 
composition of the three opposition parties (Table.5). 
Caste distribution of MLA's and Candidi 
Parties in 196: 
Caste & conununity 
Upper Castes 
Brahmins 
Rajputs 
Vasiiya/Banya 
Bliumihar* 
Kayastli 
Low Castes 
Table. 5 
ites ofTered by Jana Sangh, Praja Socialist, and Socialist 
I UP Assembly Elections (%) 
Jana Sangh 
%of 
MLA 
62.5 
16.6 
27.1 
12.5 
2.1 
4.2 
18.8 
%0f 
candidate 
78.3 
27.3 
26.3 
13 
5 
6.7 
14.9 
PSP 
%of 
MLA 
54.5 
15.2 
18.2 
6.1 
6 
9 
30.9 
%of 
candidate 
61.3 
18.4 
23.6 
5.6 
7.3 
6.4 
22.9 
Sociali 
%of 
MLA 
50 
18.2 
27.3 
— 
— 
4.5 
27.3 
*/ 
%of 
candidate 
48.1 
17.1 
17.6 
17.4 
2.8 
3.2 
31 
" See Paul Brass, Cas(e. Faction and Party in Indian Politics, vol. 1, op.cit. p. 248. 
" Ibid. p. 249. 
" See Angela S. Burger, op.cit. p. 41. 
" See Paul Brass, Caste. Faction and Party in Indian Politics, vol. 1, op.cit. p. 252. 
" For the Detailed analysis of the caste background of the MLAs of the three opposition parties elected in 
1962, sec Angela S. Burger, op.cit. pp. 53-57. 
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Kurmi 
Yadav 
Lodhi 
Other 
Scheduled** Castes 
Muslim 
4.2 
6.2 
4.2 
4.2 
18.7 
— 
2.3 
6.3 
3.3 
3 
2.7 
— 
3 
21.2 
3 
3.1 
9.1 
6.1 
5.2 
12.5 
2.6 
2.6 
3.4 
9.4 
9.1 
13.6 
— 
4.6 
22.7 
— 
8.8 
13.9 
1.4 
6.9 
7.9 
9.7 
Source: Adapted from Angela S. Burger, op.cit., pp. 54-55. 
*In the row of candidates offered from the Bhumihar caste includes other elite castes including Jats. 
**In the row of candidates offered from the Scheduled Castes only those candidates were taken who were 
given tickets in unreserved constituencies. 
The Communist Party has made no significant progress in UP since 
independence. Although its share of the popular vote in the state increased from 1952 to 
1962, the increase mainly reflects the larger number of candidates that the party ran in the 
last election. Brass points out the major weakness of the left parties was that their 
leadership and sources of support come partly from the same elements, which supported 
the Congress Party.*^ The growing marginalization of the two communist parties in UP 
was largely determined anyway by the scant attention they paid to the caste politics 
specially the low caste politics. Caste was ignored on the ground that it was bound to be 
submerged by class. The similarities between the left parties and the Congress are 
understandable since all the left parties grew out of the Congress. 
The Swatantra Party was formed on all India bases in 1959. It acquired a base in 
UP by winning the affiliation of some ex-Congrssmen of conservative views, ex-princes, 
a few big landlords and businessmen.*^ The interests of these sections of society mostly 
conditioned its ideology. Its appeal, therefore, was restricted to a socio-economic elite, 
interested in the status quo, and did not extend to the underprivileged masses that were in 
need of rapid socio-economic changes in society. As a result, the party found itself 
rapidly marginalized in Indian political life, and decided to merge with other like-minded 
parties to form a new party, the Bhartiya Lok Dal. 
The formation of the Republican Party (RPl) in 1958 inauguratesd a new and 
separatist phase in the Scheduled Caste movement in UP, "but had declined m the early 
1970s largely because of factionalism and the co-option of some of its leaders by the 
Congress."^* Following its formation, the RPI contested in the general elections held in 
** Ibid., p. 255. 
" Ibid., pp. 259-263. 
Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution, op.cit., p. 387. 
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1962. It performed better in UP. As table 6 shows after gaining 10 Assembly seats and 4 
percent of votes in the 1967 elections in UP, it rapidly declined. In the 1974, 1977 and 
1980 elections in UP, the party put up a total of 52, 11 and 2 candidates respectively in 
the state, but could not win a single seat. While Pal, identifies three major reasons for the 
brief existence of RPI and its failure to mobilize the SCs in UP as firstly lack of strong 
leadership, divisions among the leadership over the strategy to be followed and the ability 
of the Congress as a broad-based dominant party to attract SC voters.^ ^ 
Elections 
1969 
1967 
1969 
Table 6: Election Results of the RPI in the 1960s 
Seats contested 
122 
168 
181 
Seats won 
8 
10 
2 
Deposit lost 
96 
139 
153 
% of votes 
3.7 
4.1 
3.5 
Source: Compiled from Baxter, Craig, District Voting Trends in India: A Research Tool, (New York; 
Columbia University Press, 1969). 
Emergence of the Politics of Low Caste: 
As the low castes gained wealth and education, and sought admission to public 
service, they found these positions occupied by Brahmins, thus blocking their upward 
mobility. Surprisingly, the low castes were not very visible in UP politics until the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Unlike South Indian states, UP was marked by the absence of 
radical mobilization of low castes. The socialists, in fact, were the first to consider the 
lower castes as pertinent social and political identities, which were disillusioned with 
their exclusion from leadership positions. The lower castes found the Congress as an 
obstructing force in the way of their development. Though, the strength of the Congress 
lay in its strategy of accommodation and co-option of a wide social spectrum, but it failed 
to extend this strategy to the lower castes, which were banished from party and 
government. Their emergence as an autonomous political force corresponded with the 
internal crisis in the Congress party from 1967 onwards. ^ ° The political process in 
subsequent years was dominated by low caste efforts to establish a niche for themselves 
outside the ruling party. Socialist ideas propounded by Ram Manohar Lohia provided the 
*' See Sudha Pai, 'From Harijans to Dalits: Identity Formation, Political Consciousness and Electoral 
Mobilization of the Scheduled Castes in Uttar Pradesh' in Ghanshyam Shah (ed.), Dalit Identity and 
Politics: Cultural Subordination and the Dalit Challenge, vol. 2, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001), pp 
264-265. 
70 See Zoya Hasan, Quest for Power: The Oppositional Movements and Post-Congress Politics in Uttar 
Pradesh, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 135. 
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, ^ ' ) . 
ideological foundation for the low caste activities that centered Wjii^d distancing them' ' / 
from the vote banks of the Congress and the creation of a non-Cong^s,s c^dtition:' Tp^ 
socialists supported the reservation of leadership posts in political parties, government 
service, business and armed forces for the low castes. By the end of the 1960s, they had 
created a reasonable following among the Yadav, Kurmi and Lodh castes in the eastem 
and central districts of UP/"* Chaudhury Charan Singh systematically attempted to 
subsume caste into the kisan politics to engineer peasant solidarity against the urban elite. 
This approach was undoubtedly dictated by his own social background'^  since his caste, 
the Jats, occupied an intermediary position and were not numerically dominant. But he 
never projected himself as a spokesman for the low castes. Nor did he seek to mobilize 
followers on a caste basis.''* His kisan politics enabled him to build a coalition 
encompassing the cultivating castes ranging from OBCs to intermediate castes. Mulayam 
Singh Yadav was among the Yadav followers whom Charan Singh attracted in the 
1960s—he was first elected as an MLA in 1967. Interestingly, he was introduced to the 
Chaudhury by another OBC, Jairam Verma'^ who was not even a Yadav but a Kurmi, a 
sign that Charan Singh's appeal had extended successfully to the low castes in Utter 
Pradesh. 
More importantly, Charan Singh had political ambitions and he resented the way 
upper caste Congressmen threatened his attempt to become Chief Minister of Uttar 
Pradesh. The Congress party had denied him the post of chief minister in 1967 even 
though he was an influential leader, because the twice bom would not tolerate a Jat as 
leader of the Congress party. Here Congress displayed shortsightedness in marginalizing 
him because in the 1960s the social base of his kisan politics had already mushroomed.'^  
Charan Singh left the Congress with sixteen of his mostly non-upper caste supporters: 
" See N.C. Mehrotra, Lohia: A Study, (Delhi: Atma Ram & Sons, 1978), pp. 168-99. 
" See Zoya Hasan, Quest for Power, op.cit., p. 136. 
" In 1954 he wrote to Nehru along these lines, justifying his fight against caste by evoking its divisive 
impact and his own personal story: "Men like me know from experience what it means to be bom in castes 
other than those which are regarded or regard themselves as privileged". Cited in An Observer, Who is a 
Casteist ?, G^ lew Delhi: Kisan Trust, 1984), p. 31. 
^* He did not hide antipathy for Brahmuis and the parasitic anti-work culture they embody but nor did he 
try to cash in on anti-Brahmin feelings or caste cleavages. (T.J. Byres, "Charan Singh 1920-87: An 
Assessment'', Journal of Peasant Studies, imuary, 1988, pp. 143-44). 
" Lai and Nair, Caste Vs Caste: Turbulence in Indian Politics, (Delhi: Ajanta, 1998), p. 32. 
'^See Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution, op.cit., pp. 291-293. 
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nine of these ML As were Yadavs and Kurmis, four were Brahmins and Rajputs and two 
were from the Scheduled Castes." His decision to walk out of the Congress on the issue 
of leadership began a process of realignment and extended the struggle for power beyond 
the elite castes. For the first time the monopoly of the upper castes was seriously 
questioned. Charan Singh created his own party, the Jana Congress, which soon merged 
with the Bhartiya Kranti Dal (BKD).^ * He formed the coalition government and become 
Chief Minister with the support of opposition parties. For the first time in Uttar Pradesh, 
it was not a twice bom who occupied the highest post in the state. In addition 43 percent 
of ministers and state secretaries came from the intermediary, lower, and untouchable 
castes.^' Kurmi and Ahirs made the greatest gains and together they became the third 
largest group in the UP Assembly. But his government soon fell in February 1968 with 
the withdrawal of the SSP and the CPI support.^ " The failure of the Samyukta Vidhayak 
Dal (SVD) government showed that a major handicap of the lower caste leaders lay in 
their dependence on the other opposition parties, which did not share the same interests. 
In this regard the SVD's short-lived experience began a series of alternating governments 
that ended in failure. However, the change of government in Uttar Pradesh reflected the 
impact of the socio-economic rise of the middle-caste peasants in the political sphere. 
In April 1969, Charan Singh became president of the BKD, after which it 
appeared to develop as a regional party. Once free from the responsibility of Chief 
Ministership he set about restructuring it by replacing members of the ad hoc local 
committees with representatives of the smaller peasantry from the lower castes.*' He 
succeeded in giving party tickets to a large number of non-upper caste candidates in the 
mid-term elections of 1969—the BKD fielded 115 candidates from backward and 
intermediary castes, as against only twenty-three on the Congress side.*^ This strategy 
" Ibid., p. 294. 
*^ On the BKD see Zoya Hasan, Dominance and Mobilization: Rural Politics in Western Uttar Pradesh, 
1930^0, (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989). 
™ See Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution, op.cit., pp. 294-295. 
*° For more details, see Paul Brass, "Coalition politics in North India", American Political Science Review, 
57(4), Dec. 1968, pp. 1174-91 
" See Ian Duncan, "Levels, the Communication of Programme and Sectional Strategies in Indian 
Politics—BKD and the Republican Party of India in UP and Aligarh District", unpublished Ph.D. thesis. 
University of Sussex, 1979, p. 258ff. 
" See Zoya Hasan, "Power and Mobilization: Patterns of Resilience and Change in Uttar Pradesh Politics" 
in Frankel, Francine and M.S. A Rao(eds.), Dominance and state Power in Modern India: Decline of a 
Social Order, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 182. 
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certainly helped the BKD to become the second largest party in the state assembly, with 
98 seats against 211 for the Congress. In spite of this performance, Charan Singh was not 
in a position to form the government. But the Congress party split soon after. C.B.Gupta 
jomed the Congress (O) and Charan Singh's BKD allied with Indira Gandhi's Congress 
(R), which enabled him to form a coalition government. Though short lived, this second 
experiment with power helped the BKD to establish its image as a kisan party. In 1974, 
the largest section of the radical socialists in both UP and Bihar, consisting primarily of 
those leaders whose support bases came from the backward classes in those states, joined 
forces with Charan Singh's BKD, which was thereafter called the Bhartiya Lok Dal 
(BLD)." In 1974 it won more seats than in 1969—106 as against 98. This electoral 
breakthrough explains the rise of the OBCs among the UP MLAs in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s from 13 percent in 1962 to 29 percent in 1967, 27 percent in 1969 and 28 
percent in 1974. In parallel with this trend the percentage of the upper castes declined and 
remained around 40 percent in 1967-74 as against 53 percent in 1962.^ '* 
In 1977, the BLD merged into Janata coalition—a hurriedly cobbled alliance of 
opposition parties after Indira Gandhi slapped emergency in the country. The Janata Party 
election manifesto promised that if voted to power it would "reserve between 25% and 
33% of all appointments to government service for the backward classes, as 
recommended by the Kalelkar Commission." '^ The alliance strategy of the socialists and 
Charan Singh bore fruit since it culminated in the victory of Janata Party securing 352 
seats of the 425 seats of UP assembly, which enabled Charan Singh to appoint one of his 
lieutenants, Ram Naresh Yadav, as Chief Minister. He paid great attention to the 
reservation policy. His reservation policy^^ met with strong protests throughout Uttar 
Pradesh. The bad news, however, was that the Janata government was too heterogeneous 
to implement a consistent policy regarding positive discrimination. Its socialist and BLD 
components tried to push through a programme of quota politics and kisan politics but the 
" Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India since Independence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p. 83. 
" See Zoya Hasan, Quest for Power, op.cit., p. 251. 
" The 1977 Janata Party Election Manifesto. 
** In his Government of Order of 20 August, 1977, Yadav, provided for the following scheme of 
reservations for state services and for industrial training institutes: 15% for OBCs in Class I, II and III, and 
10% in Class IV; 18% for SCs and 2% for STs; 2% for Physically handicapped; 5% for Dependants of 
freedom fighters, and 8% for Ex-military officers. See Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution, 
op.cit., p. 318. 
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Congress (0) and the Jana Sangh*^  were not prepared to allow these new reservation 
policies to reduce the proportion of the upper castes in the bureaucracy. The Hindu 
nationalist party, which was strongly associated with the urban, upper caste middle class 
resisted any pro-peasant and pro-OBC policies and feared that such moves would 
strengthen the BLD in North India, its own stronghold. The Jana Sangh v^thdrew its 
support in favor of Banarsi Das, of the Congress (O), who was accepted by the two 
warring political partners. Banarsi Das froze all the reservation schemes announced by 
Ram Naresh Yadav. But this only gave a brief lease of life to the Janata Party for a little 
more than a year. Thus reservation was one of the factors that precipitated the collapse of 
the Janata coalition. The Janata government of UP had failed to implement their 
reservation policy but its attempt showed that caste politics was gaining momentum in 
the state. 
The 1980 elections brought the Congress back to power in centre as well as in 
Uttar Pradesh. These results revealed the weaknesses of OBC mobilization in UP where 
the polarization between upper castes and backward was less pronounced, partly because 
the main challenge to the ruling Congress came from the Jat leadership which was 
go 
identified with the prosperous peasantry. In the event the Congress's task appeared 
easier owing to divisions among low castes and the lack of opposition unity. The 
Congress largely owed its success to the reconstitution of the old coalition regrouping 
upper castes (mainly Brahmins), Scheduled Castes and Muslims. The Congress took the 
OBCs, SCs and Muslims into account only to woo them as voters, not as social groups 
with distinct agenda and aspirations for power. The main intention of the Congress was to 
neutralize the opposition's growing leverage gained from the mobilization of 
intermediate castes in western UP and OBCs in eastern UP,*' The OBCs were sidelined. 
Congress nominated 120 Brahmins as against 26 OBCs for the election to the Legislative 
Assembly .^ ° However, the return of the Congress did not mean that ideas instilled and the 
social dynamics of Janata period would not re-emerge one day. 
*^  See Zoya Hasan, Quest for Power, op.cit., p. 146. 
" Ibid., p. 140. 
*' Ibid., p. 147. 
^ An Observer, Who is a casteist?, op.cit., p. 115. 
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Re-Incarnation of Reservation Politics: 
The UP government clearly was not inclined to extend reservation to the OBCs. It 
wanted to underplay caste differences and caste identit>', which was a thinly disguised 
attempt to push the question of upper caste domination under the carpet. But from the 
early 1970s there was strong pressure to do something about the OBCs from OBC leaders 
in the Congress who played a significant role in the appointment of a Backward Class 
Commission, QS well as from the effects of electoral democracy. It was increasingly 
difficult to disregard pressure from the OBCs because they had become a political 
category and reservation was the vehicle of their political assertion. It was in the face of 
these compulsions that the UP Most Backward Classes Commission, 1975, headed by 
Cheddi Lai Sathi was constituted. Its recommendations had never been implemented in 
its original form due to vehement opposition from upper castes and oppositional 
fragmentation on the reservation policy. 
Twenty years afler the appointment of the Kalelkar commission, the Janata 
government announced the decision on 20 December 1978 to appoint the second 
Backward Classes Commission. It was again a kind of attempt to relaunch the quota 
politics in Indian politics with equal repercussions in Uttar Pradesh. In contrast to the 
Kalelkar Conunission, this body had no upper caste members but only OBCs." The 
Chairman of the Commission, Bindhyeshwri Prasad Mandal was a Yadav who had been 
elected MP in Bihar in 1967 on a SSP ticket and who had been briefly its Chief Minister 
in 1968.*^ ' 
The Mandal Commission submitted its report on 31 December 1980, identifying 
3743 OBCs and making recommendation that 27 percent of "seats should be reserved for 
OBC students in all scientific, technical and professional institutions run by the Central as 
well as State Governments."^^ But by 1980 the Janata government had lost power and 
Indira Gandhi, who returned to power, put the Mandal Report on the back burner. It was 
in 1982 that Indira Gandhi's Government put the Report before the Lok Sabha, when 
there was barely a quorum in the House, a clear indication of the party's priority.''* The 
" See Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution, op.cit., p. 321. 
'-Ibid 
93 Report of the Backward Classes Commission-First Part, (New Delhi: Government of India, 1980), p. 59. 
''* See Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution, op.cit., p. 329. 
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tabling of the Mandal Commission Report before the Lok Sabha marked the partial 
conversion of Charan Singh to the notion of quota politics. However the Lok Dal was in 
no position to fight for the Report's implementation. First, the staimchest candidates of 
reservations, the socialists, were not very strong in the party.'' In addition to the division 
of the socialists between the Janata Party and Charan Singh's party, the latter was also 
split.'^  Thirdly, Lok Dal leaders were not uniformly interested in seeing the 
implementation of the Mandal Report. However, the Mandal Commission did not classify 
Jats as OBCs and therefore supporters of Charan Singh from this caste lost interest in the 
issue. Charan Singh himself later softened the party's lower caste ims^e—he preferred to 
return to his former discourse that rejected caste en bloc.'^ In fact, the 1987 split of the 
Lok Dal resulted also from the desire of Yadav leaders—such as Mulayam Singh 
Yadav—to emancipate themselves from Jat tutelage. Interestingly, only 5 of the 18 Uttar 
Pradesh Lok Dal ML As continued to support, Ajit Singh but not one Jat left him.'* 
The national importance of reservations generated substantial political support for 
it as the principal issue in UP's political arena. It legitimized political mobilization in 
support of reservations as also opposition to it. Its powerful attraction for the OBCs set 
the stage for a process of counter-moves by the upper caste political elite to contain the 
threat to its monopolistic claim on political and bureaucratic power. As for the OBC 
leadership, the crystallization of opposition to Mandal stressed the need to shift from the 
earlier strategy of reconstructing pride in the Yadav or Kurmi identity to a more inclusive 
or collective group identity based on a sharper assessment of their goals, which traced 
social reform for political power. The OBC phenomenon helped the low castes to 
organize themselves as an interest group, outside the Congress party. This coalescence 
enabled the low castes to benefit from their main asset, their massive numbers, during 
elections. Indeed, the share of OBC MPs increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s as 
low caste voters became more aware of their common interests and decided to vote for 
candidates from their own social milieu (with 42 percent of Uttar Pradesh population the 
OBCs represented in many Constituencies an unbeatable majority). 
'Mbid.,p.321. 
** Ibid., p. 322. 
"Ibid, 
9t Meenalcslii Jain, "Backward Castes and Social Change in U.P. and Bihar" in M.N. Srinivas (ed.). Caste: 
Its Twentieth Century Avatar, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1996), p. 147. 
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With the erosion of its institutional base in the 1980s, the Congress found it more 
difficult to incorporate the OBCs and Scheduled Castes into the Congress system. There 
was a concerted move in 1988-9 to win back Scheduled Castes voters who were 
increasingly being alienated from the Congress. But all this was largely to no avail. The 
Congress faced serious competition from the Bahujan Samaj Party, which was actively 
mobilizing the Scheduled Castes and failed to evolve a tangible strategy to counter the 
BSP, mainly because it did not have a single reputable Dalit leader with a significant 
mass base. The Congress government made some effort to win over the OBCs by 
promulgating an ordinance in January 1989 granting retrospective reservation to OBCs in 
government employment granted to them by the Janata government in 1977, but it could 
00 
not be implemented because of litigation in High Court. The formation of Janata Dal 
government in New Delhi and UP reinforced the crystallization of politics around two 
central tendencies: the Congress with its base among the socio-economic elite of upper 
castes and some lingering support among Dalits, and the Janata Dal with its main support 
among the OBCs and Muslims. Unlike in 1977, the Janata Dal government in 1989-90 
accorded the greatest primacy to reservation for the OBCs. Over time the OBCs had 
forged alliances among themselves and with Jats, and had won a fair degree of legislative 
representation, but their presence was not strong enough to shape the political discourse 
in Uttar Pradesh. 
The turning point was V.P. Singh's decision to implement the Mandal 
Commission recommendations on reservation of jobs for the OBCs in public 
employment.'"*^ In UP, Mulayam Singh Yadav was a strong votary of reservations and he 
spearheaded a campaign for implementing the Mandal recommendations."" His 
government promulgated an ordinance providing for 15 percent reservation in 
government service for the OBCs in July 1989, even before the central government's 
reservation policy was announced.'°^ Latter in 1990, the quota was increased to 27 
" See "Wooing the Backward Vote", Editorial, Patriot (Delhi), July 3, 1989. 
'°° For an understanding of V.P. Singh's logic in introducing reservations see Seema Mustafa, The Lonely 
Prophet: A Political Biography of V.P. Singh, (Delhi: Wiley Eastern, 1995). 
"" Mulayam Singh Yadav stated in an interview that it was his duty to implement the Mandal 
recommendations. The Sunday Observer, September 2, 1990. 
'"^  As in the case of central government policy, the UP government's decision was criticized for being 
modulated by electoral considerations. See 'Yadav Tries to Carve a Constituency', The Times of India 
(Delhi),Augustll,1990. 
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percent that included Muslim groups, i.e. non-ashraf. This announcement was 
undoubtedly intended to give reservations precedence over the Ayodhya issue. This was 
certainly a successful effort to play the caste as a metaphor for power in coming 
elections. Convinced that lower caste politics and Hindu nationalism are basically 
opposed to each other, Mulayam Singh Yadav privileged caste solidarities by 
emphasizing the mobilization of lower castes on the platform of social justice against 
upper castes. Notwithstanding, the Ayodhya movement managed to shift the political 
discourse firom reservation to Hindu nationalism and Hindu unity. Soon the caste conflict 
turned into Hindu-Muslim polarization and rioting in which Muslims were the main 
victims. 
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CHAPTER; THREE 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR OF MUSLIMS: 1950s TO 
1980s 
In the post-colonial electoral dynamics of Uttar Pradesh, religion has played an 
important role in the crystallization of political identities. And the subsequent target of 
these identities for electoral mobilization has always been an attractive strategy for all 
political parties in the state. In this context, it was second to impossible for the Muslims 
to remain isolated from and uninfluenced by the open appeals to ethnic identity central to 
political campaigns of political parties. At the same time, electoral democracy based on 
universal adult suffrage has provided Muslims an opportunity to participate as fully equal 
members of the polity. They have integrated themselves into the larger group in order to 
play the games of politics according to the majority's rules. But they do so to keep in 
view the potential of their minority identity in order to avoid political negligence for the 
group. 
In British India, there were a number of areas where Muslims were 
geographically concentrated and had found it possible to exercise local domination 
through the political process, although the sub-continent as a whole had an overwhelming 
majority of Hindus. The Partition in 1947, however, ensured that the Muslims remaining 
in the Indian Union would be a minority that were geographically dispersed, for virtually 
all the Muslim dominant areas went to Pakistan. During the Constituent Assembly 
deliberations that began after Independence, it was thought by some tliat minority 
religious group should be allotted legislative seats on a quota basis, but in the end it was 
decided that all groups would compete for the same seats, and the first general elections 
of 1951-52 were conducted on that basis.' 
Before getting into the details of political participation of Muslims, it would be 
useful to have a picture of Muslim distribution in Uttar Pradesh as a whole till 1980s. 
Uttar Pradesh had a Muslim minority of 15.93 percent at the time of 1981 census. This 
' On the decision to eliminate reserved seats for Muslims, see Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: 
Cornerstone of a Nation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 144-156. 
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statistic represented a substantial growth for the Muslim community in Uttar Pradesh, for 
it had increased its numbers by 14.28 percent in 1951,14.63 in 1961 and 15.48 percent in 
1971 census.^  The Muslim minority, however, exhibited the most highly skewed regional 
distribution. Although Muslims constituted approximately 15 percent of the population, 
they were double their average strength in four contiguous districts (Saharanpur, Bijnore, 
Moradabad, and Rampur) in the northern area of the West Plain. Another seven of the 
eighteen districts (Muzaffamagar, Meerut, Bulandshahar, Badaim, Bareilly, Pilibhit, and 
Kheri) in the West Plain had higher than average Muslim populations. By contrast, 
Muslims fell below their average numbers in all but two districts (Sitapur and Barabanki) 
in the Central Plain and three districts (Basti, Gonda, and Bahraich) in the East Plain. The 
lowest Muslim population was in the five districts of the Hills and Plateau region.'' 
State of Muslims after Partition 
The future of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh in the aftermath of Partition looked vague 
and shadowy and in the process, the Muslim leadership itself was lost in the wilderness of 
blood, tears and confusion. The Independence brought a situation in which the remaining 
population of Muslims foimd themselves in a situation for which they were not 
intellectually, emotionally and politically prepared. The outcome proved catastrophic to 
the independent politics of Muslims in India and most particularly in UP after partition. 
"Leading industrial families, trading groups, and practitioners of various professions 
hurried to Pakistan in order to improve their fortunes, leaving behind a socially 
fragmented and economically depressed Muslim community,"^ No doubt the partition of 
the country had exposed UP to a greater degree of stress and tension than most other 
^ Census of India, 1951, Paper No. 2 of 1953. Religion—1951 Census, (New Delhi: Census Commissioner, 
Government of India, 1953); Census of India, 1961, Paper No. 1 of 1963, 1961 Census—Religion, (New 
Delhi: Census Commissioner, Government of India, 1963); Census of India, 1971, Series 1, Part II © (1)— 
Social and Cultural—1971 Census, (New Delhi: Census Commissioner, Government of India, 1976); 
Census of India, 1981, Series I—India. Paper No. 3 of 1984, (New Delhi: Census Commissioner, 
Government of India, 1984). 
' Francine Frankel, "Problems of Correlating Electoral and Economic Variables: An Analysis of Voting 
Behaviour and Agrarian Modernization in Uttar Pradesh" in John Osgood Field and others (eds.), Electoral 
Politics in the Indian States: The Impact of Modernization, (New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1977), pp. 
161-63. 
* Mushirul Hasan, "The Changing Position of the Muslims and the Political Future of Secularism in India" 
in T.V. Sathyamurthy (ed.). Region, Religion, Caste, Gender and Culture in Contemporary India, vol. 3, 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 205. 
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states—"ai-eas most afflicted by riots, the exodus to Pakistan, and a considerable 
'skimming off from the professional classes; a process that continued until the early' 
60s."* Thus, following the establishment of and migration to Pakistan, Indian Muslims 
became a pawn in the hands of political parties and were maneuvered merely to obtain 
their votes. 
The UP government was confronted with the task of devising a strategy to deal 
with the Muslims who stayed back. Although, "the state government took action to 
prevent a large-scale outbreak of rioting or looting, it was not particularly sensitive to 
minority fears and concerns. The state government had a poor record in providing the 
healing touch."* Muslims found that the secular state has not been able to protect their 
lives, property, and even their holy places against Hindu attacks. At the same time, many 
Congress leaders appeared to suspect Muslim loyalty to India. They were of the view that 
"having supported the idea of a separate Muslim nation, those Muslims who had stayed 
back should not object to the dominance of Hindus or Hindu nationalism in India."^ What 
emerges from the actions of the UP government during this period is that it did not 
envisage the need to remove the sense of community from the center of UP politics; 
rather, it approached Muslims as a distinct commimity, which was expected to support 
the Congress party. Congress leaders made it clear that Muslims would be protected, but 
to maintain that protection they should demonstrate their political allegiance to the 
Congress.^  The recognition of the Muslim community as a community defined by its 
religious commitments, combined with concessions given to Hindu nationalists, altered 
the ground rule of majority-minority relations and above all renegotiated the meaning of 
secularism which took the form of an accommodation of religious commimities.^  
It is also important to acknowledge tliat out of their persistent divisions and 
diversities, Muslims, in general, could neither harness their iimer resources to evolve a 
common vision nor work as a collective group in pursuit of shared goals. After 
Independence, in particular, the options of exercising 'free will', as it were, diminished. 
'Ibid. 
* Zoya Hasan, Quest for Power: Oppositional Movements and Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh, 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998\ p. 23. 
' Ibid., p. 24. 
' Lance Brennan, "The State and Communal Violence in UP: 1947-92", South Asia, vol. XVIII, 1994, 
Special Issue, pp. 22-4. 
' Ibid. 
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The supposedly monolithic structure of the Muslim leadership and organization does not 
exist either at national or local level. This is not to deny the absence of community 
consciousness or of communal solidarity, but to emphasize that a separate commimitarian 
consciousness was not always translated into any tangible political reality. 
The political context created by the post partition developments in Uttar Pradesh 
proved otherwise to Muslims. "Afraid of an uncertain future and unaware of the 
implications of the new secular epistemologies, Muslims found no other course left for 
them but to accept the new political reality or ideology and, at the same time, keep the 
flame of Islam alive by making it a personal agenda, the individual creed."'" As a 
consequence, politics for Muslims as Muslims had no raison d'etre. With the Muslim 
League dissolved in the north, particularly in Uttar Pradesh and its leadership now 
located in Pakistan, the political trajectory of the Muslims had to be defined within the 
broad democratic framework that had evolved through a painful and tortuous process and 
depended on the consensual model that Congress was attempting to create in the 
aftermath of Independence and Partition. 
Interrogating Political Consciousness of Muslims 
It goes without saying that in free India Maulana Azad and his proteges had a sole 
claim to the political and intellectual leadership of the Muslim cormnunity. The post-
partition situation had placed Azad into prominence and he emerged as the only 
cognizable center for Muslim Indians. "The Congress Muslims of Maulana Azad's 
generation remained wedded to the concept of composite nationalism and pleaded for 
greater Muslim participation in nation-building. They envisaged a new role for 
themselves, not as leaders of Muslims but as the members of a new political life."" To 
announce a new work-plan for Muslims Azad convened a Muslim convention on 
December 26, 1947 in Lucknow. Mahatama Gandhi himself was very much in the 
background of the convention and had called on Maulana Hifzur Rehman and Ahmed 
Sayeed for making the event a success.'^ 
'° Rashid Shaz, Understanding the Muslim Malaise: A Conceptual Approach in the Indian Context, (New 
Delhi: Miili Publications, 2001), pp. 59-60. 
" Ibid., p. 207. 
'^  Ibid., pp. 52-3. 
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The Indian Union Muslim Conference unanimously passed a resolution calling 
upon Muslims of all shades of political opinion to take a united decision and abjure 
communal politics. The resolution which was moved by Maulana Ahmad Said, vice-
president of Jamiyat al-ulamai-i Hind, said, "This conference of the Muslims of the 
Indian Union has surveyed the terrible happenings that have taken place in India since 
August 1947 and come to the conclusion that they reveal an alarming growth of 
disruptive, antisocial, and reactionary ideas and tendencies in Indian political life 
masquerading under communal and false religious slogans." "Communal parties have, in 
the past, done immense harm to the country and specially the minorities of India and are 
pregnant with even greater danger to their future. The time has, therefore, come when 
Muslims of all shades of political opinion must take an united decision and abjure 
communal politics." Another resolution moved by S.A Brelvi, unanimously adopted by 
the conference called upon the Muslims of India to be members only of non-communal 
political parties and advised them to join the Indian National Congress.'^ The resolutions 
adopted at this convention should rightly be termed as the new manifesto of Indian 
Muslims in free India. 
At this time when the Congress Muslims were nursing their political wounds after 
Independence/Partition, the political initiative was wrested from them by the Jamiyat al-
ulamai-i Hind and the Jamaat-i Islami. Though "competing for political supremacy, their 
members had the same high stakes in making the most of the newly created social and 
political structures. They recognized to mould their political strategy and to restore their 
hold over their followers which were slackened by the fragmentation of leadership and by 
deep ideological schisms."''' 
The Jamiat, which had taken the responsibility of leading the Muslim community 
in the changed situation voluntarily and publicly, purged its political aspirations and 
remained content in being a mere cultural organization and an appendage to the 
Congress.'^  It was founded in 1919 amid the Khilafat enthusiasm, plotted a nationalist, 
anti-colonial course in alliance with the Congress and was closely identified with the 
'^  Resolution adopted at the Indian Muslim Conference on December 28,1947. The Times of India, 
December 29, 1947. 
'^  Mushirul Hasan, "The Changing Position of the Muslims...", op.cit., p. 207. 
" RiisUid ahiu, op.cil., p. 54. 
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forces of composite nationalism.'^ In post-Independence situation, initially its leaders 
acclaimed the democratic and secular principles of the Constitution but latter they 
demanded separate electorates and reservation of seats for Muslims. The Januyat 
expressed the view that Indian Muslims "should [also] realize that in a country like India 
it is only this brand of secularism which can provide safeguards for their culture and 
religious freedom and can give strength to their status as a religious minority. It is, 
therefore, in their own interest to support the secular ideal envisaged in the Constitution 
with sincerity and ardor."'" Soon the Jamiyat leadership stopped talking of politics or 
taking up a political mode of protest to press their demands, limiting themselves to only 
cultural and 'religious' activities.'^ Above all, the Jamiyat acted within a broadly secular 
framework. Its leaders were closely allied with the Congress that, in turn, helped them to 
secure seats in parliament and in the state assembly. Prominent amongst them were 
Maulana Asaf Madani, Ishaq Sambhali, and Hifzur Rahman, 
No doubt there were other ideological groups among the Muslim community, 
which were keeping an eye on the situation, but they were not as influential as the leaders 
of the Jamiyat or Muslims of the Congressite hue. Mention should also be made of Syed 
Abul Ala Maudoodi, known for his strong opposition to both composite nationalism and 
Muslim nationalism, who though himself had shifted to Pakistan, the remnants of his 
Jamaat-i-Islami in India and particularly in UP were nevertheless intellectually active in 
formulating a new strategy for the future which found public expression in Maulana Abul 
Lais Islahi's book Musalmanan-e-Hind Ke Liye Aainda ka Lahae AmaU first published in 
1957,^ ° But at that time this voice was so weak that it could not attract many people. 
Though otherwise Islamically sound, this approach failed to generate a public debate. 
Another important development was the meeting of hundreds of Muslims from 
various districts of Uttar Pradesh on March 19, 1950 in Lucknow. It was first of its kind 
to be held in UP after Independence. The meeting was convened by eleven UP 
"' Mushirul Hasan, "The Changing Position of the Muslims...", op.cit., p. 208. 
'^  Z.M. Faruqi, "Indian Muslims and the Ideology of the Secular State" in D.E. Smith (ed.), South Asian 
Politics and Religion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 144. 
" Ibid. 
" On April 17, 1949 at an all India session of the Jamiatul Ulema held in Lucknow, Maulana Hifzur 
Rahman put forward a resolution saying that hence onward the Jamiyat was ceased to exist as a political 
organization and would limit itself to religious and cultural activities. The Times of India, April 19, 1949. 
'" Mauhiiia Abul Lais Islahi Nadvi, Mmalnuman-e-Hind Ke Liye Aainda ka Lahae Atrial, (llampur, 1957). 
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legislators, formerly members of the UP Muslim League Legislature Party, and was 
presided over by Z.H Lari, leader of the Opposition in state assembly, The meeting 
declared that "in order to shake off their present lethargy and frustration and to play due 
part in the administration of the country and reconstruction of society, the Muslims of 
Uttar Pradesh should join some non-communal party." '^ In this context, a standing 
committee of eighteen members, with Mufti Fakhrul Islam, member of the UP legislative 
assembly, was formed to advise the Muslims on this matter. The meeting also appealed to 
"all Muslim religious or cultural organizations particularly Jamiat-ul-Ulcma-e-Hind, 
Muslim League, Jamia Islamia, All-India Shia Conference, and Jamiat-ul-Ansar to merge 
and amalgamate themselves into one body so that all the Muslims irrespective of party 
affiliations may join it and work for the betterment of the community more effectively."^^ 
The meeting expressed its strong opinion that there must be "one live common non-
parliamentary organization to promote and safeguard cultural, religious, educational, 
economic, and other rights and interests of Musalmans."^^ 
Hence, there was utter intellectual confusion over the issue of Muslim's political 
agenda and its potential future role and identity different from that of other communities 
of the country in the post-independence India. Each Muslim leader and ideological 
groupings, about the possible future role of the Muslims, were not only marred by an 
identity crisis but also by a longing for and pangs of the creation of a new identity. 
Muslims in the Electoral Process: 1947-62 
There is a general impression that the Muslim community has on the whole held 
aloof from the political process. No data are available to prove or disapprove this, but 
there is some evidence of increased electoral activity among members of the community. 
When examined at the state-wide level, the data on voting for Muslim candidates, 
presented in Table 1, show no general secular trend over the three elections that have 
been held between 1952 and 1962. The Muslim community had in every election at both 
state and national level polled substantially fewer votes for its candidates than its 14.63 
percent of the population in 1961. Likewise, the number of Muslims elected to office had 
'^ Bombay Chronicle, March 20, 1950. 
" Ibid. 
'' Ibid. 
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been far fewer than would be the case if they were proportionately represented. It is also 
to be noted that there had been a rise in the proportion of votes secured by Muslim 
candidates in the Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections during the first three elections 
(Table 1). The national Parliament vote for Muslims had lagged behind the Assembly 
vote in each election. The disparity may be due to the difference in scale of constituency. 
Six seats for members of the Assembly are contained within each seat for a member of 
the Parliament, so that while the MLA candidates may be able to capitalize on small 
pockets of Muslim concentration the MP seats cover such a wide area that these pockets 
are of negligible importance. Thus more Muslims were willing to contest at the Assembly 
level and, whether as cause or effect of this tendency, Muslim candidates collectively did 
better at the lower level. 
Table 1: Valid Votes Polled By the Muslim Candidates as Percent of the Total Valid Votes Polled in 
UP. 1952-62. 
% of the population 
(1961) 
14.63 
1952 
4.64 
Lok Sabha 
1957 
5.79 
1962 
8.02 
Assembly elections 
19.52 
6.59 
1957 
8.13 
1962 
8.32 
Source: Gopal Krishna, "Electoral Participation and Political Integration" in Centre for the Study of 
Developing Society, Context of Electoral Change in India: General Elections 1967, (New Delhi: Academic 
Books, 1969), p. 39. 
While Muslim candidates contested a large share of seats than their proportion in 
the population, their share of valid votes polled was less than the Muslim community's 
share in the population. This means either that Muslim voters did not vote in the same 
proportion as the rest of the electorate or that many of them voted for non-Muslim 
candidates. Such evidence as is available, suggests that non-Muslims voted in substantial 
numbers for Muslim candidates. Paul Brass, in his study of the Baghpat Assembly 
constituency in Meerut district, has shown that the elected Congress Muslim candidate 
received support from several Hindus.^ '* 
Considerably more important than the number of candidates in the race, of course, 
is the numbers that win. The number of Muslims elected to the Lok Sabha and the State 
Assembly in the three general elections and their proportion in the State Assembly are 
shown in Table 2. The Muslim representation in the State Assembly shows a consistent 
I'aul Urass, h'ucliuncil I'uliiks in an InJiun State: The Congress Party in Ullar Pradesh, (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1965), p. 158. 
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fall. In the Assembly, the number of MLA's elected began at 41 or about 9.53 percent in 
1952, decreased to 38 or 8.84 percent in 1957, dipped to a little less than 7 percent in 
1962. 
Table 2: Number of Muslim Candidates Elected to the Lok Sabha and UP Assembly and Their 
Proportion in the Latter 
% of the population 
(1961) 
14.63 
1952 
7 
Lok Sabha 
1957 
4 
1962 
5 
Assembly elections 
1952 
41 
(9.53) 
1957 
38 
(8.84) 
1962 
28 
(6.58) 
Source: Gopal Krishna, op.cit., p. 41. 
Competitive electoral politics had probably begun to break down the isolation of 
the Muslim electorate from the political process. Commimal solidarity was clearly being 
subjected to pressure by the electoral competition; more than one Muslim candidate 
contesting from the same constituency indicated that the Muslim community did not 
operate as a monolithic entity in politics. That those seeking election have to depend on 
the support of commiuiities other than their own had the effect of broadening their 
horizons, extending their area of concern and in the process promoting the slow 
integration of their community into the emerging secular society.^ ^ The increasing 
tendency for Muslim candidates to assume national party identifications showed that the 
integrative process was at work. A further indication was that Muslim candidates 
contesting elections on the tickets of the national parties as well as independents or on 
"other party" tickets suffered a decline in one election and resurgence in another elections 
in their share of the total votes polled by Muslim candidates (Table 3). 
Table 3: Distribution of the Valid Votes Polled by Muslim Candidates Between the National Parties 
and "Other Parties" and Independents in Election to the UP State Assembly. 
1952 
National 
Parties 
77.98 
Source: Gopai 
Other Parties and 
IND. 
22.02 
Crishna, op.cit., p. 4 
1957 
National 
Parties 
70.12 
2. 
Other Parties and 
IND. 
29.88 
1962 
National 
Parties 
74.37 
Other Parties and 
IND. 
25.63 
" Gopal Krishna, op.cit., p. 40. 
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However, "the most important development in the pattern of party politics 
immediately after Independence was not the formation of new political parties in 
opposition to the Congress, but the disappearance from Uttar Pradesh politics of the main 
opposition to the Congress, the Muslim League. After the partition, the Muslim League 
leaders in Uttar Pradesh left for Pakistan. With the departure of their political leadership 
and the end of separate electorates, Muslim political organization in Uttar Pradesh came 
to abrupt end."^^ It is also to be noted that in the changed political scenario of Uttar 
Pradesh, no Muslim political organization could hope to succeed in having a significant 
effect as an exclusively Muslim political party. Maulana Azad had already conmiented in 
the Indian Union Muslim Conference held in 1947 in Lucknow that any political 
organization of the Muslims and, for that matter, of any other community—howsoever 
nationalist and progressive its outlook—would be harmful to the interest of Muslims and 
the country as a whole and could not be tolerated in the changed circumstances of the 
country. '^ Consequently, the strategies pursued have alternated between loyalty to the 
dominant party, the Congress, during the first fifteen years after Independence, on the one 
hand, attempts to use Muslim vote as a balance in inter-party conflicts in the hope of 
persuading some parties and candidates of various secular political parties to be more 
Oil 
sympathetic to Muslim cause on the other hand. 
It is to be noted that the co-option of Congress Muslims in governmental 
structures restricted their ability to keep up their links with large segments of the mass of 
the Muslim people. The underlying cause behind this shift was the disappearance of 
separate electorates and reserved seats. As a result, they were no longer required to woo 
the Muslim voter. Indeed, with their enlarged constituency, they began to enjoy the 
trappings of power, oblivious of their vulnerability in a system in which communal 
considerations continued to mould political life. This need not have been so. With their 
vast and rich experience of public life, they were ideally placed to lead the Muslims in a 
critical phase of transition and prevent their political alienation. But they did not take 
advantage of the opportunity presented to them after Independence. Instead, they 
" Paul Brass, op.cit., p.23. 
" Presidential address at the Indian Union Muslim Conference at Lucknow on December 27 1947. The 
Times of India, Lucknow, December 28, 1947. 
^' Paul Brass, op.cit., p. 235. 
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preferred to completely incorporate themselves in the status quoistic politics of Congress. 
They eschewed involvement in all issues, which were seen to be specifically Muslim, and 
were likely to leave them vulnerable to charges of promoting sectarian causes. In 
particular, during the first three general elections "the nomination and election process 
work[ed] lo put into the legislatures Muslims who [were] inclined to be docile and not 
raise embarrassing issues too persistently, lest they either not '[got] the ticket' next 
election or [were] shifted to less safe constituencies." It was a clear indication that 
Muslim population was left totally at the mercy of the Congress. For all practical 
purposes Muslims were not at the center stage any more. The fact was that their 
conversion from an active political engagement to passive political players was total. 
Muslims got themselves suspended from the leadership role. They lastly came to believe 
that despite the fact Hindu majority would have an ultimate say in the system it was 
lawfiil for the Muslim to actively participate in it and with the non-Muslim help organize 
their own social life and political leadership. 
In the 1950s, when the Congress was at the zenith of its power, both in national 
and state politics, it regularly won with overwhelming majorities at the polls. The 
examination of the Table 4 & 5 indicates that Congress nominated 43 Muslim candidates 
in 1952 Assembly elections and won 41 seats. A more likely explanation to this victory 
of Congress nominated Muslim candidates lies in the Congress hegemony of the time; it 
could and did elect almost anybody it chose to run anywhere. In 1957 and 1962, 
Congress strength of Muslim MLAs diminished somewhat in the state as a whole. It 
nominated 49 Muslim candidates in 1957, but the Congress returned only 28 Muslim 
MLAs. The major cause for the setback of the Congress Muslims in 1957 and the major 
beneficiaries from its losses in terms of seats were the Independent Muslims who 
increased their share from a mere 3 seats in 1952 to 8 in 1957. Next to the Independent 
candidates, the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) made the gains from what was lost by the 
Congress. Muslim candidates from other parties could not do well. 
29 T.P. Wright (Jr.), "The Effectiveness of Muslim Representation in India" in D.E. Smith (ed.), op.cit., p. 
110. 
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Table 4: Party wise Muslim Candidates in the UP Assembly Elections, 1952-62 
Assembly Elections 
1952 
1957 
1962 
INC 
43 
49 
45 
PSP 
KMPP 
KMPP 
16 
PSP 
23 
19 
soc 
13 
-
20 
CPI 
2 
5 
12 
SWA 
NA 
NA 
13 
RPI 
NA 
NA 
10 
Source: Fieldwork 
Year 
1952 
1957 
1962 
INC 
INC(l) 
41 
28 
22 
NCO 
INC(U) 
ICJ 
-
-
-
Table 5: 
CPI 
-
-
2 
CPM 
-
-
-
All Party Muslim MLA's, 1952-1962. 
SOC 
SSP 
SOC 
1 
-
-
PSP 
KMPP 
-
PSP 
2 
2 
BJS 
BJP 
-
-
-
SWA 
JNP 
SWA 
-
-
JNP(SC) 
LKD 
-
-
-
RPI 
-
-
3 
JD 
-
-
-
BKD 
-
-
-
ESP 
-
-
-
IND 
3 
8 
-
0 
-
-
-
Source: Fieldwork 
Hence, Muslims voted predominantly for the Congress until 1962 in both Lok 
Sabha and Legislative Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh. But soon Muslims withdrew 
their support from the party, which was conspicuously manifested in the 1967 General 
Elections. This was the result of increasing Muslim discontent over the issue of Urdu, the 
status of Aligarh Muslim University, and the increased level of communal violence. 
Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat 
With the effort of Maulana Hifzur Rahman the All-India Muslim convention 
concluded at New Delhi on June 11, 1961. The resolution passed at this convention 
embraced such subjects as national integration; measures to minimize disturbances of a 
communal nature; restoration of homes, mosques, and imambaras to Muslims; adequate 
share for the community in services, trade, and commerce; encouragement of Urdu 
including the establishment of an Urdu university.^ ^ It was on the initiative of Maulana 
S. Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, a prominent divine of the Muslim community, and S. 
Mahmood, a former Member of Parliament, that an All-India Muslim Consultative 
Convention was convened at Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulema, Lucknow, during 8-9 
August 1964. This meeting was consequent upon review of the situation arising out of 
30 The Times of India, June 12,1964. 
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communal riots and to devise ways and means to check the increasing influence of the 
communal organizations like the Jana Sangh and the RSS, which were alleged to have 
been behind all the communal disturbances in the country. The convention took stock of 
the situation and expressed grave concern over the alleged anti-Muslim policies and 
activities of the Jana Sangh and the RSS.''' 
Dr. Syed Mahmud drew the attention of the convention to six aspects of the 
situation in the country vis-a-vis Muslims. "Firstly, Muslims should dismiss the idea that 
they were unwanted and persuade others to come closer to them. Secondly, the need of 
the hour was unity among Muslims. This was a basic need without which neither 
individuals nor society could prosper. The convention should explore all possibilities of 
unity and integration. If it failed, it would stand convicted in the history. Thirdly, the 
communal disturbances had put Muslims in a peculiar state of confusion, helplessness, 
and despair and some were intent upon leaving their homeland. The convention should 
find ways and means of eliminating the possibility of such disturbances and restore the 
confidence of Muslims. Fourthly, Muslims had been isolating themselves from the social 
and political currents of the country. This state of affairs was neither happy for the 
country nor for the Muslims. Fifthly, it could not be denied that on religious and cultural 
levels, Muslims were exposed to a number of threats. Finally, Muslims had been lagging 
behind in the field of education and commerce."^^ The convention in its Resolution No. 8 
expressed its dissatisfaction on the role of some Muslim members of Parliament and state 
assemblies. In the opinion of this meeting, "the attitude of Muslim members in this 
respect particularly disappointing and regrettable, as it was their bounden duty to make 
every effort to invite the attention of the government to the state of the oppressed 
Muslims."''^  It appealed to them to re-examine their attitude. It also appealed to Muslim 
members that "it is their duty, to voice the problems and grievances of Muslims. The 
Muslim community can never forgive their avoidance of or indifference to this duty." 
It was strongly felt at the Convention that there should be a common forum for the 
Muslims to discuss their grievances and to work unitedly for the well being of the 
" S.M. Sayeed, "Role of Muslim Majlis in UP Politics", in Verinder Grover (ed.), Political System in 
India: Party System and Political Parties, vol.5. (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1989), p. 544. 
'^  The Times of India. August 9, 1964. 
" Pamphlet distributed by All-India Muslim Consultative Convention. 
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Muslims. The organization, thus formed, was named Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat— 
Muslim Consultative Committee—that is indicative of the fact that this was merely a 
consultative body for the Muslims all over the country. The main objective behind the 
formation of Majlis was as follows:^  
1. To bring about better understanding and promote unity amongst the various 
communities and sections inhabiting the country, especially Hindus, Muslims, 
Harijans, Christians, Sikhs, Parsees, Buddhists, Jains, etc.; 
2. To organize meetings, seminars, symposiums in various parts of the country in 
order to promote communal harmony and good will; 
3. To enlist the support of the members of all communities for the 'full 
implementation of the secular ideals of the Constitution of India, that is, the ideals 
of neutrality and non-discrimination by the state on ground of religion, caste, 
creed, and colour; 
4. To endeavour and bring nearer to each other all the Muslim and non-Muslim 
organization working for the uplift of communities and the country. 
5. To bring to the notice of the government and the people of India the grievances of 
the Muslims and others; 
6. To ensure that Muslims as a community live up to the high ideals of Islam and do 
not let themselves drift firom the mainstream of the social, cultural, economic, and 
political progress of the country but play their part in all activities ultimately 
leading to the country's advancement in the world and of humanity at large; 
7. To adopt peacefijl and legal measures in connection with the problems relating to 
the religious, educational, linguistic, cultural, and economic interests of the 
Muslims in particular and of others in general; 
8. To organize imits of the Majlis at the state level only for the achievements of the 
above objects; and 
9. To take such other steps as may be necessary with a view to the implementation 
of the objects hereinbefore mentioned. 
It is important to note that Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat was a federation of various 
socio-political Muslim organizations with different political ideologies, such as the 
'^^ Extracts from pamphlet conlaininB tlic constitution oftlic Muslim Majlis-c-Musliawarut. 
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Indian Union Muslim League, the Jamat-i-Islami, the Jamiyat al-jilaknai-i Hind, Khilafat • // 
Party, the Progressive Muslim League, the Anjuman-e-Tameer-i-M|llat etc. as weltas ofyi 
independent Muslims. It is also to be noted that all the above organizations have t^h'eir 
own ideals, objectives, political affiliations and religious attitudes. Thus, the Mushawarat 
was an attempt to unite a host of diverse organizations into one whole and, thereby, 
prepare a united force of the Muslims to pressurize the government for giving greater 
protection to the minorities. In Uttar Pradesh, the Mushawarat started functioning with 
the holding of its meetings at Allahabad on March 26, 1966 and at Rampur and 
Moradabad on April 1 and April 9,1966, respectively.^ ^ 
To keep in view the discontents of some of its members on active politics, 
Mushawarat decided to plunge into electoral politics with a Nine-Point Manifesto,^ ^ 
despite the initial reluctance of the Jamat-i-Islami. As a token of its impartiality, the 
Committee ruled that none of its office bearer could be candidates themselves in the 
forthcoming General Elections of 1967. Instead, it established criteria of acceptability for 
candidates (secularity, lack of bigotry and discrimination) and proposed to bargain with 
existing parties and their candidates of whatever religion for the Majlis' endorsement." 
The Majlis' demands were a combination of distinctively Muslim concerns such as 
retention of Muslim Personal Law, election rather than appointment of religious 
endowment boards, removal of unsecular textbooks, preservation of the Muslim character 
of Aligarh Muslim University, recognition of Urdu as a second language in Bihar, UP, 
Delhi, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, and creation of Minority Boards to redress 
grievances, along with general moral and welfare improvement measures: prohibition of 
alcohol, censorship of obscene literature and films, abolition of untouchability, free 
education and medical care, unemployment insurance and accident compensation. Finally 
it included proportional representation, an obvious device to increase minority and small 
party strength and bargaining power. This was undoubtedly a new trend in Muslim 
politics, for this was the first occasion that Muslims had placed certain conditions for 
" A.J. Faridi, Presidential Address, at Rampur Conference, August 1967, p. 4. 
'* Radiance Views Weekly, December 25, 1966, p. 14 and May 14, 1967, p. 4. 
" Theodore P. Wright, Jr., "Muslims as Candidates and Voters in 1967 General Elections", in Verinder 
Grover (ed.), op.cit., vol. 6, p. 248. 
'* Ibid., pp. 248-249. 
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supporting candidates and parties hankering for their votes. As a result of its policy, the 
Mushawarat supported a number of candidates belonging to various parties (Table 6). 
Table 6: Candidates Supported by the Majlis-e-Mushawarat in UP, 1967 General Elections. 
Details 
Lok Sabha Elections 
Legislative Assembly Elections 
Grand Total 
INC 
1 
- , 
1 
SWA 
8 
30 
38 
PSP 
3 
19 
22 
SSP 
10 
41 
51 
RPI 
3 
7 
10 
CPI 
3 
7 
10 
CPM 
-
3 
3 
IND 
7 
29 
36 
TOTAL 
35 
136 
171 
Source: S.M. Sayeed, op.cit., p. 547. 
It is evident from Table 6 that, barring one, in all the Assembly and parliamentary 
constituencies the Mushawarat extended its support to the candidates of the opposition 
parties only. It was due to the strong opposition of the Congress by A.J. Faridi. He held 
that Congress having been in power since Independence was primarily responsible for the 
injustices to Muslims and therefore should be thrown out of the office regardless of some 
meritorious individuals on its ticket.^' The leaders of the Mushawarat actively 
campaigned for their candidates. It is impossible to say in the absence of survey data 
what proportion of the vote for the Majlis favorites was made up of Muslims who would 
otherwise have voted for Congress. But there is no denying the fact that in the beginning 
the Mushawarat wielded considerable support of the Muslim masses, especially in the 
rural areas. In some constituencies it was due to Mushawarat that a considerable majority 
unseated the Congress candidates.'"' 
However, the overall performance of the Mushawarat in the elections was 
extremely poor (Table 7). It is also noted that majority of the Mushawarat's backed 
elected candidates belonged to non-Muslims. '^ In short, the Mushawarat contributed to a 
net decline in the number of Muslim legislators, but then the Committee's purpose was 
not to elect Muslims per se but to put in office candidates sympathetic to the minority, or 
at least not prejudiced against it (Table 8). But once the candidates were elected, they 
forgot ail the promises which they had made in order to gain the support of the 
Mushawarat and under the Samyukt Vidhayak Dal (SVD) government which they joined, 
the interests of the minorities remained just as unprotected as they were under Congress 
39 National Herald, Lucknow, January 3, 1967, p. 5 and Link, January 22, 1967, p. 11. 
'"' S.M. Sayeed, "Role of Muslim Majlis in UP Politics", in Verinder Grover (ed.), op.cit., vol. 5, pp. 547-
548. 
"' Theodore P. Wright, Jr., "Muslims as Candidates and Voters in 1967 General Elections", op.cit., p. 250. 
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regime.'*^  It seems likely that this first effort by a Muslim pressure group to sway the 
outcome of an election failed either to "deliver" a solid bloc of Muslim votes or to 
increase substantially the number of Muslim and sympathetic Hindu legislatures. 
Table 7; Candidates Elected with the Support of the Mushawarat in UP, 1967 General Elections. 
Details 
Lok Sabha Elections 
Legislative Assembly Elections 
Grand Total 
SWA 
1 
7 
8 
PSP 
-
4 
4 
SSP 
4 
17 
21 
RPI 
1 
2 
3 
CPI 
2 
2 
4 
CPM 
-
1 
1 
IND 
3 
6 
9 
TOTAL 
11 
39 
50 
Source: S.M. Sayeed, op.cit., p. 548. 
Nonetheless, the 1967 election had one good lesson to teach, and it was that the 
Miislims were not a mere vestigial entity but could substantially influence the results of 
the elections. It was for the first time that a sizable section of the Muslims voters en bloc 
exercised votes against the Congress and supported the opposition. This was also for the 
first time, on the initiative of the Mushawarat, that Muslims cast their votes on individual 
merits of the candidates instead of the ideological basis or party grounds. This brought a 
shift for a candidates-oriented pattern of voting instead of the party-oriented voting 
behaviour. 
Table 8; All Party Muslim MLA's, 1967-1989. 
Year 
1967 
1969 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1985 
1989 
INC 
INC(I) 
18 
13 
22 
6 
30 
30 
11 
NCO 
INC(U) 
ICJ 
-
-
NCO 
2 
-
INC(U) 
4 • 
ICJ 
3 
-
CPI 
-
-
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
CPM 
I 
SOC 
SSP 
SSP 
2 
2 
• 
• 
-
-
-
PSP 
KMPP 
• 
1 
-
• 
-
-
-
BJS 
BJP 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
SWA 
JNP 
3 
2 
-
JNP 
37 
-
-
-
JNP(SC) 
LKD 
-
-
• 
• 
JNP(SC) 
9 
LKD 
13 
RPI 
2 
1 
• 
-
-
-
JD 
13 
BK.D 
-
10 
11 
ESP 
-
-
-
-
-
-
5 
IND 
-
6 
1 
4 
3 
3 
8 
0 
-
-
MUL 
1 
-
JNP 
(SR) 
Source: Compiled from Election Commission Reports. 
It is also important to note that the Jana Sangh made capital out of the conflict 
between the Congress and the Mushawarat. Jana Sangh secured 98 seats in the assembly 
elections as against 2 seats in 1952, 17 seats in 1957 and 49 seats in the 1962 elections. 
The main reasons for the steady progress of the Jana Sangh were the general 
42 Siraat News-weekly, Lucknow, July 26, 1968. 
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dissatisfection of the people with the Congress rule and the division of Muslim votes 
between the Congress and the Mushawarat-supported candidates. It is in this way 
Mushawarat electoral policy proved helpful in increasing the power of the Jana Sangh 
and this was quite contrary to the very purpose of its creation.'*^ 
It is worth arguing that Mushawarat was an unsuccessful attempt at combining the 
different Muslim organizations of different shades of opinion and political ideologies. 
This was a federation formed upon weak ties between the constituent units. There might 
be certain issues over which there is unanimity among the Muslims but how can there be 
unanimity among the organizations of differing ideologies with regard to the methods to 
be adopted for tackling those problems? It is in this light, it was difficult for the 
Mushawarat to formulate an effective policy without causing injiory to the ideological 
beliefs of its units. At the same time, it was not a tangible decision to formulate a political 
policy without securing unity of its constituents. If the Mushawarat was formed to protect 
the interests of the minorities and make efforts for getting certain facilities from the 
government, it ought to have evolved a definite political policy and strived to help in 
installing a goverrmient under which their interests would be protected properly. 
Soon after the general elections of 1967, the leaders of the Mushawarat began to 
feel that the Mushawarat should be reconstituted and its policies revised in the light of the 
experiences of the elections. Consequently, a new constitution was drafted and the 
Mushawarat was dissolved with a view to reorganize it on the basis of the new 
constitution. This was in reality the collapse of the Mushawarat, at least in UP. 
Muslim Majlis: A Failed Experiment 
Within four years of its formation some of the leaders of Mushawarat realized that 
it was unwise for the Muslim community to keep itself aloof from politics and fall back 
upon the mercy of the government. As a result a meeting of the Working Committee of 
the UP Muslim Majlis was held at Lucknow on 3 Jime 1968. It had taken decision to 
form a political party with the name Muslim Majlis. This decision was confirmed by the 
meeting of the Council of the Muslim Majlis under the presidentship of Abdul Jaleel 
" S.M. Sayeed, op.cit., p. 550. 
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Faridi. The Council also adopted the Constitution of the Muslim Majlis.'^ '* The 
Constitution guaranteed the preservation of language, religion, and culture of the 
Muslims, Scheduled Castes, and other people belonging to backward classes but these 
guarantees were cast to the winds in Uttar Pradesh. Urdu, which was not only the 
language of Muslims, but also of the majority community residing in the state was 
throttled; lesions taught in schools were against the basic tenets of Islam and a culture of 
a section of people was imposed on the inhabitants in the name of Indian culture. There 
was also a wave of planned disturbances of which the victims were always Muslims. All 
this happened with Congress government in office. Protests invariably fell on deaf ears.**^  
After independence, this was the first political party constituted by the Muslims in UP to 
safeguard the interests of the minorities in general and of the Muslims in particular. In a 
sense, the formation of Muslim Majlis was the culmination of a long historical process 
extending over two decades. 
The formation of Muslim Majlis as a political party was greatly opposed by a 
major section of the Muslims on the ground of its devastating impact on the peace and 
harmony of the country. The word 'Muslim' prefixed to the name of this party had also 
been objected. But the President of the Majlis, Faridi, categorically refused to drop the 
word 'Muslim' from the name of his party and declared, "We do not want to dodge and 
defraud the people, like some political parties are doing. We believe in playing as fair and 
honest a game in politics as in any other sphere of life. We practice what we profess, 
though we know very well that in India, hypocrisy pays very good dividends."*^ He also 
strongly refuted the charge that the Majlis was a communal party based on religion and 
claimed that since it was striving for getting only those facilities, which had already been 
guaranteed to the minorities by the Constitution of India."*^  
Initially, the Majlis decided to contest the mid-term polls as an independent party. 
It applied to the Election Commission for the "half-moon with a star" symbol, which was 
allotted, to it by the Election Commission. But later on, the Election Commission 
withdrew the symbol on the objection of certain political parties who contended that the 
^* Siraat News-Weekly, Lucknow, July 26, 1968. 
•** A.J. Faridi, Presidential Address at the First Annual Conference of the Muslim Majlis, February, 1970, p. 4. 
''' Ibid 
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symbol allotted to the Majlis was a religious symbol. As a protest against the withdrawal 
of the allotted symbol, the President of the Majlis decided not to contest the elections as 
an independent political party.''^  The Majlis entered into the electoral fray in the name of 
the Federation of the Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and other Minorities. The 
Federation set up, rather adopted, 90 candidates belonging to different parties like the 
Republican Party, the Backward Party, the Mazdoor Parishad, and other organizations of 
the minorities.'*^ But again the alliance proved ineffective as only five out of ninety 
contestants could win the elections. It is also doubtful if these members were elected to 
the Assembly merely because of the support of the Majlis or because of their own merit 
and work. Anyway, united front proved to be a flop. What was more shocking for the 
Majlis that almost all the elected members except one defected from the Majlis shortly 
after the elections.^ ° The defection simply proved that there was no ideological 
commitment of the elected members with this party, but they had joined the party merely 
because of political opportunism. 
Table 9: Performance of Muslim Majlis in Mid-term Parliamentary Elections, 1971 
Constituencies 
Kanpur 
Ghazipur 
Amroha 
Muzzaffaniagar 
Moradabad 
Total vaiid votes polled 
2,44,185 
2,73,828 
2,68,312 
3,75,460 
2,37,937 
Votes secured by the 
Majlis 
1,258 
3,463 
18,154 
4,061 
7,880 
Votes secured by the 
Majlis (%) 
0.2 
1.2 
14.7 
1.0 
3.4 
Source: S.M. Sayeed, op.cit., p. 561 
It happened during mid-term parliamentary elections of 1971, Muslim Majlis 
supported the Indira Gandhi' Congress (R) and decided not to launch its candidates 
against the Congress (R). It was out of the compulsions of oblique alliance with 
Communist Party, Congress (R) left five seats uncontested. Muslim Majlis filled its 
candidates in the remaining parliamentary constituencies of Moradabad, Kanpur, 
Muzzaffamagar, Amroha and Ghazipur (Table 9). Muslims heavily populated these 
constituencies. Notwithstanding, Majlis lost all the five seats it contested. The validity of 
the claim of the Muslim Majlis that it commands the confidence of the Muslim 
48 
50 
S.M. Sayeed, op.cit., p. 558. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. pp. 558-559. 
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community got evaporated. The poor percentage of votes obtained by the MajHs is an 
evidence of the extent of its popularity among the Muslim community. The dismal 
performance of the Majlis could be attributed to many factors. First, Majlis supported the 
Congress (R) but failed enter into an alliance with it. Secondly, Majlis enjoyed the 
confidence of only less educated Muslims and the major section of the Muslims were 
deadly against the formation of a separate Muslim political party. Thirdly, Majlis was 
still to achieve the political maturity and has completed only three years of age. Finally, 
the major threat to the Majlis came from the Indian Union Muslim League which was 
penetrating into UP and had established its branches in some parts of the State. 
Voting Behaviour of Muslims: 1974 to 1980 
It is conunonly agreed that Muslim voters have been a mainstay of Congress 
Party dominance since 1951.^' But by the late 1960s, Muslims along with other 
oppressed groups had begim the search for permanent alternative of Congress. In this 
pursuit, Muslim community in Uttar Pradesh partially defected from the Congress in the 
1967 elections. As a consequence, the Congress failed to emerge as a ruling party." By 
that time, however, many die-hard Congress Muslims had left the party. As they start 
overcoming the trauma of partition and fear psychosis, Muslims felt free to support 
political parties other than the Congress. Weiner observes, "the emerging middle class 
within the Muslim community felt it had won less from the Congress government than 
some other communities. More and more Muslims drifted to other political parties as 
Muslim organizations became more assertive." It was clearly reflected in the 1974 
Assembly elections. The Muslims were not happy with the attitude of the Congress 
government on Aligarh Muslim University Act, the then pending bill in Parliament on 
change in personal law and non-recognition of Urdu as the second official language in the 
State. In opposition to the Congress, Majlis joined the alliance of BKD and SSP^ '* and 
agreed to contest election with common election symbol and one leader—Charan Singh 
" Norman Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience, (Durmam: Duke 
University Press, 1975), p. 294. 
" See, Wright, "Muslims as Candidates and Voters in 1967 General Elections", op.cit. 
" Myron Weiner, India at the Polls: A Study of the Parliamentary Elections, (New Delhi: M. Manoharlal 
Publishers, 1984). 
'•* Hindustan Times, January 9, 1974. 
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portrayed as Chief Minister if the alliance returns to the power." In the adjustment of 
seats, the Majlis was given 26 seats to contest in the UP Assembly elections of 1974. In 
this election Faridi along with Shafiqur Rehman, Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi toured UP 
and sought support for the Majlis alliance.^ ^ But the overall election results supported the 
Congress. Out of the total number of 411 Muslim contestants only 40 were able to secure 
victory. There were 22 Muslim MLAs from the Congress and 11 from the BKD. Majlis 
failed to increase its seats and only secured 3 seats out of 26 candidates. The greatest set 
back for the Majlis was the defeat of its leader Habib Ahmad from Allahabad by a margin 
of 176 votes. This was mainly of the reason of other two Muslim candidates representing 
the Congress and the Muslim League. As a consequence, Jana Sangh candidate got 
benefit out of it and declared elected." This was the usual irony associated with Muslim 
politics in Uttar Pradesh. 
A political party solely representing the Muslim cause seemed to have no political 
ftiture in UP It did not mean that political awareness was not taking place in the Muslims. 
They were really getting conscious of their political identity. The ever-increasing 
disillusionment of Muslims with Congress was the case in point. The relative stability of 
the Muslim's support to Congress was challenged in the post-Emergency elections. The 
ruling party's campaign of "slum clearance" and "sterilization" for birth control and 
subsequent "police firings" during Emergency alienated the Muslims from the Congress. 
Needless to say, it was Muslim community who showed a greater willingness to fight 
against the government during the emergency than did other communities.^ ^ Weiner notes 
that Muslims flocked to the polls to vote against Congress in the 1977 Lok Sabha 
elections and for Janata party candidates. The Muslim Majlis and Jamat-i-Islami actively 
supported the Janata campaign against the Congress.^' The Majlis was allotted two Lok 
" Explaining why the Muslim Majlis had joined hands with the BKD, the President of the Majlis, Faridi, 
said that BKD was capable of getting votes for the Majlis candidates. The BKD leader, Charan Singh, had 
also assured him that his party would try its best to mdce Urdu the second official language of the State. 
The Times of India, January 12, 1974. 
'* Laiqur Rahman Khan, "The Problems of Indian Muslims: An Overview", Indian Journal of Politics, vol. 
xix, no. 3 & 4, September-December, 1985, p. 115. 
"Ibid. 
** Myron Weiner, op.cit., p. 115. 
" Wright, Jr., "Muslims in the 1977 Lok Sabha Elections" in Verinder Grover (ed.), op.cit., vol. 7, pp. 231 -233. 
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Sabha seats to contest, Sultanpur and Fatehpur constituencies. The candidates of the 
Majlis were ZulfiqaruUah and Bashir Ahmad.^ '^  
It is interesting to note that the Muslim community did not bother about their 
ideologically and diametrically opposed constituent of Janata Party that was Jana Sangh. 
In the other words, Muslims were so irritated with the Congress that they let their 
contention against the Jana Sang easily evaporate. The Congress' strategy to nominate 
large chunk of Muslims as candidate '^, public statements of support from Muslim 
dignitaries and the Urdu press, beholden to the ruling party^ ,^ appointments of token 
Muslim "show"^ ^ and premises of subsidies for Urdu simply could not withstand the 
Janata "hawa" in North India and most particularly in Uttar Pradesh. On the opposite 
side, the shahi imam of Jama Masjid, Syed Abdullah Shah Bukhari, had toured the 
country to oppose Mrs. Indira Gandhi's government.^ This had played havoc with the 
fiiture of Congress and the Muslim community sided with the opposition. It was only 
25.9 percent of the vote in Muslim constituencies of Uttar Pradesh had been cast for 
Congress and Janata won overwhelming victories in the Muslim constituencies.*^ The 
two candidates of the Majlis were also declared elected and ZulfiqaruUah was included in 
the ministry of Janata govenmient. 
Like the Lok Sabha elections of 1977, Majlis fully supported the Janata Party in 
the UP Assembly elections of 1977. It got 10 seats to contest on the Janata Party ticket.** 
The electoral results favoured the fortune of Majlis and its 8 candidates out of 10 were 
declared elected. The elected members were UP Majlis President, Habib Ahmad, Mohd. 
Masood Khan, Khalilullah Qureishi, Chhotey Lai Nirbhay, Abdul Hafeez, Fazlul Bari, 
** Laiqur Rahman Khan, op.cit. 
*' Congress nominated thirty-eight Muslims in the 1977 Lok Sabha election, which was a sharp increase 
over the twenty-five presented in 1971. 
''^  For example, Jamiat-ul-Mansoor Hyderabad, Urdu Adabi Majlis, Urdu Newspapers Association, Chief 
of Ajmer Sharif, Jamiat-ul-Qureshi, Madhya Pradesh Momin Conference, UP, Aqaliyati Pamanda, Bihar 
Madarsa School Board Association. See particularly the pro-Congress appeal by some Muslim 
intellectuals, chiefly at Jamia Millia Islamia (Hindustan Times, February 10,1977) and the denigration of 
them after the election in "Lest We Forget: Emergency in an Academic Ghetto", Economic and Political 
Weekly, April 30, 1977, pp. 706-707. Cited from the footnote of Wright, Jr., "Muslims in the 1977 Lok 
Sabha Elections", op.cit., p. 238. 
*' For example, Aminuddin Ahmad Khan of Loharu as Governor of Himachal Pradesh (February 18, 1977) 
and Mirza Hameedullah Beg as Chief Justice of India over the head of a senior Justice, Statement Weekly, 
February 5,1977. Cited from Ibid. 
*^  Myron Weiner, op.cit., p. 118. 
"ibid., pp. 121-23. 
** The Daily Qaumi Awaz (Lucknow), May 23 1977. 
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Mushtaq Ahmad Ansari aiid Nanhey Lai Kureel.**^  Moreover, the united opposition 
succeeded in making the Emergency and the restoration of democracy the main issue of 
the electoral campaign. Apart from other things, the principal achievement, which helped 
the Janata Party win the election, was the formation of a broad-based centrist party with 
en bloc Muslim support. Thus riding the crest of an anti-Congress wave, the Janata Party 
swept aside the Congress by winning the parliamentary' and Uttar Pradesh Assembly 
elections of 1977. 
But contrary to the expectations of general Muslims, the Janata government could 
not fulfil their demands. For instance, Urdu was not granted as second official language 
of UP, minority character of the AMU was not restored, and it could not even stop the 
communal disturbances that took place in Uttar Pradesh within months of Janata victory. 
The Muslims finally realized the fallout of the unholy alliance between Janata Party and 
Jana Sangh. It is in this phase of turmoil. Congress came out in its usual style to assert its 
claim as a real protector of the Muslims and denounced the Janata government as 
ineffectual. Mrs. Gandhi tried hard to win the confidence of the Muslim community in 
the 1980 parliamentary elections. It is in this pursuit, she was successful in getting the 
endorsement of Imam Bukhari. Mrs. Gandhi also regretted for all misdeeds against the 
Muslim community during Emergency. She promised the protection, preservation and 
promotion of Urdu, non-interference in Muslim personal laws, also assured the minority 
character of the Aligarh Muslim University, and equitable employment opportunities to 
minorities.^ ^ Mrs. Gandhi also welcomed back to the Congress party H.N. Bahuguna who 
had been regarded as a friend by the Muslim population of Uttar Pradesh when he was 
Congress chief minister in the state.^ ^ 
Notwithstanding, Indira Gandhi's efforts to win over the Muslims during the 1980 
elections were only partially rewarded in Uttar Pradesh. The 1980 election, however, 
reminded that the Muslim's support to Janata Party in 1977 was not an accidental 
phenomenon. The vote for Congress in Muslim constituencies of the State only rose to 
Laiqur Rahman Khan, op.cit., p. 116. 
*'* Ibid., pp. 116-20. Also see. Correspondence between Indira Gandhi andSyed Abdullah Bukhari, Imam 
of Jama Masjid, (New Delhi: Indian National Congress, 1979). 
^ Myron Weiner, op.cit., p. 118. 
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34.4 percent.'^ It was Charan Singhs's newly formed party, the Lok Dal, which 
performed better than the Congress in the Muslim constituencies. The Lok Dal won 12 
out of the 23 Muslim constituencies and secured 35.3 percent of the vote in 23 Muslim 
constituencies as against the 34.4 percent gained by the Congress and 22.1 percent to the 
Janata Party. In the remaining 62 constituencies where Muslims constituted less than 20 
percent of the population, Lok Dal won only 26.7 percent of the vote, Congress 36.5 
percent. It was in this election that 99 Muslim candidates were in the field of UP, of 
which 17 candidates could win the Lok Sabha seats.^ ^ It was the largest figure since 
Independence. Bereft of any doubt, Muslim participations for political gain had increased 
comparatively. 
While in the Assembly elections of 1980 in UP, Congress and Lok Dal nominated 
a huge number of Muslim candidates to attract the Muslim vote. It was around 30 Muslim 
candidates from the Congress, 9 from the Lok Dal were elected (Table 8). But so far as 
the Muslim votes were concerned, it was divided between the Congress and the Lok Dal. 
Therefore, Lok Dal emerged as the second largest party, just 7 percentage points behind 
the Congress total vote share. It is in this light one can safely rightly argue that, while the 
Congress party won back a considerable portion of the Muslim vote, a large proportion of 
the Muslims in Uttar Pradesh must have voted for the Lok Dal. It was characterized, as 
the Muslim voters were getting aware of the logic of electoral politics. They became 
more assertive, competitive and increasingly demanded responses from political parties. 
They had realized the fact that there was no fruit in remaining a part of Congress' 
strategy of "vote bank". Muslims had clearly demonstrated that they were thoroughly 
disillusioned with the Congress. They by and large start favouring the non-Congress 
nominees of the opposition party to defeat the Congress nominee. " 
However, the process of political awakening of Muslim electorates and their 
alienation from the Congress was temporarily hijacked rather frozen in the wake of the 
assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Like others, Muslim voters too demonstrated a 
strong element of sympathy for Rajiv Gandhi leadership first on account of the brutal 
™ Ibid. p. 122. 
'^ Ibid., p. 123. 
'^ Dinman, New Delhi, December 2-8,1984, p. 12. 
" See N.S. Gehlot, Trends in Indian Politics, (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1988), p. 238. 
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assassination of his mother, Mrs. Indira Gandhi in the parliamentary elections of 
December 1984. The political tactics of the political parties to win the support of Muslim 
electorates was only to field as many Muslim candidates as they could. Noticeably, the 
ten opposition parties fielded more Muslim candidates than the ruling party, as there were 
137 Muslims in the fray, for example, DMKP-12, RMS-14, Congress-12, and And 
Janata-S.""* 
Muslim community, however, tactically denied the old strategy of political parties 
to attract their vote. In this context, we are reminded of what Nai Duniya, an Urdu 
Weekly, reflected on the Muslim vote in December 1984: "The greatest question before 
the minorities of this country is the survival of secularism, (Therefore) the Muslim should 
first of all find out the persons who have not discarded their secularism even in the 
darkest hour, and have raised their voice for the rights of the minorities. Such persons 
are there in the Congress (I), but also in the Janata, the DMKP and among the 
Communists. In almost all parties there are the worst opportunist.^, and communalists 
along with honest and secular elements. Therefore, the Muslims should not single out any 
party for their support but select honest and principled leaders from among all. 
The Muslims should also understand that a vote for Muslim candidates alone 
would not be the best policy. They should teach a lesion to those Muslim politicians who 
kept mum at the time of the riots in Moradabad and elsewhere. Their problems would not 
be solved by sending more Muslims to Parliament. The number of Muslims elected to the 
Lok Sabha in 1980 was the largest compared to earlier elections. Despite this, the most 
horrid riots in the country's history have taken place during this period. 
Muslim interests and sentiments should have their necessary representation in the 
Lok Sabha, but it does not mean that only Muslims are capable of doing thisjob."^^ 
The point raised by Nai Duniya was valid so far as the electoral options for the 
Muslims were concerned. Nonetheless, Muslim voters caught in the emotional upsurge 
that Mrs. Gandhi assassination had produced and aligned themselves with the "sympathy 
wave" to vote for Rajiv Gandhi. It was admitted that the sentimental voting pattern was 
not for the Congress but for a guy who lost his mother. The electoral victories of the 
'" India Today, December 31,1984, p. 99. 
" Cited from, Violette Graf, "The Muslim Vote" in Subrata K. Mitra and James Chiriyankandath (eds.), 
Electoral Politics in India: A Changing Landscape, (New Delhi: Segment Book, 1992), pp. 214-215. 
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Congress in both parliamentary and Assembly elections in the state in 1984-85, hence, do 
not indicate a return of the Muslims to Congress and in any case the electoral resuU was 
substantially the product of the extraordinary circumstances in which they had occurred. 
Thus, the manner in which Congress won the support of Muslim community in the 
elections held in mid-1980s was decided at the level of "anxieties, images and symbols." 
The Politics of Hindu Revivalism and Muslims 
The decade of the 1980s was a crucial period in Uttar Pradesh politics. It was 
marked by the emergence of Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and its anti-minority overtones 
in the guise of Hindutva politics. As to the virtual consensus, it was the rise of BJP that 
seriously challenged the declining hegemony of Congress, and the subsequent alienation 
of Muslims from the Congress in the state. There is a great deal of literature available on 
the origin of the BJP and its style of politics. Nonetheless, a cursory look on its origin is 
required to understand the voting behaviour of Muslims in the elections held after mid-
1980s in Uttar Pradesh. 
Needless to say, "in its ideological, organizational, and leadership structure the 
BJP is the direct descendant of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh (BJS)."''* The BJS itself grew out 
of an estrangement between the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and "the Hindu 
Maha Sabha and a subsequent urge of the RSS leadership and rank and file to enter into 
active political life."^^ However, the major political platform of the BJS included 
advocacy of I lindi as the national language, banning cow slaughter in the entire country, 
hawkish stance on defence, and pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim rhetoric.''* Prior to the 1975 
emergency regime, it was Jana Sangh that articulated the ideology of Hindu Rashtrya and 
symbolic, cultxiral, and social policies that addressed Hindu interests and values.^' Its 
politics "thrived on partition and was sustained by the perception that an Islamic Pakistan 
'* Yogendra K. Malik and V.B. Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India: The Rise of the Bhartiya Janata Party 
(New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1994), p. 29. 
" Aditi Dey-Sharma, "The Party System: National" in Rakhahari Chatterji (ed.), Politics India: The State-
Society Interface, (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2001), pp. 65-66. 
" Partha S. Ghosh, BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre, (New Delhi: 
Manohar, 2000), p. 82. 
" Lioyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, In Pursuit ofLakshmi: The Political Economy of the 
Indian State, (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1987), p. 37. 
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posed an ideological and military threat to India."*" These programmes primarily targeted 
popular sentiment in Uttar Pradesh. But the "Congress system" was too strong in the state 
until mid 1960s that it hardly gave a chance to the BJS to flourish. One reason could be 
identified with the low status of BJS that the state unit of Congress itself adopted the Jana 
Sangh style of politics to remain in power in UP*' The post-Bangladesh phase turned the 
fate of the Congress otherwise. It was in this phase, Congress engaged itself in portraying 
the image of party as the defender of Hindu interest in order to avert the crisis posed by 
JP movement and to bolster its mass base.*^ Since realizing the fact in 1970s that the 
salience of anti-Muslim politics had temporarily subsided for the party out of the 
Congress' encroachment in its ideological domain, Jana Sangh prudently bade adieu to 
the Hindu chauvinistic posture and joined anti-Congress camp in the post-emergency 
period.*^ To facilitate its entry into the mainstream of Indian politics, the Jana Sangh 
joined the common front of opposition parties to keep in view of the possibility of 
defeating Congress in 1977 elections. According to Malik and Singh, "The opposition 
parties' victories in the March 1977 elections resulted in the hasty fonnation of a single 
united party called the Janata Party, through the merger of such parties as the Bhartiya 
Lok Dal, Socialist Party, Congress (0), the Congress for Democracy (CFD), the Jana 
Sangh, and others."*'' 
In any case, the Jana Sangh had not diluted its anti-Muslim stance despite noting 
the fact that Muslim community too voted for Janata Party. It was out of this reason, 
controversy arisen over the issue of Jana Sangh's association with the RSS. Because the 
constituent elements of the alliance had "different personalities, goals, and motivations, 
and they were product of different cultures."*^ Given the circumstances, the Jana Sangh 
forced itself to rethink its strategy of gaining power in an atmosphere uncongenial to the 
pedigree ant-Muslim politics. On account of this realization, the Jana Sangh distanced 
" Ibid., pp. 82-85. Also see, B.D. Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and 
Development of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 256. 
'^  "Mrs. Gandhi, as if eager to cash in on her new post-Bangladesh image as Durga, began to make a much 
more conscious effort to woo the 'Hindu vote'. It is after 1971 that she started to make much publicized 
visits to temples, to talk of the 'rights' and 'fears' of the 'majority community' and so on." Achin Vanaik, 
"Communalism and Our Foreign Policy", Seminar, No. 374, October 1990, p. 18. 
" Partha S. Ghosh, op.cit., pp. 83-85. 
" Malik and Singh, op.cit., pp. 33-34. 
" Ibid., p. 36. 
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itself from Janata party stridency and revived as Bhartiya Janata Party in April 1980. 
But the BJP leaders claimed to be the real heirs to the Janata Party of Jaya Prakash 
Narayan rather than to the Jana Sangh." Vajpayee said in August 1980 that the BJP was 
different from the BJS in many ways: "Having tasted powers once, we realized that 
unless we became a parly of the national mainstream and enjoyed support from all 
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sections, we could not become a national alternative." 
Contrary to the claims, BJP did not act as if it was heir to the Janata at all. On 
August 31, 1980, Vajpayee, then BJP president, defended the RSS and accused the 
Government of appeasing the minorities.^' Since the much trumpeted conversion of a 
large number of Harijans to Islam at Meenakshipuram in Tamil Nadu in February 1981, 
the communal atmosphere continued to deteriorate in the coimtry and most particularly in 
Uttar Pradesh. The conversions sparked off the activation of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(VHP) in UP, where it claimed that conversion to Islam is very high.'" The BJP members 
supported the cause of VHP in its campaign against conversion, and the reconversion to 
Hinduism in UP." Communal riots took place in several parts of the country, the ones at 
Moradabad and Meerut being the worst. The deterioration was due to a large degree to 
Indira Gandhi's changed style of commimal politics. She made a bid for the Hindu vote, 
to the BJP's discomfiture. The crunch came in the elections to the Delhi Metropolitan 
Council and Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in 1983 "when voters who had traditionally 
voted for the Hindu-oriented Jana Sangh supported Congress-I candidates."'"' The BJP 
found the ground being gradually cut under its feet. Nikhil Chakravarty remarked that 
"Indira Ganhi's standing as a true leader of the Hindu community has now received 
electoral imprimatur."''* 
" Partha S. Ghosh, op.cit., p. 86. 
" Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India at the Crossroads, (New Delhi: Bhartiya Janata Party Publications, 1980), p. 
2. 
" Cited from A.G. Noorani, The RSS and the BJP: A Division of Labour, (New Delhi: Left Word Books, 
2000), p. 59. 
" Ibid., p. 59. 
•* VHP claimed that 1588 persons were converted to Islam in western UP. Figures given in Christophe 
Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, (London: Hurst & Company, 1996), p. 358. 
" Zoya Hasan, op.cit., pp. 194-95. 
"^ Noorani, op.cit., p. 60. 
'^ Rudolph and Rudolph, op.cit., pp 43-44. 
''^ Noorani, op.cit., p. 60. 
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Shortly thereafter occurred a very politically significant event in November 1933, 
knov^ Ti as Ekatmata Yagna or imegration rites. U? figured prominently in this programme 
of national unity, which according to the organizers' estimate reached 60 million people 
nationally.^ ^ It was organized to advertise the concept of Hindu solidarity. During the 
march, religious leaders delivered fiery speeches the central tlierne of which was: 
"Hinduism in danger." They ranted against "politicians" who "pampered" the Muslims 
because they were their vote-banks.^ * The VHP's unity efforts met with success 
particularly in the central and western parts of UP.'^ Even Indira Gandhi participated in 
this yagna. Earlier in 1982 she had spoken of the threat to Hindu Dharma at a meeting 
held in Ajmer. In the same year she had inaugurated the VHP-built Bharat Mata temple 
at Hardwar.^ * In a similar fashion, Mrs. Gandhi ruthlessly dealt with Pimjab crisis and 
secessionist sentiments of the Sikh commimity, finally culminated in the Indian Army's 
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massive assault at Amritsar's Golden Temple in June 1984. After the militaiy assault, 
"Mrs. Gandhi...said openly...that Hindu dharma [faith] was under attack" from the 
Sikhs: such charges were increasingly coupled with the accusation that Pakistan was 
abetting Sikh "terrorism".'°'' She did not live to reap the fruits of the electoral strategy she 
was perfecting with such ruthlessness. Indira Gandhi's assassination threw the entire 
opposition off balance in 1984 parliamentary elections. Her son Rajiv Gandhi, instead, 
led Congress to the largest electoral triumph in Uttar Pradesh history. Congress in UP 
won 82 of the 84 seats and 52.74 percent of the vote virtually wiping out the opposition. 
Ironically, the Congress victory had disastrous consequences for the BJP that had 
consistently claimed to represent Hindu majority. In fact, BJP was totally decimated in 
Uttar Pradesh. It failed to get a single seat in Uttar Pradesh out of 54 seats it contested, as 
Congress appropriated both the old Jana Sangh slogan of "national unity in danger" and 
' ' Peter van der Veer, "Hindu Nationalism and the Discourse of Modernity: Tlie Vishwa Hindu Parishad" 
in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Accountingfor Fundamentalism: The Dynamic 
Characteristics of Movements, (Chicago: Chicago University Press), p. 653. 
** For a graphic description of how the procession marched and how it was received by the Hindus, see 
India Today, 30 November 1983, pp. 82-84; Sunday (Calcutta), December 11-17,1983, pp. 25-8. 
'^  Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, op.cit., p. 361. 
'* See Malik and Singh, op.cit., p, 70; Economic and Political Weekly, April 19,1989, p. 658. 
" The best succinct account is in Paul Brass, "The Punjab Crisis and the Unity of India" in Ethnicity and 
Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991). 
"" Rajni Kothari, State Against Democracy: In Search of Humane Governance, (Delhi: Ajanta Books, 
1988), p. 247. 
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more than half of its "Hindu vote".'°' This was a turning point in UP politics. However, 
the Congress' impressive victorv' in 1984 pai'liamentary elections camouflaged tlie 
fragility of its majoritarian politics in UP. It was reflected in the decline of Congress 
popularity in the Assembly elections of UP, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa and Madhya 
Pradesh held just three months after the Lok. Sabha elections. By 1986 disillusionment 
with the Congress ran deep in virtually all sections of the electorate. Given the proven 
value of Hindu politics, post-Indira Congress resorted to the same artifice to try and cling 
on to power in the coming elections. The party's overall strategy was by now implicitly if 
not explicitly premised on "Hindu" majoritarianism."'^  
Two events that took place provided considerable grist to the BJP's mill. One, the 
court ruling declaring that an historic structure in Ayodhya was a temple, not a mosque, 
and ordered that the locks on the gates of the premises of the Babri Mosque be opened on 
31 January 1986. Second, the most important, the Muslim Women's Bill was moved in 
Parliament on February 25 to override the Supreme Court's ruling in the Shah Bano 
case.*^ It was in this political context, the militant Hindu nationalism established a place 
in the state politics. L.K. Advani who took over as president of the BJP in 1986 translated 
these two events into electoral strategy. By harping on the "pseudo secularism" and 
"minorityism" of the ruling Congress he charted a clear and unambiguous path in favour 
of Hindu resurgence. He denounced cow slaughter in many parts of India and the 
destruction of as many as 45 Hmdu temples in the state of Jammu and Kashmir although 
it was not wholly true.'°* The crux of the point was that since 1986 Hindu militancy no 
longer remained on the periphery of UP politics but became a distinct force with 
enormous political potential. "Ayodhya strategy" was designed to position the BJP to 
regain the votes it had lost tlie Congress in the 1984 elections. 
To keep in view the 1989 elections, Babri masjid controversy had far reaching 
political repercussions in UP. Most importantly, it provided readymade material to the 
"" For the analysis of tlie BJP's loss of Hindu vote to Congress, see Manini Chatterjee, "Seeds of Fascism", 
Seminar, No. 399, November 1992, pp. 17-22. 
'"^  Zoya Hasan, op.cit., pp. 194-95. 
'"' Sumantra Bose, '"Hindu Nationalism' and the Crisis of the Indian State: A Theoretical Perspective" in 
Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 126. 
'"* See Noorani, op.cit., p. 62. 
"*' See Malik and Singh, op.cit., p. 76. 
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champions of Hindutva politics to sensitize tlie Hindu voters and to achieve political 
power through shorter route. The decision of the central government to allovv VHP to lay 
the foundation stone of the proposed Ram Temple at the mosque-site tv/o weeks before 
the 1989 elections added an extra flavour to the growing Hindu nationalist movement. It 
was in this backdrop, the BJP adopted the means of processions along with emotive 
slogans, pujas, assortment of sadhus, and rioting in order to build a committed Hindutva 
vote bank. The hypothesis that the politics of communal sentiment "tend to polarize the 
electorates in such a way that the Hindu majority, feeling 'more Hindu', would be more 
inclined to vote for the BJP"'°^ was confirmed by the electoral outcome of 1989 
parliamentary elections. The committed Hindutva vote went overwhelmingly to BJP, 
which had unanimously backed the temple construction movement from the outset.'°' 
While Congress' electoral prospects fell victim to the fatal contradiction in its electoral 
strategy. It alienated both Muslim and the upper caste Hindu votes. Despite the large 
number of Muslim candidates launched by the Congress in UP Parliamentary and 
Assembly elections of 1989, Muslim community failed to retain trust in the Congress 
style of politics that had led the Muslim down. Against the conventional wisdom, 
Muslims did not vote only Muslim candidates. By this time, they learnt the art of tactical 
voting. And rejected the Congress' intention of placating the Muslim electorates, already 
shocked by its double face. The Muslim voters voted to all those candidates who had 
showed empathy with the Muslims and were able to defeat the BJP.'^ * This was in tum 
resulted m the great loss of Congress m Uttar Pradesh. 
Nonetheless, the 1989 elections in the UP did not show the total withdrawal of 
Muslim support from Congress. A sizable number of Muslims were still associated with 
the Congress. However, the outcome of 1989 elections ceitainly proved the hypothesis 
that undergoing alienation of Muslims from the Congress got accelerated" '^ that finally 
culminated into almost complete desertion in the elections held hereafter in the state. 
There were many inmiediate factors that worked greatly beliind this estrangement of 
Muslim relations to Congress. First, the way Congress dealt with the Ayodhya issue was 
'"* Jaf&elot, "The Politics of Processions and Hindu-Muslim Riots" in Ararita Basu and Atul Kohli (eds.). 
Community Conflicts and the State in India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 80. 
'"'Bose, op.cit, p. 129. 
'°* See Violette Graf, op.cit., pp. 227-231. 
"* Ibid., p. 227 and endnote no. 30. 
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quite shocking for the Muslim community. ITiey found no difference between Congress 
and the BJP. Second, the Congress' condemnation to death issued by Imam Khomeini to 
Salman Rushdie for his Satanic Verses in February 1989 and subsequent rioting m the 
country proved fatal to the Congress in UP viz., Muslim support was concerned.'"** Third, 
the riots that occurred in Budaun districts of Uttar Pradesh just after the introduction of 
Urdu Language Bill in UP Legislative Assembly and the Goverrunent's failure to check 
the riots also created a sense of despair among the Muslims.**' FJy tliis time Shikmyas 
procession had started which brought to the state untold Hindu-Muslhn riots. Fourth, the 
s>Tnpaihetic gestures of V.P. Singh's Janata Dal and Bahujan Samaj Party to the Muslim 
cause at this junctiu-e and tlie consequent support of Muslim hardliners, like Shahi Imam 
of Jama Masjid, Abdullah Bukhari and Syed Shahbuddin, to Janata Dal caused havoc 
with the future of Congress politics of Muslims in the state.''^ 
"°Ibid.p.219. 
'" Ibid. Also see, Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Ice on Summer Seas", Economic and Political Weekly, 14 October 
1989. 
"^  See Violette Graf, op.cit., pp. 219-22 
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CHAPTER: FOUR 
ANALYSING ELECTORAL ASSERTION OF 
OPPRESSED CASTES 
We begin with the conjecture that the Oppressed Castes, who were once the 
subject of multiple deprivation and social subordination, have now transformed 
themselves into a category of political relevance by adopting the new style of assertive 
mobilization in the competitive multi party electoral politics of Uttar Pradesh. The on-
going process of their political rise, despite their inter-and intra-caste divisions and 
conflicts, have found strong political representation in the form of a party like Bahujan 
Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. Retrospectively, it was only the upper caste groups that had 
enjoyed the fruits of caste-oriented democracy, while the Oppressed Castes had been left 
for all practical purposes outside the political arena. At the risk of obvious simplification, 
we can view their systematic exclusion from the electoral arena was of the result of 
'crisis of participation'' among the Oppressed Castes. This was certainly out of the 
consequence of their political passivity carefully managed by the upper caste's avarice to 
remain in power. Their contemporary political assertion, as it seems, embodies a dogged 
resistance to the buiaries set up by the upper castes power politics. In some respects, the 
rise of oppressed caste politics in the late twentieth century parallels the emergence of 
nationalist politics in the nineteenth century, and may have similarly wide ranging 
consequences. Whereas nationalism brought about a period of nation building and the 
destruction of multinational empires, caste politics may call the long-term sur/ival of tlie 
nation itself into question.^ In many ways, the forerunner of, and possibly prototype for, 
this new style of politics was foimd in the electoral mobilization of Oppressed Castes. 
It is here to be emphasized that their levels of political consciousness and 
participation in UP politics have traditionally been low. But it was certainly in making. 
' The term 'crisis of participation' was used by Roderick Church witli reference to low castes in a 
comparative discussion of state politics (in UP, Bihar, West Bengal, Kerala, Kamataka, Maharashtra and 
Gujrat). See Roderick Church, "The Pattern of State Politics in Indira Gandhi's India" in J.R. Wood (ed.), 
State Politics in Contemporary India: Crisis or Continuity, (Boulder Westview, 1984). We have employed 
this term in the context of discussing Oppressed Castes politics in UP. 
^ See Kancha Ilaiah, "Towards the Dalitaisation of the Nation" in Parthe Chatteijee (ed.), Wages of 
Freedom: Fifty Years of the Indian Nation-State, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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The various struggles launched by them, whether they are for protestmg the practice of 
untouchability and perpetration of atrocities, self-respect and dignity and political 
representation, have also aimed at raising consciousness among the Oppressed Castes 
about the need for political participation so as to bring social transformation leading to an 
egalitarian social order. The growing importance of caste consciousness in Uttar Pradesh 
has increasingly been fueled by the Mandal politics and the consequent emergence of 
competitive party system. Indeed it can be traced back to the mid 1980s. A renewed wave 
of caste based mobilization in north India has brought the Oppressed Castes into 
competitive politics of UP. As Chatteijee has put it: "The more the process of 
democracy have deepened in ^ India, the more has its center of gravity moved 
downward."^ 
The main objective of this chapter is to move comprehensive political inquiry in 
the direction of a deeper understanding of the contemporary electoral upsurge of the 
Oppressed Castes and the consequent rise of Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. The 
rise of the BSP altered this equilibrium, which is why we believe that it represents the 
most important political development in Uttar Pradesh since independence. As well as the 
BSP has proved itself that it is the only embodiment of the active, authentic participation 
of Oppressed Castes in UP politics for the first time in modem Indian history. The party 
not only represents their social and political assertion but also the three terms of 
Mayawati's Chief Ministership exhibited the party's unpretended Oppressed Caste 
disposition expressed in largely symbolic gestures ~ images of Ambedkar, renaming of 
districts and a Dalit administrative orientation. It can be argued that the conditions in 
which the party came to power precluded any ideological pretension but that the BSP 
consciously operates on the terrain of identity assertion. Through this analysis we have 
tried to understand the political dynamics of Oppressed Castes which is clearly 
manifested in Bahujan Samaj Party's electoral upsurge in UP. 
To avoid any circumlocution, we have chosen the term 'Oppressed Castes' as 
general identifier of the same people widely known to us with multitudes of 
' See Sudha Pai, "From Harijans to Dalits: Identity Formation, Political Consciousness and Electoral 
Mobilization of the Scheduled Castes m Uttar Pradesh" in Ghanshyam Shah (ed.), Dalit Identity and 
Politics: Cultural Subordination and the Dalit Challenge, vol. 2. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001), 
pp.258-287. 
•* See ParUia Chatteijee, A Possible India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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nomenclature such as Out Castes, Exterior Caries, Depressed Class, Untouchables^ Ex-
untouchables, Harijans, and lastly the official euphemism Scheduled Castes.'' We will 
require to use the appellations frequently and interchangeably if need arises. 
Circumspectly, we intend to justify the very construction of the sxibject on the basis of 
their centuries old experience of powerlessncss, voicelessness, social exclusion, moral 
humiliation, cultural subordination, and over all oppression insinuated by the fabricator 
of caste system, which we take to be deeply entrenched even today. On the one hand, the 
Oppressed Castes are organized in jatis as other Hindus, like Chamar. Bhangi, Dhobi, 
Dom, Dusadh etc. On the other hand, they are collectively marked by their conspicuous 
absence in the Varna scheme, often depicted as being 'out castes' or without castes. At 
the same time, they are collectively seen as a permanently polluted people. It seems to us, 
the various Jatis, which suffered the stigma of untouchability' in the past, have begun to 
identify and unify as one entity—the oppressed—to compete for power in democratic 
contestations especially the electoral competitiveness and rally around the ideology of an 
egalitarian social order with social justice and human dignity propounded by Phule and 
Ambedkar. 
Hence, "among the oppressed the appeal to caste is for unification of similar jatis 
into larger collectivities and political mobili2ation for power so as to subvert the very 
relations of the Varna order." Many of us believe that political mobilization of 
Oppressed Castes, that could alter the face of UP politics, has been stopped in its infancy. 
It has never matured. Instead, it becomes a mere cradle fit for robbery by the political 
leaders that championed the cause of oppressed. In this particular reference, Shah points 
out, "They eitlier gei co-opted by the dominant ruling class, partly with a temptation to 
get higher offices and' or renewal of tenure, or they share the ideology and agenda of the 
ruling class, or they are unable to find an alternative path."^ 
' Previously I have used the term Untouchables to denote the Oppressed Castes specially to suit the need of 
the study, which emphasized over the socio-cultural discrimination against tlie Untouchables. See Afioz 
Alam, Untouchables: The Unequal Citizens of India, Indian Journal of Politics, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2&3, 
April-September 2004, pp. 164-86. But in the present context, I have used the term Oppressed Castes lo 
comprehend their political dynamics as a collective political grouping in Uttar Prade.sh. 
* For more details about the nomenclatures applied to denote the Oppressed Castes, see Ibid. 
' For contemporary practices of untouchability, see Ibid. 
' Javeed Alam, "Is Caste Appeal Casteism? Oppressed Castes in Politics", Economic and Political Weekly 
^PW), March 27-April 2, 1999, see http:/www.epw.org.in 
Ghanshyain Shah (ed.), "Introduction", op.cit., p. 41 
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Be that as it may, the Oppressed Castes have occupied the center stage in tlie 
contemporary electoral politics of Utter Pradesh. It is their political upsurge that compels 
us to make the case crucial to understand their political dynamics. Notably, their political 
explosion startled most of the commentators. For, it was widely assumed that modernity 
would bring about the dilution of caste distinctiveness, as the spread of liberal-democratic 
values would mean the abandonment of atavistic rivalries and communal solidarities. In 
this context, we view this assumption only blinded us to the complexity of the very 
process of political articulation of the caste that ultimately laid the foundation of 
domination of the Brahmanical upper castes over the modem state institutions. And this 
in turn effectively prevented the emergence of Oppressed Castes as an active player in the 
modem politics. What accounts for the rise of this new style of Oppressed Castes politics, 
and what is its political character? 
Let us therefore straightway say that it has been conditioned, quite deeply, out of 
their experience of socio-economic oppression, cultural subjugation, and political 
marginalization for centuries. This in turn provided a basis to motivate and mobilize 
Oppressed Castes, and to create a collective identity and consciousness. Before we move 
forward its better to pass a glance over the question that how did Oppressed Castes 
become so victimized, oppressed, and remained impervious to their own political 
potential? Understandably, the answer lies in the institutional mechanism superimposed 
on the social system of India that is dominated by the hierarchical logic of caste.'" It is to 
the obvious advantage of the upper castes with a dominant status in a society to support 
the status quo. But for Oppressed Castes in UP, the establishment of an ethnic identity 
has provided a means of confronting a dominant culture of upper castes that has 
traditionally emphasized their inferiority and demanded subservience. At the same time, 
competitive politics within the parliamentary framework and the arithmetic 
consciousness of numbers have motivated the Oppressed Castes to participate in tlie 
electoral politics of UP on an unprecedented scale. They are no longer 'captive' voters of 
any one traditional mainstream party. It is their concentrated effort through electoral 
participation, as Pushpendra argues, "to create a new political identity for themselves by 
'" From the standpoint of the Great Tradition represented by the classical Sanskrit literature Hindu society 
is divided into four Varnas associated with paiticular social occupations: Brahmins (priest and literati), the 
Kshatriyas (the warriors), the Vaishyas (crafts- and tradesmen), the Shudras (servant). 
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using the levers of competitive politics."" ^^ a^at is important to note here that caste 
system, despite being oppressive in nature, provided a basis for struggle against 
oppression. Kothari argues, "It has the potentiality of a two-pronged catalyst: as purveyor 
of collective identity, and annihilator of the same order from which tlie collective identity 
is drawn."'^ 
Nevertheless, structural inequalities and liistorical oppression cannot in 
themselves explain the emergence of oppressed caste politics, Wliy, for instance, have 
caste identities become so important in the late twentieth century when the injustices that 
they seek to redress date back centuries? The answer to this may lie in the phenomenon 
of postmodernism. Just as Gellner argues that nationalism arose to provide a source of 
cultural cohesion in modem, industrialized societies, ethnic consciousness may be a 
necessaiy integrative force in emerging post-modem ones,'^ The problem of 
postmodemism is that it promotes diversity and weakens traditional social identities. In 
this sense, "ethnicity may replace nationality as the principle source of social integration, 
its virtue being that, whereas nations are bound together by 'civil' loyalties and ties, 
ethnic and regional groups are able to generate a deeper sense of 'organic' identity,"'** 
Returning to the main issue, we hereby intend to focus briefly on the political status of 
Oppressed Castes during the course of Congress politics as practiced in the state. 
Politics of Oppressed Castes and Congress Party 
We are of course confronted by one dominant question above all others. 
Undoubtedly, the political scene of Uttar Pradesh was completely dominated by the 
Congress until late 1980s. It is better to say that UP was the cradle of Congress system. 
The Congress enjoyed the monopoly of power in this region, which in turn helped it 
sustain in the Centre for long. What happened? What explains the demise of Congress 
system in a state which was once known as tlieir strong hold? One can ansv/er in many 
ways and terms. But no one can exclude Oppressed Caste's desertion of Congress as one 
of the main reason. It is therefore not surprising that the greatest incidence of political 
" Pushpendra, "Dalit Assertion through Electoral Politics" in Ghanshyam Shah (ed.), op.cit. 
'^  Rajni Kothari, "Caste, Communalism and the Democratic Process" in PrafUl Bidwai et all, Religion, 
Religiosity and Communalism, (New Dellii: Manohar, 1996), p. 145. 
" See E. Gellner, Nations, and Nationalism, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
" See Andrew Hey wood. Politics, (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 134. 
100 
shock to Congress in UP has come from the growng consciousness of this politically 
deprived group. Competitive politics operating tliroagh the system of free elections and 
universal aduU suffrage has drawn them into the political process, opening up 
opportunities for them in sharing aixd controlling power and in claiming a share in the 
divisible benefits it offers. It has been noticed that tlie Oppressed Caste voters have 
become increasingly aware of the utility of their vote. 
It is worth noting that the Oppressed Castes tended to vote for Congress ovei" tlie 
past forty-seven years of elections held in UP.'^ Obviously, this voting pattern was 
guided by several factors. The Congress traditionally paid more attention to them thaii to 
other low castes. This attitude derived from its well-established tradition of socio-
religious reform that naturally focused on the Oppressed Castes. It is in this context tlie 
discourse on Untouchability took shape.''' Even when they had no such motivation, the 
party successfiilly exhibited its commitment to root out Untouchability. llie popularity of 
the Mahatma Gandhi among the Oppressed Castes was another obvious reason why they 
granted their electoral allegiance to the Congress. The Congiess party was also able to 
attract their support because of the introduction of the reservation system and die 
concomitant access to education, the bureaucracy, and the elected assemblies it was 
meant to usher in. This policy of affirmative action was partly a smokescreen since the 
quotas were often unfiilfilled. But it enabled the ruling party to bargain and extend its 
patronage in exchange for electoral support. To put it differently, their vote for Congress 
was a vote for the party in power. In rational terms, there was little choice open to the 
Oppressed Castes in Uttar Pradesh. More importantly, Congress succeeded in projecting 
itself as their natural representative because of its skill in promoting or co-opting 
oppressed caste leaders and getting them elected in tlie framework of reservation system. 
Brass underlines that "The Scheduled Castes leaders v/ho have been given Congress 
tickets in the reserved constituencies are non-militant and have no power in the local or 
" For more details on the oppressed caste's favourable disposition towards Congi-ess, see V.B. Singh, 
"Scheduled Castes Communities in India and their Attitudes towards Congress Partj", Paper presented ai 
International Conference held at Universit>' of California, Los A;igeles, June 1987. 
" After Independence, this discourse finally realized in Article 17 of die constitution that officially 
abolished Untouchability in any form. The Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, which aimed at protecting 
the Untouchables tx>m any kind of discrimination also enabled the Congress to wco the Oppressed Castes 
voters. 
" For more details, see Christophe Jaffrelof, India's Silent Revolution: The Rise ofths Low Castes in North 
Indian Politics, (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003), pp. <)2-97. 
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state Congress organizations."'* Due to a lack of socio-political unity and the fragmented 
leadership emerging therefrom, the Oppressed Castes failed to assert their numerical 
strength successfully to bargain for political power. As a result they, more than any other 
social groups, were inclined to support the Congress party.'' It is important to note here 
that the massive participation of the Oppressed Castes in the electoral process of the state 
was largely confined to casting of their votes. Even, their overwhelming support to 
Congress did not help them to get empowered politically in any meaningful sense. This 
was partly because the Congress leaders of UP came mostly from the upper castes and 
relied largely on this social miheu to maintain their ascendancy .^ ° 
Their disappointment with the Congress was realized in the formation of the 
Republican Party of India (RPI) in 1958. The main architect of the RPI m Uttar Pradesh 
was Chhedi Lai Sathi who remained its President till 1964.^ ' No doubt, the RPI became 
electorally successful for a short time in Uttar Pradesh. Mendelshon points out, "Its 
success in UP was built around a substantial Buddhist politician of Chamar origins, B. P. 
Maurya, who drew votes away from the Congress by engmeering a local coalition of 
Untouchables and Muslims in the city and District of Aligarh."^^ But before it could 
provide a substantive challenge to the Congress's unilateral dominance and make 
effective dent into the vote share of the Congress, the RPI itself disappeared from UP. Pai 
identifies the three important factor behind the brief existence of the RPI and its failure to 
mobilize the Oppressed Castes in UP: lack of strong leadership, divisions among the 
leadership over the strategy to be followed and finally the ability of the Congress as a 
broad-based dominant party to attract SC voters.^ '* All these handicaps were greatly 
aggravated by the Congress strategy of co-opting 'Untouchable notables'. Far from 
" Paul Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966), p. 105. Brass adds, "The numerous organizations in Uttar Pradesh for 
the advancement of the Scheduled Castes and "depressed classes" have been content to serve as agencies 
for the distribution of Congress patronage." Ibid. 
" For vote preference of Scheduled Castes from 1967 to 1980, see V.B. Singh, "Harijans and Their 
Influence on the Elections in Uttar Pradesh", in Subrata K. Mitra and J. Chiriyankandath (eds.), Electoral 
Politics in India: A Changing Landscape, (New Delhi: Segment Books, 1992), pp. 247-248. 
^^  This is evident from the social background of Congress's MLAs, MPs, party cadres and members of the 
government in UP, which reflect the over representation of the upper castes. See Christophe Jaflrelot, op.cit. 
^'Ibid., p. 108. 
^ For more details on the regional distribution of the seats and votes gained by the RPI from 1962 to 1969, 
see Sudha Pai, "From Harijans to Dalits", op.cit., p. 264. 
" See Oliver Mendelsohn and Marika Vicziany, The Untouchables: Subordination, Poverty and the State 
in Modern India, (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 213. 
^* See Sudha Pai, "From Harijans to Dalits", op.cit., pp. 265-266. 
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emerging as a political force, the Oppressed Castes were marginalized politically during 
the first two decades of the Indian Republic. Moreover, there was hardly any other party 
left to stake a claim to representing the interest of the Oppressed Castes in the state. The 
force of political compulsion of the time overshadowed their aspiration for political 
emancipation. Their withdrawal of support seemed to be temporary as they again 
exhibited their overwhelming support to the Congress in the Lok Sabha and UP 
Legislative Assembly elections held in 1980 and 1984. It was tl\e emergence of the 
Bahujan Samaj Party and its remarkable performance in the elections held after 1984 in 
UP that caused a tremor in the camps of all political parties, especially the Congress. 
Unlike the earlier incarnations of Oppressed Castes politics in UP, the BSP hardly talks 
about any serious social or educational blueprint. Its firm belief seems to be to take 
control firom the above, by jumping into the electoral firay, which alone is a key to pov^ er 
•ye 
in an electoral democracy. 
Oppressed Castes and Bahujan Samaj Party 
The cold truth is that, since mid 1980s, UP has become laboratory for political 
experimentation. In this context, let alone understand how BSP emerged as a dominant 
player on the electoral platform of the UP. There are varieties of factors, which explain 
the rise of BSP. The first is the conspicuous evidence that gave an electoral stamp to the 
process of disintegration of the Congress system of power that had been underway for tlie 
last two decades. This was the result of tremendous fhistration inside the Congress over 
the question of leadership often materialized in factionalism. More importantly, the 
Congress lost its potential to skilfiilly manipulate its social base and the competency to 
co-opt the discontented leaders which resulted in the final destruction of its stable power 
relations in UP. There was a concerted move in 1988-9 to win back Oppressed Caste 
voters who were increasingly being alienated from the Congress. But all this was largely 
to no avail. The Congress faced serious competition from the Bahujan Samaj Party, 
which was actively mobilizing them and failed to evolve a tangible strategy to counter the 
BSP, mainly because it did not have a single reputable Oppressed Caste leader with a 
significant mass base. This in turn provided an opportunity for political parties, especially 
25 Pradeep Kumar, "Dalits and the BSP in Uttar Pradesh: Issues and Challenges", EPW, April 3, 1999, p. 
822, 
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BSP, seeking power with an alternative social base, namely Oppressed Castes. Secondly, 
"the political context created by the Mandal affair gave more visibility to the claims of 
Scheduled Castes while dalit politics had receded into the background after the death of 
Ambedkar."^* Thirdly, the great advance in information technology, industrialization, 
diversification of occupation, proliferation of the non-traditional institutions, 
constitutionally sponsored scheme of positive discriminations, and competitive politics 
heightened the consciousness of Oppressed Castes as an effective entity to grab the 
power structure of the countrj'. The Oppressed Castes' "disenchantment with the 
Congress and the newly found platfoma of the BSP have given a fresh impetus to their 
political unity."^^ The underlying logic behind this political unit>' is that "it is the 
collective strength of sheer nimibers that will compensate for other disabilities and further 
lead to the complex strategic issues of political formation, coalition and so on."^ ^ 
Indeed, the credit goes to Kanshiram for establishing a party that have challenged 
the conventional centers of power at least in UP. He realized the devastative potential Oi 
the Congress's strategy of co-option politics. He de\'e!oped contempt for all this, because 
of Congress hidden agenda to sustain Chamcha Age that in turn effectively circumscribed 
the emergence of independent Oppressed Caste leaders after Ambedkar. His conviction 
lies in the fact that the Brahmanical order designed the whole thing in a manner that only 
stooges could have come out of it. 
Unlike the early tradition of Oppressed Castes politics to work only among the 
Scheduled Castes, he forwarded an alternative strategy of endowing the lower castes with 
an ethnic identity. He transposed the motif of the Aryan invader versus the oppressed 
bahujan samaj in the democratic context of India.^ ^ In this context, he intended to use the 
theory of Aryan invasion, as an emotional argument for uniting the lower castes with a 
*^ See Christophe Jaflrelot, op.cit., p. 387. 
" V.B. Singh, "Harijaiis and Theii- Influence on the Elections in Uttar Pradesh", op.cit., p. 250. 
'^ Pushpendra, op.cit., p. 316. 
^' Kanshi Ram has provided a strong Dalit cntique to tlie co-option politics. See Kanshi Rain, The 
Chamcha Age: The Era of Stooges, (New Delhi; Privately printed. 1982). No Dalit leader, neither an old 
timer like Jagjivan Ram nor a contemporarj- Ram Vilas Paswan could escape his al! encompassing 
definition of c/jamc/ia,. See The Telegraph, 3 December 1989; The Week. April 16,1992; 
^° "The bahujan samaj accounts for 85°/o xif the voters. It is a shame tiiat the tbreign Aryans constituting 
15% are ruling over the 85%[...] The Ai-yaas have CKploited us. An Arj'an ruler can never work for o'lr 
betterment [...] When our ancestors from the bahujan samaj were ruling over his country, India was known 
worldwide for its prosperity. The bahujav samaj can rjle this country even today... Cited in, Kanshi Ram-
Aaj ke neta/Alochanatmak adhyctyanmala. (New Delhi: Rajkatnai Prakashan, 1996); Christophe Jaffrelot, 
op.cit, p. 390. 
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notion that bahujan samaj was large enough to capture power. The logic of numerical 
strength is omnipresent in the emotive slogans of the BSP activists: Jiski jitni samkhya 
bhari uski utni Bhagidari; 85 par 15 ka raj nahin chalega, nahi chalega; Vote hamara, 
raj tumhara, nahin chalega, nahi chalega; Tilak, taraju aur talwar isko marojoote char; 
Brahman, bania thakur chor, baki sab DS4; Vote se lenge PM/CM, arakshan se SP/DM. 
It was he who first visualized the religious minorities and Other Backward Classes 
witnessed the same oppression by upper-caste Hindus and included them in his definition 
of the bahujan samaj. This is what he learnt from the history of the non-Brahmin 
movement of Maharashtra, initiated by Phule in the 19* century. '^ His ideology of the 
bahujan samaj first found expression in the establishment of a union-like organization in 
1971 that is 'The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and 
Minority Conmiunities Employees Association'. Kanshiram's next organizational step 
was to organize the bahujan samaj elites in opposition to the twdce-bom upper caste 
elites, whom he also called the 'Manuwadi'.^^ As early as 1973 the association turned 
into federation, named All India Backward (SC, ST, and OBC) aiid Minority 
Communities Employees Federation (BAMCEF) whose aim was still to organize the elite 
of the bahujan samaj. He did not want to make the BAMCEF into a mere employees' 
union; instead he wanted it to become the organization of the educated employees, the 
'think tank', 'talent bank' and 'financial bank' of the bahujan samaj?^ In the 1980s the 
BAMCEF claimed to have 200,000 members, among whom were 500 Ph.Ds, 15,000 
scientists, 3,000 MBBS graduates and 7,000 other graduate and postgraduate degree 
holders-most of them from UP and Maharashtra.^ "* Parallel to his endless effort to 
organize educated employees Kanshi Ram was also contacting a wider audience with 
simple presentations of Ambedkar's teachings, together with contemporary oppression, 
atrocities and poverty.^ ^ He talked persuasively about the bahujan samaj that these 
" Phule coined the term Bahujan Samaj and tried to unite all- non-Brahmins. For more details, see Gail 
Omvedt, Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India, 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994). 
•'^  Kanshi Ram talks o f Manuwadl' versus 'Manavwadi', those who believe in men as human beings. His 
hostility to Manu led him to ask for the removal of the status of Manu from the premises of Jaipur High 
Court. The Hindu. September 5, 1998, p. 4. 
" Cited in, Kanshi Ram, op.cit. 
^* G. Omvedt, "Kanshi Ram and the Bahujan Party" in K.L. Shanna (ed.), Caste and Class in India, (Jaipur 
and New Delhi: Rawat, 1994), p. 163. 
" See Oliver Mendelsohn and Marika Vicziany, op.cit., pp. 221-222. 
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people had the potential to convert themselves from 'beggars to rulers' out of their sheer 
weightage of numbers in a competitive electoral politics of the country. Thus Kanshi 
Ram tried to emerge as a spokesman for the bahujan samaj by advocating the interests of 
all its components including the OBCs against the upper castes. 
Finally, Kanshi Ram's agitational activities convinced him to enter into the 
agitational politics. His first attempt to create a radical political vehicle capable of 
mobilizing the larger body of Oppressed Castes was the Dalit Soshit Samaj Sangharsh 
Samiti (DS4: Committee for Fighting for the Dalit Community and the Oppressed) 
formed in 1981.^ ^ Not a full-fledged political party but aimed at chaimelising the political 
energy generated among BAMCEF members, DS4 immediately created an impression on 
the main players in the political arena. Charan Singh, Devi L,al and Karpoori Tliakur 
foimd electoral potential in it.''^  With a membership fee of only Rs 3 per armum, Kanshi 
Ram divided DS4 into several wings. Three of them became quite popular. The Jagriti 
(awakening) wing launched the social awakening campaign through lectures, songs, 
music and street theatre; the women's wing got the ebullient in-charge in the form of 
Mayawati; and the student wing was also very active.^ ^ 
DS4 created a record of sorts in political propaganda by organizing long cycle 
marches from Kanyakumari in the South to Kohima in the North-East, from Porbandar in 
the West to Puri in the East. ITiey converged at New Delhi and a subsequent, highly 
impressive rally gave finishing touches to this 100-day long prachar yatra (propaganda 
and publicity tour). The aim was to acquaint the downtrodden in rural and urban areas 
with Kanshi Ram's vision. The DS4 also launched anti liquor cam.paign in UP to protest 
against liquor shops being opened in localities inhabited predominantly by the oppressed 
sections. With the successful experiment of DS4, Kanshi Ram, ultimately, took the 
plunge and annotinced the formation of Bahujan Samaj Party in Delhi, a fiiU fledged 
political party, on the occasion of Ambedkar's birthday, 14 April 1984.'*^  This time his 
^*lbid. 
" See Yevgenia Yurlova, "Political Emergence of Scheduled Caste Ethno-Community", Mainstream, 
29(51), 12 October 1991, pp. 19-24 
^' See Abhay Kumar Dubey, "Anatomy of a Dalit Power Player: A Study of Kanshi Ram" in Ghanshyam 
Shah (ed.), op.cit., pp. 298-299; for more defails see R.K. Singh, Kanshi Ram Aur BSP (Hindi), (Allahabad: 
Kushwaha Book Distributors, 1996). 
^' For more details on the campaign style of DS4, see Ambeth Rajan, hfy Bahujan Samaj Party, (New 
Delhi: Book Centre for Dalit Education, 1994). 
^Ibid. 
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transition from social worker to politician, and from agitational politics to electoral 
politics was complete. 
BSP's Evolution: From Electoral Player to Power Holder 
As we know, the Oppressed Castes ?.sseitioi\ in party politics and governance 
through their own party is not a new phenomenon. But tlieir eftbrt in the past did nof 
materialize into sustenance and finally receded into background. Tliis time it proved 
otherwise. The Oppressed Castes responded positively to the BSP electoral appeal. In 
order to mobilize their support, the BSP activists, have adopted novel and very effective 
method. As we have seen, they have formed small theatre group in different areas, which 
dramatized their own sufferings and the callous attitude of the upper castes and tlieir 
exploitative and oppressive tactics. The BSP proved to be iimovative. The troupes have 
thus become an instrument of conscientisation. The Oppressed Castes supported the BSP 
invigorately and made it a dominant political entity in Uttar Pradesh. 
With such an arousal of consciousness among the Oppressed Castes, and the 
confidence gathered from the backing of the 'brain bank, talent bank and fniancial banl;' 
of the Dalit bureaucracy'*^ Kanshi Ram plimged into the parliamentary elections held in 
1984. BSP came to the fore in the subsequent assembly elections and established itself as 
a pressure group of Oppressed Castes, capable of tilting the balance in close election 
fights. Kanshi Ram's supporters claimed that as a result of their party's presence 45 Lok 
Dal and 6 Janata Party candidates won in the UP assembly elections. BSP polled a total 
of seven lakh votes in UP.'*'^  In 1985, the BSP came out with the candidature of Mayawali 
in the Bijnore Lok Sabha by-election against the might of the Congress-l candidate Xleira 
Kumai (the daughter of Jagjivan Ram). The BSP came out with flying colours and 
mustered 61,000 votes. Babuji's daughter could barely scrap through with a meagre lead 
of 5000 votes, when a year ago the Congress candidate's victory margin was about 
95,000 votes.**^  In 1987. Mayawati again contested from Haridwar parliamentary by-poll 
against Janata Dai's Ram Bilas Paswan who had made a Guinness Book record of victory 
in 1977 from Bihar. Mayawati came second ahead of Paswan who lost his security 
"' See The Sunday Observer. 12 August 1990 
''"See Abhay Kumar Dubey, op.cit., pp. 299-300. 
' ' Ibid. 
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deposit. Again, die Congress could only scrap Ihrougli vvitl:i 14,000 to 15,000 votes. The 
following year Kanshi Ram fielded himself in Allahabad Lok Sabha by-election in whlclv 
V.P. Singh fought as a joint candidate of the opposition against late Lai Bahadur Shiistri'i: 
two sons Sunil Shastri who was the Congress nominee. BSP's volunteers with blue flag 
mounted on their cycles, with the symbol of 'elephant' printed on it, roamed rhe 
Allahabad constituency and displayed rare commitment. V.P. Singh won expectedly by a 
heavy margin but only after Kanshi Ram cut 71,586 potential votes of the Congress.'*^  
However, it had a breakthrough in the three Vidhan Sabha by-elections in UP in 1987 
when the BSP got 26.3 percent of valid votes.'*^ 
In 1989 the BSP emerged as a force to reckoned with. In UP Vidhan Sabha 
elections of 1989, the party performance was comparatively fair to its past result if not 
commendable. The party fielded 372 candidates and won only 13 seats, which is really 
boosting for a nascent political party having no great electoral experience. After 
mustering 9.4 percent vote share, the BSP proved itself a force no longer be avoided 
(Table I). The BSP that contested the ninth Lok Sabha elections against the entire well 
entrenched parties of the state single handedly with its 69 candidates and won 2 seats 
with 9.9 percent of its vote share in UP (Table 1). Though it won only 7 seats, but the 
party affected the outcome in another 27 seats. As a result the Congress lost as many as 
19 seats because of the BSP presence in the contest. While it lost by a ver/ naiTow 
margin in three constituencies, the BSP finished third in the contest in as many as 43 
seats. Leaving aside the Congress and Janata Dal> the BSP not only polled more votes 
than the BJP but have also shown greater populaiity in a large proportion of seats it 
contested.'*'' Despite the widespread suppon among the Oppressed Castes, the BSP 
fielded non-Oppressed Castes in most of the general seats. The majority of its candidates 
belonged to backward castes followed by the Muslim and the Scheduled Castes, but in 
none of the constituencies fielded an upper caste candidate, indicating thereby its 
principled stand against the upper castes.'*^ It reflected a blurred but true picture of a new 
alignment among the Oppressed Castes, backward castes, and the Muslims emerging to 
** Ibid. 
*' Ibid. 
*^ See Pradeep Kumar, op.cit., p. 823. 
"" See V.B. Singh, "Harijans and Their Influence on the Elections in Uttar Pradesh", op.cit, p, 241. 
*' Ibid. 
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forestall the design of the upper castes to peipetuate their strangulating dominance in 
political games. 
Table 1: Electoral Performance cf BSP in Uttar Pradesh Elections of Uttar Pradesh, 
Year 
1989 
1991 
1993 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2002 
2004 
Lok Sabha 
C 
69 
67 
-
85 
75 
85 
-
80 
W 
2 
-
6 
4 
' 14 
-
19 
Votes% 
9.93 
8.70 
-
20.60 
20.7 
22.06 
-
24.67 
1989-2004 
UPAssembly 
C 
372 
386 
164 
296 
-
-
401 
-
W 
13 
12 
67 
67 
-
-
98 
-
Votes% 
9.41 
9.44 
11.12 
19.64 
-
-
23.06 
_ • 
Notes: Here C=Contested, W=Won 
Source: See Election Commission website. http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionResults/ElectionResults_fs.htm 
As Table 1 shows, between 1989 and 1993 Vidhan Sabha elections, there was a 
marked improvement in the performance of the party from 13 to 67 seats. In this phase, 
two competing mobilisational strategies shaped the electoral politics and the role of 
parties: commimal mobilization based upon the Ayodhya issue by the BJP, and caste 
mobilization ai-ising out of the Mandal report supported by the SP/JD. Hence, in spite of 
the massive victory of the BJP in 1991, the BSP obtauied only one seat less than in the 
1989 elections. By the 1993 assembly elections, post-Ayodhya demolition poUtics and 
Hindutva violent reaction to Mandal report allowed the Backwards, SCs and Muslims to 
come together politically. It was of this tactical alliance between Samajwadi Pany and 
BSP, contained Hindutva politics led by BJP in the state. 
However, the alliance's electoral victory in the state did not tantamount to 
polarization of tlie bahujan samaj under them. This can be argued by the fact that about 
28 percent of the Backwards voted mainly in favour of the BJP while 15 percent 
supported the Congress. The SP-BSP gained about 33 percent of the Backward votes 
while the share of tlie JD fell to 16 percent. Moreover, though the Muslim votes shifted in 
favour of the alliance, the Congress v/as able to poll 15-20 percent and the JD around 16 
percent.''^ But what is important for us to note, was the massive electoral participation of 
Oppressed Castes in many parts of UP led by the BSP. In central and eastern Ul\ where 
49 See Amresh Misra, "Dalit Assertion: Possibilities and Limits", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
XXVIIl, No. 50, December, 1993, pp. 2701-2. 
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the BSP has its base, there were visible signs of tho emergence of Oppressed Castes as a 
distinct social-political group. The BJP performed well in precisel>' those regions where 
the BSP was either weak or the Oppressed Castes did not assert themselves in an 
organized manner.^ " The BSP proved one thing effectively in these elections: Wave or no 
wave, its voters would not leave the part>' in any cjxse. 
Moreover, the alliance successfully prevented the BJP from coming lo powe'-
What is more, both parties established themselves as powerful political contenders in VP 
especially vis-d-vis the Congress and the Janata Da! (JD). Many observers heralded the 
following post-poll coalition as the eclipse of Maudal politics, the uniricaiion oi' the 
Oppressed Castes, Backwards, and Muslim communitj to challenge the traditional upper 
caste hegemony. At the same time, it seemed to indicate that the BJP's efforts at sotidl 
engineering throughi comjnunal mobilization had not succeeded in gaining the suppon of 
the Oppressed Castes. To the matter of great pleasure for many, however, the coalition 
entered into an enduring crisis v/ithin a fev/ montliS that finally led to its collapse in early 
June 1995. Had the SP-BSP alliance not broken apart before the J 996 elections, the 
politics of UP would have always been in their hand. If this was the case, then, v/hy BSP 
opted to break its most strategic alliance despite its inrnnediate lose of political prestige 
and advantageous future? In this context, there were so many things, which ignited the 
mind of BSP leadership. First, it was the case of "Yadavisation" of the state under the 
Mulayam Singh Yadav government. However. Mulayam Singh Yadav tried to federate 
all the OBCs behind him, but more particularly he was keen above all to promote his 
caste fellows the Yadavs. In popular wisdom, he was well known for "his tendency to 
distribute benefits of power largely to his o'mi commimity" '^ even at the cost of depriving 
Oppressed Castes.'"^ Such a policy of the "Yadavisation" alienated tlie BSP from the 
coalition. Second, it was the OBCs— especially Yadavs— violent reaction xo the 
Oppressed Caste's upward mobility despite their own effort to achieve social mobilit)-. its 
logical outcome was the emption of frequent disputes in the villages, since both the 
groups— t^he Oppressed Castes and the OBCs (in many cases Yadavs)—became moT-e 
^ See Sudha Pai, "From Harijaria to Dalits", op.cit, pp. IIA-'ITJ. 
J^ Cf. Jaf&elot, op.cit., p. '^76. 
" Out of 900 teachers as appointed under his second go\ emraent, 720 were Yadavs. In tlie DOHCC force, out 
of 3,151 newly selected canoiddtes, 1,223 allegedly belonged to this caste. See India Foday, October 15 
1994, p. 37. 
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assertive after the 1993 elections." This in turn, partly resulted in proliferation of 
atrocities perpetrated against the Oppressed Castes.*'* In this context, some observers 
have cited the grassroots antagonism between Oppressed Castes and the powerful 
sections of Backwards as the main reason for the breakdown of the alliance.'* The upper 
castes, particularly Rajputs**, and the OBCs, especially Yadavs both were responsible for 
the atrocities against them. The belief in the BSP camp was that Mulayam was 
deliberately failing to protect them efficiently." Third, the dismal performance of BSP in 
the assembly by-elections held after the 1993 and the Panchayat elections of 1995, and 
the laudable victory of SP was another bone of contention.** Fourth, the organizational 
weakness of the BSP to keep its elected members completely loyal to the part was an 
added dominant factor. It was to the extent that Mulayam Singh foimd enough space to 
entice party's dissidents to defect.*^ Finally, the infamous circuit house incident at 
Lucknow on 2 June 1995 completely spoiled the chances of such a coming together, and 
thus, the last chance of forming a backward class political constituency in UP seems to be 
lost.*° As a result on 2 June 1995, the BSP withdrew its support for the government and 
its eleven ministers resigned. The following day Raj Bahadur and twelve other BSP 
" Especially the Yadavs, who became more assertive after the Mulayam's government, were quick to 
harass them. See, A. Mishra, "Challenge to SP-BSP Government", EPfV, February 19, 1994, p. 409 and S. 
Chandra, "Dalits versus the OBCs", Sunday, February 27, 1994, pp. 10-13. In March 1994 The Times of 
India cited an intelligence report according to which 27 out of 54 cases of atrocities perpetrated against 
Untouchables were carried out by the OBCs-half a dozen of them involved Yadavs. See The Times of India, 
March 2, 1994. 
^ The Commission of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes enumerated 1,067 cases of atrocities in UP 
in its report of 1995. See H. Hanumanthapa, "Dalits in India: A Status Report", Dalit-International 
Newsletter, vol. 2, no. June 2, 1997, p. 9. 
" See Anil Nauriya, "Dalit-Intermediate Caste Alliance: Call to Greamess", EPW, July 2, 1994. 
** For the atrocities caused by the upper castes against the Oppressed Castes, see P. Swami, "Conflicts in 
UP", Frontline. March 11, 1994, pp. 4-11. 
" The rising graph of atrocities was the main reason for the divorce between BSP and SP, as Kanshi Ram 
puts, "BSP withdrew support m 1995 because Mulayam tried to attract some of our people and because of 
atrocities against the Scheduled Castes, especially by the Yadavs. That was the main reason. I tried to warn 
him but he could not or did not want to dodo anything. Cf. Jaf&elot, op.cit., p. 412 (footnote no. 55). 
" See Sudha Pai, "From Harijans to Dalits", op.cit., p. 278. 
" See Abhay Kumar Dubey, op.cil., pp. 303-5; A. Mishra, "Limits of OBC-Dalit Politics", EPW, June 10, 
1995, p. 1356. 
On her part, Mayawati has not forgiven Mulayam Singh for the June 2, 1995 incident at the State Guest 
House in Lucknow, in which Mulayam Singh's supporters gheraoed her and threatened her after the BSP 
withdrew firom the S.P.-BSP government. She had alleged then that it was part of a conspiracy to molest 
and kill her. Uncharitable remarks made subsequently by Mulayam Singh only enraged her fiuther. She 
took the matter to the National Women's Commission, which, however, acquitted Mulayam Singh for lack 
of evidence. See Pumima S. Tripathi, "In suspended Animation", Frontline, March 16-29,2002. 
http://www.flonnet.com/fl 1906/190603 80.html 
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MLAs joined the SP. '^ Uncharitable remarks made subsequently by Mulayam Singh only 
enraged her further. She took the matter to the National Women's Commission, which, 
however, acquitted Mulayam Singh for lack of evidence. 
BSP's Flirtation with BJP: Evaluating BSP's Rationality 
As the destiny would have it, the BSP soon earned its tactical support in the shape 
of BJP, which resulted in the formation of government on 3 June 1995 with Mayawati as 
Chief Minister. It was certainly a turning point in the mode of BSP's bahiijan politico. 
The rationality of the alliance is being widely contested. Does it hold any ground to 
comment that the BSP has kept aside its ideological commitment, which talked about the 
upper castes as an oppressive minority ruling over an oppressed majority? This is really a 
very dominant question that often havmted the mind of every scholars engaged in this 
pursuit of understanding political rise of BSP. One the one hand, Pai views, the post-
alliance politics of BSP is nothing else but the entry of the BSP into TposX-bahujan phase 
on the ground of two visible trends: "coalition-building with upper caste parties and a 
deepening of the movement at the grassroots level" that leaded to "Dalitisation" of UP 
politics. On the other hand, Jaf&elot completely disagrees with Pai's reading of the 
BSP's electoral strategy to be termed as party's posX-bahujan phase. This is on the 
ground that large chimk of OBCs" still voted for the parties in the subsequent elections 
and BSP's constant effort to attract OBCs by giving them electoral tickets.^ ^ One cannot 
entirely support Pai's understanding nor go completely against the rationale of Jaffrelot. 
Let us now first understand the rationale behind the BSP's alliance with the upper caste 
parties. 
As it is overtly true, Kanshi Ram has consistently appealed to its target categories 
in his usual mood that "Political power is the master key with which you can open any 
lock, whether it is social, economic, educational or cultural..."^ The conquest of power 
has always been his prime motive behind the mobilization of Oppressed Castes, bahujan 
discourse, and, of course, in coalition-making. This was true in all and every 
*' See Jaffrelot, op.cit., p. 413. 
^] Ibid., pp. 279-287. 
*" For more details on the expansion of his argument, see Jaffrelot, op.cit., pp. 399-425. 
^ Cited from Ibid. 
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circumstances, whether it was the case of an alliance with the backward ca^te party like 
SP, or the "Manuwadi" BJP. Kanshi Ram explicitly took the view that he was prepared to 
put up with the odium of being propped up by the party hated by the whole of progressive 
India.^ ^ As he also admitted his acquisitive instinct towards administratiA'e power in 
concluding alliance with SP: "The reason why I concluded alliances with Mulayam Singh 
Yadav is that if we join our votes in UP we ^^ 'iIl be able to form the government."*^ It was 
out of this reason the alliance with BJP was especially valued because it enabled the BSP 
to remain in office. If truth were told, this is a case where end justified the means, and 
this approach was substantiated by Mayawati's first experiment in power. With this 
particular reference of Kanshi Ram unpretended intention, we find no rationality in Pai's 
argument that the BSP was converted "from a movement to a party led by an 
opportunistic leadership" in 1995 when it made an alliance with the BJP.'^' Contrary to 
the hope of the then BJP General Secretary K.N. Govindacharya thai "the rise of dalit 
power will eventually merge with the larger entity of Hindutva for the well-being of the 
whole society"''*, the BSP maintained its autonomous quest for its share in the state's 
politics. Another fact to reveal, that, for the first time, the parties representing upper 
castes repeatedly succumbed to the demands of a party representing Oppressed Castes. 
But it has hardly happened that the BSP bows its head to the subtle dexterity of these 
parties in the art of hegemonising the state's power. It was only the rationality of 
compulsions of electoral politics to a degree that allows the BSP leadership a high level 
of flexibility in alliance formation v/ith these parties. It is in this context, the party's habit 
of tactical alliance should be taken an example of pure pragmatism than pure 
opportunism. What makes the BSP's alliance with BJP an instance of pure pragmatism? 
Lets explore the viable answer to this question. 
It is not unknov/n fact that Mayawati's accession to UP's top post has provided an 
opportunity to consolidate its vote banks.'^ ''' Understandably, such consolidation was of 
the result of special treatment granted to lower castes, of which the Oppressed Castes 
" See Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op.cit, p. 277. 
"^ Ibid. 
" See Sudha Pai, "'From Harijans to Dalits", op.cit, p. 279. 
*' The Times of India, December 27, 1993 
*' Such a consolidation was a part of a deliberate strategy: soon after the withdrawal of the BJP's support 
and the fall of her first goveniment in October 1995, Mayawati declared in an interview: ''My biggest 
achievement has been consolidation of the Dalit vote bank." See The Pioneer, October 23,1995, p. 9. 
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were the first beneficiaries. Commenting upon the unique style of Mayawati's strategy to 
consolidate BSP's "vote banks" during her first Chief Ministership, Jaffrelot provides a 
graphic accounts of events in UP: "Mayawati started v^th a series of name changes: Agra 
University was renamed Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar University and the one in Kanpur, 
Chhattrapati Shahuji Maliaraj University. New districts were carved out and renamed 
after Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar, Shahuji Maharaj and Mahamayana, the mother of Budha. 
The Agra stadium was named Eklavya, etc. Dozens of Ambedkar statues were put up 
across the state. The acme of this symbolic conquest of public space was the Periyai* Mela 
that the Mayawati government organized in Lucknow on 18 and 19 September 1995 in 
honour of E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker, or Teriyar....The Periyar Mela aimed at 
rehabilitating his name, at mobilizing the Dalits and at provoking the upper castes, as did 
Kanshi Ram on this occasion by making derogatory remarks about Gandhi."''^  
Within a span of four and half month, Mayawati did her best to provide maximum 
benefits to the Oppressed Castes. For instance, she revised tlie Mulayam Singh Yadav's 
Ambedkar Village Scheme and ensured the allotment of special fimd to those villages 
where SCs constitute more than 30 percent (and even 22percent in certain areas) as 
against 50 percent previously for two years. Oppressed Castes in these villages v/ere 
especially favoured by Mayawati since "all the roads, handpumps, houses, etc., have been 
largely built in their bastes".^' Grants were created for Oppressed Castes children to 
attend classes between level 1 and 8; and those for Bhangi children were doubled. Lastly, 
20 percent of the posts of inspector of police were reserved to the Scheduled Castes. The 
various empowerment scheme launched by the Mayawati government have actually 
brought the Oppressed Castes out of the electoral passivity, which characterized their 
behaviour till the 1970s. 
In this process OBCs were not neglected but were promised that they would 
benefit fi-om 27 percent of the state budget. Some new castes were included in the OBCs 
list and the Nishads were allowed the privilege of renting plots alongside rivers. Finally, 
Muslims were designated to receive the same grants as SCs children and Mayawati 
implemented the recommendations of the second UP Backward Classes Commission, 
which insisted, in 1994 report that low caste Muslims should benefit fi:om reservations in 
™ Jaffrelot, op.cit., p. 415. 
'' Ibid. 
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the state administration. Mayawati granted the Muslims 8.44 percent of the 27 percent 
due to the OBCs. A comparable proportion-8 percent-of police officers' posts was also 
reserved for the Muslims.''^ 
In order to implement these measures, the BSP government followed the policy to 
build its own network. For this reason, the government indulged into transfer tactics to 
promote its own supporters at strategic posts.^^ To the most, the Oppressed Castes 
replaced upper caste officials. The District Magistrates belonging to the Oppressed Castes 
were being posted at the helm of almost half of the districts.^'' The upper caste 
incumbents in the Chief Secretary and Chief Minister's Principle Private Secretary 
positions were both replaced by Scheduled Caste officers. Even more controversially, a 
number of more junior Scheduled Caste officers were favoured with accelerated 
promotion and positions at the center of the administration.^' Mendelsohn brings to our 
notice that "Mayawati demonstrated that the Balmjan Samaj's antipathy to 
'Brahmanwadi' culture was no mere abstraction but was to serve as a guide to the 
identity of the actual bureaucrats who could be trusted to direct the administration."'^ It 
was this policy above all others alarmed the BJP as it helped the BSP to strengthen its 
local implementation. The BJP withdrew its support on 18 October 1995 and the fall of 
the Mayawati government led New Delhi to declare President's rule in Uttar Pradesh. 
Contextualising Electoral Durability of the BSP 
Given the withdrawal of BJP support and the consequent fall of BSP govenmient 
in the state, there was a general apprehension in popular pai-lance that the BSP will loose 
ground in UP in coming national and provincial elections of 1996. The most persistent 
complaint about the BSP was all about its stereotype politics and the Dalitisation of the 
state. So what if nobody agrees witli BSP? The party has succeeded in consciously 
'^  Ibid., p. 4! 6. 
" During his first term, Mulayam Singh ti-ansferred 419 members of the IAS and 228 members of the IPS 
between December 1989 and June 1991. Kalyan Singh transferred 460 IAS and 319 IPS between June 1991 
and December 1992. Mulayam Singh in second term transferred 321 IAS and 493 IPS between December 
1993 and June 1995. After one month of exercise of power, Mayawati had ateady transferred 82 IAS and 
96 IPS. See India Today, July 31, 1995. V/ithin 136 days of the Mayawati government, there were more 
than 1,500 transfers. See Jaffrelot, op.cit., p. 416. 
'" Frontline, December 1, 1995, p. 31. 
'^ See Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op.cit., p. 228. 
'* Ibid. 
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cultivating its image of a serious political ibrce that dretinis of a bright future for tlu"; 
oppressed castes in the state. Given the serious competition among political parties to 
gain a base among the Oppressed Castes, the BSF's effort to widen its base among the 
Oppressed Castes should not be criticized. Thus, the BSP's alliance with the BJP stand 
justified and give an example of its utmost pragmatism rather opportunism. It h only rhe 
Mayawati's experiment in office enabled the party to broaden its base amongst tlie 
bahujan samaj by showing that an Oppressed Caste could occupy the seat of power (in 
itself a very powerful symbol) and exercise it to the profit of the downtrodden. It is out of 
tills experimentation in power, the BSP did well in Lok Sabha elections of 1996 in U? 
without any strategic alliance. 
The increase in the electoral strength of the BSP was really astounding. As the 
Table 1 shows, the party had increased its tally considerably irom 1 in 1991 to 6 in 1996. 
This was a six times bigger achievement than its last electoral performance. What is more 
important to note, its vote share increased tremendously from 8.70 percent in 1991 to 
20.60 percent in 1996 which v,as noticeably higher than the Congress and equal lo SP.'^  
There were 52 seats in the state where the party polled more than 1,00,000 votes. The 
party stood second in 17 seats and secured more than 20 percent of total polied votes in 
46 seats. '* In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the BSP's zones of strengtli were confined 
to Bundelkhand and East Uttar Pradesh but since the mid 1990s its iafluence has become 
more evenly distributed. Even in the over\vhelmingly upper caste zone of Uttarakhand, 
BSP improved its vote share from 2.2 in 1991 to 10.1 percent in 1996 Lok Sabha (Table 
2). The data available on the voting preference of tlie caste and comjnunity showed that 
59.1 percent of the Oppressed Caste voters supported the BSP in 1996 Lok Sabha 
election (Table 3). It does not mean that the BSP electorate, though dominated by the 
Oppressed Castes, is confined to them. The party ensured its base among the OBCs and 
Muslims though a limited one.^ "* On the whole, the election strengthened the impression 
of very high Oppressed Castes voting solidarity for the BSP, with only marginal division 
of the vote to other parties. This in itself explaias the trend that the considerable rise in 
"^ The Congress secured only 8.55 percent of votes and 5 seats, where as SP liad polled 20.60 percent of the 
votes that is equal to BSP in 1996 Lok Sabha elections. But in terms of seat winning, tlie SP won i6 seats 
as compared to BSP's 6. See http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionResults/ElectionResults_fs.htm 
" Pushpendra, op.cit., p. 331. 
' ' For the voting percentage of OBCs, Muslims and upper castes for BSP in 1996 Lok Sabha elections , see 
Pradeep Kumar, op.cit., p. 823. 
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the political consciousness of the Oppressed Castes in UP has been translated into the 
support for the BSP. The result of the 1996 Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh has 
confirmed this trend. 
Table 2: BSP Share of Vote in Uttar 1 
~~ •—-Kggr 
Region "-—-~^ 
Uttarakhand 
West UP 
Ruhelkhand 
Doab 
Bundelkhand 
Avadh 
Poorvanchal 
LS 
Assembly 
LS 
Assembly 
LS 
Assembly 
LS 
Assembly 
LS 
Assembly 
LS 
Assembly 
LS 
Assembly 
Pradesh Elections 
1991 
2.2 
3.5 
3.3 
3.5 
i5.1 
5.9 
9.5 
10.2 
20.2 
20.3 
8.9 
8.8 
12.6 
13.5 
1993 
-
4.2 
-
5.7 
-
2.7 
-
9.9 
-
26.1 
-
5.6 
-
21.9 
by Region, 1991-2004 (% 
1996 
10.1 
21.5 
18.5 
29.7 
20.5 
27.2 
22.8 
. 
25.8 
35.8 
18.8 
33.2 
20.2 
27.4 
1998 
9.38 
. 
18.78 
. 
18.50 
. 
-
. 
25.65 
. 
20.83 
. 
23.49 
. 
1999 
6.1 
. 
23.8 
. 
22.6 
. 
22.8 
_ 
28.9 
_ 
22.8 
. 
23.6 
. 
\ 
2002 
-
. 
-
23.2 
-
20.6 
-
23.0 
-
28.0 
-
22.7 
-
23.1 
2004 
• 
. 
25.3 
. 
21.2 
. 
21.6 
. 
27.0 
. 
26.8 
. 
28.1 
-
Source: For 1991 LS, Zoya Hasan, "Persistence of polarization". Frontline, Mayl7,1996, p. 37; For 1991 
and 1993 Assembly elections, Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution, op.cit., p. 400; For 1996 LS, 
Aditya Nigam, "Looking for a new equilibrium". Frontline, June 28,1996, p. 88; For 1999 LS, Frontline, 
November 19,1999, p. 41; For 1998 LS, Kanchan Chandra, "Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh: The 
Ethnification of the Party System and its Consequences", in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds.), 
Indian Politics and the 1998 Election: Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics, (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1999), p.75; For 2002 Assembly elections, A.K. Verma, "UP Assembly Elections; Caste 
Dominates Ideology", Economic and Political Weekly, May 25,2002; For 2004 LS, A.K. Verma, "Uttar 
Pradesh: Caste and Political Mobilization", Economic and Political Weekly, December 18,2004, pp. 5464. 
Table 3: Vote Preferences of Scheduled Castes in UP Lok Sabha elections, 1996-2004 
Parties 
Congress 
BJP 
BSP 
SP 
1996 
9.4 
10. 
59.2 
7.1 
1998 
8.0 
18.4 
50.5 
9 
1999 
20 
5 
57 
4 
2004 
7.8 
5 
70 
11 
Source: For 1996 and 1998 Lok Sabha, Pradeep Kumar, "Dalits and the BSP in Uttar Pradesh", op.cit., p. 
824; for 1999 and 2004 Lok Sabha, A.K. Verma, "Uttar Pradesh: Caste and Political Mobilisation", op.cit., 
p. 5464. 
In the subsequent UP Assembly election in 1996, BSP entered into another 
strategic alliance. This time its ally was Congress. BSP went to the poll aUiance with 
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Congress with two most important facts despite others at the back of its mind. Chandra 
and Parmar put it pragmatically "as (1) a short-run strategy to catapult the party into a 
position to form a government in UP, and (2) as a means to capture Congress' remaining 
dalit and backward vote in UP, and other states."^° Though, the overall result otthe 1996 
Assembly election was strikingly similar to the pre Assembly elections meajis, 67 seats 
for BSP, the BSP improved its position in terms of vote share from 11.12 in 1993 and 
19.64 in the 1996 and the alliance winning 27.8 percent. The resuh also showed its rising 
influence in the every region of the UP in terms of vote share. The Oppressed Caste 
voters supported the BSP vehemently. Their vote percentage to BSP constitute this time 
aroimd 65 percent* '^ and combined with the Congress alliance constitute around 73 
percent (Table 4). The fact that the party was supported by two-thirds of the Oppressed 
Castes-who represent 21 percent of UP's population-was quite an achievement and 
could only be explained by the BSP's rise to power. The party also demonstrated its base 
among the non-Oppressed Caste groups. 
Table 4: Caste group and vote preference. Assembly elections 1996,Uttar Pradesh 
Caste 
Forward Castes 
Landed Backward 
Most Backward 
SC 
ST 
Muslim 
Others 
BJP+Samta 
76.8 
26.4 
53.1 
8.3 
58.3 
2.3 
40.9 
INC+BSP 
6.7 
12.2 
19.2 
73.0 
16.7 
24.9 
24.2 
United Front 
8.6 
51.8 
19.9 
14.0 
25.0 
67.6 
26.8 
Others 
7.9 
9.6 
7.8 
4.7 
0.0 
5.2 
8.1 
Source: V.K Rai, "In Search of a New Balance: Caste. Region and Community in Uttar Pradesh", EPfV, 
August21-28, 1999,p.2404. 
A New Reversal of Alliance 
The results of the UP polls revealed that no party, which aspired to come to 
power, could afford to claim the government fomiation independently. Hence New Delhi 
once ag£un imposed Presidents' Rule on the state. Tliis really proved a boon for the BSP. 
The BSP leaders immediately announced that they would form a coalition with any 
political force willing and able to allocate the Chief Ministership to 
*° Kanchan Chandra and Chandrlka Parmar, "Party Strategies in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly Elections, 
1996", EPW, February 1, 1997, p. 216. 
" Jaffi-elot,op.cit., p. 401 
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Mayawati.^ ^FoUowing aii '.mderstanding between the BJP and BSP, a BJP-BSP coalition 
government was swom-in in UP on 21 March 1997. It v/as decided that the BSP would 
have its Chief Minister for six months to start with followed by a BJP Chief Minister for 
the next six months. The process would continue with tA^ 'o paities alternating in the chief 
ministerial position. As for the government, it would comprise 50 percent BJP and 50 
percent BSP ministers.*"' The BSP therefore came back to power thanks to a new reversal 
of alliances. In pursuit of its strategy to enlarge its base among the Oppressed Castes the 
BJP found it necessary to v/oo the BSP. By alignhig itself with the BSP "it tried to 
present itself as a dalit friendly outfit so as to dent the dalit-OBC-Muslim vote bank."*^ *^  
While the BSP's aim was to acquire pov/er. Here both the parties made major ideological 
compromises. 
It may appear opportimistic in the grammar of our erstwhile secular-nationalist 
politics that the party again entered into alliance with the BJP. But given the ideology of 
BSP, as discussed, is concerned, the administrative and political potential of state policy 
are the only instrument of Oppressed Caste emancipation. It is not surprising then that the 
BSP is v/restling control of the state apparatus by whatever means. Clearly, it is out of the 
dynamics of internal struggle for power for the Oppressed Castes reason, the party needs 
no gjound to explain its readiness to shift alliances. From tlie view point the ordinary 
Oppressed Caste "who knows that brahmanism and maniiwad are the main oppressors 
who have crushed them for centuries, the facx is no less important that today it is the 
social base of the likes of Mulayam Singh Yadav that is oppressing them brutally."*^ 
From this perspective, it would be suicidal to permanently fix the liierarchy of enemies: 
neither Mulayam nor the BJP, nor anybody else should be able to take their support for 
granted.*^ 
It is interesting to note that Mayawati did not change her style of promoting the 
cause of Oppressed Castes despite the fierce criticism from its ally BJP and others too. 
"ibid. p. 418. 
"ibid. p. 419. 
" Partha S. Ghosh, BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism- From Periphen' to Centre, (New Delhi: 
Manohar, 1999).p. 131. 
"' Aditya Nigam, "Radical Politics in the Times of Globalization: Notes on Recent Indian Experience" in 
Niraja Gopal Jayal and Sudha Pai (eds.), Democratic Governance in India: Challenges of Poverty/, 
Development, and Identity, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001), p. 174. 
'* Ibid. p. 175. 
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Within two days after taking over she had announced tliat 250 constiible-clerks would be 
soon recruited among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.*^ The .\mbedkar 
Villages Scheme was comprehensively revived under the direct supervision of the Chief 
Minister.^ ^ In addition, 15,000 Ambedkar statutes were installed throughout Uttar 
Pradesh. The 120 crores Ambedkar Udhyan (Park) was laid out on a massive scale."*^  
Furthermore, even as time passed the BSP became more aggressive in the promotion of 
symbolic Oppressed Castes assertion. The scholarships were increased and targeted 
towards the poorer sections of the Oppressed Castes. And Rs 700 million were allocated 
for the setting of schools on the ashram model for children of the Balmiki caste. Apart 
from this Oppressed Castes were to be given priority in licenses for business such as 
stone quarries, sugarcane crushing, and all sugarcane cooperatives were to have at least 
one Oppressed Caste member. The government decided to set up special courts in every 
zilla to try offences against the Dalit Atrocities Act and other civil cases where they are 
involved, such as land disputes, etc.'^ It also spearheaded a campaign against caste-based 
cultural violence, oppression and discrimination, symbolically centered around the 
installation of statues of the Ambedkar across the state.^ ^ What is important to note that 
"the BJP failed to chalk up a plan to convert the coalition into a 'bloc' led by the upper 
caste dominated hindutwa forces" during this six month of Mayawati's Chief 
Ministership. In order to ensure the effective implementation of her policies, Mayawati 
again adopted her transfer tactics. Within these six months of her second tenure, she 
transferred a total of 1263 civil servants from the IAS, IPS and the Provincial Civil 
Services.'^  This massive transfer of officials was solely to benefit supporters of her 
policies and regime. No doubt, the officers from the Oppressed Castes were greatly 
" The Times of India. March 23,1997. 
'* On assuming power in March 1997 Mayawati issued orders that all important programs must 
inunediately be made operative in the selected Ambedkar villages. See Dainik Jagran, September 30, 1997. 
*' Jaffrelot, op.cit. 
^ Government of Uttar Pradesh, Sushri Mayawati Ke Gatisheel Netritwa Me Uttar Pradesh Sarkar Ke 
Pramukh Nirnay Awam Thos Uplabhdhiya, (Lucknow: Department of Information and Public Relations, 
Government of Uttar Pradesh, September 20, 1997). 
" See Craig Jeffrey and Jens Lerche, "Dimensions of Dominance: Class and State in Uttar Pradesh" in C.J. 
Fuller and Veronique Benei (eds.). The Everyday State & Society in Modern India, (New Delhi: Social 
Science Press, 2000), p. 104. 
^ Anirudh Deshpande, "Casteism, Communalisin and Politics", EPW, October 11,1997, p. 2579. 
' ' Ian Duncan, Casteism and the Interpretation of Indian Politics. Paper presented at Political Studies 
Association-UK, 50* Annual Conference, London, April 10-13,2000. 
ww .^psa.ac.uk/cps/2000/Duncan%25201an.pdf 
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favoured. However dubious these transfers may have seemed, in the eyes of Oppressed 
Castes they were recompense for the years of upper caste dominance of the pubhc 
services and neglect of the interests of the Oppressed Castes. T hus, having achieved 
power, the BSP was very successful in promoting emancipatory proces:>es, which were 
already under way among the Oppressed Castes. 
Mayawati's term ended in September and the BJP's Kalyan Singh took over. The 
change, however, was not smooth. BSP's policies were creating difFicuhies for Ihe BJP 
and it also finds BSP's anti-Manuwadi tirade, which includes anti-upper caste rhetoric, 
unpalatable. Given the apprehension in the camp of BSP to bear the WT&th of BJP, it v,'as 
almost certain that Mayawati would not step down in favour of the BJP, which Kanshi 
Ram hinted at.^ '* Soon after Kalyan Singli's takeover the BSP withdrew its support on 19 
October fi'om the government as a result of which the government was reduced to a 
minority. However, contrary to Kanshi Ram's expectations, Kalyan Singh manipulated 
splits in the Congress and the BSP to ensure a vote of confidence in his favour to .stay in 
power. 
BSP's Decline and Resurgence: Interpreting 1998 and 1999 Elections 
The BSP contested the 1998 Lok Sabha elections on its own. As we have already 
seen that the BSP succeeded in galvanizing a ver>' large section of the Oppressed Castes 
to its political programme, which resulted in voting for the BSP candidates in the 
Assembly and the Lok Sabha elections. After being assured of the Oppressed Caste votes, 
the BSP in the 1998 Lok Sabha elections focused on the backward castes and Muslims. 
This strategy was reflected in its distribution seats to the member of particular group. 
Oppressed Castes were given 25 percent of tickets in 1998 Lok Sabha elections as against 
the 30 percent in the 1996 Assembly elections. Whereas, 41 percent of the tickets were 
given to backv/aj-d castes, an increase of more than 10 percent ftom the 1996 Assembly 
'•* A few weeks before Kanshi Ram had more or less explicitly announced his divorce with the BJP: "My 
aim is that the BSP should move tbrward. At any given pouit, I will enter into a tactical alliance with 
another party if I feel it will strengthen the BSP and it is what I have done in the past. I did not enter into an 
alliance with the BJP because of any ideological common giound-in fact v/e are poles apart. [...] We 
entered into an understanding with the BJP last year to increase the base of the BSP and when we feel we 
are not benefiting any longer, we will end ii. [...]! am only looking for a suitfible ladder." Cited in The 
Times of India, August 21, 1997. Kanshi Ram also opined that while his party is for social change the BJP 
is in favour of the status quo and so "both cannot go together." The Times of India, May 19, 1997. 
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elections. Interestingly, the most backward castes obtained 66 percent of the tickets given 
to backwards. In addition, the party allotted Muslims roughly the same percentage (16 
percent) that it had in the 1996 Assembly elections. Finally, the upper castes gained 
around 17 percent of tickets as it was in 1996.^ ^ The BSP's strategy of proportional 
distribution of tickets to the social categories was the realization of the heterogeneous 
composition of Uttar Pradesh's electoral constituencies. Since the party did not enter into 
alliance with any party, the BSP had no option left but to pursue votes on all fronts, 
including upper castes. Thus it was certainly a wise decision on the part of the BSP to 
supplement its core votes of Oppressed Castes sufficiently to permh it to win electoral 
victories. 
Nonetheless, the BSP's strategy to court votes on all front did not elevate itself to 
a winning position in Uttar Pradesh. The results revealed that the party tally in the Lok 
Sabha was reduced from six to merely 4 out of the 75 candidates contested. V»Tiat was 
even more important was that its vote share also remained almost static with very 
marginal increase from 2.6 to 2.7 (Table 1). And the most shocking news was the defeat 
of BSP's supreme Kanshi Ram in Saharanpur. The data on BSP's pattern of regional 
support indicates that the party was not in a winning position in any region in UP (Table 
2). The base of BSP since its inception has remained confmed to eastern UP, 
Bundelkhand, and parts of central UP. As is revealed from Table .>, the Oppressed Castes 
voting in favour of BSP was on decline. It came dov/n from 59.2 percent in 1996 to 50.5 
percent in 1998. The BJP, on the other hand, increased its share of the Oppressed Caste 
votes from 10 percent to 18.4. This was really disappointing for the BSP. While there has 
been negligible change in the OBC support of the BSP, it has ironically gained ground 
among the upper castes (Table 5). 
Table 5: Cotnmunity-wise VotiriK Dehaviour in 
Caste groups 
SC 
ST 
OBC 
Upper Caste 
INC 
8.0 
-
6.8 
7.7 
BJP 
18.4 
30.0 
30.6 "1 
50.7 
JD 
. 
-
0.7 
-
Uttar Pradesh 1998 (%) 
SP 
9.0 
40.0 
30.4 
23.8 
BSP 
50..5 
10.0 
9.2 
4.1 
Others 
14.2 
20.0 
22.3 
13.7 
Source: P. Kumar, "Dalit and the BSP in Uttar Pradesh", op.cit. 
93 See Kanchan Chandra,, "Post-Congress Politics in Utt?.r Pradesh'", op.cit. pp. 69-73. 
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No doubt, the frustrating results of 1998 elections revealed some of the 
weaknesses of the BSP's new electoral strategy. First, the co-option of politicians, 
especially upper castes, who were not as politically committed as people with a 
BAMCEF or DS4 background. It was this policy brought heavy resentment among the 
veteran leaders of the Dalit movement.^ ^ Second, the constant change in alliances for the 
sake of power went hand in hand with a decline in party discipline: the BSP is especially 
prone to defections by its members as its leaders promoted a political culture based on 
occupation of power. Third, the weak party structure resulted in frequent dissidence and 
defections that constantly damiiging the BSP. Fourth, its renowned prestige of 
undemocratic functioning is another point to be noticed. Prior to 1997, Kanshi Ram 
appointed BSP presidents in the stales and they in turn selected the leaders of the district 
committees. It was in 1997 the chiefs of the state units were elected but they continued to 
select the members of the state executive committees and of the district bodies.^ " More 
importantly, Kanshi Ram and Mayawati were quick to dispense with presidents of state 
units.^ ^ Their autocratic modus operandi also alienated many second rank leaders.""' 
Establishing a link between intra-party democracy, fragmentation and renewal, 
Pratap Bhanu Mehta argues, "The more discretionary power is vested with leaders, the 
more a political party depend solely on its leaders for renewal...If there are no formal 
mechanism to challenge entrenched party hierarchies and regulate conflict within, parties 
are more likely to fragment..."" '^ Noticeably, poorly institutionalized intra-party 
democracy of BSP and the incapability of its leadership produced more factions. It was, 
however, the bitter experience of the BSP's electoral decline in 1998 elections and the 
risk of its obsolescence in the coming elections forced Kanshi Ram to introspection. It 
was only after the realization of party's organizational weaknesses, he decided not to 
'^ During the 1998 elections, in Meerut district BSP activists resigned from the party to protest against the 
issuing of the ticket to one such former mayor, Arun Jain, see Jaffrelot, op.cit. p. 421. 
" Till 1997 the BSP had never held party elections, the office bearers being chosen by party grandees. Ibid. 
'* Ibid. 
" In May 1997, Mayawati unceremoniously removed Bhagwat Pal from the party presidentship in Uttar 
Pradesh. National Mail, May 24, 1997. 
'"*' In 1998, the General Secretary of the UP unit of the BSP, D.P. Bara resigned because he felt humiliated 
by the Mayawati. A few days later, an influential Kurmi leader, Ram Punjab Patel, a former MP, resigned 
from the National Executive of the party and then from the primary membership. The Hindu, September 5, 
1998 and September 17,1998. 
'"' Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Reform Parties First", The Hindu, October 31,2000. 
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contest elections over the coming five years in order to concentrate on consolidating the 
party.'°^ His return to his initial focus probably had a positive impact on the party as it is 
reflected in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. 
As a part of its strategy, the BSP decided to contest all the 85 Lok Sabha seats and 
to not enter into electoral alliance with any party in the 1999 elections in UP. At the same 
time, the party underscores the need to develop its integiative strategy to increase its seat 
share. While distributing the tickets, the party maintained the principle of "each 
according to his strength of population" in the state. It amiounced Muslim candidates in 
17 constituencies where it was felt that the Muslims were moving away from the 
Samajwadi Party. It allotted 20 seats to Oppressed Castes especially in those districts 
where the party was sure of their support as demonstrated in past elections. The upper 
and backward caste candidates were selected carefiiUy and they were expected to 
campaign using the party ideology.'^^ The backward castes secured 38 and the upper 
castes 10-five Brahmins and five thakurs.'"'* What is significant to note here that party 
had preferred to give tickets to upper castes in those areas where they had expressed their 
displeasure with both Congress and BJP.'°' It is with this aritlunetic in mind the BSP 
fielded a Gujjar in Baghpat, a Kashyap in Kairana, a Saini in Muzzaffamagar, a Bralimin 
in Haridwar, and Muslims in Saliaranpur, Meerut, and Hapur.'"^ The party also developed 
leadership across the state among the castes neglected by other political parties such as 
Pal, Shakya, Baghel, Maurya, Pushkat and Saini among the backwards, and Sankhawai, 
Pasi, Dhobi, Valmiki and Kliatiks among the Oppressed Castes.'°' 
The party also exhibited its utmost sincerity in selecting the candidates in 
consultation with the district office bearers of the party. The party set up poll 
managements system by dividing assembly segments into sectors of 20 polling booths 
each handled by six party workers, and identified v/inning seats which included those 16 
in which the BSP ended second in 1998. In the electoral campaign, the party also held 
"awareness rallies" as a result of which Oppressed Castes voted even in those areas 
'°^  See Jaffrelot, op.cit. p. 423. 
'°^  For example, media report describe Ashok Yadav in Pratapgarh explaining to the voters, "Baba Saheb's 
constitution gives everyone tiie right to vote.,.", Hindustan Times, New Delhi, October 10, 1999. 
'*• Sudha Pai, "BSP's New Electoral Strategy Pays Off, EPW, October 30,1999, pp. 3099-3101. 
'"' Ibid. 
'°* The Hindu, August 11, 1999. 
'"' Sudha Pai, "BSP's New Electoral Strategj' Pays Off, op.cit. 
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where their participation was negligible.''''^  It is, ihus, perhaps stating at the risk Oi" 
obvious to say that the party has addressed all xhose weaknesses in the 1999 elections, 
which were overwhelmingly present in the 1998 elections. 
Table 6: 
Caste 
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Let us now trj' to bring the contours of our universe of analysis into siiarper fociis 
by concentrating on the electoral resurgence of Bahujan Samaj Party in the 1999 Lok 
Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh. A question that can be legitimately asked is whether iloe 
"new strategic changes" really helped the BSP to better its electoral prospects in IJP. (f 
one goes by resuhs of the 1999 Lok Sabha polls, one would agree that it really did yes. 
There was marked improvement in the seat as it secured 14 seats in 1999 in comparison 
with the 4 in 1998 elections. If we look at the percentage of votes polled, we would see 
that the BSP gained further ground. It polled about 22 percent as against the 20.70 
percent in 1998 (Table 1). An analysis of the results shows that the BSP wiiile winning 
14 seats also occupied second place in another 15. Two upper caste, two Muslim, two 
backward and seven Oppressed Caste candidates won on the BSP ticket, indicating a 
broadening of its social base.'"'' Interestingly, nine of the 14 BSP MPs were elected from 
non-reserved seats. Perhaps this is the first indication of a limited acceptance of the BSP 
among the sarva samaj that the party has begiui speaking of. A significant siiift is 
"«Ibid. 
"«lbid. 
1 ' ^ J , -
noticeable in the BSP's regional base. Barring Utt<irakhand where its percentage dropped, 
in the remaining four zones of UP it gained commendably and thus making it a party 
having recognizable presence all over UP (Table 2). 
An analysis of the verdict based on voting preference of the caste and 
communities shows that BSP has almost monopolized the Oppressed Caste votes. The 
party garnered around 57 percent of Oppressed Caste votes (Table 6). It is necessarj' to 
dispel the commonly held belief that BSP has a powerful electoral appeal only among tlie 
Oppressed Castes, let alone simply the Chamars. The Table 5 reveals that the parly has 
considerable success in attracting other groups. The CSDS election survey data indicates 
the inclination of non-Yadavs towards BSP. Though their support remained confined to 
11 percent, but certainly improved from the 1998 elections. More importantly, the upper 
caste votes to BSP also increased. But the figure also make the BSP aware of the fact that 
it had yet to work hard in the direction of gaining support from the non-Oppressed Caste 
voters. What was really a cause of botlier for the BSP that the BJP and Congi-ess were 
still enjoying a considerable support among the Oppressed Castes? Aroimd 20 percent of 
the Oppressed Caste votes went to the Congress. In popular conscience this was not at all 
surprising because the Congress has traditionally enjoyed their support. '\\T:iatevei the 
gains made by the BSP in terms mobilizing the Oppressed Castes, it was only at the cost 
of Congress. But what as really a matter of worry for the BSP to note that despite ixs pro 
Oppressed Castes orientation a large chunk of Oppressed Castes voted for the other 
parties in UP. This, of course, gave a lesson to the BSP that the party should not be 
lethargic towards rest of the alienated Oppressed Castes. It was out of this realization, the 
party seemingly worked hard to strengthen its image of a party of Oppressed Castes 
without crusading against the non-Oppressed Caste groups. This was justified by the 
logic that if the Oppressed Castes en bloc do not vote for BSP, it would recede into 
electoral oblivion. Given the fact of 21 percent of the total Oppressed Caste population of 
the UP, this is equally true that if the BSP fails to gamer a considerable amount of non-
Oppressed Caste voters, it would never be able to attain power independently. In this 
context, if we look at the BSP's strategic thinking of incorporating other groups while 
consolidating Oppressed Castes seems nowhere unjustified. Thus, its technological 
rationality was the only cause behind the electoral resurgence of BSP in the 1999 Lok 
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Sabha elections in UP. Embraced v/ith this logic the BSP entered into the 2002 Assembly 
and 2004 Lok Sabha elections and proved its potential on both the front. 
Sustaining Resurgence 
It has become the crystal clear from the experience of 2002 Assembly and 2004 
Lok Sabha elections that the BSP entienched its position by successfully mobilizing the 
Oppressed Caste in Uttar Pradesh. The verdict of voters in both the elections was 
fractured but it was decisive in favour of the socially downtrodden, precisely called 
Oppressed Castes. The Oppressed Caste voters showed their confidence in their own 
political party, namely BSP. It was of this result the party increased its seat tally. 
Numerically, the party earned 31 seats from 1996 assembly elections, totalling 98 in the 
2002 Assembly elections. Its share of vote has also kept rising with every election. BSP 
managed to score 23.06 percent of votes polled in 2002, wliich is all time high in 
comparison with its previous Assembly election performances. The party gained 24.67 
percent of votes in 2004 elections, which is conspicuously above than the previous Lok 
Sabha elections (Table 1). What is really interesting to note that the political might of 
BJP has been lost in these elections. The BSP obtained more number of seats and 
percentage of votes than tlie BJP in botli the elections."° The BJP has been steadily 
declining and slid to the position of the third largest party even behind the BSP in both 
the elections. 
The verdict is a clear expression of preference for the non-higli caste social bloc 
of parties. Tliis is also reflective of a trend that the society of Uttar Pradesh is witnessing 
a great social churning and the Oppressed Castes are asserting their social right to live 
with dignity under the regime of their own party and leaders. This can be argued on the 
basis of emerging homogeneity of voting patterns in the Oppressed Castes. Despite the 
competing Claims of the Congress and BJP, the BSP profitably secured the majority of 
the Oppressed Caste votes in its favour in 2002 and 2004 elections. It is certainly tnje that 
the Chamars of the UP constitute the single largest social constituency for the BSP. But 
the shifting voting pattern of other Oppressed Caste groups has given a prima facie 
"" BJP won only 88 seats and garnered around 21 percent of votes in 2002 Assembly elections; and 10 
seats and around 22 percent of votes in 2004 Lok Sabha elections in UP. 
http:/Av\vw.eci.gov.in/ElectlonResults/ElectionResults_fs.htm 
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example of their eagerness tc support Ihe cinancipatoiy attitude of BSP. Despite an 
attempt to defuse Oppressed Caste mobilizarioji by the BJP and Congress, there is an 
obvious comfort among the BSP regarding tiie heritage of collective Oppressed Caste 
mobilization. It is interestingly because the RSP's natural strategy for augmenting 
Oppressed Caste assertiveness remains rooted m iis anti-Manuv/adi ideology. 
Table 7: Community-wise Voting 
Castes 
Upper Castes 
Yadav 
More Backward (MRBC) 
Most Backward (MBC) 
Jatav 
Other SCs 
Muslim 
Others 
Behaviour 
INC 
12.5 
3,3 
2.5 
5.9 
2.6 
6.4 
7.1 
-
• Ja UP Assembly Elections 2002 (%) 
BJP+ 
64.3 
7.6 
51.5 
31.6 
1.7 
1!.6 
9.6 
15 
SP+ 
9.9 
75.2 
12.4 
23.7 
2.1 
15.7 
62.5 
15 
BSP 
4.8 
5-1 
8.4 
25.4 
84.7 
57.6 
9 
15 
Others 
8.5 
8.9 
25.2 
13.4 
8.9 
8.7 
11.9 
55 
Source: CSDS Post-Poll Data; A K Verma, "UP Assembly Elections: Caste Dominates Ideology", EFW, 
May 25, 2002 
It is not only the BSP consolidated the Oppressed Caste votes, but also 
demonstrated its dexterity in successfully competing with other political parties in 
gaining a base among the most backward castes. The Table 6 and 7 reveals that the large 
sections of non-Yadav backward castes, especially the most backward castes have shifted 
their electoral allegiance to BSP in 2002 and 2004 elections. Tliis very trend shovv\< that 
the rise of BSP not only have effectively closed any possibility of mobilization of 
Oppressed Castes in favour of Hindutva politics of BJP, but also claimed a substantial 
part of the most backward caste votes. The party also registered identical gains among the 
Muslim voters. This indicates that the Muslim voters are not completely banking on the 
Samajwadi Party. In accordance with a social engineering fonnula that is strictly her 
own, she had allotted the party ticket to a large number of upper-caste - or what she calls 
"manuvadi" - candidates - 37 Brahmins and 36 Tliaktirs - and to a record number of 
Muslims (86). This formula apparently ensured the support of caste Hindus, besides 
Dalits and Muslims, to the party.'" If we look at the caste composition of the BSP's 
'" Pumima S. Tripathi, "The Drubbing of its Life", Frontline, March 2-15, 2004. 
http://www.flonnet.com/fl) 905/190501 lO.htm 
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MLAs in 2002 Assembly elections, there were four Yadav, 32 upper caste, 15 Muslim 
and 24 non-Yadav backward caste."" 
The region wise analysis of the 2002 Assembly and 2004 Lok Sabha elections 
show that the BSP got more than 20 percent votes in all the seven regions. The party 
gained 23.2 percent of votes in West UP popularly Icnown as "Jatlai:id", the heart of Lok 
Dal in 2002. In 2004, the party further improved in this region to 25 percent of votes, it's 
really a 1.5 percent increase from the 1999 elections. The party continued to dominate the 
Bundelkhand region by capturing 28 percent votes, though it won maximum seats from 
the Avadh where it polled 22.7 and Doab regions securing 23 percent in 2002. In the East 
region the BSP had made its presence strongly felt. The 2004 elections too attested the 
party's increasing position in every region except marginal decline in Ruhelkhand and 
Bundelkhand (Table 2). A more significant point that emerges from the regionwise 
analysis is the BSP no longer be an avoidable political because it has established its leg 
so entrenched in every region that cannot be rooted out in any single blow. 
No Government Without BSP 
It is with this sustained resurgence, the BSP has come a long way. It has ensured 
participatory upsurge of the Oppressed Castes that oft resulted in the attainment of power, 
but for a short while. No one could take away the fact that the party has trounced all its 
opponents and crossed a barrier few would have predicted—an Oppressed Caste's party 
would attain such an electoral support to attain a highest seat of power in Uttar Pradesh. 
But the 2002 Assembly elections placed UP in a situation where no party had a clear 
majority, no government could be formed without the participation of the BSP."'' The 
possibility of an alliance with the SP is restricted because of the structure of social 
relations in which the influential among the OBCs have in no way been less exploitative 
of the Oppressed Castes than the upper caste people. This has forced the BSP, once again^  
to enter into alliance with only BJP in order to form the govenunent in May 2002. 
Evidently, the BJP has done this in the belief that her company would bring it electoral 
benefits in the next Lok Sabha elections. Their hope was being tarnished on the very 
"^  See Pumima S. Tripathi, "In suspended Animation", op.cit. 
"^  Mayawati was aware about the fact as she openly asserted, "There can only be a government led by me. 
Otherwise there will be no government". Ibid 
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occasion of Mayawati's oath ceremony. "The blazing blue of the party and its elephant 
symbol and huge cutouts of Mayawati loomed over evety comer of Lucbiow city. Even 
the oath-taking venue - the sprawling grounds of the La Martinier School - was bathed In 
the BSP's blue. The saffron of the BJP was conspicuous by its absence. The gathering at 
the venue mostly comprised of BSP workers, apd they cheered lustily for "Behen Kuinari 
Mayawati" throughout."^''' Once again, Mayawati has ultimately proved right tlie slogan; 
"U.P. ki majboori hai, Mayawati jaroori hai" (Mayawati is ii\e compulsive need for 
U.P.).""^ However, gaining power through this loosely structured alliance, Mayawati has 
not been able to hold on to office for long periods and there has been extreme 
unpredictability to the stability of her government. This is primarily because "Mayawati 
has not yielded any ground to the BJP, either politically or ideologically.""* 
Conventionally, Mayawati has aggressively pursued her own pro-Oppressed Caste 
agenda and consolidated her support base further, and has run the government on her own 
terms."' In truth, the BJP, supposedly a party with some self-esteem had agreed to a 
bizarre, servile and humiliating arrangement just to share power with a leader who made 
no secret of her contempt for its Manuwadi ideology. 
Even the presumption that an alliance with the BSP would get the BJP some 
Oppressed Caste votes was proved wrong in the recent by-elections. Electorally, the 
transfer of a significant number of Dalit votes would have provided a big boost to the 
BJP. This was unhkely to happen. The success of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the 
by-elections to one Lok Sabha seat and two Assembly seats has reaffirmed Mayawati's 
supremacy in Uttar Pradesh. It is a measure of her political charisma that the BSP not 
only managed to retain the Akbarpur Lok Sabha and Jehangirganj Assembly seats, 
vacated by Mayawati, but also wrested the Bahedi Assembly seat from the Samajwadi 
Party (S.P.). In contrast, the BJP was left red faced, having lost the only seat it contested, 
"^  Pumima S. Tripathi, "The Great Game", Frontline, May 11-24, 2002. 
http://www.flonnet.com/fll910/19100200.htni 
"* The slogan, which was raised with abandon at the oath-taking ceremony, has been refined by the BJP 
leadei-s opposed to tlie alliance as "BJP ki majboori hai, Mayawati jaroori hai" (BJP has a compulsive need 
for Mayawati). Ibid. 
"* Pumima S. Tripathi, "Coalition Troubles", Frontline, March 14, 2003, p. 40. 
"'Ibid. 
"* Praful Bidwai, "A Big set back for the BJP", Frontline, September 13-26,2003. 
http://www. flonnet.com/fl2019/stories/2003 0926006912200.htm 
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Dibai."' What ii reveals, the Oppressed Caste votes were not traiisfen-ed to ihe BJP. The 
alliance has been of no help to BJP. In fact, c\'en in Uttar Pradesh Mayawati has ensured 
that the BSP's vote bank remains loyal to ii. More significantly, the pmly was also 
vigilant about the Congress's meticulously laboiired effort lo regain the lost ground of I'P 
and Oppressed Castes in its fold. Interestingly, these signals cairie soon after unexpected 
visit by Priyanka Gandhi Vadra, the daughter of Sonia Gandhi, to Ajnethi, tlie latter's 
parliamentary constituency. 7'he surge of populai- response to Priyanka's sympatJietJc 
gesture to an Oppressed Caste cause alaraied Mayawati, who consider the community to 
be her captive vote bank.''^" After sensing the potential threat from the Congress. 
Mayawati held a "savdhaan rally" (caution lally) in Amethi on December 11 2002 lo 
prevent Oppressed Castes from being "misled"" by Sonia Gandhi. At the rally, the first 
ever held by the BSP in the constituency, she said: "The Dalits were misled into voting 
for her. If you people would not vote for her, she would not see the enuance i>S Lok 
Sabha in the next election.'"'^' 
Her political tactics was to keep the Oppressed Castes active throughout the realrn 
of her Chief Ministership. The opulent birthday celebrations of Utt^ ar Pradesh Chief 
Miruster Mayawati held both in Lucknow and New Delhi on January 15, 2003 was used 
to convey the message to other political parties that the BSP has a monopoly over the 
Oppressed Caste cause and that efforts to hijack it would be opposed. Unfazed by 
criticism from the Opposition paities, Mayawati named her birthday ''swabhiman diwas" 
(self-respect day) for the Oppressed Castes. By proclaiming the day "'swabhiman diwas" 
for the Oppressed Castes, the BSP leadership made it clear to the Bhartiya Janata Party 
and Congress (I) that Dalit politics remained its forte. Mayawati's action of arresting 
Raja Bhaiya under POTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act) smacks of political adventuiisro. 
" ' Pumima S. Tripathi, " Political Quandary", Frontline, June 22-July 25. 2002. 
http://www.flonnet.com/fl 1913/19130440.htm 
'^ ° During her four-day tour of the constitusncy in the last week of November 2002, Priyanka interacted 
with party workers and visited people's houses to enquiie about their well-being, it was then that she came 
across a Dalit, Shambhu Nath, in Punnpur village, who told her that his house had been demolished by A 
local BJP politician, Babban Singh, and that the police refused even to register a first irifomiation report 
(FIR). This prompted Priyanka to march to the police stalion and lodge an FIR. See Pumima S. Tripathi, 
"A Flutter in Amethi", Frontline, December 21,2002-January 3,2003. 
http://www.tlonnet.coiTi/fll926/stories/20030l03004403100.kri. 
'=' Ibid. 
122 Puniima S. Tripathi, "A Birthday Me.=,3age", Frontline, February 1-14, 2003. 
http://www.flonnf;t.coni/fl2003/.siories/200302140022042C0.1nni 
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Such was his ability to unleash terror and so strong vvere his political connections that 
nobody could have imagined that the long ann of law could reach him. By taking 
recourse to arrest Raja Bhaiya and smashing his terror, Mayawati has succeeded in 
portraying the might of an Oppressed Caste Chief Minister, in earning the good will of 
people, and in consolidating her base among Oppressed Castes, who have been at the 
receiving end of Raja Bhaiya's atrocities. She has also proved that under her regime 
nobody can enjoy the prestige of status above law. 
It has become more than obvious for even the most naive that Mayawati has used 
power for the empowerment of the Oppressed Castes. She spent hundreds of crores of 
rupees on the development of a park in Lucknow named after Ambedkar. Spread across 
several acres of lush green land in the heart of the city, the project remains one of her top 
priorities. Similarly, identifying villages as Ambedkar villages based on the size of their 
Dalit populations and taking up their development on a priority basis has been one of her 
pet ideas. Shortly after taking over as Chief Minister this time, Mayawati identified 
another 10,000 Ambedkar villages and met the World Bank Country Director in May to 
request fimding for their development.'^ '* At the same time, she issued a government 
order on August 24 effecting 50 per cent reservation in sports colleges and hostels in the 
State: 21 percent for the Scheduled Castes, 2 per cent for the Scheduled Tribes, and 27 
per cent for the Other Backward Classes. However later, she withdrew this order out of 
the presser of its ally. But Mayawati promptly annoimced similar reservation in the 
allotment of fair price shops. The order, which came into immediate effect, reserves 21 
per cent of the shops for the SCs, 2 per cent for ttie STs and 27 per cent for OBCs. In the 
absence of enough S.T. applicants, their quota would go to the SCs, the order said.'^ ^ She 
announced another ambitious project: a university dedicated to the Buddha, to be set up 
at an estimated cost of Rs.300 crores in the Greater Noida area of Gautam Buddha Nagar 
district. The foundation was to be laid on October 14, 2002, the day on which Dr. B.R. 
' " Pumima S. Tripathi, "By Hook or by Crook", Frontline, February 15-28,2003. 
http://www.flonnet.eom/fl2004/stop:es/20030228002704300.htm 
124 Pumima S. Triparhi, "Mayawati in double trouble", Frontline, September 14-27, 2003. 
http://www.flonnet.com/fll919/19190340.htm 
'"Ibid. 
'^ ^Ibid. 
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Ambedkar had embraced Buddhism.'^ ^ However, the BSP's welfare/development 
programmes have been 'mere symbolism' to obtain support without addressing the 
longer-term deprivations faced, particularly by the Oppressed Castes.'^ * Nevertheless, 
there has been a steady rise in the political consciousness of the Oppressed Castes 
throughout the 1990s. Quite surely, this is the product of BSP's exclusive focus on "self 
respect" of the Oppressed Caste; A very scant attention has been given to uplift them 
from entrenched economic deprivation. This is evident from the argument of the BSP 
leadership that "self-respect is more important to dalits than material gains" and what we 
are fighting for is dignity and self respect".'^' The outcome is obvious. The pace of 
political empowerment of the Oppressed Castes is such that all political parties embroiled 
themselves to appease this historically neglected social group and overcome their brand 
image as upper caste parties. 
Quite surely, she could have done more good for the Oppressed Caste, had she 
been in power for the full term. But the State hurtled from one impossible situation to 
another soon after the BSP-BJP coalition came to an end with the BJP withdrawing 
support to the Mayawati government and the latter recommending the dissolution of the 
House on August 25, 2003. On August 29, established political equations were turned 
upside down and political assumptions were demolished, with parties opposed to the BSP 
facilitating Samajwadi Party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav's third stint as Chief Minister. 
More serious was the split in the BSP, which was much bigger than previous ones. The 
37 defectors from the BSP formed the Loktantrik Samaj Party, which was recognized by 
the Speaker, later merged it with the S.P. Thus, today Mayawati sits in opposition as 
Mulayam Singh Yadav holds the reigns of the state. 
An examination of the 2004 election results, which we have dealt already, reveals 
that the BSP despite the difficulties it has faced throughout the realm of its government 
has improved its seat and votes share in the UP. It is a denominator of the fact that the 
' " Pumima S. Tripathi, "Expanding Woes" Frontline, October 26-November 8,2002. 
http://www.flonnet.com/fl 1922/stories/20021108003004000.htm 
'^ * Cf. Sudha Pai, "Dalit Question and Political Response: Comparative Study of Uttar Pradesh and 
Madhya Pradesh", EPW, March 13,2004, p. 1141. 
'^' Ibid. 
Pumima S. Tripathi, "Uttar Pradesh Drama", Frontline, September 13-26,2003. 
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2019/stories/20030926005200400.htm 
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assertion of the powerful nascent social force has increased which is appropriately 
reflected in electoral outcomes of 2004 in Uttar Pradesh. 
In conclusion, this chapter argues that tlie Oppressed Castes in Uttar Pradesh have 
come a long way since the early days of their political passivity. They are in a better 
position to understand that how does India's widely acclaimed democracy functioned as 
undemocratic monopoly of upper castes. The answer lies in their historical follies which 
they have committed to be caught in the "tactical logic of social unity" efficiently 
managed by the Congress system to maintain upper caste's domination over the power 
structure of UP. Understanding this logical manipulation enables them to better answer 
the question: why power always rotates around the upper castes despite the change of 
governance in the state? This is out of the fact that they remained "vote bank" throughout 
the course of electoral history either for one party or another party. They had never 
asserted their numerical strength, which is really a vehicle to attain power under the 
management of universal adult franchise. Instead, they poignantly conceded the 
systematic weakening of their organizational base and their potential claims in the power 
structure of UP through the means adopted by the upper caste parties, namely, cooption, 
accommodation, and factionalism. They have also realized that there is no party in India 
that has natural intention to emancipate and empower them. Against this larger political 
canvas, the Oppressed Castes have found the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party 
inspirational and liberating and recognized it as their own party. They have found a voice 
against the upper castes and an ability to counter the forces that confined them to the 
periphery of society. The party's first agenda is to convert this community into a strong 
electorate that wields its sheer size for political purposes. In this pursuit, the BSP has 
largely succeeded in the goal to unify and consolidate the Oppressed Castes. The party 
has proven to be inventive and innovative in their approach to social and political 
mobilization. The active grassroots mobilization by the BSP has led positive result. The 
Oppressed Castes, who once lagged behind upper castes in terms of exercising their 
fi-anchise, have now surpassed the upper castes in terms turning out to cast their vote. 
This certainly gives an impression of "the strong political aspiration on the part of 
'^' Girish Rishi, "Politics of IVIayawati". The paper presented by the author in National Seminar on "Uttar 
Pradesh in the 1990s: Critical Perspectives on Society, Polity and Economy' by the Centre for Political 
Studies, SSS, JNU, New Delhi on March 10-11,2005. 
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Oppressed Castes and their effort to assert in a democratic polity by utilizing the electoral 
process."'"'^  It simply proves that the Oppressed Castes actively transformed themselves 
into a category of political relevance that no longer be resisted by any clever design of the 
upper caste's political parties. In this context, the credit goes to BSP and its effective use 
of administrative power that inculcated the idea of social, political, and economic 
empowerment of Oppressed Castes could be possible only if there is active and effective 
purlicipalion of the community in the political process of the country. 
'" Pushpendra, op.cit., p. 317. 
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CHAPTER; FIVE 
CONTEXTUALISING MUSLIM VOTE IN THE 
COMPETITIVE PARTY POLITICS: 1990s TO 2004 
"Being a Muslim in India is at the same time a challenge and an opportunity to become 
functionally alive in the developing, secular democracy, ...a way to meet that challenge is for the 
Muslims to discover their own individual, highly differentiated pasts and only then to engage in 
making aggregates of them, first at the local and regional levels, and later at the national level. 
...(T)here is no one Muslim or even Indian Muslim past. Such constructs are only abstractions, 
and not entirely neutral. In the process of discovering the past, as we move from individual to 
increasingly larger units, the quantum of abstraction increases, as does the potential for the past to 
become restrictive. ... (T)hose who seek to discover the past exist in certain objective political 
conditions, as did the creators of that past which is being rediscovered. If those conditions - past 
and present - are overlooked in the rediscovering process, then that abstract past can also become 
concretely coercive."' 
Introduction 
In both, popular and academic discourse, there is a degree of ambiguity relating 
with the importance of Muslims vote in the competitive party politics of Uttar Pradesh. 
This is particularly because of little attention given by the scholars to understand the 
party's approach to Muslims vote in the post-Congress phase of the state politics. This 
chapter modestly attempts to explore the participation of Muslims in the electoral politics 
of UP in the 1990s and mid 2000s. The central argument of this chapter is to test the 
hypothesis that the high levels of multiparty competition increases the salience of Muslim 
votes and that bipolar party competition generally decreases the importance of Muslim 
votes. The second conjectural part has already been discussed in the third chapter. In 
order to test the first one, we would identify three important phenomenon quite related 
with the electoral strategy of political parties with respect to Muslim vote. The first one is 
to find out relationship of electoral competition with anti-Muslim riots. The second point 
is to look into the changing strategies of political parties with respect to expanding their 
' CM. Naim, Ambiguities of Heritage: Fictions and Polemics^ (Karachi: City Press, 1999), pp. 66-67. 
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base among Muslims and the perceptible change, if any, in the Muslim's support for 
political parties. The third thing is to enquire the salience of Muslim votes in the high 
degree of party fractionalization and the high levels of multiparty electoral competition in 
Uttar Pradesh 
However, it must be confessed at the very outset that the empirical data in support 
of such exploration has been thin. Election Commission's data, various state-level 
opinion data on Muslim support for parties available since the mid-1990ss, and many 
scattered but valuable academic exercises by noted scholars in this direction have been 
the only relying source for this study. 
Demographic Profile of Muslims 
The Muslims occupy a distinctive place in Uttar Pradesh for many reasons. But 
the most important reason behind the political importance of Muslims in UP is their 
proportion of population in the state. Though Jammu and Kashmir is the Muslim majority 
state, the highest concentration of Muslim population, in numerical terms, is to be found 
in Uttar Pradesh. According to Census 2001, Muslim constitutes 18.5 percent of the total 
population of the state, which is the highest so far as the other religious minorities in the 
state are concerned. The Sikhs are the second numerous minority group, constituting 0.4 
percent. Buddhist and Jains covers 0.2 and 0.1 percent respectively (Table 1). 
Table 1: Population of all Religious Communities in Uttar Pradesh 
Religion 
Hindus 
Muslims 
Christians 
Sikhs 
Buddhist 
Jains 
Total Population 
133,979,263 
30,740,158 
212,578 
678,059 
302,031 
207.111 
Percentage 
80.6 
18.5 
O.l 
0.4 
0.2 
0.1 
Source; Compiled from the Census of India 2001, Series 10: Uttar Pradesh. The First Report on Religion 
Data (Stale and Districts), (Lucknow: Directorate of Census Operations, Uttar Pradesh & Uttaranchal, 
2004). 
The Muslim minority, however, exhibited the most highly skewed regional 
distribution. We could divide the districts of lUtar Pradesh in 4 categories so far as the 
Muslim population is concerned: First, the districts where Muslims constitute more than 
double of the slate average. In this category, there are six contiguous districts in Western 
137 
Uttar Pradesh, namely Rampui- (49.1%), Moradabad (45.5 percent), Bijnor (41.7 percent), 
Jyoti Ba Phule Nagar (39.4 percent), Saharanpur (39.4 percent), Muzaffar Nagar (38.1 
percent). Second, the districts where the Muslims are just above than the state average. In 
this category, there are around 18 districts namely Balrampur (36.7 percent), Bahraich 
(34.8 percent), Bareily, (33.9 percent), Meerut (32.6 percent), Siddharthnagar (29.4 
percent), Shrawasti (25.6), Baghpat (24.7 percent), Sant Kabir Nagar (24 percent), 
Ghaziabad (23.8), Pilibhit (23.8 percent), Barabanki (22 percent), Budaun (21.3 percent), 
Bulandshahar (21.1 percent), Lucknow (20.5 percent), Sitapur (19.2 percent), Gonda 
(19.2 percent), Kheri (19.1 percent), and Mau (19 percent). Third, the districts where 
Muslim population is just below the state average. There are 10 districts in this category, 
namely Shahjahanpur (17.9 percent, Aligarh (17.8 percent), Kushinagar (16.9 percent), 
Maharajganj (16.5 percent), Ambedkamagar (16.4 percent), Sultanpur (16.3 percent), 
Varansi (15.9 percent), Kannauj (15.8 percent), Kanpur Nagar (15.7 percent), and 
Azamgarh (15.1 percent). Fourth, the districts where the Muslims are least in number. 
There are around 36 districts in this category (Table 2). 
S.No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Table 2: Muslim 
Districts 
Rampur 
Saharanpur 
Muzaffamagar 
Bijnor 
Moradabad 
Jyotiba Phule Nagar 
Memit 
Baghpat 
Ghaziabad 
Gautam Budha Nagar 
Bulandshahar 
Aligarh 
Mathura 
Agra 
Firozabad 
Etah 
Mainpuri 
Budaun 
Bareily 
Pilibhit 
Shahjahanpur 
Kheri 
Sitapur 
Hardoi 
Population 
% 
49.1 
39.1 
38.1 
41.7 
45.5 
39.4 
32.6 
24.7 
23.8 
13 
21.1 
17.8 
8.1 
8.1 
12.7 
11.4 
5.3 
21.3 
33.9 
23.8 
17.9 
19.1 
19.2 
13.1 
in the Districts of Uttar Pradesh (%) 
S.No. 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Districts 
Lalitpur 
Hamirpur 
Mahoba 
Banda 
Chitrakoot 
Fatehpur 
Pratapgarh 
Kaushambi 
Allahabad 
Barabanki 
Faizabad 
Ambedkamagar 
Sultanpur 
Bahraich 
Shrawasti 
Balrampur 
Gonda 
Siddharthnagar 
Basti 
Sant Kabir Nagar 
Maharajganj 
Gorakhpur 
Kushinagar 
Deoria 
% 
2.9 
8 
6.7 
8.2 
3.5 
13.3 
13.7 
13.5 
12.7 
22 
14.6 
16.4 
16.3 
34.8 
25.6 
36.7 
19.2 
29.4 
14.7 
24 
16.5 
9.2 
16.9 
11.4 
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25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Unnao 
Lucknow 
Rae Bareli 
Farrukhabad 
Kannauj 
Etawah 
Auraiya 
Kanpur Dehat 
Kanpur Nagar 
Jalaun 
Jhansi 
11 
20.5 
11.8 
14.8 
15.8 
7.2 
7.1 
9.3 
15.7 
10.1 
7.4 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Azamgarh 
Mau 
Ballia 
Jaunpur 
Ghazipur 
Chandauli 
Varansi 
Sant Ravidas Nagar (Bhadohi) 
Mirzapur 
Sonbhadra 
15.1 
19 
6.6 
10.2 
9.9 
10.2 
15.9 
12 
7.5 
5.4 
Source; Census of India 2001, op.cit. 
Contrary to the other minority communities in Uttar Pradesh, Muslims are 
disproportionately concentrated in rural areas. Of the total Muslim population of the Uttar 
Pradesh, 64 percent Muslims live in rural areas, while 36 percent live in the urban areas 
(Table 3). This shows the low level of urbanization process among Muslims. 
As compared to the other minority or majority community, literacy rate among Muslims 
are lowest, 47.8 percent. It is below the average literacy rate of Muslims at national level 
that is 59.1 percent and also below the average literacy rate of Uttar Pradesh as a whole 
(56.3 percent). It is surprising to note that the rural Muslims are more literate than the 
urban Muslims. 
Table 3: Demographic Pattern of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. 
INDIA 
UTTAR PRADESH 
Residence 
Total 
Total 
Rural 
Urban 
Total Muslim 
Population 
138,188,240 
3 0,740,158 
19,666,297 
11,073,861 
• ( % ) 
13.4 
18.5 
64 
36 
Literacy 
(%) 
59.1 
47.8 
57.4 
42.6 
Source: Census of India 2001, op.cit 
Table 4 shows the poor working condition of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. The total 
workforce among Muslims is 29.1 percent of the total Muslim population in the state. 
The Muslim working class could be further categorized in rural and urban Muslim 
working class. Conspicuously, 67.4 percent Muslim workers live in rural areas and only 
32.6 percent live in urban areas. The poignant condition of the Muslims in the state could 
also be seen when we find that almost 71 percent Muslims are workless. Of the total 
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Muslim workers, cultivator constitutes 25.7, agriculture workers 21.6 percent, household 
industrial workers 11.9 percent, and workers belonging to other category 40.7 percent. It 
proves that Muslims remain untouched witli the fruit of economic development in the 
state. They are only confined to the agricultural activities and rural areas. 
Total 
Rural 
Urban 
Table 4: 
Total 
Workers 
(%) 
29.1 
67.4 
32.6 
rhe Category of Muslim workers in Uttar Pradesh (%) 
Cultivators 
25.7 
96 
04 
Agricultural 
Workers 
21.6 
92.1 
07,9 • 
Household 
Industrial 
Workers 
11.9 
53.8 
46.2 
Other 
Workers 
40.7 
40.2 
59.8 
Non-
Workers 
70.9 
62.6 
37.4 
Source: Census of India 2001, op.cit 
Political Importance of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh 
A significant development during the 1990s and early 2000s was the increasing 
importance of Muslims in the highly competitive electoral politics of Uttar Pradesh (UP). 
Undoubtedly, the electoral history of Uttar Pradesh suggests that there had never been a 
time when Muslims did not influence the UP politics. But they were deliberately being 
put to low platform. This was largely because of the absence of intense competition and 
high levels of party fractionalization that has given more leverage to extremist majority 
community voters and antiminority parties in the state. 
Noticeably, in Uttar Pradesh, large-scale mobilization around a backward-caste 
identity is a recent phenomenon. In previous decades, because of the weakness of 
opposition parties, the ruling Congress Party politicians had little incentives to woo 
Muslim voters at the expense of the Hindu nationalist swing vote (the Jana Sangh) and 
their core upper caste constituencies. The growing strength of similar lower-and middle-
caste parties in UP since the late 1980s, however, has shifted the balance. Unlike in the 
past, they established themselves as an important political category in the competitive 
interparty electoral politics of UP. It is important to understand how Muslims become the 
beneficiaries of greater levels of electoral competition and become pivotal voters in a 
state, rather than extremists from the majority community. In general a greater number of 
cross-cutting etimic cleavages leads to an increase in party proliferation. Therefore, in 
Uttar Pradesh, where social, ideological, economic, and intra-ethnic cleavages among the 
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Hindu community are highly salient, the political parties could expect a greater 
willingness to reach out to Muslim voters. The parties are competing for Muslim support 
because of the number of votes Muslim can deliver and the low cost to the majority 
parties of the demands Muslim voters and politicians make, relative to the demands made 
by other groups within the majority community. ^ 
Table 5: Highly Muslim Populated Parliamentary Constituencies in Uttar Pradesh 
S.No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Districts 
Rampur 
Moradabad 
Bijnor (SC) 
Saharanpur 
Amroha 
Merrut 
Kairana 
Balrampur 
Bareily 
Muzaffamagar 
Padrauna 
Sambhal 
Domariaganj 
% 
42 
40 
38 
38 
37 
30 
29 
28 
28 
27 
27 
27 
26 
S.No. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Districts 
Bahraich 
Lucknow 
Kaiserganj 
Sahjahanpur 
Khurja 
Hapur 
Khalilabad 
Barabanki 
Pilibhit 
Bulandshahr 
Sitapur 
Chail (SC) 
% 
23 
23 
23 
21 
21 
21 
20 
20 
19 
19 
19 
18 
Source; Compiled from H.D. Singh, 543 Faces of India: Guide to 543 Parliamentary Constituencies (1952-
1998) 
The political importance of Muslims in contemporary competitive politics of 
Uttar Pradesh could be of the following reasons: 
• Firstly, Uttar Pradesh contains the highest number of Muslims in comparison with 
the other states of India. The highest concentration of the Muslims in the state 
singularly makes them the single biggest minority. Most importantly, the electoral 
importance of Muslims lay in the population geography of the electoral 
constituencies in the state. There are around 25 Parliamentary constituencies in 
' The electoral system obviously makes a difference to how valuable small shifts in voter preference will 
be: in India's plurality single-member system, small swings in votes can lead to dramatic swings in terms 
of seats. See Steven 1. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Communal Riots in 
India, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 141. 
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which Muslims constitutes from 45 to 18 percent in Uttar Pradesh (Table 5). A 
slight change in the Muslim vote could have a greater impact on the electoral fate 
of political parties in these regions. 
• Secondly, because of their historical role, cultural contribution, social 
distinctiveness, and urban and semi-urban habitation contrasted with their present 
cultural bewilderment, social degeneracy, educational decline and economic 
backwardness. 
• Thirdly, because of their shared sense of political despair so unwisely perpetuated 
by the existence of exclusivistic non-secular, uncreative and inept leadership. 
• Fourthly, from the viewpoint of electoral politics, Muslim electorates Bre being 
treated differently in the political life of UP. The political parties are approaching 
them as a single monolith community against the socially diverse character of 
Hindu community largely divided on caste lines. The assumption that Muslims as 
coherent political mass, which votes en bloc if convinced and sympathized, by 
any political party or candidate, gives Muslims an exceptional importance. 
• Fifthly, from leadership perspective, Muslims are, no doubt, a politically orphan 
community. There is no political party as well as effective leadership to articulate 
their interest and bargain effectively at the cost of their votes. It is out of this 
reason, every political party and political leader in the state have equal chance to 
gain their electoral loyalty by appealing their interest. 
• Lastly, in UP where intragroup cleavages are strong, politician from the ethnic 
majority will often prefer to seek Muslim support rather than the support of 
segments of their own ethnic group with which they are in competition for scarce 
political goods. 
Competitive Electoral Politics and Muslims 
In the 1990s, there has been a dramatic growth of new-Hindu led parties that 
explicitly claim to represent the "oppressed", especially the middle and lower castes and 
minorities, groups that collectively represent a majority of the Uttar Pradesh population. 
Examples would include the Bahujan Samaj Party, which represents Scheduled Castes; 
and the Samajwadi Party, which has a particular base among backward castes. Both the 
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parties are keen to expand beyond their core social constituencies and include Muslims in 
a broader social and political coalition. The rise of these "pro-backwai-d" pailies-and 
hence the size of the overall "market" for Muslim votes-has therefore increased 
considerably over the past few decades. 
Muslim voters in UP are in a good position to profit from this increasing state-
level electoral competition over distributional issues because they demand less tlian most 
Hindu voting blocs. Muslims are a large proportion of the electorate (18.5 percent), they 
have intense preference on one major issue (physical security) and they make fewer and 
less intense demands on other political issues than many of the main voting blocs within 
the majority Hindu electorate, even lower than those made by the middle and lower 
castes.^  Muslims make fewer demands in part as a consequence of their community's 
relative economic backwardness. 
As a result of anti-MusUm riots in the past, we know that Muslim place a very 
high priority on one particular issue-that of physical protection-compared with other issue 
dimensions that are more salient for Hindu voters. That Muslim voters value security so 
highly and that they have fewer educated, privileged members whose interests have to be 
satisfied than any other major ethnic group makes Muslims a relatively inexpensive 
voting bloc. In contrast, middle-and upper- caste voters, groups well entrenched in the 
bureaucracy who are belter educated and with larger landholdings, will be a much more 
"expensive" group of voters for a party to attract. 
However, these Muslim demands for security cannot be portrayed as threatening 
to the core interests of the majority for the following reason. Muslims are a minority in 
almost all districts with the exception in a handful of districts in Uttar Pradesh (such as 
Rampur, Moradabad, Bijnore, Saharanpur, Jyotiba Phule Nagar, Saharanpur and 
Muzaffamagar), so it is difficult to claim that a greater supply of security will alter the 
^ Ibid., p. 144 
* There have been several estimates over the years to determine how important the "Muslim vote" is in 
national politics. Rudolf and Rudolf, for example, identified 207 constituencies in the Lok Sabha where 
Muslim accounted for 10 % or more of the vote. Lloyd 1. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, In 
Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), pp. 194-95. There have been fewer attempts to do the same things for state politics. Asgher Ali 
Engineer and several others have estimated that Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, where they are 17% of the state 
population but 29 % in urban areas, are of crucial electoral importance in around 60 of the 403 assembly 
seats. "Defeat of BJP is Defeat of Communalism", Secular Perspective, March-1-15, 2002. 
http-.//ecumene.org/US/csss7 \ .htm 
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political balance within the state as a whole. Finally, because they are in minority in most 
constituencies, Muslim generally support Hindu-led parties, whose Hindu leaders can 
therefore reassure anxious members of the Hindu majority that moves to help Muslims 
are not threatening to Hindus.^  
Communal Riots and Muslim Vote 
The fact that election surveys with detailed data on minority voting in UP 
elections have only been collected since the mid-1990s, makes it impossible to test the 
hypothesis at low (bipolar) levels of party competition. But it is possible to make partial 
test of our arguments about the importance of levels of party competition and minority 
support in explaining government response to riots from the late-1990s. We could 
examine the two cases from Uttar Pradesh in the 1990s (for instance mobilization in 
Varansi 1991 ,^ and in Mathura in 1995) where the UP government had to decide whether 
to prevent or allow Hindu nationalist mobilizations that, it knew, were likely to lead to 
communal violence. The difference between these two outcomes can be explained when 
we look at three factors: the party in power, the BJP in 1991, a BJP-BSP coalition in 
1995; the group of voters that the party in government saw as pivotal for its party's 
success in the next election (the BJP in 1991 wanted to attract Hindus, the BSP in 1995 
wanted to attract Muslims); and the overall level of party competition in the state.' 
Wilkinson argues, "Uttar Pradesh moved from a situation in 1991 in which the BJP felt 
that if it polarized the Hindu electorate it could win power unaided, to a more fluid 
system in the mid-1990s in which it was becoming clear no one group or party could 
form a government without the support of others. What happened in the town of Mathura 
in 1995 demonstrates the good effects of multipolar political competition in reducing 
violence, even in a situation where one of the two coalition partners in government, the 
BJP, was explicitly pro-Hindu and antiminority."* 
Strategic Riot at Varansi in 1991: 
' The notable exception here is in the city of Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, where Muslims have supported 
a Muslim-led party, the Majlis-i-Ittehad-i-Muslemin (MIM). 
* See for more details on Varansi riots, Dipak Malik, "Three Riots in Varansi: 1989-1990,1991, and 1992" 
in Prafiil Bidwai, Harbans Mukhia and Achin Vanaik (eds.). Religion, Religiosity and Communalism, (New 
Delhi: Manohar, 1996), pp. 157-166. 
'Wilkinson, Votes and Violence, op.cit., pp. 160-61. 
' Ibid. 
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In the first case, the state government allowed the Hindu nationalist VHP to 
conduct a religious procession and ceremony with only a light police escort in the 
sensitive city of Varansi in November 1991. This procession led directly to a serious 
Hindu-Muslim riot in which 17 people were murdered.' How can we explain this riot and 
the failure of the government to ban the procession? To understand why Kalyan Singh 
government facilitated the mobilization that culminated into riot, it is necessary to 
understand both the state electoral context and the internal tensions within the party by 
November 1991. By the autumn of 1991 there was a substantial degree of disagreement 
in BJP over the party's attempt to rein in Hindu nationalist mobilization. Singh's attempt 
to placate the hardliners in BJP with the transfer of 67 policemen and civil servants (who 
had taken action against Hindu protesters during the Ayodhya campaign the previous 
year) was not successful.'" In September Vinay Katiyar, the local MP for Ayodhya and 
the state secretary of the Bajrang Dal stepped up the hard-line pressure when he 
demanded the removal of some police barricades at Ayodhya." The Kalyan Singh 
government removed the barricades, as it was becoming obvious, to reduce some of the 
internal party pressure on Ayodhya, 
But these internal ideological' pressures would probably not have been enough on 
their own to force Singh to allow the procession in Varansi. The key reason he allowed 
the anti-Muslim, pro-Hindu procession to take place in one of the state's most religiously 
important and sensitive cities, was that by-elections to 14 state assembly constituencies 
were due in two weeks and the BJP viewed those Hindu voters sympathetic to Hindutva 
and fearful of the alleged "Muslim threat" as the pivotal constituency his party needed to 
attract. The BJP leadership was worried that the party would lose its bare majority in the 
Assembly unless it could use these issues successfully to mobilize Hindu voters behind 
the party.'^ The BJP had only eight-seat majority in the state assembly, and several of 
these constituencies in May 1991 experienced extremely tight races between the BJP and 
its rivals supported by backward castes and Scheduled Castes, the Samajwadi Party and 
' See for more details, Wilkinson, Votes and Violence, op.cit., pp. 161-65; Asgher AM Engineer, "Banaras 
Rocked by Communal Violence", Economic and Political Weekly, March 7-14, 1992, pp. 509-11. 
'""Temple Talk", India Today, August 15, 1991. 
" Katiyar warned that "I do not care whether the BJP Government stays or goes, but the barricades at the 
site have to go." Cf. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence, op.cit., p. 164. 
'^  Times of India, November 16,1991. 
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the BSP. It seemed possible that the BJP's failure to resolve the Ayodhya mosque issue, 
combined with more general antigovemment sentiments, might lead to a low Hindu 
turnout, which in turn would lead to BJP's loss in at least some of the seats and the 
consequent fall of the BJP government. The BJP's worries about losing its majority 
therefore persuaded it that allowing a planned VHP anti-Muslim procession to take place 
in the sacred, symbolic city of Varansi might help the party to mobilize Hindu voters, for 
the forthcoming by-elections. 
In the short term, the BJP strategy to win over swing Hindu voters worked. The 
party won 8 of the 14 by-elections and held onto its precarious majority in the UP 
house.'"^  The BJP allowed the 1991 Varanasi's procession to go on and then did not 
intervene once violence broke out because, on the evidence of 1991 state elections, it felt 
it could win an absolute majority in the UP Assembly by pursuing anti-Muslim agenda 
that appealed mainly to the upper castes and those voters prejudiced against and fearftil of 
Muslims. 
Strategic Riot at Mathura in 1995: 
In the second case, at Mathura in 1995, the state government ultimately 
intervened to prevent the mobilization and averted communal violence. The contrast 
between the riot at Varansi and the riot that almost broke out in Mathura in August 1995 
provides a good example of the way in which the shift to a genuine multiparty system in 
Uttar Pradesh has improved the state's effectiveness in preventing conununal riots. 
The BJP had suffered a great setback in the 1993 Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh. 
The Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party formed an anti-BJP coalition in January 
1994, which then fell apart in May 1995, when the BSP imexpectedly formed a coalition 
of convenience with the BJP. Both the BSP and the BJP hoped to use their period in 
office in order to build support for the state elections that would follow once the two 
parties finally parted ways. But the two partners had very different views of the 
possibilities in the next election. The BSP with a social bloc (Scheduled Castes) of only 
22 percent of the population knew that its future lay in building coalitions with other 
Hindu castes and with the Muslims. The BJP, on the other hand, believed that by 
" For by-election results, see the Election Commission website, http://www.eci.gov.in 
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mobilizing a large segment of Hindus around anti-Muslim issues as it had done in 1989-
91, it could once again secure an overall majority in the UP assembly. 
The BJP's chosen statewide symbol was the western UP town of Mathura. In 
August 1995, the BJP and its allied Hindu nationalist organization, the Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad (VHP) announced their attention to carry out a Vishnu mahayagna (religious 
offering to the Hindu god Vishnu) and a parikrama (circumambulation) around what it 
referred to as the "disputed" complex that houses both the Hindu Keshav Das temple and 
the Muslim Shahi Masjid Idgah.'"* The VHP timed Xhs parikrama to coincide with the 
religious festival of Janamashtami, which draws thousands of pilgrims to Mathura every 
year. And it planned the Yagna for a Friday, when it would coincide with large numbers 
of Muslim worshipers offering their afternoon prayers at the nearby Idgah.'^  
There were three reasons why Mathxara rather than some other town was selected 
by the VHP for large-scale Hindu-Muslim mobilization in August 1995. First, Mathura is 
one of the most important religious sites in north India. Second, and more important, the 
Keshav Das temple-Muslim Idgah complex is one of the several dozen disputed mosque-
temple sites in UP, and, as such, a "natural" site for ant-Muslim mobilization. The third 
reason was that the VHP leaders knew that the BJP needed substantial backward-caste 
support if it was to win the upcoming assembly elections. The Keshav Das temple and the 
city of Mathura are closely associated with the Hindu god Krishna, who is regarded as a 
Yadav, and the hope was that a campaign built around Krishna would win over large 
number of backward castes suspicious of the BJP's upper caste image. As one Hindu 
nationalist leader put it, "As of now, the Yadavs, almost to a man, are with the 
S.P.[Samajwadi Paity] led by Mulayam Singh Yadav. But when the call of a Yadav god 
comes, can they remain indifferent?"'* 
In late July, when the mahayagna was first mooted, Mayawati apparently did not 
wish to challenge it openly, and she gave her verbal permission for the mahayagna, as 
'* The VHP claimed a four and a half acre plot next to the Idgah as a hall for religious and cultural events. 
India Today, June 15,1993. 
" On August 4, some Muslim politician from Aligarh visited Mathura to encourage Muslims there to turn 
out en mass for prayers at the Idgah on August 18. A proposed "peace march" to coincide with the VHP 
parikrama, planned by Muslim students from Aligarh Muslim University, was halted by authorities. Hindu, 
August 7,1995; Indian Express, August 14,1995. 
"A/wrfM, August 16, 1995. 
147 
long as the festivities were not on too large a scale.'^ But Mayawati quickly realized just 
how serious an electoral threat the Mathura mahayagna would be. During her period in 
office, Mayawati had made great efforts to win over at least some of the Muslim vote 
from the Samajwadi Party.*^ Her government had created a new ministerial position for 
minority welfare and, at a meeting in Lucknow on July 10, the BSP national leader, 
Kanshi Ram, announced that the UP government would henceforth reserve 8.44 percent 
of government jobs for poor Muslims.' 
If the mobilization campaign succeeded, Mayawati realized that the BSP stood to 
lose all the ground she had gained with Muslim voters, which would potentially block 
any hopes of increasing the BSP's share of the vote if state elections were to be called the 
next year. She ultimately decided that there was more to be gained from taking a firm 
stance than for acquiescing in the Mathura mobilization. On August 4, in the UP 
Assembly, Mayawati announced "nobody will be allowed to start any new tradition for 
paying obeisance in the complex." Shortly afterward she announced that no VHP 
ceremony would be allowed within three kilometers of the complex. 
Mayawati refused to allow the mahayagna and threatened to resign if the BJP 
pushed the issuer unwilling to risk the long-term loss of Muslim votes for the short-term 
advantages offered by staying in power prior to the elections. Once it became obvious she 
would not step back, a BJP compromise plan was adopted. The VHP would scrap the 
parikrama and hold the mahayagna on August 18, but well outside the three-kilometer 
security cordon surrounding the temple-mosque complex.^' This cordon prevented 
hundreds of Muslim and Hindu activists, who had traveled from throughout northern 
India, from getting near the site. This plan worked smoothly, and no Hindu-Muslim riot 
broke out. 
" Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, "Angry in Mathura", Frontline, September 8, 1995, pp. 10-16 
" Meanwhile, SP leadership was doing all it could to foment revolt among the BSP's Kurmi MLAs, who 
were unhappy over Uie allocation of ministries in the state government. Mayawati stemmed the revolt by 
immediately appointing four Kurmis as district magistrates and promising to appoint two Kurmis as 
ministers as soon as possible. For details see Sunday, July 30-August 5, 1995, pp. 24-26. 
" By reserving benefits for "backward Muslims" the BSP got round the constitutional provision that 
forbids employment discrimination on religious ground but allows it to relieve social backwardness. The 
BJP forced the BSP to withdraw this proposal, but it nonetheless helped establish Mayawati's credibility 
with Muslims. See "Looking for Support", Sunday, July 30-August 5, 1995, pp. 24-26, and "Growing 
Mandalisation", Economic and Political Weekly, July 22, 1995. 
°^ "VHP's Mathura Plan Strains BJP-BSP Ties". Indian Exprexs, August 7. 1995. 
'^ Indian Express, August 15, 1995. 
148 
Thus, these two communal incidences describe how electoral incentives 
determine whether state governments will prevent communal violence. As party 
competition increases, especially if the new parties focus on redistribution from forward 
to backward castes, majority politicians will have greater incentives to appeal to Muslim 
voters who can provide them with the margin victory. The increasing party competition 
for minority voters has led to a reduction in Hindu-Muslim violence, as politicians are 
forced by electoral incentives to take firm action to prevent Hindu-Muslim riots. 
Electoral Incentive Model of Anti-Muslim Mobilizations 
A central problem facing individual politicians is how they can ensure that voters 
will identify themselves with a politician's party and the group he or she claims to 
represent, at least on polling day, rather than with other ethnic or nonethnic groups, 
parties, and interests. The choice of which identity politicians choose to invoke in an 
election is complex and depends on the interplay of many different factors: the extent to 
which existing ethnic identities are sustained by social, religious, and economic 
institutions; the number of votes needed to win an election under any particular electoral 
system; the degree of ethnic heterogeneit}' within a constituency; political alliance with 
other ethnic parties; the strength of the party's internal discipline; and the nimiber and 
ethnic heterogeneity of other seats in which the party is competing.^ ^ 
Having been decided which ethnic or nonethnic identity to invoke, politicians face 
the challenge of how to make this identity the most politically salient among their target 
voters. One approach is obviously to highlight the range of programmatic (policy) or 
clientelistic benefits (i.e., direct transfers to specific voters) the party will deliver to the 
ethnic group once it wins the election: government jobs; subsidies to areas and economic 
sectors in which their target group is concentrated; and religious and cultural protection.^ ^ 
But in a situation where the parties arc dominated by the upper castes that enjoys a 
disproportionate share of wealth, power, and government employment, promises to share 
" For a general discussion of the ways in which politicians make such calculations, see Wilkinson, Votes 
and Violence, op.cit., pp. 21-22; George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
" For the distinction between programmatic and clientelist appeals, see Herbert Kitschelt, "Linkage 
between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities", Comparative Political Studies, 33, no. 6-7,2000, 
pp. 845-79 
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the wealth with others could be viewed with skepticism by the have-nots, and with horror 
by tliose haves who already support the party. In Uttar Pradesh, we could better take 
Congress and Bhartiya Janata Party as suitable examples. 
In this situation, high caste parties adopt the methodology of using ethnic wedge 
issues-albeit for short term-to mobilize those target voters who are at risk of voting for 
the main rival parties. In Uttar Pradesh, for example, 18.5 percent of the total state 
population is Muslim but Muslims account for 36 percent (Table 3) of the state's urban 
population. The upper castes are also concentrated in urban areas. '^' Because these two 
groups frequently vote cohesively, they often constitute the two main voting blocs in 
bipolar urban races, with the pivotal political position between upper caste and Muslim 
supported parties in towns occupied by middle and lower caste voters. The challenge for 
upper caste politicians and parties in urban areas, therefore, is how to win over these 
pivotal Hindu voters. 
They meet this challenge by highlighting the threat posed by Muslims. Upper 
caste dominated parties highlight anti-Muslim wedge issues-for example, Muslims' 
alleged slaughter of cows, the renaming of a town with a Muslim origin name with an 
•ye 
"authentic Indian" (i.e., Hindu) name, taking a Hindu procession route through a 
Muslim neighborhood, or disputing the status of a plot of land claimed or occupied by 
Muslims. These wedge issues allow these parties to potentially rally a large proportion of 
Hindus (80.6 percent of the UP's population) to their side, while entailing no economic 
cost for the party's existing upper caste supporters. In the real term, the upper castes are 
fighting Mandal with Mandir?^ 
A favorite strategy of Hindu party leaders who calculate that they would gain 
electorally from polarization around a Hindu identity is to organize unusually large 
religious processions that take new routes through Muslim neighborhoods, to hoist the 
national flag over a disputed site, or to sponsor processions to celebrate national 
anniversaries. These tactics make it very difficult to ban the event, for who could possibly 
•^' Although no precise census figures are available for upper castes, but a fact reflected in the last caste 
census in 1931. 
" The BJP proposed in 1990 and 2001 that Ahmedabad be renamed "Kamavati". Hindu, June 11,2001. 
Similar proposals have been made to rename Allahabad "Prayag". 
'^ The incentives for Muslim candidates to polarize the vote exist theoretically but not often in practice 
because Muslims arc 30 percent or more of the population in only 10 of the 70 districts of Uttar Pradesh, 
and constitute a majority in only 1. See Table 2. 
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object to the performance of a religious obligation, the raising of the national flag, or the 
celebration of a national day? '^' But the organizers, once permission has been granted, can 
easily introduce symbols and speech into these events that is likely to provoke the other 
• 28 
community. 
However, the Muslims countermobilisation (that also increases the probability of 
riots) that results from this kind of electoral mobilization will not, of course, be sufficient 
to scare all the Hindu swing voters into rallying behind the most pro-Hindu party. Many 
voters, after all, would have firm political allegiance to particular ideological or ethnic 
political parties?' And some voters would have a greater degree of bias toward Muslims 
than others. But to win an election, it is not necessaiy to appeal to every voter but only to 
pivotal swing voters, especially those undecided voters who are uninformed, unlikely to 
vote (imless scared into doing so), and most likely for whatever reasons to fear the 
consequences of not taking a strong defensive posture towards Muslim community.''^  In 
Uttar Pradesh for example, ethnic wedge issues appeal more to some groups among the 
upper caste voters than Scheduled Caste, and middle and lower caste voters. For example, 
upper castes were mainly the voting blocs of Congress but that the politics of processions 
could swing them to the Bhartiya Janata Party. 
Organizing processions and other types of mobilization designed to highlight 
ethnic cleavages requires scarce-resources: time, effort, and money. Therefore we should 
not expect divisive ethnic mobilization to take place at all times or in every seat in which 
" The principle that government should be "neutral" toward religions and allow each religion to carry out 
processions and ceremonies began to be introduced in the 1830s, and became a cornerstone of post 1857-
govemment policy despite the conflict and political mobilization around religious identities it has caused. 
For an examination of this policy shift and how it was related to 19* century riots, see C.A. Bayly, Rulers, 
Townsmen and Bazars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 335-38; and Katherine Prior, "Making History: The State's 
Intervention in Urban Religious Disputes in the North-Western Provinces in Early Nineteenth Century", 
Modern Asian Studies, 27, no. 1,1993, pp. 200-2. 
'^ For a fine analysis of processions as a form of mobilization, see Christophe Jaffrelot, "The Politics of 
Processions and Hindu-Muslim Riots" in Amrita Basu and AtuI Kohli (eds.). Community Conflicts and the 
Slate in India, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 58-92. 
" In Uttar Pradesh, for example. Scheduled Caste voters identify themselves with the Bahujan Samaj Party, 
the Backward Caste voters, most particularly Yadavs, with the Samajwadi Party, and the middle caste 
voters like Jats are political associated with Ajit Singh's party National Lok Dal. 
'" In a study of electoral campaign in southern United States, James M. Glaser reached to this conclusion. 
See his Race, Campaign Politics and the Realignment in the South, (New haven: Yale University Press, 
1996), p.69. 
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ethnic parties compete. First, it seems likely that polarizing events will occur 
disproportionately before elections as politicians try to use inflammatory issues to 
solidify their own ethnic community's support or to intimidate their ethnic opponents. In 
Uttar Pradesh, for example, upper caste politicians fomented Hindu-Muslim violence in 
order to bolster their Bhartiya Janata Party's chances of winning 1989, 1991, 1993, 1996, 
1998, 1999, 2002, and 2004 elections. Like BJP, the ruling party Congress, during 
Ayodhya campaigns, also equally supported in fomenting Hindu-Muslim violence in 
order to consolidate its base among upper caste voters. 
Qualitative research supports the statistical findings that increase in electoral 
competition are associated with a rise in the likelihood of coirmiunal riots. Communal 
mobilization and countermobilization are being taken as the necessary tool, by the 
politicians of ethnic parties, for an improvement in their electoral prospects. In 1993 
Neeraj Chaturvedi, an MLA from the constituency of Kanpur, was frank in claiming that 
Hindu-Muslim riots sparked by a procession of his BJP supporters would polarize Hindu 
voters in his favor.''' 
On obvious grounds, we can say that polarizing the electorate through communal 
processions and other events likely to divide people and increase the salience of religious 
identities, is a highly effective electoral strategy. In most of the constituencies of Uttar 
Pradesh that experienced riots were ones in which the upper-caste BJP was competing 
with a Muslim supported backward caste party for political power. Between the 1989 and 
1991 state elections, for instance, a total of 33 riots in which 295 people died took place 
in UP. Of this total, 19 riots and 188 deaths from 1989 to 1991 took place in the small 
proportion of urban constituencies (18 percent of all constituencies) in which the BJP had 
been one of the top two finishers in the 1989 elections: these constituencies accounted for 
57 percent of the total number of riots and 67 percent of the total number of deaths.^ ^ 
In every case of electorally motivated riots, the precipitating event for violence 
was an organized Hindu nationalist attempt to disrupt an anti-Muslim procession, to hold 
an anti-Muslim public meeting, or to raise the fears that Muslims were just about to turn 
upon Hindus. For example, the Agra riot, in December 1990, took place because Muslim 
" R.K. Srivastava, "Sectional Politics in an Urban Constituency: Generalganj (Kanpur)", Economic and 
Political Weekly, January 13-20, 1996, pp. 111-20. 
" See Wilkinson, op.cit., p. 49. 
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objected to a Hindu nationalist attempt to take a procession carrying the ashes of "Hindu 
martyrs" through Muslim neighborhoods of Tajganj and Loha Mandi.^ "' In Saharanpur in 
March, violence broke out when members of a Hindu procession deliberatively shouted 
provocative slogans in front of a mosque.^ '* In Ganjdundwara the riot followed a speech 
by the firebrand BJP member of Parliament Ms. Uma Bharti?' In Aligarh in December, 
violence was triggered by published reports in the Hindi newspaper Aaj, later found to be 
false, that Muslim doctors in the Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College Hospital had 
murdered dozens of Hindu patients.'' 
This polarization paid off for the BJP on polling day. Riot affected towns saw a jump in 
their BJP vote far larger than in towns not affected by violence. The towns affected by 
Hindu-Muslim riots saw their BJP vote go up by an average of 24 percent, from 19 
percent to 43 percent, while the average town saw its BJP vote go up only 7 percent, from 
29 percent to 36 percent. In terms of electoral outcomes, the effect of this BJP boost was 
dramatic. The BJP defeated incumbents from the middle-caste, Muslim-supported Janata 
Dal in all but two of the riot-affected towns, and in eight towns its share of the votes rose 
to around 50 percent,"'^  It seems likely that many Hindu voters, alarmed by the riots, 
switched their votes from the Janata Dal Party to the Hindu nationalist BJP in order to 
keep out Muslim-supported parties. 
Anti-Muslim Politics: Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha Elections, 1991 
In the changed circumstances of Congress decline in Uttar Pradesh, a large-scale 
defection of upper caste Congress voters to "Hindu nationalism", and its fortuitous 
conjunction with a splintering of the OBC, Muslim and Scheduled Caste electorate 
among several contenders, enabled impressive BJP victories in parliamentary elections, 
1991. Communal animosity towards Muslim was inflamed by Muslim participation in 
informal blocs or alliances with political groupings representing low castes. 
" Times of India, April 1, 1991. 
" Times of India, December 15, 1990. 
" Times of India, December 6, 1990. 
" The official death toll in these Aligarh riots was 37 though the unofficial total was over 65. Times of 
India, December] I, 1990. 
" See Wilkinson, op.cit., p, 50. 
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However, two important electorally motivated events of early 1990s had played 
an important role in deciding the strategies of political parties toward Muslims in Uttar 
Pradesh. First, the BJP sponsored Ayodhya mobilization with an intention to consolidate 
Hindu vote. Second, the implementation of Mandal Commission Report in 1990 by the 
V.P. Singh government with an intention to consolidate backward caste vote.''^ 
Politically, the importance of these two events for Muslim lies in the fact that they gave 
birth to two diametrically opposite electoral strategy of the political parties, namely BJP 
and Mulayam Singh Yadav's party Janata Dal, later Samajwadi Party, in Uttar Pradesh: 
the anti-Muslim and pro-Muslim political strategy. 
Since the announcement of the implementation of the Mandal plan, BJP was 
confronted with a dilemma as how to respond to this challenge, which had the potential 
of dividing the Hindu community vertically between the upper and lower caste. An 
outright condemnation of the Commission's recommendations would risk alienating 
countless "Hindu" voters. The party resolved this dilemma by reviving its anti-Muslim 
strategy. The top party leader, Lai Krishna Advani, launched his so-called Rath Yatra, a 
march from Somnath (Gujrat) to Ayodhya (Uttar Pradesh) to start construction work for 
the temple in October 1990.^ ^ On the eve of his launching tlie Rath Yatra, Advani called 
upon Hindus to demonstrate Ram bhakti (devotion) and lokshakti (people's power) to 
bulldoze his paity to power."*" Advani was arrested before he could reach Ayodhya, but 
thousands of Hindutva activists attempted to storm the mosque in end-October 1990. The 
Uttar Pradesh government of Janata Dal led by Mulayam Singh Yadav thereupon ordered 
police to open fire to disperse the mob, and several dozen persons were killed. This 
incident brought dovra the V.P. Singh government, as it lost its working majority in 
parliament after BJP withdrew its support in protest.'*' Mulayam Singh Yadav survived as 
Chief Minister only because he decided to support Chandrashekhar's Samajwadi Janata 
Party who had split with the Janata Dal. 
" For an analytical and sympathetic study of Mandal Report, see Mihir Desai, "A Justification of 
Reservations and Affirmative Action for Backward Castes in India", South Asia Bulletin (Now York), 11 
(1&2), 1991.PP. 110-130. 
Partha S. Ghosh, The BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre, (New 
Delhi: Manohar, 2000), pp. 94-95 
*° Ibid. 
" M6. 
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Despite the failure of the Rath Yatra, BJP did not stop itself playing anti-Muslim 
card. It was now time to consolidate the Hindu vote for the Lok Sabha election scheduled 
for May 1991. Accordingly, it entitled its manifesto Towards Ram Rajya. Unlike in the 
1989 Lok Sabha elections, this time the party firmly promised to construct the Ram 
Temple at Ayodhya as soon as the party came to power. As the campaign progressed, the 
BJP coined slogans such as "Jo Hindu hit ki boat karega, wohi desh par raj karega" 
(Only those will rule the country who would look after the interests of Hindus) and "BJP 
ko lana hai, ram rajya banana hai" (To bring the Ramrajya in the country, bring the BJP 
to power)*^ to encourage the anti-Muslim feeling among the majority community. Three 
video tapes-one on Advani titled The Man India Awaits, a second on the BJP titled The 
Right Alternative, and the third to highlight how thousands had been martyred by the 
guns of pro-Muslim UP Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav on October 30,1990-were 
extensively circulated .''^  
The strategy paid rich dividends in the May-June 1991 parliamentary elections 
when it increased more than four times its percentage of votes statewide. The BJP 
contested 84 Lok Sabha seats of Uttar Pradesh. As far as election candidates are 
concerned, the BJP nominated more than two times more Brahmins and Rajputs than the 
low caste candidates in the 1991 elections-19 Brahmins and 20 Rajputs against 15 OBCs 
and 18 SCs. To reflect its anti-Muslim posture, BJP did not nominate a single candidate 
from Muslim community.'*'* The anti-Muslim electoral strategy of BJP brought success to 
the party in UP. It polled 32.8 percent of the votes and won 51 of the 85 Lok Sabha seats 
while only 4 of its 84 candidates lost their security deposits."^ Communal violence 
enlarged the BJP's political base.^ ^ Polarizing on communal lines was bolstered by the 
high concentration of Muslims in Meerut, Moradabad, Bulandshahar, Ghaziabad, 
Rampur and Aligarh, and the eagerness of Muslim groups to defend the symbols of their 
identity partly in the wake of a religious resurgence and partly in response to recurring 
*^ Yogendra K. Malik and V.B. Singh, Hindu Nationalism in India: The Rise of the Bhartiya Janata Party, 
(New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1994), p. 199. 
^Mbid.,pp. 199-200. 
^ India Today, May 15, 1996, p. 32. 
*' David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections, 1952-91, (New Delhi: Living 
Media, 1991). 
*' "Communal Riots before during and after the Lok Sabha Elections", Economic and Political Weekly, 
September 14,1991, p. 2135. 
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violence. The party did exceptionally well in ureas with a large Muslim population or 
where there was an extensive rioting and a lot of VHP activity, which seems to have 
functioned as vanguard of the BJP.''^  As against its average support of 32.8 percent, the 
BJP had polled 39 percent of votes in constituencies where Muslims constituted 30 
percent of the population."^ It also performed remarkably well in the legislative assembly 
elections held simultaneously with Lok Sabha elections 1991. The party contested 416 of 
the 420 Vidhan Sabha scats and won 221, It was due to anti-Muslim mobilizations, that 
the party had alienated the Muslims in a very real sense. 
Vidhan Sabha Elections, 1993 
It is instructive to note that the BJP's victory in the 1991 elections was mainly at 
the expense of a massive desertion of upper caste voters from Congress, which had failed 
to take an unambiguous stand on the Mandal issue. When the upper caste ditched 
Congress for BJP, Muslims and a section of the Scheduled Castes grew alienated as well. 
Muslim, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes together constituted as anti-BJP 
vote. The victory of BJP was reinforced by the fact that the anti-BJP vote was badly split 
among three contenders: the two Janata Dal factions and Congress. 
After the 1991 elections, when the BJP government led by Chief Minister Kalyan 
Singh was installed in UP, the building of the Ram temple was to become an issue, since 
BJP had won the election with the pledge to build the temple at the site where the Babri 
Masjid stood. By the end of 1992, BJP again adopted the strategy of anti-Muslim 
mobilization. On 6 December 1992, a large group of Hindus assembled at the site and 
finally demolished the Babri Masjid.^ *' The ruling Congress at the Centre, which had 
intelligence reports suggesting what was actually to happen, did precious little to prevent 
it from happening. '^ Following the demolition, the BJP government of UP led by Kalyan 
Singh resigned. 
Zoya Hasan, Quest for Power: Oppositional Movement and Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh, 
(New Delhi: Oxford University, Press, 1998). p. 213. 
*^ Malik and Singh, op.cit., pp. 204-205 
^' Ibid., p. 203. 
^ Ghosh, op.cit., p. 99. 
" Ibid. 
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Based on its 1991 electoral performance and the likely division of the anti-BJP 
votes, the BJP strongly believed that it would return to power in overwhelming majority 
in the Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha elections of 1993. During its campaign and in its 
election manifesto, the anti-Muslim thrust was maintained.'^  The BJP had criticized all 
other parties for their ambivalent attitude towards the Ram temple and in contrast 
committed itself to its reconstruction. But as the election campaign progressed, the all 
anti-BJP parties attacked the BJP's anti-Muslim position and fervently appealed to the 
electors to defeat the BJP's divisive politics. As the election results suggest, BJP won 
only 177. seats, which was quite at loss with 44 seats from the 1991 Assembly elections. 
There was hardly any gain for the party in its share of votes. While it received 31.6 
percent of the votes in 1991, it polled only 33.2 percent in 1993,'^ However, the party 
emerged as the, majority party but the government was formed by a coalition of 
Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which earned the support of 
almost all the non-BJP opposition incluiling Congress and the Janata Dal. An indepth 
analysis of BJPs loss of seats in UP has been due to the decisions of the Muslims to 
punish it democratically for the demolition of Ayodhya structure.^ '* 
Muslim Vote for Caste Based Parties 
Traditionally, the Muslims preferred to stand with the Congress. That was the 
only party in power that guaranteed special rights to thcMuslims. But since the change in 
the political scenario with the emergence of Bhartiya Janata Party, Congress started 
taking Muslim votes for granted. Wherever Muslim voters were in sizable numbers, the 
Congress preferred Muslim candidates for elections. They could cut into Hindu votes. 
With Muslims behind the Congress the victory of the party candidate was regarded a near 
certainty. The strategy did work in many cases. Muslim candidates from outside the 
constituency were given Congress tickets purely on the consideration that they would 
attract Muslim votes en masse. Muslim voters were in this process reduced to the status 
of a Congress vote bank. The Congress Party found this state of affairs very convenient. 
"ibid., p. .100. 
"ibid., p. 101. 
'* Indian Express, November 30, 1993. 
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It would from time to time, patronize some Muslims to senior official positions. The 
Muslim mass remained untouched.'^  
Very soon the Muslims developed great dissatisfaction towards Congress. That 
was largely, first, because of the Congress' dubious stand on Muslim issues. The Babri 
Masjid demolition had almost totally alienated the Muslims from the Congress. Its anger 
was directed at the Congress because the party had repeatedly assured the protection of 
the disputed structure. As Dr. Tanveer Hasan Siddiqui, a shopkeeper of readymade 
garments on Nazirabad Road put it: "Our faith in the Congress got shattered after the 
Ayodhya demolition and now its words cannot be taken for granted." "What the BJP did 
had not come to us as a surprise, as it had come to power on this mandate, but what the 
Congress did by remaining a silent spectator to the whole episode has dashed our 
hopes."^^ Second, Muslims have realized that they were treated only as vote bank for the 
Congress. This perception of Muslims as a vote bank makes them important only at 
election time. Once that is over, their peculiar problems do not merit anyone's attention. 
Muslims started looking for other options. Political parties who had been waiting in the 
wings seized the opportunity. Muslim vote was no longer remained a political property of 
Congress, rather moved away from it. 
However, it seems obvious that political necessity creates strange alliances. The 
Mandal versus Mandir phenomenon in UP politics helped the anti-upper caste parties not 
only to consolidate their own caste base but also Muslims who were electorally important 
for them. There were three reasons why Muslims fmd themselves more comfortable with 
the low caste political parties. First, since they have defected the Congress, Muslims were 
left with no alternative except to respond on the call of low caste parties in Uttar Pradesh. 
Second, reservation politics culminated into high caste Hindu versus low caste Hindu 
conflict. However, in this context of electoral struggle between upper and lower caste, 
Muslims were being treated as potential partner by the low caste parties like Janata Dal to 
dislodge the upper caste from power. With this view in mind, the low caste parties 
adopted the pro-Muslim strategy in contrast with the anti-Muslim campaign of BJP. 
Third, the anti-Muslim Ayodhya design was only introduced to neutralize the lower caste 
" N.K. Chowdhry, Assembly Elections 1993, (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 1994), pp. 204-05. 
'* Cf. Ibid., p. 208. 
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assertion and the effect of Mandal Report on electoral results. Here, the common enemy 
of both Muslims and lower castes was the politics of high caste parties. It was this logical 
understanding between the low caste and Muslims supported each other to form an 
electoral coalition against the conunon enemy, upper caste. 
However, the three levels of voting consciousness conditioned the 1993 Assembly 
election. First, the caste conscious voting duly conditioned by the Scheduled Castes and 
the Backward Caste assertions. The second was the Hindutva conscious voting quite led 
by the Bhartiya Janata Party. The third was the emerging Muslim conscious voting due to 
anti-Muslim politics of the BJP. 
What is important is to note that the BJP's one-point strategy of sensitizing all 
Hindus against Muslims under one umbrella of Hindutva received a beating at the hands 
of rejuvenated Dalits. And, since the Muslims political response was guided by the 
trauma of Babri Masjid demolition, it also naturally aimed to defeat the BJP. They had 
aligned with the emerging coalition of low castes, Dalits and Backward Castes, in the 
1993 elections of Uttar Pradesh. But they were caught into a dilemma to find a candidate 
in a particular constituency. The Janata Dal MP, Syed Shahabuddin appealed to the 
Muslim electorates to vote for Congress candidates wherever candidates of his party were 
not in a position to defeat BJP.^ ^ While Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid, Imam Bukhari was 
making a serious effort for unity between JD and SP so as to avoid the split of Muslim 
votes.^ * The Imam of the Fatehpuri Masjid, Mufti Mukarram Ahmad, who held a meeting 
with several Muslim religious leaders and intellectuals, had also given a call to defeat the 
communal forces.^' Consequently, Muslims voted for the SP/BSP candidates only where 
they appeared to be the strongest. Wherever the Janata Dal or Congress candidate 
appeared stronger, Muslim voters had no hesitation in switching their vote to them and 
away from the SP/BSP.^ ° The Muslim voting choice differed from region to region, 
depending upon the popularity of a party in a particular area. An assessment of the 
Muslim mood showed that by and large, they voted for the JD in western and eastern UP, 
" Ibid, p. 209. 
** Ibid., pp. 210-11. 
"Ibid. 
** Prannoy Roy, "Looking Ahead", Seminar, No. 413, January 1994, pp. 75-6, 78. 
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and the Samajwadi Party in the central and Bundelkhand regions.^' Muslims gravitated in 
large number towards the SP/BSP alliance as only it could afford to take on the BJP 
effectively. Superficially, it was easy to explain the SP/BSP's excellent shown in terms of 
the consolidation of the backward caste-Muslim vote in the wake of the Ayodhya 
demolition, which turned 1993 elections almost into a matter of life and death for the 
Muslims. 
However, the pro-Muslim strategy of Mulayam Singh Yadav reflected in his 
assurance of Muslim protection and security in the state; communal harmony rallies 
organized by him^ ;^ in ordering the police to fire on the mob in Ayodhya who intended to 
demolish the Babri mosque in late 1990; in promises made to the Muslims for the 
restoration of status quo as existing in 1947 with regard to place of worship and the 
constitution of a special force with adequate representation of minorities in his 
manifesto '^'; in the final implementation of government's ordinance on Urdu as second 
official language of Uttar Pradesh in 1994^ generated a strong emotional feelings which 
resulted in the alignment of Muslims with Mulayam Singh Yadav. The Muslims 
preferred the BSP/SP combination in 1993 elections not because of any ideological 
affiliations but because they thought that was the only option to keep BJP out of power. It 
is also to be noted that like any other party, the Samajwadi Party creatively maintained its 
ambiguity so far as the Muslim issues were concerned. But in his public utterances, the 
assertion was that he is the only savior of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. Notwithstanding, its 
premeditated electoral strategy and drama with respect to Muslims earned a title for him, 
popularly known as Maulana Mulayam Singh. 
Increasing Importance of Muslim Vote 
Making sense of elections held after 1993 and the Muslim vote in Uttar Pradesh 
remains an intellectual challenge, which students of Indian politics are yet to take up. The 
preliminary observations offered here are by way of drawing attention to the phenomenon 
that took place in the state elections after 1993. What needs much more attention is the 
*' Chowdhry, op.cit., pp. 129-30. 
"Malik and Singh, op.cit., p. 210. 
°' See Chowdhry, op. cit., pp. 65-66. 
** Ibid., pp. 185-186. 
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question of the significance of the Muslim voting trend in UP. That is directly related to 
the terrain of meaning embedded in the emergence of an intense political competition 
among the political parties in Uttar Pradesh. 
The decline of a catch-all party, like Congress, which retained its pre-eminence 
through cross-sectional mobiUzation, had already started resulting in the rise of 
exclusivist parties with sectional political agendas.^ ^ The most significant trend was the 
inevitable rise of OBCs and Scheduled Castes to political power in Uttar Pradesh. Both 
the politically marginalized communities have generated their own political leadership. In 
UP, both the Bahujan Samaj Party of Kanshi Ram and Mayawati, and Samajwadi Party 
of Mulayam Singh Yadav have redefined the political equation. The other major 
development was the Muslim's coh'siderable disenchantment with the Congress and their 
realignment with the emerging exclusivist political blocs following the destruction of the 
Babri Masjid. Whatever may have been the trend, the examination of 1996 and 2002 
Assembly elections, and 1998, 1999, and 2004 Lok Sabha elections show that the 
importance of Muslim vote in the state have increased with the emergence of competitive 
party politics with all its exclusivist gestures. It was largely because of the realization of 
competing political parties that a swing in the Muslim vote can tilt the balance of power 
in the highly fragmented political system of Uttar Pradesh. 
The increasing importance of Muslim vote for the political parties in the period 
rightly described as "second demographic upsurge" could be seen in the representation of 
Muslims in the Council of Ministers of the Uttar Pradesh (Table 6). As a part of its 
electoral strategy to win the Muslim vote, the ruling parties start giving them their due 
representation in their Ministries. For example, the Janata Dal government headed by 
Mulayam Singh Yadav in 1989-91 had given 9.1 percent share to Muslims in its 
Ministry. This ratio further increased in 1993-95 to 10.7 percent under the SP-BSP 
government. This increasing trend again substantiated with highest share of Muslims in 
the UP Council of Ministers under SP in June 2006. It increased from 10.7 percent in 
1993-95 to 15.8 percent in 2003-06. More importantly, Bhartiya Janata Party, which is 
known for its anti-Muslim politics, too followed this trend. For example, Muslims who 
" See Yogendra Yadav, "Reconfiguration in Indian Politics, State Assembly Elections, 1993-95", 
Economic and Political Weekly. January 13-20, 1996. 
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constituted only 2.1 percent of Kalyan Singh Ministry in 1991-92 increased to 2.2 percent 
in 1997 and 3.2 percent in 1999. BSP was also not untouched with this strategy of giving 
increasing representation of Muslims in its Ministry. For example, it had given 12.1 
percent share to Muslims in 1995. However, the Muslim percentage got down to 8.5 
percent in 1997 under BSP-BJP regime. But one should note here that Muslims got this 
much of share under a government duly formed with the support of BJP which has no 
record of giving share to Muslims beyond 5 percent. These are the trends that indicate 
that the political parties of all hue and colors were trying hard to woo the Muslim vote in 
the elections held after 1993 in the state, and thus making the Muslim vote more 
important than earlier. 
Table 6: Muslim Profile of UP Council of Ministers, 1988-2006 
Ruling Party 
JD 
BJP 
SP-BSP 
BSP 
BSP-BJP 
BJP 
BJP 
SP 
Years 
1989-91 
1991-92 
1993-95 
1995 
1997 
1997 
1999 
August 2003-June 2006 
Percentage 
9.1 
2.1 
10.7 
12.1 
8.5 
2.2 
3.2 
15.8 
Source: The Muslim profile of the Council of Ministers (1989-1997) are being adapted from the table 
provided by Kanchan Chandra, "Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh: The Ethniflcation of the Party 
System and its Consequence" in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace, Indian Politics and the 1998 Election: 
Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics, (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 91. For 1999 and 2006, 
Fieldwork. 
Wooing Muslim Vote: Lok Sabha Elections, 1996 
Unlike the extreme anti-Muslim wave that energized the BJP's 1991 and 1993 
campaigns, the party had moderated its image in 1996 elections in order to widen its 
social base and woo the Muslim vote. BJP's most important symbol to underline its 
moderate image during the election campaign was its leader, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. He 
seldom referred to the party's slogan of Hindutva and also tried to establish rapport with 
Muslims by assuring them that they had nothing to fear by voting for the BJP.^ ^ BJP 
created a minorities cell within the party under Arif Beg's leadership. The cell prepared a 
Pramod K. Kantha, "General Elections, 1996: BJP Politics: Looking Beyond the Impasse", Economic 
and I'otitical Weekly, November 29, 1997, p. 3093. 
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comprehensive package offering taaleem (education), tanzeem (organization) and tijarat 
(employment to the Muslims as part of its campaign for the 1996 general election). Beg 
said: - "After this, the BBC, London will no longer refer to us as the Hindu right-wing 
Bhartiya Janata Party. We will be a truly secular parly." He added: "The biggest problem 
of the Muslim community is lack of education, organization and business and 
employment opportunities. With this three pronged approach we hope to eradicate the 
root cause of their alienation and bring them into the mainstream."^^ As part of its 
strategy, the BJP organized Muslim sammelans and iftar parties to appease the Muslim 
vote as well as promised "a riot free India" in which human rights of all sections would 
be protected.^ * Murli Manohar Joshi also urged the Muslims to take a "fresh look" at the 
BJP, if they wished to escape from the clutches of the Congress, which he alleged had 
been "exploiting them over the past several decades".^' 
Observing over this changed tactics of BJP, one Muslim journalist noted: - "It is 
not so necessary to remove the apprehensions of Muslim, it is more essential to remove 
the prejudice against Muslims from the minds of hundreds and thousands of the BJP 
leaders, workers, supporters. It is not enough that Advani and Vajpayee pontificate about 
the upliftment of the Muslim community, what is required is a clear and unequivocal 
instruction to small town party leaders to stop harassing and hounding Muslims...It is not 
enough to take shelter behind the ambiguous semantic jugglery-'Kashi and Mathura are 
not on BJP's agenda'. It is compulsory to unequivocally announce, once and for all, that 
no other Muslim place of worship will ever be destroyed... The 'three T's' programme of 
the BJP is a very ambitious project involving huge funds and manpower. The party, 
according to recent press report, has targeted the working class Muslims like the 
carpenter of Mirzapur, loc-smiths of Aligarh, zarZ-makers of Varansi, banglemakers of 
Firozabad and so on for showing its largesse. How time changeth! Now the self-righteous 
party is determined to indulge in the same practice which it has always accused the 
Congress of, namely, appeasement of the Muslims. Incidentally, L.K. Advani has always 
pooh-poohed the secular credential of the Congress and the Janata Dal as pseudo-
secularism and has always claimed that it is only the secularism of the BJP that is real. 
''''Asian Age April 9, 1995. 
'* Ghosh, op.cit., pp. 104-5 
••'' Times of India, October 16, 1995. 
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Hopeftilly, the BJP's newly devised policy of Muslim appeasement will be 
genuine as against the spurious appeasement of the Congress." 
However, there was nothing substantive the BJP offered to convince the Muslims about 
the party's change approach to Muslims. Opposition to the policy of appeasement of the 
minority continued to be the mainstay of BJP's campaign. Familiar issues such as the 
government's help to Muslim for performing haj, absence of uniform civil code, 
minorities ability to run their own educational institutes under Article 30 of constitution 
were highlighted, the Muslims were also targeted on issues such as the influx of 
Bangladeshi Muslims, the alleged ISI network in the country.'' Higher birth rate among 
the Muslim population in India was also used as a plank to raise Hindu passion.'^  One of 
the chief themes that the BJP tried to highlight during the 1996 campaigns was its drive 
for a uniform civil code.''' 
However, the BJP was competing fiercely with the Congress, the SP and the BSP 
for the Muslim votes it had itself scoffed at earlier. It was not an easy task. The Muslim 
vote, the largest potential voting bloc in the state, was inaccessible to it. The Congress, 
which had lost its traditional base among the Muslims, was trying to regain it. Ghulam 
Nabi Azad of the party had apologized to the Muslims for his party's failure to protect the 
Babri Masjid. Congress happily accepted the support of Shahi Imam's fatwa to vote 
against the BW?^ 
The SP of Mulayam Singh Yadav had built up a strong base among the Muslims, 
which was difficult to wrest from him. The SP sought to widen his appeal by promising 
things like jobs and providing security to the Muslims.'^  As a part of its strategy to attract 
the Muslim vote, "the SP, but really Mulayam Singh personally, stood forth as the 
protector of and provider of benefits to the Muslims.'^  
Muslim themselves have become politically conscious and did not vote en bloc. 
They had ignored the appeal of Imam Bukhari to vote for the Janata Dal, choosing 
™ Parwez Hafeez, "BJP's 3-T Agenda: Real versus Spurious", Asian Age, June 7, 1995. 
'^ The Hindu, February 10, 1996, p. 15. 
'^  The Hindu, May I, 1996, p. 9. 
" India Today, August 15, 1995, p. 28. 
''* Indian Express, May 12, 1996, p. 3. 
" Amresh Misra, "Realignment of Social Forces in UP", The Times of India, April 19, 1996. 
"• Paul R. Brass, "General Elections, 1996 in Uttar Pradesh: Divisive Struggles Influence Outcome", 
Economic and Political Weekly, September 20, 1997, p, 2419. 
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instead to cast their lot with the Mulayam Singh Yadav-Kanshi Ram alHance, which 
successfully halted the BJP's onward march. Exploding the myth of so-called monolithic 
Muslim vote Imtiyaz Ahmad argued that there would be "a highly clustered patter of 
voting with the Muslim vote splitting evenly among the different political formations for 
the Congress (T) to the BSP besides the SP and the JD.... Muslim vote will split along 
caste-class lines with the elite Muslims reverting substantially to the Congress and 
upwardly mobile backward Muslim groups voting in tandem with similar groups for the 
political parties raising tiie slogan of social justice."'''' 
Verdict: Lok Sabha Elections, 1996 
Though no further dramatic moves were made to change the current situation in 
Ayodhya so far as the 1996 Lok Sabha elections were concerned, but "the memory of the 
destruction of the mosque and of the roles played in it by not only the BJP, but the 
Congress under the leadership of Narsimha Rao, had not in the least faded from the 
minds of Muslims. Muslims in UP rejected utterly the Congress and its leaders, whom 
they blamed as much as the BJP for the destruction of the mosque."^^ The exit polls 
conducted in UP by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies showed that 83 
percent of Muslims supporting the JD-SP alliance and only 5 percent supporting the 
Congress. '^ This reflected almost complete alienation of Muslim vote from the Congress 
and its alignment with Samajwadi Party. Most Muslims themselves acknowledged their 
identification with the SP and its leaders. For example, a sitting MLA from Meerut 
district said that, in general, in Meerut district and elsewhere in the state, the "Muslims 
either were with the Samajwadi Party or, to some extent with BSP". Further, he 
remarked, "Muslims did not vote even for a Muslim candidate from Congress Party."*° 
However, no party received an absolute majority in the election. The election also 
witnessed low turn out of voters in Uttar Pradesh. It was only around 46.50 percent 
electorates that turned to vote. BJP that it contested 83 seats won 52 and secured 33.44 
78 
II Imtiaz Ahmad, "The Muslim-vote Myth", India Today, April 30, 1996, p. 47. 
" Paul R. Brass, "General Elections, 1996 in Uttar Pradesh: Divisive Struggles Influence Outcome", 
Economic and Political Weekly, September 20, 1997, p. 2403. http://www.eci.gov.in 
™ India Today, May 31, 1996, p. 26. 
^ Cf. Paul R. Brass, "General Elections, 1996 in Uttar Pradesh: Divisive Struggles Influence Outcome", 
Economic and Political Weekly, September 20, 1997, p. 2409. 
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percent of valid votes in UP. BSP contested 85 seats and won 6 seats with 20.61 percent 
valid votes in its favor. Congress contested 85 seats and was able to win only 5 seats with 
lowest percentage of valid votes, 8.14 percent. SP contested on 64 seats and won 16 with 
20.84 percent."' 
Table 7: IWuslim Candidates in LOK Sabha Uttar Pradesh 
Political Parties 
BJP 
Congress 
SP 
BSP 
1991 
0 
12 
16* 
23 
11996 
0 
11 
17 
21 
1998 
1 
12 
13 
14 
1999 
1 
11 
16 
16 
2004 
2 
9 
12 
20 
Source: Field Survey 
•Represents the candidates of Samajwadi Janata Party (SJP) 
Table 8: Muslim MPs from UP Lok Sabha Constituencies 
Year of Elections 
1991 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2004 
BJP 
-
-
1 
-
-
INC 
1 
1 
-
2 
-
SP 
-
4 
3 
2 
6 
BSP 
-
1 
2 
3 
4 
Others 
2(JD) 
• 
1 (RLD) 
l(RLD) 
Source: Compiled from the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/ElectionAnalysisfs.htm 
Muslim MPs: Lok Sabha Elections, 1996 
One of the important strategies of political parties to attract the Muslim vote was 
the nomination of Muslim candidates. But it is now proved that Muslims of Uttar Pradesh 
hardly vote on this ground. If Muslims had this criterion in mind, they might have been 
able to get a good amoimt of Muslims elected to the Lok Sabha. An examination of 
selection of candidates and their ability to win in 1996 Lok Sabha Elections (Table 7 and 
8) shows that BJP had failed to atU-act Muslims to contest on the platform of the BJP in 
the state. While Congress nominated around 11 Muslims candidates in 1996, quite lower 
than previous Lok Sabha election. But only one Congress Muslim candidate was able to 
win. On the o.ther hand, the largest number of Muslims contested from the platform of 
Samajwadi Party, which nominated 17 Muslim candidates in the 1996 against the 
" Statistical Report on General Elections, 1996 to the Eleventh Lok Sabha, Vol. I, (National and State 
Abstracts & Detailed Results), (New Delhi: Election Commission of India) 
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background of 14 Muslim candidates in 1991. But only 4 were able to win in this 
election. Bahujan Samaj Party, known as a party having strong base in Dalits, nominated 
21 Muslims in this election, but only 1 Muslim candidate won from this Party. It is 
important to note here that the party strategy to win the confidence of Muslims was 
merely based on giving tickets to community according to its proportion of population. 
On this basis, BSP allotted around 23 seats to Muslims in 1991 Lok Sabha election. It 
was a different thing that the party was in a nascent position and hardly got any seat with 
a Muslim candidate. 
Table 9: Vote Preference of Muslims in Lok Sabha Elections of Uttar Pradesh (%) 
Political Parties 
BJP+ 
Congress 
SP+ 
BSP 
1996 
5 
10 
61 
6 
1998 
7 
10 
68 
6 
1999 
11 
40 
40 
5 
2004 
3 
15 
47 
9 
Source: CSDS data Unit. 
Voting Preference of Muslims: Lok Sabha Elections, 1996 
Moreover, estimates of the projected Muslim votes for the principal parties in the 
1996 Lok Sabha election indicated that Muslim intended to vote overwhelmingly for the 
Samaj wadi Party and hardly intended to vote for other parties. Table 9 shows that in 1996 
Lok Sabha election, 61 percent of Muslims voted for the Samajwadi Party. Bahujan 
Samaj Party, which had no base among Muslims was continuously making a dent among 
Muslims and was able to ensure 9 percent of Muslim vote. The Congress, which had a 
monopolistic claim over Muslim vote, reduced to only 16 percent of Muslim vote. It is 
important to note that BJP secured only 5 percent of votes despite its changing attitude 
towards Muslims. This reflects the strong anti-BJP voting among Muslims. 
Muslim Dominant Constituencies: Lok Sabha Elections, 1996 
For understanding the Muslims support to polhical parties, we have identified 
thirteen Lok Sabha constituencies where Muslims constituted from 45 percent to 25 
percent. These constituencies are Rampur, Moradabad, Bijnore, Saharanpur, 
Muzaffamagar, Amroha, Meerut, Kairana, Balrampur, Bareily, Bahraich, Padrauna and 
Sambhal. An analysis of the of the valid votes secured by the political parties in these 
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constituencies indicate that there were 8 constituencies out of 13 where BJP secured the 
valid voles more than its state average. In 8 constituencies, its candidates were winners 
and in another 4 its candidates were runners. The Samajwadi Party followed the similar 
trend. There were 8 constituencies where the party secured the valid votes above its state 
average and won only three seats and 6 constituencies where its candidates were the 
runners.*^ This shows that in Muslim dominated constituencies the Muslim voting pattern 
was largely confmcd to BJP versus SP. Muslims heavily supported the SP in all 
constituencies excluding Rampur where the Congress candidate was the winner. The 
analysis also indicates that the Congress completely lost its popularity among Muslims. 
Except Rampur, Kairana, Meerut and Muzaffamagar, Congress failed to cross its state 
average of 8.14 percent of valid votes. But the performance of BSP was much better than 
the Congress.^ ^ It was rather competing with the BJP and SP in terms of valid votes 
polled in many constituencies of Muslim domination. However, since the BSP polled 
well below its mean vote in the state as a whole in these regions, it can be safely assumed 
that it got few votes beyond its core Scheduled Caste supporters. 
Table 10: Percentage of Valid Votes Polled by the BJP in the Lok Sabha Constituencies of UP where 
Muslim constituted from 45 to2S percent 
Constituency 
Rampur 
Moradabad 
Bijnore 
Saharanpur 
Muzaf&magar 
Amroha 
Meerut 
Kairana 
Balrampur 
Bareily 
Bahraich 
Padrauna 
Sambhal 
2004 
15.02 
27.82 
14.36 
23.6 
27.51 
14.75 
NC 
9.29 
38.81 
32.77 
26.16 
14.68 
9.85 
1999 
27.52 
-
30.4 
18.5 
25.05 
31.77 
31.4 
24.29 
35.29 
44.67 
37.63 
28.28 
23.17 
1998 
32.75 
34.54 
35.88 
33.19 
35.44 
37.45 
42.22 
40.13 
37.88 
46.24 
34.25 
38.31 
27.9 
1996 
26.78 
37.77 
36.49 
33.24 
36.93 
31.53 
48.66 
30.97 
31.33 
41.94 
34.4 
33.23 
25.19 
Source: Compiled from the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/ElectionAnalysisfs.htm 
82 Compiled from the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/ElectionAnalysisfs.htm 
" Ibid. 
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In Rampur where Muslim constitutes around 42 percent, BJP secured around 
26.78 percent of valid votes, its candidate Rajindra Kumar Sharma stood as runner 
candidate. The Congress did well over here securing 36.96 percent of valid votes, which 
was nearly four times more than the state average. And its candidate, Begam Nur Bano 
was declared elected. The widely acclaimed Muslim supported paity SP only got 19.73 
percent of valid votes while BSP secured 10.89 percent of valid votes. In Moradabad, 
where Muslims constitutes 40 percent, BJP secured 37.77 percent of valid votes quite 
more than its state average. Its candidate, Sandip, was runner here. Congress' presence 
was almost negligible. It secured only 3.09 percent of valid votes. The performance of SP 
was satisfactory. It registered 38.06 percent of valid votes, which was almost double of 
its state average, and its Muslim candidate Shafiqur Rahman Warq was declared elected. 
BSP got 17.65 percent of valid votes. In Bijnore, where Muslims constitutes 38 percent, 
BJP was able to secure 36.49 percent of valid votes, which was more than its state 
average. Here, its candidate Mangal Ram Premi was wiimer. Congress stood nowhere 
with its 1.01 percent valid votes. However, the performance of SP was up to the mark. It 
ensured 31.96 percent of valid votes and its candidate Satish Kumar was ruimer. BSP did 
much better in this constituency; it secured 26 percent of valid votes, which is quite more 
than its state average. In Saharanpur where Muslim constitutes 38 percent, BJP got 33.24 
percent of valid votes and its candidate, Nakli Singh, was winner. While Congress and 
BSP got 6.52 percent and 21.64 percent of valid votes respectively. SP was able to secure 
32.89 percent of valid votes and its candidate, Rashid Masood, was ruimer in this 
election. In Muzaffamagar, where Muslims constitutes around 27 percent, BJP secured 
more than its state average, 36.93 percent of valid votes and its candidate Sohan Veer 
was able to win the seat. The SP was able to gamer only 30.86 percent of valid votes and 
its candidate Sanjay Singh could not win the seat. The Congress and BSP secured 8.74 
percent and 20.05 percent of valid votes respectively (Table 5,10,11,12, and 13).*'* 
*^  Ibid. 
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Table 11: Percentage of Valid Votes Polled by the SP in the Lok Sabha Constituencies of UP where 
Muslim constituted from 45 to2S percent 
Constituency 
Rampur 
Moradabad 
Bijnore 
Saharanpur 
MuzafTamagar 
Amroha 
Meerut 
Kairana 
Balrampur 
Bareily 
Bahraich 
Padrauna 
Sambhal 
2004 
35.7 
33.29 
NC 
35.67 
35.51 
NC 
NC 
NC 
23.65 
14,.64 
34.38 
8.44 
47.02 
1999 
11.46 
24.5 
27.03 
5.48 
16.49 
10.21 
1.75 
19.39 
38.31 
24.12 
16.28 
24.44 
41.85 
1998 
14.32 
39.52 
37.09 
17.28 
32.22 
24.92 
35.77 
31.5 
46.36 
41.47 
19.66 
30.73 
50.04 
1996 
19.73 
38.06 
31.96 
32.89 
30.86 
38.67 
-
32.75 
20.47 
34.66 
12.36 
25.42 
-
Source: Compiled from the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/ElectionAnalysisfs.htm 
In Amroha, where Muslims constitutes around 37 percent, BJP secured 31.53 
percent of valid votes and its candidate Chetan Chauhan was the runner. The SP 
candidate Pratap Singh was a winner who secured 38.67 percent of valid votes. But the 
Congress and BSP secured only 6.2 percent and 20.57 percent of valid votes respectively. 
In Meerut, where Muslims constitutes around 30 percent, BJP performed extremely well 
and was able to secure 48.66 percent of valid votes and its candidate Amar Pal Singh was 
declared elected. This constituency was the fourth best constituency for the BJP in the 
entire state in terms of the percent of the popular vote polled by its winning candidate.^ ^ 
There were 13 Muslim candidates among the horde of 52 who contested this seat.*^  SP 
did not contest the seat. It was allotted to JD whose candidate Mohd. Afzal was the 
runner who secured 22.33 percent of valid votes. But the Congress and BSP secured only 
10.34 percent and 16.36 percent of valid votes respectively. In Kairana, where Muslims 
constitutes around 29 percent, BJP secured 30.97 percent of valid votes and its candidate 
Udai Veer Singh was runner. The SP candidate Munawwar Hasan was winner who 
secured 32.75 percent of valid votes. But the Congress and BSP secured only 20.29 
percent and 12.6 percent of valid votes respectively (Table 5,10, 11,12, and 13).*^  
" Paul R. Brass, "General Elections, 1996 in Uttar Pradesh: Divisive Struggles Influence Outcome", 
Economic and Political Weekly, September 20, 1997, p. 2409. 
86 Ibid. 
" Compiled from the Election Commission of India website 
http.//www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnaIysis/ElectionAnalysisfs.htm 
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Table 12: Percentage of Valid Votes Polled by the BSP in the Lok Sabha Constituencies of UP where 
Muslim constituted from 45 to2S percent 
Constituency 
Rampur 
Moradabad 
Bijnore 
Saharanpur 
Muzafiamagar 
Amroha 
Meerut 
Kairana 
Balrampur 
Bareily 
Bahraich 
Padrauna 
Sambhal 
2004 
15.59 
22.99 
31.37 
32.96 
21.14 
19.06 
36.2 
22.22 
31.27 
25.52 
29.59 
21.37 
20.94 
1999 
13.62 
19.32 
26.06 
30.53 
23.99 
43.87 
30.53 
22.88 
14.83 
10.62 
36.67 
19.22 
22.15 
1998 
16.24 
. 18.58 
23.62 
25.97 
19.06 
29.15 
15.03 
8.61 
8.32 
6.77 
40.12 
19.68 
18.42 
1996 
10.89 
17.65 
26 
21.64 
20.05 
20.57 
16.36 
12.6 
8.17 
10.07 
17.47 
19.58 
34.72 
Source: Compiled from the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/ElectionAnalysisfs.htm 
In Balrampur, where Muslims constitutes around 28 percent, BJP secured 31.33 
percent of valid votes and its candidate Satyadev Singh was the winner. The SP candidate 
Akbal Hussain was the runner who secured 20.47 percent of valid votes. But the 
Congress and BSP secured only 6.04 percent and 8.17 percent of valid votes respectively. 
In Bareily, where Muslims constitutes around 28 percent, BJP secured 41.94 percent of 
valid votes and its candidate Santosh Kumar Gangwar was the winner. The SP candidate 
Islam Sabir was the runner who secured 34.66 percent of valid votes. But the Congress 
and BSP secured only 1.11 percent and 10.07 percent of valid votes respectively. In 
Bahraich, where Muslims constitutes around 23 percent, B.TP secured 34.4 percent of 
valid votes and its candidate Padam Sen Chaudhari was the winner. But an independent 
candidate from this constituency, Aarif Mohd. Khan, was the runner who secured 20.41 
percent of valid votes. But the SP, Congress and BSP secured only 12.36 percent, 1.48 
percent and 17.47 percent of valid votes respectively (Table 5,10,11, 12, and 13).*^ 
Ibid. 
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Table 13: Percentage of Valid Votes Polled by the Congress in the Lok Sabha Constituencies of UP 
where Muslim constituted from 45 to25 percent 
Constituency 
Rampur 
Moradabad 
Bijnore 
Saharanpur 
Muzaflamagar 
Amroha 
Meerut 
Kairana 
Balrampur 
Bareily 
Bahraich 
Padrauna 
Sambhal 
2004 
25.16 
NO 
4.59 
5.16 
12.2 
0.9 
9.45 
1.53 
1.33 
23.25 
4.02 
25.12 
1.59 
1999 
41.77 
9.96 
-
-
28.82 
-
34.74 
-
6.24 
19.53 
4.52 
22.41 
9.86 
1998 
32.14 
4.85 
-
-
9.87 
4.5 
5.21 
-
3.22 
3.09 
1.21 
3.65 
0.65 
1996 
36.96 
3.09 
l.OI 
6.52 
8.74 
6.2 
10.34 
20.29 
6.04 
1.11 
1.48 
6.57 
1.11 
Source: Compiled from the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/ElectionAnalysisfs.htm 
In Padrauna, where Muslims constitutes around 27 percent, BJP secured 33.23 
percent of valid votes and its candidate Ram Nagina Misra was winner. The SP candidate 
Kasim AH was the runner who secured 25.42 percent of valid votes. But the Congress 
and BSP secured only 6.57 percent and 19.58 percent of valid votes respectively. In 
Sambhal, where Muslims constitutes around 27 percent, BSP secured 34.72 percent of 
valid votes and its candidate Dharam Pal Yadav alias D.P. Yadav was the winner. The JD 
candidate Shri Pal Singh Yadav was runner who secured 33.8 percent of valid votes. But 
the Congress and BJP secured only 1.11 percent and 25.19 percent of valid votes 
respectively (Table 5,10, 11, 12, and 13).^' 
Wooing Muslim Vote: Vidhan Sabha Elections, 1996 
It is already pointed out that since 1993 Assembly elections Muslim vote had 
become the need of every political party competing in the electoral arena of Uttar 
Pradesh. The electoral strategy of antagonizing Hindu mass against the Muslims was 
conspicuously absent, in both 1996 Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections. The party 
like BJP sought votes from across the spectrum without attempting to consolidate the 
Hindus by mobilizing them against Muslims."" The party consciously avoided the 
construction of Ram temple to be a central issue in this campaign, even in the 
^ Kanchan Chandra and Chandrika Parmar, "Party Strategies in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly Elections, 
1996", Economic and Political Weekly, February 1, 1997, p. 214. 
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constituency of Ayodhya." There was no statewide coordination with the Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad, as there had been in earlier elections, and several prominent VHP campaigners 
including Sadhvi Rithambara, on whom the BJP had relied heavily for mobilizing votes 
in previous campaigns, were kept away from the party's election meeting. It would be 
wrong to say that the BJP disowned the Hindu card entirely in this election. Faint echoes 
of it could be heard from the mention of the Ram temple as it was given in the party's 
state manifesto''' and from the brief references made to the construction of the Ram 
temple by BJP leaders in their election rallies.^ '* It could be discovered in the allotment of 
tickets, only one out of 415 BJP tickets, was given to a Muslim.'^  
Table 14: Muslim Candidates in Vidhan Sabha Elections, Uttar Pradesh 
Political Parties 
BJP 
Congress 
SP 
BSP 
1993 
0 
45 
35 
39 
1996 
1 
13 
46 
46 
2002 
1 
69 
68 
86 
Source: For 1993, see Iqbal A. Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims in India: 1952-2004, (New 
Delhi: Manak Publications, 2006), pp. 292-293; 
Congress sought the Muslims support by making 'anti-conmiunalism' a central 
part of its election campaign, and by promising a separate reservation quota for minority 
OBCs in its manifesto.''^  BSP sought the Muslim support vigorously by making anti-
communalism a central part of the election campaign, obtaining the endorsement of 
several religious leaders including the Imam of Jama Masjid on the assurance that the 
BSP would not come to any post-poll agreement with the BJP and by allotting one-fifth 
of its tickets (52) to Muslim candidates.'^ BSP entered into an electoral alliance with 
Congress in the 1996 Assembly elections. 
" The Times of India (Lucknow edition), September 28, 1996. 
" Chandra and Pamiar, op.cit., p. 217. 
'^  Hindu, September 19, 1996. 
'^  See, for instance, reports of L.K. Advani's speech at Varansi, Hindu, September 19,1996, and Murii 
Manohar Joshi's speech at Kanpur, The Times of India, September 18,1996. 
" Three Muslim initially awarded tickets by the BJP, but two were later replaced by other candidates. See 
The Indian Express, September 23, 1996. 
^ Asian Age, September 10, 1996; The Times of India, September 12, 1996;//;W«, September 21, 1996. 
" Asian Age, September 6, 1996; Hindu, September 7, 1996. Also see Hindu, September 11, 1996 and 
.September 20, 1996. 
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Table 15: Muslim MLAs in the UP Legislative Assembly 
Year of Elections 
1991 
1993 
1996 
2002 
INC 
4 
-
3 
4 
BJP 
-
-
1 
-
BSP 
1 
11 
10 
14 
JD 
11 
3 
-
-
SP 
' 
7 
22 
22 
Others 
6 
4 
3 
6 
Source: Compiled from the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/EIectionAnalysis/ElectionAnalysis fs.htm 
The United Front (UF) in the UP Vidhan Sabha elections was constituted by the 
Samajwadi Party, the Janata Dal, the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Communist 
Party of India-Marxist (CPM), the Congress (T), and later, the Bhartiya Kisan Kamagar 
Party (BKKP). As conglomeration of parties with varying objectives in the Vidhan Sabha 
elections, the UF's election strategy was not the outcome of conscious and coherent 
planning. But in order to consolidate its base in UP, the UF's first option would 
obviously have been to consolidate its base fiarther among Muslims. It made particular 
appeals to Muslim voters through an aggressive campaigns against the BJP and the 
portrayal of the UF as the best secular alternative. At each election rally, the UF leaders 
described the election as a war between secularism and commimalism: "Ever since 
independence the secular forces have joined hands against communal forces. We have 
begun a war and the last battle of the war now be fought in UP."^* In addition, Muslims 
were courted by specific measures such as delaying the government's referral of the 
Ayodhya issue to the Supreme Court, a position which had attracted the opposition of 
several prominent Muslim leaders; by promising a separate quota of reservations for 
Muslim OBCs^; by seeking the endorsement of the Muslim religious leaders'^ "; and by 
promising increased governmental expenditure for the educational advancement and 
social welfare of Muslims."'' 
Verdict: Vidhan Sabha Elections, 1996 
The results of the UP polls revealed all the vagaries of a three party system. BJP 
contested 414 seats and won only 174. Congress contested 126 seats and was able to win 
only 33 seats. BSP contested 296 and won 67 seats. On 281 seats Samajwadi Party had 
''* Uloo Yadav, at election rally in Muzaffamagar, Hindustan Times, July 28, 1996 
''//mt/M.Juiy 17, 1996. 
"" Asian Age, August 20, 1996. 
' See assurances made to Muslims by welfare minister Ramoowalia in Hindu, August 30, 1996. 
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contested and secured 110 seats. The vote share of each party in the Vidhan Sabha 
election, with the exception of the SP, stayed virtually the same: 32.52 percent for the 
BJP, 8.35 percent for the Congress, 19.64 percent for the BSP, and 21.80 percent for 
gp 102 jyjg gp gio^g increased its share of the vote slightly from 20.84 percent in the Lok 
Sabha elections to 21.80 percent in Vidhan Sabha, a marginal increase worth mentioning 
only in the light of the static positions of the other parties. 
There were 122 Muslim candidates nominated by the political parties in the UP 
Assembly elections. Out of these 122 contestants, the Congress Party nominated 13, the 
SP and the BSP nominated 46 candidates each, and only one candidate was nominated by 
the BJP. Out of the total 424 MLAs elected, 39 belonged to Muslim community. The 
Muslim representation in the Legislative Assembly marked by an improvement of 14 
Muslims from the previous election. Major gainer in the election was the SP, which won 
22 Muslim seats, followed by BSP with 10 seats, the Congress 3 seats and the BJP 1 seat. 
Against the background of this electoral result, in which no political party is in a position 
to attain power, we can argue that political parties would now have even stronger 
incentives to tone down aggressive rhetoric, and build more inclusive social coalitions 
than before.'"•' A political system that is composed of multiple social groups and multiple 
parties, none of whom are strong enough on their own to come to power, would seem to 
naturally exert a strong influence on the modes of party behavior during election 
campaign. No party can ignore any social bloc in its overt campaign in order to build its 
base in another social bloc. In this particular situation, the strategy of political parties 
quite moderated so far as the Muslim electorates are concerned. Thus, the idea of 
electoral incentive impressed almost all parties and Muslim vote in this regard became 
indispensable. 
Table 16; Vote Preference of Muslims in Vidhan Sabha Elections of Uttar Pradesh (%) 
Political Parties 
BJP+ 
Congress+ 
SP+ 
BSP 
Others 
1996 
2.3 
24.9 
67.6 
5.2 
2002 
9.6 
7.1 
62.2 
9 
11.9 
Source: CSDS Data Unit 
'"* Key Highlights of the General Elections, 1996 to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, (New 
Delhi: Election Commissions of India, 1997). See http://www.eci.gov.in 
"" Chandra and Parmar, op.cit., p. 219. 
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Table 16 elaborates the voting preference of Muslims for the political parties in 
Uttar Pradesh: As the table indicated, Muslim voters failed to develop likeness for the 
BJP. The party was able to impress only 2.3 percent of Muslim voters despite its 
relatively moderate treatment with the anti-Muslim issues. The Congress and BSP 
coalition got the support of 24.9 percent Muslims. Continuing its earlier tradition, 
Muslim community voted heavily for the United Front. Almost 67.6 percent of Muslim 
vote went in favor of them. However, this pattern of heavy voting for the UF was mainly 
because of the Muslim's loyalty with Mulayam Singh's Samajwadi Party, which was its 
coalition partner. It also indicates that Muslim support was one of the two pillars holding 
it up in Uttar Pradesh. 
Wooing Muslim Vote: Lok Sabha Elections, 1998 
The political factors that were at play in Uttar Pradesh in the last three elections -
the Assembly elections of 1993 and 1996 and the parliamentary elections of 1996 -
continue to dominate the scene this time as well. There was no change in the strategy 
adopted by the political parties to expand their social base in the 1998 elections. But the 
key aspect of this election was the acceleration of ethnic appeals that dominated the 
electoral arena. As a consequence of stiff competition among the political parties to align 
with new social blocs in order to attain a wirming margin, the electoral importance of 
Muslims doubly increased. The Congress and its successor parties in Uttar Pradesh, BJP, 
SP and BSP, made open appeals to Muslim voters, cynosure of their political campaigns. 
As a part of its electoral strategy to woo the Muslims, Sonia Gandhi, after castigating the 
BJP for its culpability in the event in her election campaign in UP, unreservedly 
apologized to the Muslims for the Congress's failure to protect the Babri Masjid.'°'' At 
the same time, the Congress manifesto held out the "solemn pledge" that such events will 
not be allowed to recur. But on how to excise the festering sore of Ayodhya, it remained 
silent. This was consistent with the Congress' policy of equivocation ever since Ayodhya 
104 For description of Sonia Gandhi's election campaign in Uttar Pradesh, see reports of her speeches at 
Amethi (The Hindustan Times, February 2, 1998); Meerut and Mohanlalganj (The Hindu, February 9, 
1998); Mathura (The Times of India, February 14, 1998); Muzaffamagar and Ghaziabad (Dainik Jagran, 
February 14,1998); Rae Bareli {The Hindu, February 15, 1998); and Sitapur (The Times of India, Febmary 
18,1998). 
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emerged on the political landscape as a serious issue."^ ^ The other tempting promises 
made to Muslims in the manifesto of the Congress were as follows: creation of a new 
ministry for minorities to ensui-e better coordination and integration; constitution of a 
high powered conmiission on how the representation of minorities in public services 
could be enhanced; amending Constitution to establish a Commission for minority 
educational institutions and provide direct affiliation for minority professional institutions 
to central universities; ensures to make Maulana Azad National Urdu University as a 
center of excellence; grant Urdu its due status; rejects the idea of uniform personal laws 
for all Indians; with respect to Kashi and Mathura mosques, the Protection of Places of 
Worship of 1991 v^ U be strictly enforced which freezes the status of all places of worship 
as on August 15, 1947; and also guarantees the recruitment of minorities to the police 
force, the parliamentary and armed forces, and pledges to keep a special watch on 
communally sensitive districts and places.' 
On the other hand, the Bhartiya Janata Party further moderated its tone on anti-
Muslim issues. The construction of temple at Ayodhya, protection of cow, and Article 
370 were duly noted in the election manifesto but ignored in the election campaign."*^ 
During his campaign speeches in UP, L.K. Advani pointed out that contentious issues 
such as Ram temple, common civil code, etc, were introduced by Sonia Gandhi, and the 
BJP, unlike in 1989 and 1991, would not have raised them.'°^ In similar vein, Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee in six election meetings addressed in major UP towns in late January 1998, 
made no reference to the Ayodhya issue and concentrated on the developmental issues, 
and tried to reassure the Muslims that they had nothing to fear from the BJP."'' The party 
not only moderated its pro-Hindu rhetoric, it had made parallel effort to attract Muslim 
support."° The manifesto of BJP promises the following to the minority communities: 
'"' Sukumar Murlidharan, "Promises and Policies", Frontline, Vol. 15, No. 4, February 21-March 6, 1998. 
"^ Asghar Ali Engineer, "Election Manifestos and Minorities; Promises Galore", Economic and Political 
Weekly, May 9,1998, pp. 1069-1070. 
'"^  Kanchan Chandra, "Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh: The Ethnification of the Party System and 
Its Consequences", in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds.), Indian Politics and the 1998 Election: 
Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 64-65. 
"" See The Hindu, January 23. February 6, 1998. 
'"* Sudha Pai, "New Political Trends in Uttar Pradesh: The BJP and the Lok Sabha Elections, 1998", 
Economic and Political Weekly, July 11, 1998, p. 1842. 
''" For BJP's effort to woo the Muslim \ 
Hindu Nationalism, op.cit., pp. 136-38. 
voters in 1998 elections, see Ghosh, BJP and the Evolution of 
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equal opportunities for their prosperity; inducement for acquiring education; all possible 
encouragement to artisans; education for women; special courts for disposal of communal 
violence related cases; protection of waqf properties. 
The strategy of the BSP to attract its target-voting blocs in 1998 elections was 
based on a single point programme: proportional representation for every social category 
in the government, bureaucracy, and other state institutions."^ The following extract 
from a speech by BSP leader Mayawati illustrates the BSP's use of this strategy with 
regard to Muslims during the 1998 election: "I want to tell my Muslim brothers also that 
this time the BSP has given the single largest number of seats in Uttar Pradesh to Muslim 
candidates. We allotted these seats to Muslims where the Muslim Samaj had at least 
200,000 votes. In all these constituencies, the votes of the Dalit Shoshit Samaj will be 
cast for these candidates in any case. If in all these constituencies the 200,000 Muslim 
votes come to us as well, then I can assure you that all of the 14 candidates from the 
Muslim community will become members of parliament.""'' The BSP continued to seek 
the support of Muslims: it allotted Muslims roughly the same percentage of tickets (16 
percent) that it had in the 1996 assembly election and in addition circulated a separate 
booklet describing the BSP's commitment to Muslims."* 
Having developed a great understanding of anti-BJP voting among Muslims, the 
Samajwadi Party continued to highlight anti-BJP rhetoric and emotive speeches quite 
sentimentally attached with Muslims in its election campaign in order to keep its Muslim 
base intact. Speaking on the demolition of the Babri mosque at Ayodhya, Mulayam Singh 
declared: "1 want to tell my Muslim brothers that by protecting one mosque, we have 
done them no favor. This is a matter of national unity.... But when bullets were fired, our 
Hindu brothers got angry." He put the issue of uniform civil code in the same way: 
"What is the meaning of uniform civil code? The Muslim has no problem marrying his 
uncle's daughter, his first cousin. Now, my Hindu brother, tell me, are you ready to marry 
your first cousin?" Even the issue of poverty and hunger were presented separately and 
individually experienced by Muslims and Hindus: "When it is Id, is there, in the homes 
'" Engineer, "Election Manifestos and Minorities", op.cit., p. 1070. 
"^  Chandra, "Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh", op.cit., p. 70. 
'" BSP Election Rally, Saharanpur, February 14,1998. Cf. Ibid. 
"* Ibid., p. 71. 
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of all my Muslim brothers 10-15 kilos of ghee in their house, 20-25 kilos of sugar, 
arrangement for new clothes for the children? Now Holi is about to come. Tell me, my 
Hindu brothers, do you have 10-15 kilos of ghee ready in your house? 20-25 kilos of 
sugar?.... Unless our Hindus and Muslims have enough resources to celebrate Id and 
Holi properly, stability will not come to India." "^ 
In particular, the Samajwadi Party targeted all Muslims, defined as a cohesive 
religious minority and courted them by purposefully highlighting the dangers posed to 
Muslims by the BJP and describing the SP as the only party committed to protecting the 
lives and security of Muslims. Mulayam Singh Yadav frequently invoked the violence 
that followed thedemoHtion of the Babri Masjid in his 1998 campaign: "The BJP says 
we will wipe out hunger. Who will wipe out hunger? Those who by destroying the 
mosque on December 6, 1992, laid waste all of Hindustan? Surat, Bombay, Bhopal, 
Kanpur were burning; there were riots, mijrders, and our daughters were stripped naked 
and made to dance on shards of broken glass and told if they did not dance then we will 
shoot your family. And our poor daughters paid with their honor so that their families 
would be protected...and then they shoot their families in front of them."'^ ^ Mualayam 
Singh's deliberately melodramatic description of the riots reveals as much about the SP's 
attempt to keep the threat of the BJP alive as about the actual danger posed to Muslims 
by the BJP. The BJP's Hindu communalism has benefited the SP by allowing it to 
consolidate its support among Muslims. As long as the BJP threat continues to exist or 
can be depicted to exist, the SP can retain its support among Muslims through the 
relatively low cost strategy of promising protection. The SP manifesto promises the 
following things to Muslims: due representation of Muslims in services, police and army; 
against any external interference in Muslim personal law; establishing inter-college and 
technical institutions in Muslim majority areas; to make arrangements for security and 
protection of all religious institutions; legal action against anyone harming any religious 
place of worship; all religious institutions under department of archeology, where 
worship is not permitted today, will be opened for religious service; legal action against 
those responsible for riots against Muslims after demolition of Babri Masjid; constitution 
' " Cf. Ibid., p. 77. 
' " SP Election Rally, Saharanpur, February 14, 1998. Cf. Ibid., p. 79. 
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of a security force giving representation to all communities to check communal violence; 
favors resolution of mandir-masjid controversy through the court judgment. 
Verdict: Lok Sabha Elections, 1998 
During the 1998 I.ok Sabha elections, there were no major shifts in support bases 
for the principle political parties in UP, though the result revealed a mark improvement in 
the seat and vote share of the BJP alongside total collapse of the Congress, the poor 
performance of (he BSP in terms of scat but marginal increase in vote share, and a 
marginal improvement for the second largest party, the SP. BJP contested 82 seats, won 
57 and secured 36.49 percent of valid votes in UP."* The BJP gained in some new 
districts, but lost symbolic Faizabad seat associated with the Ayodhya movement. As it 
has been the case in UP since 1991, the BJP benefited from a three-way split in the 
opposition and the inability of the SP and BSP to forge a lasting alliance. In 41 
constituencies won by the BJP and its allies, the combined BSP and SP vote would have 
defeated the BJP. If one also imagines the Congress as part of an alliance, the BJP would 
have one only 12 seats in UP, ceteris paribus }^^ BJP had given ticket to only one Muslim 
candidate, Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, from Rampur constituency who was declared elected 
(Table 7 and 8). 
The Congress was the major loser in UP, relinquishing all its seat, including the 
Nehru-Gandhi family seat of Amethi. Salman Khurshid, the new Uttar Pradesh Congress 
committee chief, could not even come in second in his constituency, as both he and his 
party were unpopular with the Muslim community. However, the Congress nominated 12 
Muslims to attract the Muslim vote. Despite the fact, Muslims hardly felt appeased by 
this. Congress' vote share fell from 8.14 percent in 1996 Lok Sabha elections to 6.02 
percent in 1998,'^ *^  casting serious doubts on its ability to resurrect itself as the nationally 
dominant party as well as on the efficacy of the so called "Sonia Effect". However, the 
' " Engineer, "Election Manifestos and Minorities", op.cit., p. 1070. 
"* Statistical Report on General Elections, 1998 to the 12th Lok Sabha Volume I (National and State 
Abstracts & Detailed Results), (New Delhi: Election Commission of India). See http://www.eci.gov.in 
' " Yogendra Yadav and Alistair McMilan, "Results: How India Voted", India Today, March 16,1998, p. 
31. 
'^ '' Statistical Report on General Elections, 1998, op. cit. 
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post-1998 elections show a marked improvement in the performance of Congress, and 
that is all because of the Sonia Gandhi's sincere campaigning. 
The BSP saw its number of seats drop from six to four, although its vote share 
increased marginally to 20.9 percent. In comparison to the other political parties 
competing in this election, BSP had nominated maximum Muslim candidates, around 14. 
But only two were able to win the election (Table 7 and 8). Candidates of the BSP were 
not in the race except in a handful of constituencies like Azamgarh and Baharaich, where 
former Congress (I) figures Akbar Ahmed "Dumpy" and Arif Mohammed Khan were the 
candidates and were also declared elected. 
The SP made the most significant gains, improving its vote share from 20.84 
percent to 28.7, and increasing its number of seats from 16 to 20. Out of the 13 Muslim 
candidates fielded by Samajwadi Party, only 3 were declared elected (Table 7 and 8). 
Most Muslims appeared to be solidly behind the SP. Still, in some constituencies, Muslim 
divided their votes three ways-among the SP, BSP, and Congress. In Rampur 
constituency, for example, all the candidates including the winning BJP candidate were 
Muslims. The SP came in fourth here, and common wisdom holds that the SP or at least 
the Congress should have won this constituency. The strategy of Muslims, uniting behind 
the candidate most likely to defeat the BJP, failed here only because Muslims were not so 
organized as to able to avoid dividing their votes.'^ ^ 
Muslim Dominant Constituencies: Lok Sabha Elections, 1998 
An analysis of the 13 Muslim dominated constituencies (Table 10,11,12,13, and 
t 
17) indicate that the BJP increased its vote share of 2.1 percent from 34.5 percent of valid 
votes in 1996 Lok Sabha elections to 36.6 percent of valid votes in 1998. What is more 
important is to note that the valid votes polled in these constituencies are more than the 
state average. There were 8 constituencies in which its candidates were wdnners and in 
another 5 of its candidates were runners.'^'' In 5 constituencies, BJP retained its previous 
'^ ' Ibid. 
122 Virginia Van Dyke, "The 1998 General Election' The JaniKs-faced Policies of the BJP and Religious 
Mobilisation at the District Level in Uttar Pradesh" in pp. 110-11, Roy and Wallace (eds.), op.cit. 
'" In Amroha, Rampur, Bareily, Padrauna, Mccrut, Muzaffarnagar, Kairana and Saharanpur, the BJP was 
declared elected. And in Bijnore, Moradabad, Sambhal, Bahraich, and Balrampur, the BJP stood as runner. 
See, constituency wise result on the Election Commission of India website. 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/RlectionAnalysis fs.htm 
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seats, in two constituencies it had snatched the seat from the SP and in another one it has 
taken the seat from the Congress.* '^* In 9 constituencies, the BJP and the SP entered into 
fierce competition. Out of this 9, BJP's candidates were winners in 6 constituencies. In 3 
constituencies, BJP had a fight with the BSP in which 2 seats were captured by the BJP 
and it won 1 seat from the Congress.'^^ However, overall, the BJP gained from a division 
of Muslim votes in three parties in these regions. 
Table 17: Percentage of Valid Votes Polled by the Political Parties in the 13 Muslim Dominated Lok 
Sabha Constituencies 
Lok Sabha Elections 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2004 
Congress 
8.42 
6.84 
19.76 
9.52 
BJP 
34.50 
36.63 
29.83 
21.22 
SP 
28.89 
32.38 
20.10 
29.81 
BSP 
18.14 
19.20 
24.18 
25.40 
Source: The percentage is calculated from the vote share polled by the BJP in 13 Muslim dominated Lok 
Sabha constituencies. See the Constituency wise result on the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/ElectionAnalysisfs.htm 
The Samajwadi Party followed the similar trend. Like BJP, it also increased its 
vote share of 3.5 percent from 28.9 percent of valid votes in 1996 Lok Sabha elections to 
32.4 percent of valid votes in 1998. What is more important to note is that the valid votes 
polled in these constituencies are more than the state average. There were 4 
constituencies in which hs candidates were winners and in another 5 its candidates were 
rumiers.'^* Only in 1 constituency, SP retained its 1996 Lok Sabha seat and it lost two 
seats to BJP as well as snatched two seats from it. And in one constituency it had 
snatched the seat from the BSP.'^^ In short, Muslims supported the SP in large number 
that resulted in the comparatively better performance of the party. 
'" The BJP retained its seats in Bareiiy, Padrauna, Meerut, Muzaffamagar and Saharanpur. The party was 
able to snatch the seats of Amroha and Kairana, previously occupied by the SP. And it had occupied the 
Rampur constituency, previously held by the Congress. Ibid. 
' " Bijnore, Moradabad, Sambhal, Bareiiy, Bahtimpur, Padrauna, Meerut, Muzaffamagar, and Kairana with 
SP. And in Bareiiy, Padrauna, Meerut, Muzaffamagar, and Kairana, the BJP defeated the SP candidate with 
minimum margin. And in only three constituencies where the BJP had faced competition with the BSP, 
were Amroha, Bahraich, and Saharanpur. Saharanpur seat was occupied by the BJP. Ibid. 
'^ * In Balrampur, Moradabad, Sambhal and Bijnore, the SP was the winner. And in Bareiiy, Padrauna, 
Meerat, Muzaffamagar, and Kairana, the SP was the runner. Ibid. 
The SP retained Moradabad seat. But it lost its two previous seat, Amroha and Kairana, to the BJP. 
Though it gained the Balrampur and Bijnore seats from the BJP. The SP occupied the Sambhal seat, 
previously won by the BSP. Ibid. 
182 
The Bahujan Samaj Party had a poor performance in these 13 Muslim dominated 
constituencies. Unlike B JP and SP, BSP declined its vote share of almost 1 percent from 
18.4 percent of valid votes in 1996 Lok Sabha elections to 19.2 percent of valid votes in 
1998. Quite unusual of its past record, the party's vote share polled in these 
constituencies is below than the state average. The BSP won only one constituency in 
these regions that was Bahraich. And in only Amroha and Saharanpur, the party acquired 
second position. What was more disturbing for the BSP was the defeat of its top most 
leader, Kanshi Ram. Nakli Singh, the BJP candidate with almost 8 percent of vote 
margin, defeated him. The BSP was forced to the fourth place in this region. The party 
lost its Sambhal seat to the SP. And its candidate, Arif Mohammad Khan, occupied the 
Bahraich seat previously won by the BJP. However, the BJP's candidate Chetan Chauhan 
defeated the BSP's Muslim candidate. Alley Hasan, in Amroha constituency. '^' 
The Congress ceased to exi.st in these regions. It further declined its vote share 
from 8.42 percent in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections to 6.8 percent in the 1998 Lok Sabha 
elections.'^ *^ The party failed to retain its only seat in these regions that is Rampur. Its 
Muslim candidate. Begum Nur Bano, was defeated by another Muslim candidate of BJP, 
Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, by a slight margin. What is more surprising to note is that the SP 
failed to perform well in this only Muslim majority constituency and was forced to fourth 
position since last two elections.''" 
Like 1996, there were only 4 Muslims elected from these constituencies in 1998 
Lok Sabha elections. The SP had given ticket to four Muslims, namely Islam Sabir from 
Bareily, Munawwar Hasan from Kairana, Mohd. Irshad from Saharanpur, Sarafat Yar 
Khan Rizwan Zaheer Khan from Balrampur and Shafiqur Rahman Barq from 
Moradabad. Its two candidates, Rizwan Zaheer Khan and Shafiqur Rahman Barq, were 
declared elected. The BSP had nominated four Muslim candidates from these regions, 
namely Arif Mohammad Khan from Bahraich, Abdul Salem from Rampur, Alley Hasan 
from Amroha, and Ashfaq Ahmad from Balrampur. But only Arif Mohammad Khan was 
declared elected. Congress nominated five Muslim candidates from these regions namely 
'^ Mbid. 
'^'ibid. 
""Ibid. 
"Mbid. 
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Mohsina Kidwai from Meerut, Hafiz Mohd. Siddiqui from Moradabad, Shahid Siddiqui 
from Muzaffamagar, Begum Nur Bano from Rampur, Nasimul Hassaii from Sambhal. 
But no one was able to v^ fin the election. The BJP had given only one ticket to a Muslim 
candidate in Uttar Pradesh, Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, who was elected from the Rampur. 132 
Voting Preference of Muslims: Lok Sabha Elections, 1998 
The 1998 election witnessed a swing towards the BJP and its allies in Uttar 
Pradesh. However, the Muslim voting rcniuiued remarkably similar to that of 1996. A 
striking fact emerging in this election was that Muslim polarization not only remained 
intact but also appears to have further sharpened. The Samajwadi Party retained its 
support base among Muslims. Table 9 shows that Muslim electorates had consolidated 
themselves behind the Samajwadi Party. There was aroimd 7 percent increase in their 
support to the SP from 61 percent in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections to around 68 percent 
in 1998. Strikingly, the BJP, which had no support among the Muslims, had improved its 
vote share of 2 percent among Muslims from 5 percent in 1996 to 7 percent in 1998. The 
Bahujan Samaj Party failed to improve its support base among Muslims. It remained the 
same in 1998, as it was in 1996 that is 6 percent quite lower than the BJP. It is equally 
important to note that the Congress, which was known for its strong support base among 
Muslims, remained low. It secured only 10 percent of votes in 1998. In Uttar Pradesh, the 
SP, BSP, and to a lesser extent BJP ate into Congress support among the Muslims. As a 
result, with distinctive parties capturing the Muslim votes in Uttar Pradesh, there 
remained no major Muslim support to the Congress. 
Wooing Muslim Vote: Lok Sabha Elections, 1999 
The c£impaigning of the 1999 Lok Sabha election in UP proved itself that this 
election was also not an exception to the rule that in a multi-cornered electoral 
competition, political parties compete for the Muslim vote more strongly to get a margin 
that may help them to attain power. In fact what the poll scene in UP during this election 
show was that "the war for the Muslim vote has hotted up among the three non-BJP 
' " See Mahendra S. Rana, India Voles: 1998 Lok Sabha Elections, (Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 
1998), pp. 248-64. 
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contestants, with the BSP, to the chagrin of the Congress, making an equally strong bid 
for the Muslim vote." '^''^  
Though largely seen as the party of the Scheduled Castes, the BSP too has 
cultivated a Muslim constituency in UP as a part of its strategy and gauging the mood of 
Muslim voters, had put up maximum number of Muslim candidates among all the parties 
in the state in the present elections. The Party armounced Muslim candidates in 17 
constituencies such as Amroha, Barcily, Pilibhit, Unnao, Agra, Saharanpur and Nainital 
where it was felt that Muslims were moving away from the SP.'^ '* The BSP hoped to 
swing the poll outcomes in its favor "through a dalit-Muslim combine in quite a few 
constituencies where the Muslims and the dalits each constitute some 20 percent of the 
population."^^^ Apart from proportional nomination of Muslim candidates, Mayawati 
made serious efforts to gain the support of Muslims by promising them reservations if 
they helped the BSP to gain enough votes so as to be part of the new government which 
she pointed out would enable them to have their own representatives in power.'^ ^ 
It is also to be noted that BJP too did not take the risk of following the exclusivist 
policy of neglecting Muslim votes. With a view to attract Muslim votes, the BJP 
continued its strategy to be a moderate and catch all party. This moderation was 
manifested, by and large, in the manifesto of BJP and its allies (known as National 
Democratic Alliance) that tactically put the Hindutva agenda on the backbumer. Now it 
talked of "genuine secularism" and "...the concept of secularism consistent with the 
Indian tradition..."'^^ It also dropped four controversial issues: building a temple at 
Ayodhya; enacting a uniform civil code; abolishing the National Minorities Commission; 
and abrogating Article 370 of the constitution.'''* Doubtless, the compulsions of electoral 
calculations obliged the BJP to adopt moderation. Nonetheless, the BJP continued to 
placate its hard-core Hindutva electorates during the election campaign. The then BJP's 
' " "Shifting Loyalties", Economic and Political Weekly", September 18, 1999, p. 2688. 
' " Sudha Pal, "BSP's New Electoral Strategy Pays Off', Economic and Political Weekly, October 30, 
1999, p. 3100. 
' " "Shifting Loyalties", op.cit. 
" ' The Times of India, September 8,1999. 
' " Venkatesh Athreya, "Of Promises and Policies", Frontline, September 11-24, 1999. See 
http://www.flonnet.com/fl 1619/161903 80.htm 
' " "Introduction", in Zoya Hasan (ed.), Parties and Party Politics in India, (New Delhi: Oxford University 
?rcss,20a2), pp. 15-16. 
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General Secretary, K.N. Govindacharya, explicitly said that the party is "neither breaking 
out of our commitment to those issues nor are we apologetic about our stand." Kalraj 
Mishra, a senior BJP leader in UP, echoed this line. "Elections or no election, the party 
was committed to the construction of Ram Temple."'*^ 
However, the strategy of Mulayam Singh Yadav to attract the Muslim vote was 
quite different from the earlier elections. The SP, first, sensed the pro-Congress mood of 
Muslim voters. The SP did not support the minority Congress Government after the fall 
of Vajpayee government at the center mainly on the ground that supporting the Congress 
would result into losing its Muslim votes to the Congress.''*' The calculation seems to be 
that if the Congress had greater control of the government at the Centre, the Congress 
would be more successful in attracting Muslim votes, which were presumed to be no 
longer hostile to the Congress. The tactical voting of Muslims in favor of Congress in 
order to neutralize the BJP could harm the SP interest so far as its strong base among 
Muslims was concerned. The SP had thrown all its effort to check the Congress in 
consolidating its Muslim support. However, this strategy of the SP did not help the party 
to contain the Congress in gaining support from the Muslim voters. 
On the other hand, the Congress was banking heavily on the return of the 
Muslims to its fold for its rejuvenation in the state. The strategy of the party along with 
media support to win back the Muslims was its propagation among the conmiunity that 
the SP had a tacit understanding with the BJP to thwart the attempt of the Congress to 
form the government at the Centre.''*^ As well as, the Congress, while gauging the anti-
BJP stand of Muslims, successfully portrayed itself as the only alternative to the BJP at 
the Centre. This strategy helped the Congress very much in regaining its lost support 
among Muslims. Even, Mulayam Singh Yadav, had admitted, in an interview to 
Frontline, his loss in UP mainly because of this strategy of the Congress.'^ ^ 
' " Cf. A.G. Noorani, The RSS and the BJP: A Division of Labor, (New Delhi: LeftWord Books, 2000), p. 
102. 
'••^  Ibid., p. 103. 
''" Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, "Politics of Compulsions", Frontline, May 08-21, 1999. 
http.7/www. flonnet.com/fl 1610/16100150.htm 
'^ ^ SG, RR, "Uttar Pradesh: Samajwadi Party Holds Ground", Economic and Political Weekly, December 4, 
1999, p. 3419. 
'*' Sec, Frontline, October 23-Novcmbcr 05, 1999. http://www.flonnct.com/fll622/16221140.htm 
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Verdict: Lok Sabha Elections, 1999 
The verdict of 1999 Lok Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh was quite paradoxical 
in nature. The BJP had secured 27.64 per cent of the votes, some 9 percentage points 
(8,85 percent) down from last year but only a fraction below what they secured in the 
1991 and 1996 parliamentary elections. Yet the BJP won only 29 seats compared to 
between 50 and 60 seats it has secured in the past. For the Samajwadi Party, the result 
was even more paradoxical: it acquired 24.06 percent vote in 1999 Lok Sabha election, a 
loss of nearly 5 percentage points (4.64 percent) since the 1998 elections, but its seats 
tally had gone up from 20 to 26. The BSP recorded only a marginal increase (1.18 
percent) m its vote share, from 20.9 to 22.08 per cent, but its seats tally rose from 4 to 14. 
The surprising element about the Congress (I) was that normally under the Indian 
electoral system one would not expect a party securing 14.72 per cent of the votes to win 
any seats. However, the Congress (I) romped home with 10 seats. The first-past-the-post 
system that normally rewards the biggest party and punishes the rest did not seem to have 
worked that way in U.P. The party with the highest vote share, the BJP, won only 29 
seats; the second and third highest-vote-share parties, the S.P. and the BSP, made major 
gains in terms of seats. In fact, even the fourth and lowest seat-share-party, the Congress 
(I), won a significant number of seats.''''* The Congress expansion had come from the 
Muslim voters. 
The remarkably good performance by the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan 
Samaj Party in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh proves that the tendency 
among Muslims to see the prominent political forces representing the backward classes 
and Dalits as their natural allies and to forge tactical alliances with them to defeat the 
upper-caste-oriented Bhartiya Janata Party has become sharper. Muslims evidently 
supported the Congress, BSP and SP wherever it seemed capable of defeating the BJP.'"*^  
'''•' CSDS team, "A Paradoxical Verdict", Frontline, November 06-19,1999. 
http://www.flonnet.com/fl I623/16230400.htm; Statistical Report on General Elections, 1999 to the 
Thirteenth Lok Sabha, Volume 1 (National and State Abstracts & Detailed Results), (New Delhi: Election 
Commission of India). See http://www.eci.gov.in 
"•^  Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, "Consolidation in Uttar Pradesh", Frontline, October 23-November 05, 1999. 
http://www.flonnet.com/fll622/l6221130.htm 
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There were 68 Muslim candidates contesting the 1999 Lok Sabha Elections in UP. Out 
of these 68 Muslims contestants, the Congress Party nominated 11, the SP and the BSP 
nominated 16 candidates each, and only one candidate was nominated by the BJP. Out of 
the total 85 MPs elected by the Ultar Pradesh, only 8 belonged to Muslim community. 
The representation of Muslims in the Lok Sabha was marked by tJie improvement of 2 
Muslims from the previous election. Of Uie 8 elected Muslim members. Congress, BSP 
and SP elected 2, 3, and 2 respectively. Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) contributed one 
Muslim member from Kairana (Table 7 and 8). 
Muslim Dominant Constituencies: Lok Sabha Elections, 1999 
Evident from the 1999 Lok Sabha results, no Muslim candidates were nominated 
from the Lok Sabha constituencies having less than 10 percent of Muslims. And the 
constituencies, where Muslims were 11 to 20 percent, only two Muslims were elected 
that was from Shahbad and Badaun. The nomination and wirming ratio of Muslim 
candidates were from the constituencies having 21 to 50 percent Muslims. There were 6 
Muslims elected from these regions, namely from Amroha, Rampur, Balrampur, 
Muzaffamagar, Kairana, and Saharanpur.'''* This pattern establishes the conclusion that 
political parties are strategically concerned with nominating Muslim candidates from 
those constituencies where Muslims are numerically strong. The parties hardly nominate 
the Muslim candidates from those constituencies where the Muslims could hardly help 
them to win the election. Two conclusions could be drawn from this pattern: first, by 
nominating the Muslim candidates in less Muslim populated constituencies, the political 
parties do not want to take the risk of antagonizing the Hindu voters; and second, the 
greater ratio of nominating Muslim candidates by the political parties in the Muslim 
dominated constituencies was to placate the Muslims of this region and attract their votes. 
However, an analysis of the 13 heavily populated regions shows that the voting 
preference of Muslims in these regions was clearly divided among the three contending 
political parties, namely the SP, the Congress and the BSP. The BJP had declined its 
support base as it is indicated from the fact that BJP failed to improve its vote share, 
rather heavily declined from 36.6 percent in 1998 to merely 29.8 percent in 1999 Lok 
'** Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims in India, op.cit., pp. 78-89. 
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Sabha elections. It was almost the loser of 7 percentage of vote share. Eventually the 
party also failed to improve its seats. It won only 4 seats in this election against the 8 
seats in the previous election.''* 
The major gainer in this region was the Congress. The party, which was collapsed 
in this particular region, registered its presence by improving almost 13 percent of its 
vote share from 6.8 percent in the previous election to 19.8 percent in the present Lok 
Sabha elections. The party not only gained in terms of vote share but also improved its 
seat from nil to 3. 
The SP's support base in this region was seriously eroded, as was evident by its 
declining vote share from 32.4 percent in the 1998 Lok Sabha elections to only 20.1 
percent in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. It was a great loss of almostl2 percent to the 
SP. It seems that the Congress gained what the SP lost. It was not the loss only in terms 
of vote share but the party failed to gain any seat from the previous elections; rather the 
party faced the loss of 2 seats from 4 in 1998 to only 2 in 1999. The party was the loser in 
terms of holding second position in this region. Against the previous 5, this time the SP 
was runner only in four constituencies.''*' The shift in the support base of the SP was to 
such extent that even party Chief Mulayam Singh Yadav was unsure of retaining his 
Sambhal seat, despite the large presence of Muslims, and therefore contested also from 
Karmauj with a predominantly non-Muslim electorate.''° 
It is interesting to note that that the BSP is successfiilly making way in this region. 
There was no downward trend in its vote share polled in this heavily populated Muslim 
region. The party improved its vote share from 19.2 percent in 1998 to 24.2 percent in the 
1999 Lok Sabha elections. It was almost 5 percent increase. The party also improved its 
seats from 1 in the 1998 to 2 in this election.'^' 
In short, the analysis of this region gives support to three valid points: first, there 
is a great shift in the Muslim vote .away from the Samajwadi Party to the Congress, 
leading to a revival of the Congress in the state; second, the impact of this shift in the 
'^' See the Constituency wise result on the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/ElectionAnalysis fs.htm 
'*» Ibid. 
'«Ibid. 
"° "Shifting Loyalties", op.cit. 
' " See the Constituency wise result on the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnaiysis/ElectionAnalysisfs.htm 
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Muslim vote proved fatal to the poll prospects of the Bhartiya Janata Party; and third, the 
Muslim voters became more tactical in exercising their vote. 
Voting Preference of Muslims: Lok Sabha Elections, 1999 
The percentage of people who had made up their minds on whom to vote for a 
few days before the election was higher in U.P. at 44 per cent than the nationwide 
average of 36 per cent. The proportion of people who made up their minds before the 
campaign started was also significantly lower here, by 15 percentage points, than 
nationally. Muslim voters were by far the most likely group to make up their mind late,' 
This finding of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) point proved the 
fact that Muslim voters played pivotal role in resorting to tactical voting against the BJP. 
The Muslim vote was evenly split between the Congress (I) and the SP (Table 9). 
However, it is important to note that there was a considerable decline of Muslim support 
for the SP. Contrary to its past record, only 40 percent of Muslims voted for the SP. 
Around 28 percent Muslims who voted for the SP in the last election did not vote for the 
party this time. One of the reasons, often cited, behind the SP's loss of Muslim vote was 
the anguish among the commimity on the SP's denial of support to Congress at the 
Centre. Second, the 1996 and 1998 elections had shown that the SP was incapable of 
assembling the coalition of social forces that could actually empower the Muslims. This 
provides an incentive to Muslims to turn to the Congress, which remains the only serious 
national alternative to the BJP.^ '^' 
The CSDS survey did not show any significant support for the ESP among 
Muslims. There was a decline of Muslim support for the BSP from an even 6 percent in 
1996 and 1998 to 5 percent in 1999 Lok Sabha election (Table 9). However, Muslim 
voters did support the party in some constituencies where they found that its candidates 
were able to defeat the BJP. For example, in Amroha, Basti, Saharanpur and Shahbad 
constituencies, the BSP gained fi-om the perception among Muslims that it stood the best 
' " CSDS team, "A Paradoxical Verdict", op.cit. 
' " Sukumar Murlidharan, "Changing Scene", Frontline, September 25-October 08, 1999. 
http://www.flonnet.com/fll620/I6200080.htm 
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chance of defeating the BJP. In other nine constituencies including Bahraich, the BSP 
was able to gain second place only with the help of Muslims. 
Surprisingly, the vote share of the BJP and its allies among Muslims had grown, 
throughout the decade of 1990s, even if only slowly. In the 1999 elections, the share 
reached a two-digit figure. The alliance had increased its vote share among Musluns from 
7 percent in the 1998 elections to 11 percent in 1999 Lok Sabha elections in Uttar 
Pradesh. However, the Muslims did not vote for the BJP in that large number as it had 
been shown in the CSDS survey. If there was any increase in its vote share among 
Muslims was to be entirely owing to its allies. 
This time the Muslims backed the resurgent Congress. Compared to 1998 Lok 
Sabha election, the Congress got the biggest share of the votes of Muslims. The vote 
share of the Congress had gone up by about 30 percentage point, three times more than 
its previous election. This indicates a general return of the Muslim's faith in the 
Congress. 
Wooing Muslim Vote: Vidhan Sabha Elections, 2002 
The strategy of the political parties to attract the Muslim votes remained the same 
in 2002 Vidhan Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh. The increasing salience, the shifting but 
tactical pattern of the Muslim votes in the state had become more decisive on the 
outcome of the elections in the state. Reading the Muslim voting trend, the political 
parties competing in this assembly election further modified their strategy to emerge as 
the first choice of the Muslim voters. The strategy to attract minority support has mainly 
been two-fold. First, there was a rush to nominate maximum number of Muslim 
candidates. In the ensuing competition, the BSP emerged the topper by fielding 86 
Muslim candidates. The Congress fielded 69 Muslims and the Samajwadi Party, 68 
(Table 14). Since the BSP did not issue its manifesto, the party leader Mayawati, 
presented the figures as a proof of her being more concerned with the interests of 
Muslims than Mulayam Singh Yadav.'*'' 
Promises in the election manifestos and assurances in the speeches of important 
leaders formed the second part of the strategy. This was reflected in the BJP's stand that 
' " The Hindu, February 4,2002. 
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did not succumb to the pressure of its sister organization, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, that 
frequently raised the issue of Ram Temple and wanted to go ahead with the construction 
of the temple at Ayodhya from March 15, 2002.'" The BJP had made it absolutely clear 
that since the Ayodhya was not on the NDA agenda, the party would not make the 
Ayodhya an issue in this election. Like other parties, the BJP too expressed its solidarity 
with the court's verdict or negotiated settlement of the controversy between the parties 
concerned.'" However, the then Chief Minister of UP, Rajnath Singh had put the 
Congress and the Samajwadi Parly on the defensive by asking them to clarify whether 
they stood by their commitment to rebuild the mosque at the disputed site.'^ ^ The party 
also blamed the Congress and the SP for trying to create a feeling of insecurity among the 
minorities (particularly Muslims) to win their votes. And eulogized its believe in the "oft-
repeated principle of justice for all and appeasement of none." Rajnath Singh described 
the Congress as "the most communal paity at the national level" and the Samajwadi Party 
as "the most communal party at the regional level."'^' One caimot say with certainty that 
this moderated stand of the BJP was to win the confidence of the Muslim votes. But, it 
can certainly be argued that BJP did not want to antagonize the Muslims and moderate 
Hindus. 
However, despite the assertion of the BJP that Ayodhya issue was not on its 
agenda, the party was ever eager to appeal to its voters in the name of the temple. As well 
as, the anti-BJP parties also did not seem to be prepared to let the issue stay in the 
background. On their part, the Samajwadi Party and Congress had never failed to discuss 
the Ayodhya issue, which stir the Muslims emotionally. Obviously, the BJP and its 
associates were not the only parties exploiting the Ayodhya issue to their political 
advantage.'*" 
The Congress adopted the strategy to float its Muslim leaders in UP during the 
elections in order to attract the Muslim votes. For example, the Rajya Sabha MPs, 
Obaidullah Azmi and Maulana Asad Madani, along with their supporters had been roped 
'"Ibid., February 11,2002. 
"* Ibid., February 1 and 3,2002. 
"'' A.K. Verma, "UP Assembly Elections: Caste Dominates the Ideology", Economic and Political Weekly, 
May 25,2002. See the journal's website, http://www.epw.org.in. 
'" The Hindu, February 3,2002. 
'"Ibid. 
^" Ibid., Fcbruai7 9, 2002. 
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in. This was in addition to Ghulam Nabi Azad, Salman Khursheed, Akbar "Dumpy", and 
Mohsina Kidwai who were already in the field.'^' And the party had also taken help the 
leaders who had a greater appeal among Muslims, for example, Laloo Prasad Yadav. 
During his campaign in UP, Yadav extended its support to Congress and blamed L.K. 
Advani for using "Ram for electoral gains time and again" and termed the BJP as the 
"Bharat Jalao Party."'*^ As a part of its strategy to alienate Muslims from the SP, the 
Congress continued to attack on the SP by highlighting its failure to give support to the 
Congress to form the anti-BJP government at the Centre in 1999 and the SP's implied 
understanding with the BJP.'^ ^ 
The Samajwadi Party, known for its strong base among Muslims, also energized 
its effort to consolidate its base among them. It was largely because of the Muslim voters 
who made the SP learn that the party should not take the community for granted as it was 
in case of previous elections. In order to appease Muslim voters, the SP promised special 
provisions for the welfare of community if returned to power in Uttar Pradesh. For 
example, the party had promised to create a separate Minority Development Ministry to 
administer the Muslim Waqf, Haj pilgrims, the Minorities Finance Corporation and the 
Minorities Commission; making provision for special reservation for Muslims not only in 
Govemment services by also in educational institutions; opening schools in Muslim 
majority areas; setting up a minority education conmiission to suggest means to remove 
educational backwardness of the Muslims; and to work for the development of the 
Urdu.'" At the same time, Mulayam Singh Yadav, had taken a strong stand against 
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) and the ban on the Students Islamic 
Movement of India (SIMI). He had criticized the BJP Govemment on the two issues and 
dared the Govemment to impose a ban on the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Bajrang 
Dd as it did on the SIMI. He aimed at presenting him as a leader with special concern for 
the Muslim interests.'^' 
'" Ibid., February 6, 2002. 
'" Ibid., Febmary 8,2002. 
'"Ibid., February 14.2002. 
'" Ibid., February 2, 2002. 
'" Ibid., February 7 and 8,2002. 
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Verdict: Vidhan Sabha Elections, 2002 
Uttar Pradesh had entered into yet another era of uncertainty with the State 
Assembly election throwing up a badly fractured verdict. The election brought almost a 
rout of the Bhartiya Janata Party, which lost the number one position in the State's 
politics to the Samajwadi Parly. Against the 32.48 percent votes in the 1996 Assembly 
elections, the BJP secured only 20.08 percent votes in 2002 and won only 88 seats out of 
320 seats it contested in 2002 against the 174 seats it won out of 414 seats contested in 
1996. The Samajwadi Part had emerged at the top but was yet far away from a clear 
majority. The SP got 25.37 percent votes in 2002 as against the 21.80 percent in the 
previous Assembly election. It won 143 seats out of 390 seats it contested in 2002, which 
was quite above than the previous Assembly elections in which the SP won 110 seats out 
of 28 l i t contested.'^ 
The most surprising aspect of the election was, however, the unexpected gains for 
the Bahujan Samaj Party which secured 23.06 percent votes in this election against the 
19.64 percent in 1996 Assembly election. It also improved its seat tally from 67 seats in 
1996 to 98 seats it v/on in 2002. The Congress finished a poor fourth position with 25 
seats in 2002 against the 33 in 1996. However, the party marginally improved its vote 
share from 8,35 percent in the 1996 Assembly election to 8.96 percent in 2002.'^ ^ 
Table 14 and 15 shows that out of 557 Muslim candidates who fought the 
election, only 46 were able to win. However, the total representation of Muslims in the 
Legislative Assembly of UP has improved from 22 in 1991 to 26 in 1993 to 39 in 1996 
and 46 in 2002. Out of 69 Muslim candidates nominated by the Congress, only 4 were 
able to win in 2002 Assembly elections. The SP put up 68 Muslim candidates, but only 
22 were declared elected. The BSP, which had given the highest number of seats to 
Muslims (86), but returned only 22 winning Muslim candidates. However, the BJP 
nominated only one Muslim candidate, and he was declared elected. 
"* See Key Highlights of the General Elections, 1996 to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, op.cit.; 
Key Highlights of the General Elections, 2002 to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi: 
Election Commissions of India, 1997. See http://www.eci.gov.in 
'"Ibid. 
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Voting Preference of Muslims: Vidhan Sabha Elections, 2002 
The CSDS data (Table 9 and 16) on the voting preference of the Muslims in 2002 
Assembly elections indicate that 62.2 percent of Muslims voted for the Samajwadi Party. 
It means that for the majority of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, the SP proved itself as the 
most potential alternative to the BJP in this election also. However, there was a decline in 
Muslim votes to SP from the previous Assembly elections election. The SP lost almost 5 
percent of Muslim votes in comparison to the 1996 Assembly elections. If we throw a 
glance over the voting preference of Muslims in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections and 2002 
Assembly elections, we find that the SP improved its share among Muslims from 40 
percent in 1999 Lok Sabha to 62.2 percent in the 2002 Assembly elections. The increase 
was almost of 22 percent. 
The vote share of Bahujan Samaj Party among Muslims was only 9 percent. The 
BSP and Congress alliance during 1996 Assembly elections garnered a comparatively 
better share among Muslim votes, around 24.9 percent. But if we look at the performance 
of both the parties by adding together their votes among Muslims in this election, we find 
that only 16 percent Muslims voted for both the parties. However, in comparison to 1999 
Lok Sabha election, the BSP improved its vote share among Muslims from 5 percent to 9 
percent in 2002 Assembly elections. It was almost 4 percent increase that reflects the 
tactical and shifting pattern of Muslims vote. 
The Congress was the loser so far as its vote share among Muslims was concemed 
in 2002. Only 7.1 percent Muslims turned up to vote for the Congress. However, the BSP 
and Congress alliance in 1996 Assembly election did much better than their independent 
contest in this election. Compared to the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, h had lost a 
substantial share of votes among Muslims, which was around 33 percent. Muslims, who 
had earlier indicated their willingness to switch over to the Congress, suddenly deserted 
them and voted for the SP. 
Compared to the 1996 Assembly elections, the BJP and its allies registered a 
significant gain among Muslim voters. It had improved its vote share from 2.3 percent in 
1996 to 9.6 percent in 2002. Compared to the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP and its 
allies lost marginally among Muslim votes, around 1.5 percent. The vote share of the BJP 
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among Muslims indicate that despite the majority's anti-BJP voting, a certain section of 
Muslims, who were in minority, continued to vote for the BJP. 
Wooing Muslim Vote: Lok Sabha Elections, 2004 
The rising importance of Muslim votes constitutes one of the most significant 
changes in the post-Congress phase of Uttar Pradesh electoral politics. The 2004 Lok 
Sabha election reveals the extent to which almost all political parties are still struggling to 
articulate a viable electoral strategy that can mobilize Muslims behind it. At the same 
time, Muslim voters have emerged as powerful political constituency in their own right. 
They are no longer being treated as the vote bank for any political party. The political 
parties took this trend among Muslims very seriously in 2004 elections by bringing out 
effective strategy to placate, woo and enlist their electoral support. An analysis of the 
electoral manifesto issued by the political parties amply proves this point. 
The absence of favorable emotive issues, the diminishing appeal of Hindutva, and 
the habitual anti-BJP tactical voting by Muslims forced the BJP to woo the Muslim 
voters. This is exemplified by the BJP's downplaying of its much publicized Hindutva 
strategy to polarize the votes on religious ground. Like other parties, the BJP and its allies 
(together known as National Democratic Alliance) come out with a pro-Muslim 
programme in its manifesto in order to attract their attention. The alliance promised to 
unveil a Minorities Development Agenda to focus on 3-E program; Education, Economic 
upliftment, and Empowerment; ensuring equitable share of poor and backward families 
among minorities in education, housing, etc.; re-orientation of the Minorities 
Commission to address their development and welfare issues; encouragement to the 
promotion of Urdu and to the modernization of Madarsa education; and making efforts in 
the direction to increase minorities' representation in administration and public bodies.'^ ^ 
Like other parties, the BJP too followed the strategy to get the statement of Muslim 
community leaders in its support. For example, Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid, Imam 
Bukhari called upon the community to support the BJP.'*' 
"* National Democratic Alliance Manifesto to the 2004 Lok Sabha election, "An Agenda for Development, 
Good Governance, Peace and Harmony", April-May 2004. 
"* Ibid. p. 12 
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Realizing that its efforts to win over the community was not yielding the desired 
results, the BJP came up with another strategy—ensure that Muslims do not vote in large 
numbers for a particular party. For example, Vajpayee's statement, that Muslims should 
not vote for the Congress but for the Mulayam Singh Yadav-led Samajwadi Party that 
was "more trustworthy" and ideologically close to the BJP, had such an aim.''" Similarly, 
a section of BJP leaders hinted that if the NDA fell short of a majority in the Lok Sabha, 
the SP could extend support to it.'^' But, Mulayam Singh categorically denied any 
support to BJP m an interview to Frontline. 
The Congress came out with the following promises to the minorities in its 
election manifesto: reservations for Muslims in government employment and education 
on the ground of their social, educational and economic backwardness; promote and 
maintain communal peace and harmony, especially in sensitive areas; amendment in the 
Constitution to establish a Commission for Minority Educational Institutions to provide 
direct affiliation for minority professional institutions to central universities; special steps 
for modem and technical education among women in minority communities; opening 
new middle-level technical institutions in the areas of artisan and weaver concentrations; 
the National Minorities Development Corporation and State Minorities Development 
Corporation will be made direct lending institutions; settlement of Ayodhya through 
court's verdict or through negotiation between the parties to the dispute that must have 
legal sanction; and the enforcement of the Places of Worship (Special Provision) Act, 
1992. Apart from its promises made to the Muslims, the Congress ensured the support 
of the community by getting the appeals of All India Milli Coimcil (AIMC) to them to 
vote in favor of Congress in some constituencies."'* Another strategy of the Congress to 
win back the Muslim votes was the active participation of Gandhi-Nehru family, Sonia, 
Priyanka and Rahul Gandhi, in the electoral politics of Uttar Pradesh. 
Realizing the fact of shifting voting trends among Muslims, Mulayam Singh 
Yadav announced a series of other measures apart from arousal of emotional feelings to 
consolidate his base among Muslims. He has created 3000 posts for Urdu teachers, had 
'™ Pumima S. Tripathi, "Strategic Voting", Frontline, May 21, 2004, p. 14. 
' " Ibid. 
'"ibid., p. 9. 
' " Election Manifesto of the Indian National Congress to the 2004 Lok Sabha election. 
"* Frontline, May 21,2004, p. 14. 
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made provision in his budget for modernization of Madrasas and has also announced 
creation of Persian and Arabic University at Rampur to protect Islamic heritage in these 
languages.'^ ^ The BSP had adopted its traditionally old but effective strategy of putting 
up a relatively large number of Muslims candidates in order to attract the Muslim votes. 
Verdict: Lok Sabha Elections, 2004 
The final all UP seats and vote share of major political parties during 2004 Lok 
Sabha election reflects an established multiparty competition with four main contenders. 
The BJP lost its ground in the heartland of Uttar Pradesh. In the Lok Sabha elections held 
in 1999, the BJP had managed to secure 27.64 per cent of the popular vote share in the 
state. That figure decline to 22.17 percent this time, a fall of 5.47 percentage points. The 
BJP, on its own, dropped 19 seats to finish at 10, compared to 29 seats in the previous 
elections. This indicated a real erosion of its popular base in UP. Interestingly, the BJP, 
which claims to be promoting the cause of Hindutva, has been ousted in all three favorite 
Spots of the Sangh Parivar: Ayodhya, Kashi and Mathura. 
The SP and BSP were the net gainers, both in terms of seats as well as votes. The 
SP improved its vote share from 24.06 percent vote in 1999 Lok Sabha election to 26.74 
percent in 2004, a net gain of nearly 2.68 percent of votes from the previous election. As 
well as, in the seats tally, the SP performed tremendously well. Its seats had gone up from 
26 to 35. The BSP recorded an increase of 2.59 percent in its vote share, from 22.08 
percent in 1999 to 24.67 percent votes in 2004 Lok Sabha elections. The BSP also 
increased its seats from 14 in 1999 to 19. The identical increase in terms of vote share of 
the BSP and the SP show that both parties are competing and expanding their social base. 
The surprising element about the Congress (I) was that the Congress, which had given a 
sign of revival in the previous election, emerged as a partial loser in terms of both its vote 
share and seats tally. The popular support for the Congress declined in UP as it reflected 
in its decline of vote share from 14.72 per cent in 1999 to 12.04 percent votes in 2004. Its 
vote share actually fell by 2.68 percentage points. Compared to 10 seats 1999, it won 
only 9 seats this time. However, this loss could be explained by its fewer nimiber of seats 
' " Asghar AH Engineer, "Indian Muslims and Lok Sabha Elections", March 1-5, 2004. http://www.csss-
isla.com/archive/2004/mar 1 _ 15 .htm 
''* Frontline, June 4, 2004. p. 19. 
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it contested from the previous election—73 as compared to 76 seats that it contested last 
time.'" 
If we look to the Muslim representation, we find that out of the 85 Muslims 
contesting the 2004 Lok Sabha elections 11 were declared elected. It was an increase of 3 
Muslims this time as compared to the previous elected Muslim candidates. This time no 
Muslim candidate returned from the Congress despite its nomination of 9 Muslim 
candidates. However, Congress nominated comparatively less number of Muslim 
candidates from the previous election. The SP also nominated comparatively less number 
of Muslim candidates from the previous election, but it was able to return around 6 
Muslims to the Lok Sabha. As a part of its strategy to attract the Muslim votes, the BSP 
nominated the highest number of Muslim candidates, around 20, and was able to get 4 of 
them elected. Like in 1999, the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) contributed one Muslim 
member in this election (Table 7 and 8). 
Muslim Dominant Constituencies: Lok Sabha Elections, 2004 
Like the 1999, in 2004 Lok Sabha elections, no Muslim candidates were declared 
elected from the Lok Sabha constituencies having less than 10 percent of Muslims. There 
was an increase of 3 Muslim candidates winning from the previous election to this 
election from the constituencies, where Muslims are 11 to 20 percent. The 5 Muslim 
candidates that elected were from Shahbad, Badaun, Sultanpur, Ghazipur and Phulpur. 
However, there was no increase in the Muslims candidates that elected from the 
constituencies having 21 to 50 percent Muslims. Like previous elections, this time also 
only 6 Muslims were declared elected from this region, namely from Moradabad, 
Bahraich, Domariaganj, Meerut, Muzaffamagar, and Saharanpur. However, the sitting 
Muslim MPs lost their seats in Amroha, Rampur, Balrampur, and Kairana.'''* This pattern 
confirms the point that political parties did not change their strategy to nominate Muslim 
candidates from those constituencies where Muslims are numerically strong. Like the 
previous elections, the parties competing for Muslim votes hardly nominate the Muslim 
'^^Statistical Report on General Elections, 1999 to the Thirteenth Lok Sabha, Volume I, and Statistical 
Report on General Elections. 2004 to the Thirteenth Lok Sabha, Volume I, (National and State Abstracts & 
Detailed Results), (New Delhi: Election Commission of India). See http://www.eci.gov.in 
"* Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims in India, op.cit., pp. 78-89. 
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candidates from those constituencies where the Muslims could hardly help them to win 
the election. 
However, an analysis of the perfonnance of political parties in the 13 heavily 
Muslim populated regions reflect two points: first, the voting preference of Muslims in 
this region remained divided among the three contending political parties, namely the SP, 
the Congress and the BSP; and second, Muslim voters have given a sign of right 
calculation as which candidate is potential enough to defeat the BJP. The traditional 
miscalculation of Muslim as which candidate is able to defeat the BJP got corrected this 
time. The growing sign of right calculation played havoc with the future of BJP in this 
region. As an outcome of this, BJP failed to improve its vote share, rather heavily 
declined from 29.8 percent in 1999 to 21.22 percent in 2004 Lok Sabha elections, a net 
loser of almost 8 percentage point. Unlike the previous elections, the BJP was at loss of 
almost 1 percent of votes in comparison with its state average. As well as the party also 
failed to improve its seats. It won only 2 seats (for example, Bareily and Balrampur) in 
this election against the 4 seats in the previous election.''' And on only two seats (for 
example, Muzaffamagar and Moradabad), its candidates were runners. 
The Congress declined its support base in this region despite its clear sign of 
revival in the previous election. The party registered its presence by declining almost 
10.24 percent of its vote share from 19.76 percent in the previous election to only 9.52 
percent in the present Lok Sabha elections. The party not only lost in terms of vote share 
but also failed to gain any seat. It acquired the second position only at one place, namely 
Padrauna.'"" The SP regained its support base among Muslims in this region in 2004 
what it had lost in the previous election. Its increasing vote share from 20.10 percent in 
the 1999 Lok Sabha elections to 29.81 percent in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections evidenced 
ii. The SP compensated its loss of almost 12 percent in from 1998 to 1999, by improving 
around 10 percent from 1999 to 2004. It seems that the SP gained what it had lost to the 
Congress. It was not the improvement only in terms of vote share but the party also 
increased its seat tally from the previous elections. This time the party was able to snatch 
back 6 seats out of 9 seats it contested (for example, Saharanpur, Muzaffamagar, 
' ' ' See the Constituency wise result on the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/ElectionAnalysisfs.htm 
™lbid. 
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Bahraich, Sambhal, Rampur and Moradabad) as compared to only 2 out of 13 seats it 
contested in 1999. This is for the first time SP was able to win the seat of Rampur.'*' 
What is more important is to note that the BSP is successful in consolidating its 
base in this region. Like the previous elections, the BSP witness no loss in this region, 
known for the highest concentration of Muslims, rather improved marginally. The results 
indicated that there was no downward trend in its support base. The party improved its 
vote share from 24.18 percent in 1999 to 25.40 percent in 2004 Lok Sabha elections. It 
was almost an increase of 1 percentage point. However, the party won only one seat (for 
example, Meerut), but there were 7 seats (for example, Bijnore, Sambhal, Bareily, 
Bahraich, Balrampur, Kairana and Saharanpur) where its candidate stood as runners. The 
Rashtriya Lok Dal of Ajit Singh also performed well. It won two seats (for example, 
Bijnore and Kairana) and at two places (for example, Meerut and Amroha) its candidates 
were runners.'*^ 
In summation, the Muslims' vote has proved decisive in these constituencies that 
has tilted the balance in favor of SP and its allies. The analysis of this region gives 
support to four valid points: first, tactical voting of Muslims proved fatal to the BJP; 
second, unlike to the previous election, SP got the maximum share of Muslim votes; 
third, Muslims again deserted the Congress, sinking all hopes of revival. However, in few 
constituencies Muslims voted for the Congress, for example in Rampur, and fourth, 
Muslim also voted for the RLD and BSP, wherever they find their candidates in a best 
position to defeat the BJP. Thus, the Muslims had better calculation this time to defeat 
the BJP. They voted almost en bloc to the party whosoever was able to defeat the BJP, in 
their view, in a multi polar party contest in this region. 
Voting Preference of Muslims: Lok Sabha Elections, 2004 
The basic information about the voting preference of Muslims in the 2004 
election is reported in Table 9. The Table shows the voting pattern of Muslims quite 
familiar to the students of Indian politics. The SP enjoyed an overwhelming lead of more 
than 30 percentage points over the Congress among the Muslims. It was around 47 
'" Ibid. 
'*^  See the Constituency wise result on the Election Commission of India website 
http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionAnalysis/EIectionAnalysisfs.htm 
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percent of Muslims voted for the SP. Compared to the previous Lok Sabha election, the 
SP improved this time a net 7 percentage points among them. Compared to 2002 
Assembly elections, the SP has lost its more than 15 percent votes to other political 
parties. Overall, Muslims voted for the SP in large number wherever its candidates were 
in a position to defeat the BJP. This is best illustrated by the fact that even in Rampur, a 
Muslim dominated constituency where the Congress' Begum Nur Bano held sway, 
Muslim supported the SP's non-Muslim candidate, Jayaprada, enabling her to win with a 
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margin of over 85,474 votes. 
Despite the popular expectation of a major shift among Muslims towards 
Congress, only 15 percent of Muslims voted for the Congress. Nonetheless, this was what 
the party had expected from the Muslims.'*^ However, the party lost around 25 percent 
Muslim votes this time as compared to the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. Comparing with 
2002 Assembly elections. Congress improved its vote share among Muslims in 2004 Lok 
Sabha elections. It was a gain of almost 8 percentage points. Muslims vote for the 
Congress in UP is marked by ups and down. However, a deeper look at the trend set by 
the Muslims reveals the fact that there is a clear sign of Congress' revival among 
Muslims. 
If we look at the performance of BJP, we find that Muslim voters neglected it 
over rightly. Contrary to the previous elections, the BJP and its allies have lost the 
Muslim votes what it had consolidated after adopting the role of a moderate party. Even 
the minority among Muslims that continued to vote for the BJP deserted the party this 
time. The party was at loss of 8 percent of Muslim points this time as compared to the 
previous Lok Sabha election, and of almost 5 percent loss this time as compared to 2002 
Assembly elections. The theory that Muslims would vote tactically in order to defeat the 
BJP despite its overtures to the community was proved right. An example of the Muslim 
community's anti-BJP preference was seen in Kaiserganj where Arif Mohammad Khan, a 
recent convert to the BJP, was defeated by the SP's Beni Prasad Verma, by over two lakh 
votes.'^ ^ 
'" Frontline, June 4,2004, p. 19. 
'" The Congress conducted a survey in February 2004 which showed that around 15 percent Muslims will 
vote for the Party in UP. Ibid.,, April 9,2004, p. 36. 
"Mbid., June 4,2004, p. 19. 
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However, there is good sign for the BSP so far as the Muslim votes are 
concerned. The party is able to gamer the support of the Muslims, though at slow rate. In 
comparison to a meager 5 percent of Muslim votes in 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the BSP 
secured 9 percent this time. It means, the party has increased its vote share among 
Muslims by 4 percent. It is this shift of Muslims that helped the BSP to increase both its 
vote share and seats. However, there is no improvement if we compare the vote share of 
BSP among Muslims in 2002 Assembly elections and 2004 Lok Sabha elections. The 
party remained intact with the 9 percent of vote in both the elections. 
Summing it up, there was a strong movement among Muslim community to 
ensure once again the defeat of the BJP by tactical voting. In fact, there were indications 
that even the BSP was not anathema to the community despite its dalliances with the BJP. 
Despite the depletion of the Muslim support for the SP in some of the constituencies, SP 
remained a primary alternative of the BJP for the community at all UP level. In many 
other constituencies, the Congress emerged as the alternative choice of the Muslim 
voters. Thus, the impact of the tactical voting certainly harmed the BJP to a large extent 
because this time Muslim voters got their calculations right as to which candidate was 
capable of defeating the BJP. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study brings to the fore this fact that contemporary electoral politics of Uttar 
Pradesh is dominantly shaped by caste and community considerations. At the same time, 
while going through the electoral history of Uttar Pradesh, we also find that there had 
never been a time when the politics of the state was not coloured with caste and 
community factors. The root of political mobilisation of caste categories lies in the very 
division of Indian society on caste and communal lines with inbuilt discriminations, 
colonial model of representative institutions, introduction of adult suffrage and the socio-
political geography of the electoral constituencies. The decisive impact of "number" on 
the electoral outcome under adult suffrage model forced the political parties in Uttar 
Pradesh to consolidate, and mobilise the caste groups. 
In general terms, the electoral politics of Uttar Pradesh, since Independence to late 
1960s, can be understood in two inter-connected features. First, the domination of upper 
caste elites provided the framework of political bonding in a fi-agmented society that 
sustained the monopolistic design of the Congress for two decades in the state. Second, 
the systematic attempt of the upper caste elites to alienate and exclude the marginalised 
castes from the power structure of the state was made either by arresting the rising 
consciousness of marginalised caste groups or by co-opting their emerging elites. The 
Congress strategy of accommodation and co-option of a wide social spectrum did not 
extend to the lower castes in the real sense of the term. It is also important to note that the 
upper caste domination was not only being championed by the Congress but almost all 
right wing opposition parties operated in consonance with the hierarchical logic of the 
Indian society. 
The decade of 1970s and 1980s witnessed the process of defragmentation of 
lower castes into a political identity with the consistent effort of socialist parties to 
mobilise them in order to create an electoral base. The instrument behind the mobilisation 
of low castes was the emergence of reservation politics dominantly supported by the 
socialists. The role of Lohia and Charan Singh was remarkable in shaping the separate 
political identity of the low castes. However, the assertion of the nascent political identity 
of the low castes did not sustain for long. This was largely because of the refragmentation 
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of the same into many political identities without concrete outlet that was successfully 
encashed by the Congress. However, the appointment of the Mandal Commission and its 
implementation with consequent violent reaction of the upper caste groups in early 1990s 
suggested that the defragmentation and consolidation of the lower castes will further be 
accelerated and may prove to be effective and decisive in turning the electoral outcomes 
outside the domain of parties representmg upper caste interest. 
We may have reason to be less pessimistic that in the past, the upper caste 
collectively organised themselves in one political category under the banner of Congress 
party and successfully dominated the power structure of Uttar Pradesh. While the decline 
and displacement of the Congress system in the decade of 1990s was marked by the 
replacement of upper caste groups by the assertion of marginalised lower caste groups 
under the banner of numerous socially fragmented parties. Uttar Pradesh politics 
epitomises this trend, apparent in the emergence of more or less homogeneous parties of 
the OBC strata and Dalits. 
The argument of this thesis, however, suggests that the mobilisation of collective 
caste categories is now fragmenting on individualised caste assertion. This gives way to 
the processes of fragmentation, de-fragmentation and re-fragmentation. The collective 
political grouping of this broader caste groups fragmented themselves into individualised 
caste groups in order to reap the benefit of competitive electoral competition of political 
parties during mid 1990s in UP. It in turn resulted in the unfolding of unexpected political 
patterns. The electoral incentives that lay behind the fragmentation of caste and 
community proved to be decisive factors in increasing multiplication and fragmentation 
of political parties that resulted into the intensification of electoral competition in the 
state. Particularly significant is the decline of Congress party with the desertion of the 
Brahmins, Kshatriya, Dalits and the Muslims. Equally important is the rise of Bhartiya 
Janata Party with the consolidation of Kshatriyas, Brahmins and Banias. Most 
importantly, the subaltern castes sought to break free from their marginalised position 
and began to consider the potential of wider horizontal political mobilisation with a 
broader collectivity of similarly placed caste groups. We find the manifest example of the 
consolidation of Dalits, more particularly Chamars, along with the Bahujan Samaj Party 
and the Other Backward Castes, particulary Yadavs, with the Samajwadi Party. 
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However, the individualised assertion started increasing its pace in the mid-1990s 
that gave birth to the refragmentation process of the caste clusters. Kurmis and Lodhas no 
longer find themselves in the web of OBC politics of Mulayam Singh Yadav. These two 
castes have now established themselves into an important political category. Jats have 
already consolidated behind the Lok Dal of Ajit Singh, Posts and Valmikis have started 
asserting their independent identity quite outside the domain of Dalit politics of 
Mayawati. Thus, the process of fragmentation of political identities is making it difficult 
for the political parties to keep the conglomeration of caste categories remain intact and 
permanent with their domain. 
Another landmark in the changing style of UP politics was the electoral strategy 
of Hindutva politics under the championship of Bhartiya Janata Party. It was largely 
designed to curb the sharp political mobilisation of OBCs and Dalits by tactically 
portraying the Muslims as alien enemy. However, the BJP's strategy of using religious 
cleavages, as those between Hindus and Muslims to their advantage, was countered by 
the strategy of the political parties using the caste cleavages exemplified in the conflict of 
upper, backward, and Dalits and their consequent consolidation by the BJP, SP and BSP. 
Our findings about the relationship between political competition and caste and 
community mobilization in Uttar Pradesh might seem to lend empirical support to the 
argument that the political incarnation of caste and community in Uttar Pradesh is an 
inevitable by-product of electoral competition in highly fragmented societies. Our central 
finding is that a high level of electoral competition makes the low caste groups and 
minority communities especially Muslims strategically important. 
A deep analysis of the electoral politics in UP since 1990s indicates that the 
electoral incentives of socially heterogeneous constituencies have led parties to switch 
from the strategy of demobilizing and excluding other social categories to the strategy of 
building bridges between included and excluded categories. The heterogeneous nature of 
constituencies exerts a powerful moderating effect on conflicting issues in the following 
ways: first, no party is able to build a stable majority on its own, and must reach out to 
groups outside its core voters and groups that it formerly excluded. Second, since the 
dimensions of mobilization keep changing, no single group, no matter how defined, is 
permanently excluded from the political system. If we look at the party system in UP as a 
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whole, every group has found a voice in the political system: Muslims, upper castes, 
backward and Scheduled Castes are all being courted by all four parties, namely the 
Congress, the BJP, the BSP, and the SP. 
Why has the BSP begun to supplement its traditional vote base by wooing 
Muslims? The answer lies in the heterogeneous composition of Uttar Pradesh's electoral 
constituencies. The Scheduled Castes, who form the core of BSP support, are not strong 
enough in any constituency to ensure its victory. The central dilemma for the BSP, as for 
every other party in Uttar Pradesh, therefore, has been to find ways of supplementing its 
core vote sufficiently to permit it to v^n electoral victories. In this light, the BSP 
attempted to mobilise Muslims vote that could boost its chances of a required winning 
margin. Thus, the party has greater incentives to appeal to Muslim voters. However, the 
BSP faces fierce competition for the support of Muslims with the SP and Congress and 
was unlikely, in a single election, to obtain the strong support from Muslims that might 
have guaranteed a winning margin. 
It was also the same electoral compulsion of the heterogeneous constituencies that 
forced the BJP to moderate its aggressive tone with regard to Muslim issues. The toning 
down of BJP's anti-Muslim rhetoric is best interpreted as a signal to Muslim voters that 
in aligning with BJP, they would feel no threat. The BJP's core group of voters comes 
from among the upper castes. But in ethnically heterogeneous constituencies of Uttar 
Pradesh, even the en masse support of the upper castes is typically not sufficient to 
produce a victory. Even with the support of the majority of upper castes, a considerable 
additional margin of votes is needed in order to win. In order to obtain a winning margin 
in Uttar Pradesh, the BJP must increase its support base among members of Muslim 
community. So far, it has chosen the strategy to target the Muslims as potential alliance 
partner since 1996 in order to attain the wiiming margin. However, the BJP is locked in 
fierce competition for the support of Muslims with the SP, BSP and Congress, all of 
which are pursuing Muslim voters by explicitly promising them security and a share in 
power in proportion to their population. Given the existing terms of electoral debate, the 
BJP is unlikely to successfully wean Muslims to its side. 
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The core base of support for the Samajwadi Party comes from the backward 
castes, particularly from Yadavs. In order to obtain its winning margin in ethnically 
heterogeneous constituencies, the party has exercised the option of seeking Muslims 
support. The decision of the party seems to have been based on the calculation that the 
Scheduled Castes and the upper castes were firmly welded to the BSP and BJP 
respectively, and could not be weaned away by the SP in a single election. The 
immediate difficulty of obtaining support from the Scheduled Castes and the upper castes 
made it all the more imperative for the SP to make an aggressive bid for the support of 
the Muslims along with backward castes in order to obtain its winning margin. 
However, the present study is confined specifically to understand the electoral 
behaviour of the Dalits (Oppressed Castes) and Musluns. In this respect, we can have our 
doubt on the independent exercise of Muslim's "free will" during the course of all 
elections, parliamentary or assembly, till 1980s. Our findings about the relationship 
between political competition and Muslim response in Uttar Pradesh support the 
argument that the political environment of Uttar Pradesh did not provide fertile soil for 
the independent assertion of Muslims at least till 1980s. Like other segments, Muslims 
too supported the Congress vehemently till 1960s. The reasons to support the Congress 
were many. But the most important was that the Congress was successful in bargaining 
votes with the Muslims m exchange of its equivocal promise to provide security to them 
in the state. It seems obvious to us that the Muslim fear-psychosis about their physical 
protection after independence and political necessity pushed Muslims to vote for the 
Congress. Nonetheless, the high levels of party competition combined with strong 
backward caste movements that regard Muslims as acceptable and valuable coalition 
partners were visibly absent in Uttar Pradesh till mid 1960s. It was in this context, that 
Muslims were placed in an extremely bad position to decisively demand political 
preference, employment as well as educational preference in lieu of their votes. As a 
result of this weak presence of caste politics, there was no strong alternative to Congress 
for Muslims, Consequently, Congress was able to secure Muslim votes without putting 
much energy into wooing Muslims. Muslims had no alternative in the state except to 
support the Congress despite being aware of the fact that the ruling Congress politicians 
had little incentive to woo Muslim voters at the expense of the Hindu nationalist swing 
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vote (the Jana Sangh) and their core upper-caste constituencies. Thus, in the first two 
decades after Independence, the electoral behaviour of Muslims was largely guided by 
one particular issue that of physical protection or at least non-aggression from the state. 
But as the inter-party competition increased with a focus on backward caste 
mobilization, Muslim vote became a matter of pivotal salience in the state. Propelled by 
the need to survive politically against the Congress, non-Congress politicians found 
greater incentives to appeal to Muslim voters who could provide them with the margin of 
victory. The strategy of the non-Congress parties was to moderate their stance towards 
issues sensitive to Muslims and preserve the option of forming coalitions with them. 
Needless to say, it was with this aim, the opposition parties in U.P approached the 
Muslims that finally shifted the balance in their favour temporarily in 1967 and 1977 
elections. However, Muslims did not vote in these elections differently. They were very 
much the part of anti-Congress upsurge prevailing during these elections. Though the 
immediate reasons that forced Muslims to say good bye to Congress inl967 and 1977 
elections was the maltreatment of Urdu, doubts about the minority character of Aligarh 
Muslim University, increasing incidents of anti-Muslim violence in Uttar Pradesh and the 
reluctance of ruling Congress in preventing the riots because of the doubt whether doing 
so would help or hurt them politically. 
Only in the late 1980s, backward caste parties began to provide real competition 
in Uttar Pradesh that turned Muslims for the first time into a key swing vote. Disgusted 
by the dual politics of Congress on Ayodhya-Babri mosque controversy Muslims 
permanently deserted the Congress in 1989 to support the party emerging as alternative to 
Congress. Mulayam Singh, first as a leader of Janata Dal and later as supremo of 
Samajwadi Party, therefore made successful efforts to woo the Muslims firom Congress. 
The Muslim votes were sufficient to give Mulayam Singh a stable majority in the UP 
Assembly. The parties like Janata Dal and later Samajwadi Party had been able to win 
power in the state only by building coalitions that included Muslims. 
With the deepening cross-cutting ethnic cleavages since 1990, the political parties 
showed a greater willingness to reach out to Muslim voters. It is true to that where intra-
ethnic cleavages are strong, politicians from the ethnic majority will often prefer to seek 
the Muslim support rather than the support of segments of their own ethnic groups with 
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which they are in competition for scarce political power. As a result, the parties are 
competing for Muslim support because of the number of votes Muslims can deliver and 
the low cost to the majority parties of the demands of Muslim voters relative to the 
demands made by other groups within the majority community. 
More importantly, the Muslim voters in UP are now in a better position to profit 
from this increasing electoral competition. As the party politics that focuses on 
redistribution from forward to backward caste, the low caste parties will have greater 
incentives to appeal to Muslim voters who can provide them with the margin of victory. 
At the same time, the competitive party system has led to a reduction in Hindu-Muslim 
violence, as politicians are forced by electoral incentives to take firm actions to prevent 
Hindu-Muslim riots. 
So far as the voting behaviour since 1990 is concerned, Muslims are being guided 
by the anti-BJP voting. In this process, they also deserted the Congress and started voting 
for the parties that represents the low caste interests. The desertion of Congress was 
consequence of many reasons. First, it was largely because of the Congress' dubious 
stand on the Muslim issues. Second, tlie Muslim voters have realized that the Congress 
had treated them as vote bank. Once the election is over, their peculiar problems do not 
merit the Congress attention. Therefore, Muslims started looking for other options that 
culminated in their consolidation behind the low caste parties. 
The anti-BJP voting of Muslims was guided by the anti-Muslim mobilisation 
politics of the BJP. A landmark in this direction of completely alienating the Muslim 
voters from rallying behind the BJP was the demolition of Babri Masjid. The electoral 
motive behind this move was to polarize the voters on religious lines in order to curb the 
influence of the Mandal politics which would risk alienating countless Hindu voters from 
the BJP. However, the strategy of BJP using ethnic wedge issues only helped the party in 
consolidating the upper caste voters with certain floating votes among the low caste 
identities. 
It is significant to find that the Mandal versus Mandir phenomenon helped the 
anti-upper caste political parties not only to consolidate their own caste base but also 
Muslim electorates. There were three reasons why Muslims find it more comfortable to 
be with the low caste political parties. First, the alienation from the Congress left no 
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alternative before Muslims except to align with the low caste political parties. Second, in 
the emerging context of electoral competition between upper caste and lower caste, 
Muslims were treated as potential partner by the low caste political parties to dislodge the 
upper caste from the power structure of the state. Third, the politics of Mandir against the 
Mandal of BJP made the upper castes common enemies of both low caste parties and 
Muslims, As a consequence, Muslims and lower castes entered into a long term electoral 
coalition against the common enemy. 
With regard to the Oppressed Castes, we find that the Oppressed Castes in Uttar 
Pradesh have come a long way since the early days of their political passivity. They are 
in a better position to understand that how India's widely acclaimed democracy does 
function as undemocratic monopoly of upper castes. The answer lies in their historical 
follies which they have committed to be caught in the "tactical logic of social unity" 
efficiently managed by the Congress system to maintain upper caste's domination over 
the power structure of UP. Understanding this logical manipulation enabled them to 
better answer the question: why power always rotates around the upper castes despite the 
change of governance in the state? This is out of the fact that they remained "vote bank" 
throughout the course of electoral history either for one party or another party. They had 
never asserted their numerical strength which is really a vehicle to attain power under the 
management of universal adult fi-anchise. Instead, they poignantly conceded the 
systematic weakening of their organizational base and their potential claims in the power 
structure of UP through the means adopted by the upper caste parties, namely, co-option, 
accommodation, and factionalism. They have also realized that there is no party in India 
that has natural intention to emancipate and empower them. Against this larger political 
canvas, the Oppressed Castes have found the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party 
inspirational and liberating and recognized it as their own party. They have found a voice 
against the upper castes and an ability to counter the forces that confined them to the 
periphery of society. The party's first agenda is to convert this commimity into a strong 
electorate that wields its sheer size for political purposes. In this pursuit, the BSP has 
largely succeeded in the goal to unify and consolidate the Oppressed Castes. The party 
has proven to be inventive and innovative in its approach to social and political 
mobilization. The active grassroots mobilization by the BSP has yielded positive result. 
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The Oppressed Castes, who once lagged behind upper castes in terms of exercising their 
franchise, have now surpassed the upper castes in terms of turning out to cast their vote. 
This certainly gives an impression of "the strong political aspiration on the part of 
Oppressed Castes and their effort to assert in a democratic polity by utilizing the electoral 
process." It simply proves that the Oppressed Castes actively transformed themselves into 
a category of political relevance that can no longer be resisted by any clever design of the 
upper caste's political parties. In this context, the credit goes to BSP and its effective use 
of administrative power that inculcated the idea of social, political, and economical 
empowerment of Oppressed Castes which could be possible only if there is active and 
effective participation of the community in the political process of the country. 
Summing it up, our findings support the central argument that there were three 
levels of voting consciousness that conditioned Uttar Pradesh politics since 1990s, First, 
the caste-conscious voting duly entrenched by the assertive mobilisation of Scheduled 
Castes and the Other Backward Castes along with the counter mobilisations of the upper 
caste groups. Second, the Hindutva-conscious voting duly interested in using the ethnic 
wedge issues in order to polarise the electorates on the basis of religious identities. Third, 
the emerging Muslim-conscious voting that is reflected in their anti-BJP tactical voting 
pattern that often proves to be decisive in tilting the electoral balance. 
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